Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T00:34:07.950Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Surviving Personal Identity Theory: Recovering Interpretability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Thane Plantikow
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 90 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Hypatia, Inc.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Campbell, Sue. 1997. Interpreting the personal: Expression and the formation of feelings. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian. 1991. On Boyd. Philosophical Studies 61: 149–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hacking, Ian. 1998. Mad travelers: Reflections on the reality of transient mental illnesses. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian. 2001. The social construction of what? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Laing, R. D. 1965. The divided self. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. 2002. Survival and identity. In Personal identity, ed. Martin, Raymond and Barresi, John. New York: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Meyers, Diana Tietjens. 2004. Narrative and moral life. In Setting the moral compass, ed. Calhoun, Cheshire. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. 2001. Damaged identities, narrative repair. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schechtman, Marya. 1996. The constitution of selves. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Walker, Margaret Urban. 1997. Picking up pieces: Lives, stories, and integrity. In Feminists rethink the self, ed. Meyers, Diana Tietjens. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.Google Scholar