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Toward a Moral Theology of Social Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2014

Norbert J. Rigali
Norbert J. Rigali*
Affiliation:
University of San Diego
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Abstract

A certain “rugged individualism,” characterizing classical Catholic moral theology, can be traced to theology's defining love according to the model of appetite. This model of love, in turn, is part and parcel of the prepersonalistic, static “faculty psychology” that logically and inevitably flows from the Aristotelian, substance-accidents worldview. To overcome classical individualism in principle and to become solidly established as a socially conscious science, moral theology must operate from a new understanding of love—love understood according to the model of freedom.

Type
Articles
Information
Horizons , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , Fall 1977 , pp. 169 - 181
Copyright
Copyright © The College Theology Society 1977

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References

1 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 9.

2 Merkelbach, B. H., Summa Theologiae Moralis (10th ed. Bruges, , 1956), I, p. 675Google Scholar.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 672. Whereas Merkelbach raises explicitly the question of whether it is possible to love God as good in himself rather than simply as one's own good, the problem is generally dealt with in an implicit way, and the affirmative answer assumed, in the manuals.

Because of their teleological approach to morality the manualists ordinarily begin their works with a discussion of man's last end. This end, understood as the object of the supernaturally elevated intellective appetite, is conceived as the beatitude that “consists in the intuitive vision of God and in the supreme love and joy resulting from it” (Noldin, H.-Schmitt, A., Summa Theologiae Moralis, [30th ed., Innsbruck], Vol. I [1952], p. 17Google Scholar). When a thematic discussion of charity is eventually introduced later in his work, the manualist defines charity immediately as the virtue by which “we are inclined to love God above all things for his own sake,” adding the distinction (or its equivalent) between this “perfect charity” and “caritas imperfecta (minus perfecta),” by which God is loved “because good redounds to us from God” (ibid., Vol. II [1954], pp. 50-51). See also, e.g., Davis, Henry, Moral and Pastoral Theology (New York, 1938), I, pp. 7–10, 304, 307–308Google Scholar; Tanquerey, Ad., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis, (10th ed., New York, 1936), II, pp. 37–47, 520–521Google Scholar; Hürth, F.-Abellán, P. M., De Principiis; De Virtutibus et Praeceptis (Rome, 1948), I, pp. 17–27, 264–265Google Scholar.

Thus the manualists are united in the process of thought, demonstrated in Merkelbach, that moves from the love of God as one's own good to the love of God on account of himself.

5 Merkelbach, , Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, p. 674Google Scholar.

6 Ibid., pp. 674-675.

7 Ibid., p. 695.

8 Ibid., p. 697. Cf. Busenbaum, Hermann, Theologia Moralis, augmented by La Croix, Claude (Cologne, 1710), I, Bk. 2, p. 138Google Scholar. La Croix presents verbatim the doctrine of the Medulla Theologiae Moralis that “each one is bound to love after God: (1) himself according to spiritual goods; (2) the neighbor with regard to the same goods; (3) himself with regard to bodily goods; (4) the neighbor with regard to the same; (5) finally, himself and then the neighbor with regard to external goods.” In Ligouri, Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, critical ed. of Gaude, Leonard (Rome, 1905, I, p. 318Google Scholar, Busenbaum's ordo caritatis is repeated with even literal fidelity. See also, e.g., Aertnys, J.-Damen, C., Theologia Moralis (15th ed., Turin, 1947), I, p. 294Google Scholar; Tanquerey, Ad., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis, II, pp. 547–549Google Scholar; Hürth-Abellán, , De Principiis; De Virtutibus et Praeceptis, I, pp. 283–284Google Scholar. It should be noted that a number of manualists mitigate, without undermining completely, the egocentrism of the ordo in various ways. Thus Davis Moral and Pastoral Theology, I, p. 319)Google Scholar writes the following strange lines: “But one who truly loves his neighbor will not stay to debate as to what he is bound to do [in the face of a neighbor's need]; he will help his neighbor first, and may discuss his obligations afterwards.” (Whereas Davis creates a dichotomy between obligations and what “one who truly loves his neighbor” will do, Christian obligation is precisely to do what “one who truly loves his neighbor” would do.) Thus also Vermeersch, A. (Theologiae Moralis Principia, Responsa, Consilia [Bruges, 1928], II, p. 72)Google Scholar teaches that we may but are not bound to (possumus sed non debemus) prefer our own bodily good to that of the neighbor.

9 Merkelbach, , Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, p. 697Google Scholar.

10 Ibid., p. 695.

11 The biblical command, Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, is used by St. Thomas as a proof-text for his contention that a person ought to love himself in his spiritual nature, as distinguished from his corporal nature, more than anyone else after God (II-II, q. 26, a. 4, Sed contra & in corp.). The command manifests, according to Aquinas, that the love of a person for himself is the exemplar of the love to be had for another person. However, since an exemplar is superior to what is modeled after it, out of charity, the argument concludes, a person ought to love himself more than the neighbor. Contemporary scholarship, of course, cannot allow itself to read an Aristotelian distinction between man's spiritual and material nature into the Leviticus commandment and Jesus' interpretation of it.

