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The Semolika Expedition of 1904: A Participant Account
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 May 2014
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British imperialism in west Africa during the late nineteenth century is known to be the product of the interrelations between expansionist forces at the center of empire and those at the periphery on the one hand, and the relationship between the peripheral forces and African circumstances on the other hand. Expansionist forces at Whitehall included nationalistic sentiments and inter-European rivalry, economic considerations, and public reactions to these motivations. Of the expansionist forces at the outposts of empire, pressure from commercial interest groups and the activities of the men on the spot are notable.
Indeed, the work of the military personnel on the outposts of empire was instrumental to British territorial annexations. As officers and non-commissioned officers to the colonial army of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), the British personnel hailed from all rungs of society, and seconded from metropolitan regiments into active service in West Africa. Their motivations largely included economic interests, sport and adventure, while the African auxiliaries enlisted out of economic considerations. Naturally, the men on the spot were indispensable to British expansion, as they particularly constituted a reliable source of information for policymakers at home. They also subscribed with their superiors to the use of force to maintain political supremacy on the frontiers of empire. The men on the spot controlled the timing, pace, and extent of British military imperialism. However, they had to reckon with indigenous response, as their prerogatives met challenges in African interests and concerns, such as territorial inviolability and non-interference in their internal affairs. This interplay of military imperialism and African response is aptly demonstrated in the British encounter with the Semolika in Northern Nigeria.
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References
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17 National Archives, Kaduna (NAK) SNP 15 Acc.19 Borno Province Report no. 2 of 30 November 1902.
18 PRO, MSS Brit.Emp.s.99 (L), 3. Northern Nigeria Estimate 1901-2; CO 446/14, 260. High Commissioner, F.D. Lugard to Joseph Chamberlain (received, 18 February 1901), enclosure no.1 in despatch no.19, Northern Nigeria.
19 CO 446/14,260. Lugard to Chamberlain, 18 February 1901, Northern Nigeria.
20 Zackari was a political agent deployed on preventive service. (CO 446/57, 532. Lugard to Secretary of State (despatch no.ll), Zungeru, 14 February 1906); see also NAK/O/ARLI/vol.m/208 Alder Burdon, Resident Bida, to High Commissioner, Bida, 5 April 1902: “I can get no definite information as to the purchase of powder but I am told that the supply of powder through French territory [Damagaram] is stopped and that therefore the whole demand for powder through Hausa [territory] has now to be supplied from Lagos [by British traders].”
21 SNP 15 Acc.65 Resident of Kabba Province, H.D. Larrymore to the High Commissioner (Confidential No.253/1905), Lokoja, 29 October 1904, Semolika Expedition; H.D. Larrymore to the Political Assistant (Confidential No.303/1904), Lokoja, 15 December 1904 (enclosed); Political Assistant, Northern Nigeria, to the Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Government House, Zungeru, 20 February 1905, (enclosed) Semolika Expedition.
22 This engagement was less disastrous, relative to a government encounter with Satiru rebels in February 1906, in which the Company C of the Mounted Infantry, consisting of 70 men and five officers of the WAFF, was defeated. The casualties included Acting Resident Sokoto, H.R.P. Hillary; Asst. Resident, A.G.M. Scott; Lieut. Blackwood; 24 native soldiers, and 1 horse boy. (CO 446/53,132-137. From the Medical Officer Sokoto, Dr. M.F. Ellis, to the Resident Sokoto Province, 16 February 1906, enclosed in Confidential despatch of 7 March 1906).
23 Semolika is situated in the neighbourhood of Lokoja, the provincial capital, but is more safely accessible from Kabba in the northwest, the divisional headquarters. The Semolika polity—like others of Bauchi plateau, as well as the Tiv, Abuja, Ningi, Zuru, and Borno—effectively resisted the jihad movement launched by Usman dan Fodio in 1804; see Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy.
24 Otherwise, in 1903 a group of native soldiers in the WAFF abducted some women in Sokoto. The women, having been identified and claimed by their spouses, were handed over to political agents for an enquiry into the matter. While escorting the women and their spouses to court to determine the tatter's claims, the agents were attacked in broad daylight on three different occasions by parties of soldiers. The women were recaptured and their spouses assaulted. On the third occasion, one of the soldiers was identified by a Political Officer, Captain Lewis, who was close to the scene. Presumably, the unruly soldiers were punished. NAK/SokProf 2/1 27/1903 Resident Sokoto, 4 May 1903, Report 2/1903 of 30 April 1903 on Sokoto Province. For other excess and abuses of WAFF troops elsewhere in the Protectorate see Fika, British Overrule, 134-37.
