Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T20:59:44.778Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

VII. The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Keith Wilson
Keith Wilson
Affiliation:
University of Leeds
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The question of the direction of the speech which Lloyd George made at the height of the Agadir crisis of 1911 has recently been raised again by Dr Cosgrove. His article, however, is in some respects not entirely satisfactory. Most of the material that he uses to revive the traditional version of the Mansion House speech – namely that it was directed against the Germans – is derived from letters which deal with reactions to it, most of them Foreign Office reactions, and some of them at a considerable remove from the event itself. Admittedly one can build a prima facie case on ‘the entirely different impressions’ which the speech was observed to produce in Paris and in Berlin. There was the placing of it by Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to London, at the end of a line of mounting irritation in England against the attitude of Germany, as the sort of thing the Spectator might have quoted in support of its thesis of the necessity of the union ‘intime évidente, affirmée’ of England and France; and his suggestion that French papers be encouraged ‘à publier quelques appréciations flatteuses de ce discours et de son auteur’.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 1972 , pp. 513 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The Historical Journal, xii, 4 (1969), 698–701Google Scholar, ‘A note on Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House 21 July 1911’ by Cosgrove, R. A.. The view he contests is that of Taylor, A. J. P. in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 469–71.Google Scholar

2 Nicolson-Cartwright, 24 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.

3 P. Cambon-de Selves, 22 July 1911, D.D.F. 2nd ser., xiv, no. 94; Cambon, P., Correspondence, ed. Cambon, H. (3 vols., Paris, 1940), n, 333; Cambon to his son, 25 July 1911: ‘(Kiderlen) a ducroire que jamais Lloyd George et les radicaux n'emboucheraient la trompette patriotique et qu'ils nous laisseraient nous débrouiller tout seuls.’Google Scholar

4 The Times, 24 July 1911.

5 Goschen-Nicolson, 26 Aug. 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/350.

6 Morley-Asquith, 27 July 1911: Asquith MSS, vol. xin; Loreburn-Grey, 27 July 1911: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/99.

7 Goschen-Nicolson, , 29 Apr. 1911Google Scholar: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/348; there was also a warning from the German quarter, which was also heeded: B.D., vn, no. 265. Cartwright-Grey, , 13 May 1911 and minutes.Google Scholar

8 Nicolson-Goschen, , 1 May 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/348.Google Scholar

9 Nicolson-Bertie, 1 May, Nicolson-Buchanan, , 10 May 1911,Google Scholaribid.; Nicolson-Hardinge, , 8 May 1911: Hardingc MSS, vol. xcii.Google Scholar

10 Nicolson-Cartwright, , 15 May 1911: Cartwright MSS.Google Scholar

11 B.D., vii, no. 371; Nicolson-Cartwright, , 24 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.Google Scholar

12 Nicolson-Goschen, , 1 May 1911,Google Scholaribid./348.

13 Nicolson-Goschen, , 7 June 1911,Google Scholaribid.

14 Although the Admiralty regarded ‘with equanimity’ a German port on the West coast of Morocco, the government thought that ‘there would be a great fuss here at seeing Germany share in a partition of Morocco’, and Grey was looking for ‘a settlement that did not let her in as infinitely preferable to any that did (B.D., vn, no. 375). The reason for this was that if France let Germany into Morocco, most of which England had given up to France to do with as she wished by the Agreement of 1904, English public opinion would demand some compensation from Germany for the damage which her presence there would necessarily do to the existing British position in Morocco, and that such compensation would be hard to acquire. This, in Grey's words, would be ‘the least desirable form that settlement could take’ (B.D., VII, no. 377). But as the French interest in Morocco was the more vital the English expected them to assume the burden of keeping the Germans out. This line, followed at Agadir, had been laid down during an earlier Moroccan crisis. In 1908 Langley, commenting on the desires of Tardieu, the French colonialist, for an end to the Algeciras Act so that France could get on with the job, had no doubt that the French Government would hardly adopt such a policy: ‘They would themselves have to find compensation for Germany’ (minute on Bertie-Grey, 10 Oct. 1908: F.O. 371/488/35420).

15 Asquith to the king, 11 July 1911: Asquith MSS, vol. vi. The Diary of J. A. Pease, first Lord Gainford, who at this time was in the cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and was keeping his own record of cabinet meetings, agrees with this. Grey's report is given as follows: ' the position in Morocco looked like ending in a friendly way by France giving Germany some privileges in the French Congo and, in regard to this we had no concern – we had made our view our [sic] position clear to the French, as to our objection to Germany having a position in the Mediterranean, or a fortified station on W(est) coast of Morocco’. Pease, Diary, II July 1911. Dr Cameron Hazlehurst is engaged upon editing this Diary for publication, and it is with his very kind and special permission that I am enabled to quote from this source, which will not be generally available until he has completed his task.Google Scholar

16 D.D.F. 2nd ser., xiv, nos. 71, 74.

17 B.D., VII, no. 391.

18 Selves, Daeschner-de, 18 July 1911, D.D.F. 2nd ser., xiv, no. 76.Google Scholar

19 Minutes, by Langley, and Crowe, , B.D., vii, 372–3, 18 July 1911.Google Scholar

20 Ibid. no. 397, Grey-Bertie, , 19 July 1911.Google Scholar

21 Ibid. no. 376, Bertie-Nicolson, , 12 July 1911.Google Scholar

22 Nicolson-Buchanan, , Goschen, , 18 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.Google Scholar

23 Bertie-Grey, , 21 July 1911, B.D., vii, no. 407.Google Scholar

24 minute, Nicolson for Grey, 21 July 1911,Google Scholaribid. no. 409.

