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Socrates and Jesus on Non-Retaliation and Love of Enemies
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
Abstract
This essay is a comparison of the teachings of Socrates and Jesus on non-retaliation and love of enemies as they appear in Crito 47c-49d and Republic I, 331e-336a, and in Matthew 5:38-48 and Luke 6:27-36. It asks in each case precisely what the authors meant and how they grounded their conclusions.
Socrates held that one must never do harm to another even in return for harm received. His arguments were based on his general theory of virtue and on certain ambiguities in Greek ethical language. Ultimately the arguments are based on a form of self-interest; retaliation is a form of injustice and hence harmful to the one who practices it. He does not propose a doctrine of general non-violence, nor does he ever say that one must actually love one's enemy.
The gospel texts go beyond simple non-retaliation and make positive love of all enemies, inside and outside the community, an absolute command of Jesus. It is a positive attitude and is not based on hope of love in return. God will reward it, but the primary motive is imitation of the Heavenly Father, whose daughters and sons the disciples are. Enemy love does not give them this status; rather it flows from the fact of discipleship.
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References
1 My appreciation to my colleagues, Pheme Perkins, Robert Daly, S.J., Arthur Madigan, S.J., and Ted Ahem, also to the anonymous referees of Horizons, for suggestions in the preparation of this essay. Errors, infelicities, and omissions are all mine.
2 Guthrie, W. K. C., History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 3:113.Google Scholar See too Guthrie's footnote on the same page: “To appreciate the revolutionary character of the Socratic ethic, one must remember how deeply rooted in Greek morality was the doctrine that ‘the doer must suffer,’ which made the exaction of retribution or vengeance not only a right but often a religious duty.”
3 The Republic of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 1:11Google Scholar, in a comment on Rep. I, 335b. More recently—but without reference to Jesus' teaching— Terence Irwin argues that, while Socrates did hold for non-retaliation, “his defense is as weak as his overall defense of justice” (Plato's Moral Theory [Oxford: Clarendon, 1977], 59–60).Google Scholar And Gregory Vlastos speaks of Socrates' “great proposition that it is never right to harm the enemy” and admires the fact that “even this he is prepared to re-examine” (“The Paradox of Socrates” in Vlastos, Gregory, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays [Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971], 10–11).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 For a good recent analysis of all aspects of these ethical ideas and the relation between them, see Blundell, Mary, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 26–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 Irwin, 61. I shall argue below that Plato too was dissatisfied with Socrates' “proofs,” though in the Republic he accepted his conclusion that justice is virtue entire, i.e., if you have it you possess all the other virtues too.
6 Woozley, Anthony, “Socrates on Disobeying the Law” in Vlastos, , ed., Philosophy of Socrates, 311–12.Google Scholar
7 Dover, Kenneth J., Greek Popular Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 311–12.Google Scholar For example, in Isocrates 18, 63, adikein and kakōs poiein are presumed to be equivalent.
8 Annas, Julia, An introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 33–34.Google Scholar
9 As Blundell, (Helping Friends and Harming Enemies, 243)Google Scholar puts it: “Forgiveness per se is not a characteristically Greek virtue.” She cites Dover, (Greek Popular Morality, 192)Google Scholar: “Returning positive good for ill, an important stage beyond mere refraining from requiting ill, does not seem to be exemplified in the available literature.”