25 This reflected colonial policy of language training for Political and Military Officers, in a bid to promote direct communication between them and the people. As Lugard observed, “the gain to the Administration of having Officers who can speak the language [Hausa] is simply incalculable for they are otherwise wholly in the hands of their interpreters, who are, as a class, scoundrels.” Quoted in John Edward Phillips, “The Origins of Northern Nigeria Language Policy: Lugard and Hausa (1900-1906),” Paper submitted to the International Conference on the Sokoto Caliphate and the European Powers 1890-1906, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, February 1993, 1; See also Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1900-1911, 104; Temple, Native Races, 246.
Thus knowledge of Hausa, which was the lingua franca of Northern Nigeria, and any other language (Yoruba, Nupe, Kanuri, Bassa, or Okpoto) that was widely spoken in the territory of a Political of Milititary Officer, became requirements for promotion. Accordingly, language examinations were conducted for interested candidates, the Hausa Language Examination being predominant. (SNP 7 42/1902 G.M. Moloney, Resident Lower Benue, to the Secretary to the Government, Loko, 27 January 1902, Haussa Language Examinations (188/1902), enclosed in Language Gratuities; SNP 1/1 4 (238/1904) High Commissioner, Northern Nigeria, to Secretary of State, Zungeru, 26 January 1904; see also Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., “Examinees, Examiners and Examinations: The Hausa Language Requirements of the Northern Nigerian Government, 1902-1962” in Furniss, Graham and Jaggar, Philip J., eds., Studies in Hausa Language and Linguistics (London, 1988)Google Scholar.
In 1904 Lugard considered the language policy as successful, supposedly because Officers who passed the examinations made use of their language skills to control government troops and agents. As the High Commissioner observed, “[a] matter of almost vital importance is the knowledge of the local language, and in this considerable progress has been made, alike on the civil and military side… In the past an enormous amount of harm has been done by the interpreter class - quite a considerable number of whom are now serving their times as convicts for extortion, &c. It was owing to Dr. Cargill's knowledge of Hausa that he was able to detect a widespread scheme of extortion and slave dealing in the Muri province, carried on in the name of Government by the Interpreter [Issa Kada]. Later he discovered that it had been due to malpractices and misrepresentation on the part of Captain Moloney's interpreter [Abdu Tintin] which had led to that officer's sad death, and lately Mr. Webster, who had acquired a fair knowledge of Hausa, was able thereby to avert a needless war and convict the real culprit. (Annual Reports, 215-16). In fact, Officers who knew the indigenous languages were few in numbers. Thus their achievements were of little avail to the control of the relatively predominant government troops and agents.
26 Typically the colonial officials considered their prestige and security endangered and had to be redeemed, as “from the High Commissioner down to the lowest subordinate, every white man [was] in a position of authority.” (Lugard, Lady, “Nigeria”, 372Google Scholar). Colonial sentiments in these circumstances have been vividly captured in Terence Ranger's interpretation that “while indigenous policies of acquiescence served, on the whole, to support white assumptions of African readiness to accept white moral leadership, the rebellions challenged all easy generalizations about African gratitude and readiness to accept colonial rule, and all assurances that whites understood the Africans. Rebellions instead provoked anguished professions of incomprehension and disillusion. Also, they convinced the invaders of the need to develop alliances with collaborative African communities. (“African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa” in Colonialism in Africa, I, 308Google Scholar).
27 A curious prototype of present conditions in the demilitarised zone (DMZ) between South and North Korea.
28 Their reticence may also have stemmed from the belief that the Europeans would not stay around for a long while.
29 Typical of a relentless and uncompromising stance until defeat, this display of outright resistance was a variant of African response to European invasion. Of the other options, some polities resisted colonial invasion from the outset but sooner rather than later acquiesced to the foreigners' demands; others tolerated the provocations of the invaders only to rebel later; and there were those who accommodated the invaders from the very beginning. (Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J., “The Partition of Africa” in The New Cambridge Modem History, 11:617–18Google Scholar).
