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Feminism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Audrey Yap
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Abstract

The logical empiricists often appear as a foil for feminist theories. Their emphasis on the individualistic nature of knowledge and on the value-neutrality of science seems directly opposed to most feminist concerns. However, several recent works have highlighted aspects of Carnap's views that make him seem like much less of a straightforwardly positivist thinker. Certain of these aspects lend themselves to feminist concerns much more than the stereotypical picture would imply.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Hypatia , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , Spring 2010 , pp. 437 - 454
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Audrey Yap

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