12 Merkelbach, , Summa Theologiae Moralis, I, p. 34Google Scholar. Cf. Summa, II-II, q. 2, a. 8: “… impossible est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. …In solo igitur Deo beatitude hominis consistit.” This doctrine is argued by Aquinas as follows. Beatitude is the perfect good, which totally satisfies the human appetite; otherwise it would not be the ultimate end. The object of this appetite, the will, is the universal good. Universal good, however, is found, not in any creature, but only in God.

St. Thomas goes on to spell out implications of this asocial, individualistic doctrine of the final end of man. “[T]he companionship of friends is not required of necessity for beatitude since a man has the total plenitude of his perfection in God. However, the companionship of friends does make for the well-being [or accidental perfection, bene esse] of beatitude” (ibid., q. 4, a. 8). The glory which is essential to beatitude has to do with God, not other men (ibid., ad 1). If it seems that, since charity embraces both God and the neighbor, the perfection of charity in beatitude should embrace both and thus requires the companionship of friends, it is to be noted that “the perfection of charity with regard to love for God is essential to beatitude, not however with regard to love for neighbor. Even if there were only one soul enjoying God, it would be beata, not having a neighbor to love” (ibid., ad. 3).

13 de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard, The Phenomenon of Man, tr. Wall, Bernard (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1961), p. 294Google Scholar.

14 Cf. Curran, Charles E., Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue (Notre Dame, 1972), p. 111Google Scholar.

15 The names of Gilleman, D'Arcy, Geiger, Pié, Héris, Spicq, Carpentier, Johann and, of course, Nygren—to mention only some—will be readily recalled.

16 John Giles Milhaven maintains that love is love “of good experiential consequences,” i.e., a person's wanting “to do nothing but find the means to bring about, in himself and others, a rich, happy, mature life of human experience” (Toward a New Catholic Morality [Garden City, N.Y., 1970], pp. 15, 24Google Scholar). This notion of love, self-evidently aligned with the traditional, egocentric understanding of love as an act of appetite, emerges, not in a systematic theological analysis of charity, but in essays with other purposes—in this case, in an essay seeking to establish that there are no absolute moral laws of behavior. Accordingly, Milhaven treats his definition of love as self-evident, asserting but never justifying it. Since, for its author, it expresses the secular experience of love; and since “secular experience is irreducible” and “cannot be altered by religious faith or theological understanding” (ibid., p. 35), Milhaven, not unlike the classical moralist, can spare himself the task of analyzing his definition in the light of the Gospel or indeed of any religious experience. No dialogue with biblical scholarship or “theological understanding” is even relevant, much less necessary.

Nevertheless, while Milhaven presents a definition, if no theology, of love, it is difficult to find even this much in other contemporary Catholic moralists. One must infer, for example, from passing remarks of Charles Curran what the general lines of his definition of charity would be, were he to present one (cf. Curran, C. E., A New Look at Christian Morality [Notre Dame, 1968], pp. 31–32, 51Google Scholar). See Rigali, Norbert J., “The New Legalism,” Homiletic & Pastoral Review 75 (1975), pp. 68–73Google Scholar; idem., “Love and Christian Morality,” ibid., 76 (1976), pp. 60-64.

17 Cf. McCormick, Richard A., “The Social Responsibility of the Christian,” Australasian Catholic Record 52 (1975), pp. 253–263Google Scholar.

18 Cf. Curran, C. E., A New Look at Christian Morality, pp. 1–23, esp. 9–21; 25–71, esp. 53–71Google Scholar. Note that in each of these two essays, introducing the notion, “the reign of God,” leads the author to at least some discussion of social morality.

19 Cf. Müller, Max and Haider, Alois, “Person I. Concept,” Sacramentum Mundi, ed. Rahner, Karl (New York & London, 1969), IV, p. 404Google Scholar.

20 S. Th., I, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2.

21 S. Th., II-II, q. 26, a. 3.

22 S. Th., II-II, q. 24, a. 1 and a. 2.

23 Rahner, K., Theological Investigations I (Baltimore & London, 1961), pp. 362–369Google Scholar.

24 Ibid., VI (New York & London, 1974), p. 241.

25 Ibid., p. 243.

26 Ibid., p. 241.

27 Ibid., p. 246.

28 Ibid., V (London & Baltimore, 1966), p. 443.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p. 441.

31 Lonergan, Bernard J. F., Method in Theology (New York, 1972), p. 104Google Scholar.

32 Ibid., p. 105.

33 Ibid.