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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
In this article I address two intersecting and recurring debates that occur in discussions of religious education. The first issue has to do with the role of conversion in religious development. The second issue regards various educational philosophies and the priority they set on “content” or “process” in learning. After reviewing these debates I delineate the way in which I believe they intersect. By pointing out that development involves both “heritage” and “achievement” I clarify the relationship between conversion and development. Conversion involves both a transformation of the tradition one has inherited and the choosing of a direction for one's religious journey. Authentic religious education involves a healthy balance of tradition (content) and open-ended questioning (process). At the same time it must allow for the occurrence of conversion, a radical shift from inauthenticity, that may be startling and challenging to the educator, the educational system, and the tradition itself.
1 E.g., see O'Hare, Padraic, ed., Tradition and Transformation in Religious Education (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1979).Google Scholar
2 Haughton, Rosemary, “Formation and Transformation” in Conn, Walter E., ed., Conversion: Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation (New York: Alba House, 1978), 23–26.Google Scholar This is an excerpt reprinted from The Transformation of Man (Springfield, IL: Templegate, 1967)Google Scholar, Introduction and ch. 1.
3 Haughton, , “Formation and Transformation,” 23.Google Scholar
4 Ibid., 25-26.
5 Moran, Gabriel, Religious Education Development (Minneapolis, MN: Winston, 1983), 21–23.Google Scholar
6 See Bushnell, Horace, Christian Nurture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).Google Scholar
7 See Coe, George Albert, “Religious Education as a Part of General Education” in Who Are We?, ed. Westerhoff, John III (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1978), 15–16.Google Scholar See Boys, Mary, “Access to Traditions and Transformation” in Tradition and Transformation in Religious Education, 11–13.Google Scholar
8 Moran, 94-95. See also Hauerwas, Stanley, A Community of Character (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)Google Scholar and Dykstra, Craig, Vision and Character (New York: Paulist, 1981).Google Scholar
9 Moran, 22. Moran does not himself think that the two are incompatible. See his own theory, 129ff.
10 Kohlberg, Lawrence and Mayer, Rochelle, “Development as the Aim of Education” in Kohlberg, Lawrence, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 49–96.Google Scholar
11 Kohlberg and Mayer move on from their description of these two approaches to outline their own position, which they call Progressivism. This is an approach based on cognitive developmental theory and envisages an interaction between the questioning individual and the environment. See ibid., 53ff.
12 Crowe, Frederick E., Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1985), x.Google Scholar
13 Lonergan, Bernard, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Crowe, Frederick E. (New York: Paulist, 1985), 180–81.Google Scholar See also Crowe, , Old Things and New, 1–2.Google Scholar
14 In its very broadest form Kohlberg and Mayer's position on Progressivism would be complementary to the position Crowe takes here. The difference lies, I believe, in that Crowe grounds his position more thoroughly and more precisely in the operations of the human subject. See also Mary Boys' article, “Access to Traditions and Transformation,” in which she takes a view of religious education that reflects a position similar to that of Crowe. She emphasizes that tradition itself cannot be correctly understood unless it is made relevant in a creative way to the contemporary context of the learner.
15 Ibid., 23.
16 The articles in Tradition and Transformation in ReJigious Education edited by O'Hare tend to reflect this ambiguity. The topic of this collection of essays seems to be the relationship between heritage and achievement in religious education, as in Crowe's work. At times, however, the authors contrast the handing on of tradition with “changing the world,” which has the connotation of weeding out distortions and reversing evil trends. In spite of this ambiguity the central agreement of the authors that there is no ultimate contradiction between tradition and creative discovery in religious education comes out loud and clear.