30 When they really decided on substantial cooperation with the colonial officials, it was certainly informed by their experience of constant harassment by the Semolika. This illustrates Ajayi's widely supported interpretation that African collaboration and resistance to European expansion partly depended on the interrelations between African polities in the period prior to colonial invasion: Ajayi, J.F.A., “Colonialism: An Episode in African History” in Colonialism in Africa, 1:506Google Scholar; Hargreaves, , “West African States,” 202–08Google Scholar; Allen, and Isaacman, Barbara, “Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Africa, c.1850-1920”, IJAHS 10(1977), 37Google Scholar; J.M. Lonsdale, “The Conquest State of Kenya” in Imperialism and War.
31 Although the Semolika possessed some modern weaponry, Dane guns, they were apparently unskilled in their use. This is reminiscent of Kano forces in 1903 and illustrative of African incapacity and the resulting dilemma in military confrontation with colonial forces. When Kano was captured, “in the arsenal was found every conceivable kind of ammunition and a great quantity of powder. About 20,000 rounds of ammunition were destroyed and 350 firearms.” Muffett, D.J.M., “Nigeria— Sokoto Caliphate” in Crowder, Michael, ed., West African Resistance (New York, 1971), 288Google Scholar; see also Smaldone, Joseph P., Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate (Cambridge, 1977), 121–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Political Agents Adama and Joseph are known to have participated in the campaign. Apart from information-gathering, their role involved interpreting and relaying messages, in the event of colonial officers having to parley with the enemy forces. In 1910 both were awarded the West African Frontier Medal for their effective service in the Semolika campaign. (SNP 6/3 95/1907 Instructions for the control of Expeditions, Patrols and Escorts. (Based upon Residents Proclamation 1900; G.S.O. 1, sections 18, 88, 89; Political Memo 7; W.A.F.F. Regulations 103 to 109), enclosed in Military Operations; SNP 7/9 5676/1908 (L.P.436/1908) Resident H.D. Larrymore, Lokoja Provinces, 17 January 1910, enclosed in Medal for the Semolika Expedition; SNP 15/1 Acc.65 From the Political Assistant, Northern Nigeria, to the Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment, WAFF, Zungeru, 20 February 1905, Semolika Expedition, 1904 (conf.192).
33 By this policy, widely adopted in Northern Nigeria and elsewhere in the British colonies, African rulers who fought colonial occupation became instruments of resistance, to be taken away into exile, thereby suppressing potential rebellions by their polities. Lokoja was a favorite place of exile for political prisoners in the Protectorate. By 1904 Lokoja was hosting such prominent visitors as ex-emir Abu Bakr of Nupe, Muhammadu Lawal (Kwassau) of Zaria, Umaru of Bauchi, and Aliyu Babba of Kano. Others included the principal war chief of Sokoto, captured at Bormi in 1903, as well as Mallam Maikara (a young mallam of Bormi who led the midnight attacks on colonial troops), and Mallam Jibrella (Jibril Gaini) also of Bormi. The ex-emirs were maintained by their successors, who paid £5 per mensem for their support. They were allowed full liberty within the precints of Lokoja under the direct supervision of the Resident. (PRO CO 446/32,1904; CO 446/65, 93-94. Intelligence Report, 1907).
