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Expecting Bad Luck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Abstract

This paper draws on Card's discussions of moral luck to consider the complicated moral life of people—described as pessimists—who accept the heavy knowledge of the predictability of the bad moral luck of oppression. The potential threat to ethics posed by this knowledge can be overcome by the pessimist whose resistance to oppression, even in the absence of hope, expresses a sense of still having a “claim” on flourishing despite its unattainability under oppression.

Type
Oppression and Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Lisa Tessman

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