17 See Moran, 129.
18 Although “development” is often used to refer to the narrower movement of the way of achievement, I will be using it here to incorporate both ways of learning. Within development I will use the terms tradition, heritage, and belief to describe “the way down” and achievement, discovery, creativity, and innovation to describe “the way up.” On Lonergan's use of the word “development” note that although he applies it to the way of achievement in the passage quoted above there are other places in which he uses it in the broader sense that includes both ways of learning. See Lonergan, , Third Collection, 106.Google Scholar
19 For a survey of recent perspectives on conversion, including psychological, theological, and social aspects of conversion, see Conn, Conversion: Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation.
20 On different popular uses of “conversion,” see Boys, Mary C., “Conversion as a Foundation of Religious Education,” Religious Education 77 (1982): 212–17.Google Scholar See also Conn, Walter E., Christian Conversion (New York: Paulist, 1986), 7.Google Scholar
21 Lonergan distinguishes intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. Others following in his path have added an affective dimension, although the exact explanation of this type of conversion differs from person to person. For a delineation of these different types of conversion, see Lonergan, Bernard, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 237–44;Google Scholar Conn, Christian Conversion; Tyrell, Bernard, “Passages and Conversion” in Lamb, Matthew L., ed., Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1981), 11–33;Google Scholar and Doran, Robert, “Psychic Conversion,” Thomist 41 (1977): 200–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Some writers make a distinction between conversion as it affects the structure of one's faith and conversion in relation to the contents of one's faith. James Fowler considers conversion to deal solely with the contents of faith, and then works out an intricate set of ways in which conversion as a change in faith content is related to structural stage changes. Walter Conn distinguishes between a horizontal conversion that affects the contents of what one believes and a vertical conversion that involves a total restructuring of one's faith, leading into a totally new horizon even if the essential content of faith remains the same. See Fowler, James, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 281–86Google Scholar, and Conn, , Christian Conversion, 27.Google Scholar
23 Note that my discussion of conversion here eliminates a definition of conversion as merely a change from one tradition to another. While in common parlance we speak of certain persons as “converts” to this or that religious tradition, the central issue as I see it is not what tradition one accepts but the authenticity or inauthenticity of both the tradition accepted and the manner in which one accepts it. To define conversion in terms of one's acceptance or rejection of a particular tradition assumes that this particular tradition is singular in its hold on authentic religion. This type of “monopoly of authenticity” attitude is quite dangerous and can, in the long run, discourage rather than facilitate an authentic quest for self-transcendence.
24 Take as an example a couple who finds that they are infertile. This may raise many questions for them about the degree to which childbearing is held up as a norm and ideal in their religious community. They may be challenged to revise their hopes, dreams and values. They may reject many of the traditional expectations they inherited. At the same time they may discover new meanings in traditional texts, such as Old Testament prophecies about barrenness, or find new comradery in religious figures, such as Hannah and Elizabeth. Images of creation waiting to give birth may become central to their spiritual lives. Thus their struggles and discoveries will both challenge and be enriched by their tradition as received.
25 For a sampling of both early work and recent discussion of this topic see William James, “The Divided Self and Conversion”; Robert H. Thouless, “The Psychology of Conversion”; and Oates, Wayne E., “Conversion: Sacred and Secular” all in Conn, , Conversion, 121–68.Google Scholar
26 See Thouless, 144-47. See also Hiltner, Seward, “Toward a Theology of Conversion in the Light of Psychology” in Conn, , Conversion, 184–87.Google Scholar
27 This is true of Kohlberg's stages of moral development, Fowler's stages of faith development, and Moran's stages of religious development. In relation to conversion, there seems to be a conversion to conventional wisdom as well as a subsequent conversion away from conventional (traditional) views; see Thouless, 144-45 and Moran 150-51.
28 See Conn, Christian Conversion. For an introduction to his developmental view of conversion, see 26-32.
29 While there are some Christian traditions in which conversion plays a minor role, there are others in which conversion is such a dominant expectation that one is considered deviant unless one has a conversion experience. Conversion thus is “programmed” and becomes a kind of initiation rite into the community or into adulthood. On programmed conversion, see Oates, 163-64.