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Reply to Louise Antony

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Naomi Scheman
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Abstract

In her discussion of Naomi Scheman's “Individualism and the Objects of Psychology” Louise Antony misses the import of an unpublished paper of Scheman's that she cites. That paper argues against token identity theories on the grounds that only the sort of psycho-physical parallelisms that token identity theorists, such as Davidson and Fodor, reject could license the claim that each mental state or event is some particular physical state or event.

Type
Comment/Reply
Information
Hypatia , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , Summer 1996 , pp. 150 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by Hypatia, Inc.

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References

Antony, Louise. 1985. Is psychological individualism a piece of ideology? Hypatia 10 (3): 157–73.Google Scholar
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