This essay suggests that a clearer understanding of violence and nonviolence as means to be used in the pursuit for justice will be achieved if we move the discussion of nonviolence to the domain of spirituality rather than ethics. A distinction is made between militant nonviolence and historic forms of pacifism and nonresistance, and it is argued that militant nonviolence only makes sense as a spirituality, rather than as an ethical demand. Finally it is argued that such a spirituality is essential for the pursuit of justice and some practical implications are drawn.

These reflections on Sebastian Moore's soteriology fall under four headings. By way of introduction and in order to establish a context, I commemorate an anniversary (I). There follows an effort to state in summary fashion what I understand Moore to be saying and what I understand him to be doing in what he says (II). A third section contains a suggestion concerning the ecumenical significance of Moore's work (III). The paper concludes with a number of critical observations and proposals for further work (IV).

This article examines the anthropoloy of Ernest Becker through the medium of his notion of creatureliness which represents a dominant focus, especially in his later work. Two elements stand out in this consideration—self-esteem, which as a motivation disguises creaturehood and makes it bearable, and the fear of death, which is the final confirmation of creaturehood. After examining Becker's treatment of these elements, the article explores several dimensions of a religious view of creatureliness which have not been taken up in order to show that Becker is dealing with finitude rather than creatureliness. A fuller treatment of creatureliness would require an approach that does justice to these dimensions, and, if one wishes as Becker does to demonstrate a convergence between religion and the social sciences, it would require a more coherently developed method of correlation. The article concludes with an examination of the spirituality that emerges for Becker out of his perspective on the human.

The ongoing Chrislology of Wolfhart Pannenberg is a rich locus for discerning several major currents in the field of contemporary Christology, for not only does it reflect certain prevalent emphases but it has in fact initiated them. It is the purpose of this article to examine how that is in fact the case.

First it is shown how Christology played a major role in the early Pannenberg's overall theological synthesis, forming the key source of his original perception of the structure of reality and of reality's relationship to God. Next, Christology itself is focused upon. Three aspects of Pannenberg's Jesus— God and Man are highlighted as having been widely influential, viz., the method of proceeding “from below” with the history of Jesus providing the starting point; the emphasis on the resurrection; and the stress on Jesus' dedication to the Father (rather than to the Logos) as the basis for understanding his unity with God. The third section of the article traces Pannenberg's recent development in Christology, particularly as reflected in a series of (untranslated) essays in the last decade. Advances in his understanding of method and the growing role of anthropology and Trinitarian doctrine are noted. The article closes with a look to the future, including Pannenberg's own projection of the direction he will be taking in Christology.

An examination of major themes in Merton's writings on Zen; the ground out of which he met with Zen (theology as experienced in contemplation); his presentation of Zen enlightenment in terms of its effect on awareness; his movement from articulating Zen enlightenment as an experience of “being” to a presentation of it as a realization of “void”; and a positive analysis of his understanding of Zen from the writings of D. T. Suzuki and S. Hisamatsu.

The question of the sources for Christian Ethics has been a perennial problem. In the first part of this study a heuristic continuum is set up in order to examine briefly six ways of relating faith and morality at the level of sources for Christian ethics which some theologians have actually adopted (e.g., Karl Barth and James Gustafson). In the second part, the author's own constructive proposal is offered along with a critical analysis of the previous positions. It is argued that a critical-dialogical relation between faith and morality offers the best possibilities both for preserving the relative autonomy of each and for utilizing the resources of faith and morality in the discipline of Christian ethics.

The article is divided into two parts. The first deals with the subject of spiritual discernment in Christian tradition: its nature, importance in the spiritual life, and the aspects of the spiritual life on which it bears. The second part deals with Catherine of Siena's particular approach to the subject of discernment: an explanation of the three images she uses to illuminate the meaning and operation of discernment and an exploration of the theological sources of her teaching on this subject.

A survey of contemporary spirituality is obtained by addressing a basic set of questions to twelve recent books in this field. Five significant trends are noted and offered as an agenda for the future of Christian spirituality.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the consistency and coherence of some arguments about abortion. Theological, philosophical, and public policy discussions of abortion are linked by the necessity of understanding the legitimate claims of the fetus on the woman who bears it, as well as on the larger human community. The tools of moral philosophy widely are employed, whether directly or indirectly, to evaluate abortion as one solution to problematic pregnancies. In particular, theologians examining the problem of abortion from the standpoint of normative ethics find it necessary to take into account some of the seminal work in recent moral philosophy. However, the logic of the moral arguments adduced is not always given fully critical attention in either “pro-choice” or “pro-life” positions, whether they be essentially religious, philosophical, or political in character.

