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Reply to Critics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Lisa Tessman
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Abstract

Tessman responds to her three critics’ comments on Burdened Virtues, focusing on their concerns with her stipulation of an “inclusivity requirement,” according to which one cannot be said to flourish without contributing to the flourishing of an inclusive collectivity. Tessman identifies a naturalized approach to ethics—which she distinguishes from the naturalism she implicitly endorsed in Burdened Virtues—that illuminates how a conception of flourishing that meets the inclusivity requirement could carry moral authority.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 23 , Issue 3: Special Issue: In Honor of Iris Marion Young: Theorist and Practitioner of Justice , September 2008 , pp. 205 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Hypatia, Inc.

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