34 Obviously, collaboration held out benefits for the Igarra. A similar situation obtained between the colonial officials and the polities of Gombe and Bormi, east of the Protectorate. On the arrival of British colonial forces at Bormi in March 1902, Mallam Jibrilla engaged them in battle in defence of his kingdom, which he had captured and preserved for over a decade from neighboring Gombe. However, Jibrilla's senior officials, including Musa Dedare and Alkali Deda, favored cooperation with the colonial forces. Military resistance, they feared, might lead to the conquest and subjection of Bormi under the authority of their traditional enemy Gombe, which was cooperating with the colonial forces. Musa and his party prevailed over Jibrilla, and Musa secured the chieftaincy as a reward from the colonial administration. Three months later, Musa was deposed for resisting provincial reorganization involving the incoporation of Bormi into the jurisdiction of Gombe: Low, Victor N., Three Nigerian Emirates (Evanston, 1972), 161–64Google Scholar; Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. and Newman, Paul, West African Travels and Adventures. Two Autobiographical Narratives From Northern Nigeria (Hew Haven, 1971), 145Google Scholar; Garba, Abubakar Sa'id, “Mahdiyya, Its doctrine, Spread in West Africa and Encounter with Imperialists” in Mustapha, Abubakar, ed., Dirasat Islamiyyah (Kano, 1983)Google Scholar; SNP 15/1 Acc.58 Captain W.B. Dunn, Officer Commanding Gujiba, to J. Cochrane, Military Resident Borno, Maiduguri, Received, 12 June 1906, enclosed in Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1903; see also Cochrane to Lugard, Maiduguri, June 30 1902. For other advantages and benefits of African collaboration with colonial occupation, see Ranger, , “African Reactions,” 308Google Scholar; Allen, and Isaacman, Barbara, “Resistance and Collaboration,” 58Google Scholar; Ajayi, , “Colonialism,” 507Google Scholar; Hargreaves, , “West African States,” 202–08Google Scholar; Twaddle, Michael, “The Bakungu Chiefs of Buganda Under British Colonial Rule, 1900-1930,” JAH 10(1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
35 Political Officers usually accompanied government military expeditions in accordance with standing orders. They would explain to the enemy forces the reasons for government action, and parley with them for a peaceful solution to their problems. Political Officers performed their duty with the aid of political agents. (SNP 6/3 95/1907 Instructions for the control of Expeditions, Patrols and Escorts. Based upon Residents Proclamation 1900; G.S.O. 1, sections 18, 88, 89; Political Memo 7; W.A.F.F. Regulations 103 to 109, enclosed in Military Operations; see also Muffett, Brave Captains, 166-72; SirBurns, Alan, History of Nigeria, London (1978), 196–97Google Scholar; Dusgate, , Conquest of Northern Nigeria, 138Google Scholar.
36 SNP 15 Acc.65 Resident of Kabba Province, H.D. Larrymore to the Political Assistant (Confidential No.303/1904), Lokoja, 15 December 1904, enclosed in Semolika Expedition.
37 As with Buba and the Bachama. Buba was a former messenger of Rabih Fadl Allah, who settled in Bachama territory of Adamawa, a trading district on the Benue, where the Royal Niger Company maintained its presence. In 1901 Buba reported to Resident Hewby on the restless and hostile condition of the inhabitants, who were known to be disrupting trade in the region. (NAK/YolaProf Al Resident Hewby, Report no.1 of 31 December 1901, Upper Benue Province).
By December 1902 Buba had succeeded in pacifying the country. He persuaded the Bachama clans to submit to colonial rule and arranged a meeting between their representatives and the Resident. The latter event, Resident Hewby would regard as “most unexpected and almost unheard of in the case of such wild tribes who are very shy and suspicious of trusting themselves to strangers and leaving their own territory:” YolaProf Al Monthly Report no.14, December 1902; see also YolaProf Al Monthly Report no.13, November 1902; CO 446/17,13-16. Report on a Recruiting Expedition under Lieutenants H. Bryan, 1st battalion WAAF, and E.B. Macnaghten, R.A., WAFF, September 1898; Ukpabi, Mercantile Soldiers, 99-102. For his accomplishments Buba was recommended for employment as political agent in the colonial administration. The request was granted and Buba joined the service in September 1903: YolaProf Al The Private Secretary to the High Commissioner, to Resident Yola, 30 April 1903, Monthly Report no.13, November 1902; SNP 1/1 vol.4 Secretary, M.H.D. Beresford, 27 January 1904, Return of all new Offices and Appointments created at Northern Nigeria during the Quarter ending 31 December 1903.
38 On the contrary, the High Commissioner sought Residents' advice in 1908 on disbanding the Constabulary and re-employing the personnel in other departments of the Civil Service: SNP 6/3 182/1907 Resident Temple to Acting High Commissioner, The Residency, Sokoto, 9 December 1907, Suggestions on the Native British Staff in the Political Department of the Protectorate).
39 SNP 15 Acc.65 Political Assistant, Northern Nigeria, to the Commandant, Northern Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, Government House, Zungeru, 20 February 1905, enclosed in Semolika Expedition.