One logical implement used broadly is the analogical argument. Burdensome pregnancy can be compared to other situations in which the duty of one individual to protect the rights of another either is sustained or is modified. Differences in evaluations of the morality of abortion can be clarified and perhaps reduced by probing the ways in which the morally significant features of fetal dependency, and of maternal and societal obligation, are partly revealed yet partly hidden by the analogical mode of moral argument.

I must be honest from the start and confess the summary of my six years of teaching undergrads and five years of graduate students: being a “creative teacher” of spirituality in a system of education that is destructive both of spirituality and creativity is impossible. Education, like religion itself, cannot afford to succumb to privatization as if a “loneranger” teacher in spirituality could endure or carry on without a structure and a program that is based in sound theory and practice that itself sustains creativity and spirituality.

A recent graduate of our Institute in Creation-Centered Spirituality is now pursuing doctoral studies in theology, and his comment after his first semester at a renowned university was: “There is no spirituality in upper academia.” What he was experiencing was the absence of sensitivity to both right and left brains as sources for learning; the absence of sensitivity to making connections and therefore to the artist in self and society; the absence of synthesis or interdependence on the part of curriculum or faculty. What he was also undergoing was a deep experience of the malaise that education finds itself in today in the West—a crisis that, if attended to, also reveals an opportunity of staggering dimensions.

This essay is divided into two sections. Part I analyzes and compares in detail the arguments of Schubert Ogden and Hans Küng for the existence of God. Essentially, both Küng and Ogden argue that certain characteristic human activities (especially moral choices) presuppose a confidence (Ogden) or a basic trust (Küng) that our lives and reality of which our lives are a part are meaningful. They continue to argue that this confidence or this basic trust are only justifiable on the condition of belief in God. Hence, they conclude that a belief in God is presupposed by our moral choices. Part II critically evaluates the above argument by drawing on distinctions made by analytic philosophers (Baier, Nielsen, Ayer) in their discussions of what conditions are necessary and sufficient to make a life (or life) meaningful. The discussion with analytic philosophy is important because neither Küng nor Ogden take any notice of the arguments raised there.

Whether a book is a “good book” is a matter not only of taste but also of genre. The genre of every book sets up certain expectations which the reader must engage and assess in order to understand the text. The reader uses genre to differentiate among multiple ways in which texts “work.” Genre minimally enables the reader to avoid the uncritical expectation that the success or failure of a text depends on the presence or absence of a particular theme. Maximally, a generic analysis can suggest new ways of disclosing the religious significance of literary texts. Genre as hypothesis provides a heuristic method for interpreting a text by itself and in relation to others. Generic analysis overcomes the deficiencies of thematic analysis to show how Mary Gordon's Final Payments succeeds as an action novel and The Company of Women as an apologue.

There is an old adage, “I hear and I forget, I see and I remember, I do and I understand.” In teaching courses on global poverty and hunger from a Christian perspective, one of my major concerns is how to educate for something more than a purely intellectual grasp of the problem. I call what I am aiming at personal understanding. It is an understanding that includes empathy with the suffering of the poor, the ability to critically analyze the causes of their suffering, and a sense of responsibility to alleviate their suffering. Without this type of understanding, the transformation of values, systems, and structures necessary for social change cannot occur. While readings, lectures, guest speakers, and films are a necessary and integral part of my courses, I find that, pedagogically, something more is needed. For me, it is the student project.

There are several ways in which teachers might introduce feminist studies into the mainstream of world religions. Perhaps the best way to proceed would be for me to sketch my own teaching efforts (which have criss-crossed the world religions and Christianity), so that the reader will have one fairly full model against which to react. I apologize for the self-advertising this will entail.

I began with a dual focus. On the one hand, I was asked to teach a course on “Women and Religion” that would serve a developing Women's Studies program (first at Penn State, then at Wichita State). The program was composed of various “Women and …” courses: “Women and Business,” “Women and the Law,” “The Psychology of Women,” “The Sociology of Women,” etc. On the other hand, I was asked to represent feminist scholarship and feminist interests within my home-base departments of Religious Studies. This meant cross-listing the course on “Women and Religion” as a Religious Studies elective, but also providing for feminist issues in other, usually general courses, such as “Introduction to Religion,” “Christianity,” “Traditional Religion in the Modern World,” and the like.

The contemporary religious seeker often experiences the feeling of being about to be quartered by wild horses running in opposite directions. Such a person recognizes the situation that Yeats describes in “The Second Coming”:

Discussion about women and spirituality can range from romanticized claims of special privilege to insistence that equality means sameness. Some typical questions focus the issues. “What is a women's spirituality?” “How is it different from male spirituality?” “What is spirituality, anyway?” And, “what is a feminist spirituality?” “Is it androgynous?” “Is it a stage on the way to something else?”