10 Most notable recent full commentaries on the Sermon on the Mount are those of Strecker, Georg, The Sermon on the Mount: An Exegetical Commentary (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1988)Google Scholar, a translation by O. C. Dean, Jr., of the 1985 German edition; Guelich, Robert A., The Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982);Google Scholar and Lambrecht, Jan, The Sermon on the Mount: Proclamation and Exhortation (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1985).Google Scholar On the love commandment the following are especially helpful: Piper, John, Love Your Enemies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979);Google ScholarSchottroff, Luise, Fuller, Reginald, Burchard, Christoph, and Suggs, M. Jack, Essays on the Love Commandment (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978);Google ScholarPerkins, Pheme, Love Commandments in the New Testament (New York: Paulist, 1982);Google Scholar and Horsley, Richard A., Jesus and the Spiral of Violence (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).Google Scholar
11 On the relationships of Luke to Matthew and of each to Q, the account here follows Strecker, , Sermon on the Mount, 81–82Google Scholar, where he enunciates what seems to be the opinio communis: “In all probability the redactor Matthew created the antithetical formulation (vv. 38-39a, 43-44). From him also came the division of the originally unitary material into two parts, the antithesis on retaliation and the one on love of enemy, for in the Q source the two are not distinguished.” And, ibid., 86: “A synoptic comparison between the Lukan and Matthean versions shows that Matthew reports the Q material more conservatively in terms of content, while the arrangement is, by and large, closer to the Q tradition in Luke.”
12 For the interpretation of the examples, the rhetoric of the passage, and the Old Testament background, see the commentaries of Strecker and Guelich. Both view the principle of arrangement of the examples asanticlimactic. Strecker says (83): “They forma downward sloping line from the greater evil to the lesser one: violent encounter, court trial, coercion, request. … Matthew wants to say: whenever anyone comes at you with evil intention, do not repay evil with evil, but show yourself to be Jesus’ disciple; demonstrate an attitude of humble love and compliance.” Guelich (252) connects the examples in 5:41-42 (the last three) as “different types of requests according to a diminishing order of personal obligation. In the first (5:41), one has the legal obligation to accompany the one demanding time and assistance for the distance of one mile. In the second (5:42a), one has the less binding, religious obligation of contributing alms to the begger, and in the third (5:42b), one has the least binding obligation of a personal loan. Yet, in each instance, the other individual's interest serves as the focal point.”
13 The Old Testament parallel (Lev 19:18) does not include hatred of the enemy, which seems to be a Matthean addition. For discussion, see Guelich, , The Sermon on the Mount, 252–54Google Scholar, and Strecker, , The Sermon on the Mount, 85–90 (with ample bibliography).Google Scholar
14 There is much discussion about the background of Matthew's use of teieios (Old Testament, Qumran, Wisdom) and about the meaning he attaches to it (wholeness, perfect observance of the Law as preached by Jesus). Guelich, who treats the matter in an excursus (The Sermon on the Mount, 234-36), believes that it describes an attitude that goes beyond legal considerations or disciple-rabbi relationship: “Rather, Jesus was summoning the young man to a relationship of total surrender and trust that would cut across the self-sufficiency of his righteousness and wealth.” So, too, enemy love—and non-retaliation, as argued above—are based on a new attitude of surrender and a new relationship with others.
15 Epēreazein, according to Aristotle (Rhet., II, 2, 3-4), is behavior that consists in someone thwarting my desires not for any benefit to himself but simply for the pleasure of depriving me of what I want. The insult lies in the fact that the action is indicative of an attitude: the other person thinks that he has nothing either to fear or to gain from me; he simply despises me. Matthew gets something of the same tone in 5:39b when he adds that the slap is on the right cheek, that is, with the back of the hand.
16 Luke omits the third item in Matthew's list, the example of the extra mile. Was it less applicable to an urban, non-Palestinian situation? Or was it that this type of institutionalized violence seemed less to the point for Luke's better-off readership? It is not possible to say with certainty.
17 Matthew has the rule in a wholly different context in 7:1-12. Hence the reciprocity problem does not arise for him.
18 Fitzmyer, Joseph, The Gospel According to Luke (Garden City, NY: Anchor Double-day, 1981), 1:639.Google Scholar
19 The account here follows that of Van Unnik, W. C., “Die Motivierung der Feindesliebe in Lk. 6:32-35,” Novum Testamentum (1966): 288–300.Google Scholar
20 The fact that the Greeks thought of benefiting friends and taking revenge on enemies as two equally balanced sides of the same moral imperative may be at least a partial explanation of why Luke did not feel the need—if it ever occurred to him—to treat non-retaliation separately from enemy love.