25 Goschen-Nicolson, , 21 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.Google Scholar

26 Callwell, C. E., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (2 vols., London, 1927), 1, 96.Google Scholar

27 Haldane to his sister, 20 July 1911: Haldane MSS 6011; to his mother, 21, 22 July 1911, ibid. 5986.

28 Pease Diary, 19 July 1911.

29 Asquith to the king, 19 July 1911: Cab. 41/33/22.

30 Ibid.; B.D., vii, no. 399.

31 B.D., VII, nos. 397, 401.

32 Ibid. no. 405; to this extent Caillaux's threat that if France was to be deserted by England it would not only be a blow to the entente but might necessitate her having to make great sacrifices to Germany in order to keep her out of Morocco, sacrifices which might by implication hit British interests elsewhere, was not strictly relevant. Grey had decided that the French must make up their own minds how much they were prepared to concede for a stronger position in Morocco than the Algeciras Act gave them. And anyway, Bertie's letter containing Caillaux's remarks arrived too late to have any effect on British action. Bertie-Grey, , 21 July 1911Google Scholar (not sent until 22 July), ibid. no. 408; Grey-Bertie, , 20 July 1911,Google Scholaribid. no. 402.

33 Goschen-Grey, , 10 July 1911,Google Scholaribid. no. 367.

34 Asquith to the king, 21 July 1911: Asquith MSS, vol. vi. My italics.

35 B.D., VII, no. 411.

36 Churchill, W. S., The World Crisis 1911–1918(2 vols., London, 1923), 1, 46.Google Scholar

37 B.D., VII, no. 399; compare this with Churchill's account of what Lloyd George was thinking, in World Crisis, 1, 46-7.

38 On 4 July Lloyd George dined with the ministers most outraged by the German move, but there is no indication of how strongly he felt. Churchill, Randolph S., Winston S. Churchill, Companion vol. 11, pt. 2 (London, 1969), p. 1097Google Scholar; for an earlier essay of Lloyd George's in foreign politics, see Hardinge to King Edward VII, 24 Aug. 1908: Hardinge MSS, vol. xiv, and Esher, Viscount, Letters and Journals, ed. Brett, and Esher, (4 vols., London, 1934), II, 332–3, 23 Aug. 1908.Google Scholar

39 George, Lloyd, War Memoirs (2 vols., London, New Edition, 1938), 1, 26Google Scholar; Nicolson-Hardinge, , 27 July 1911Google Scholar: Hardinge MSS, vol. xcii; Riddell, Lord, More Pages from my Diary 1908–14 (London, 1924), pp. 20–1.Google Scholar

4 0 B.D., VII, no. 364; Cab. 41/33/20, 4 July 1911; Nicolson-Goschen, , 1 Aug. 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349; Hansard, 5th ser., XXVIII, col. 1828, 27 July 1911. Asquith's statement of 6 July had been called for by, among other things, Viscount Wolmer's Parliamentary Question of the 5th, who asked the prime minister ‘whether he has addressed a remonstrance to the German Government on their recent action in Morocco?’ (Hansard, 5th ser., xxvn, col. 1110, 5 July 1911).Google Scholar

41 Cab. 41/33/20; B.D., VII, no. 356; to the French Ambassador, on the other hand, Grey was to say that we should remain loyal to our treaty obligations, and that we desired to know, without delay, what suggestions the French Government wished to put forward: Cab. 41/33/20. And P. Cambon wrote from London: ‘Ce qui touche le plus ici le vulgaire, c'est l'idée du Gouvernement allemand de causer ` trois sans l‘Angleterre.’ Cambon, , Correspondence, II, 328, 6 July 1911.Google Scholar

42 Minute, by Villiers, , II July 1911, on Cartwright's tel. no. 71 to Grey of 10 July: F.O. 371/1163/27013; B.D., VII, no. 371.Google Scholar

43 Tyrrell-Hardinge, , 13 July 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. xcii.Google Scholar

44 Goschen-Hardinge, , 15 July 1911Google Scholar, ibid.; Cambon, , op. cit., 11, 333.Google Scholar

45 Nicolson-Hardinge, , 5 July 1911, B.D., vii, no. 359.Google Scholar

46 Nicolson-Hardinge, , 27 July 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. xcii.Google Scholar

47 D.D.F., 2nd ser., xiv, no. 36; B.D., vii, nos. 411, 351, 352; and see above note 41 for Grey's first efforts to counteract this.

48 Grey-Goschen, , 25 July 1911, B.D., vii, no. 419.Google Scholar

49 Selves, P. Cambon-de, 26 July 1911, D.D.F., 2nd ser., xiv, no. 106.Google Scholar

50 Bertie-Grey, , 5 Sept. 1911, and Grey minute: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/52.Google Scholar

51 Churchill to his wife, 6 Aug. 1911, Churchill, Winston S., op. cit. Companion vol. 11, pt. 2, p. 1109.Google Scholar

52 D.D.F., 2nd ser., xiv, nos. 113, 117, 120; though see Gooch, G. P., Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft (London, 1942), p. 152Google Scholar. Grey stood by the step he had sanctioned. Later in the year he wrote: ‘the effect of (Lloyd George's) speech upon German opinion may not have been tran-quillizing, but its effect upon the line taken by Germany in the negotiations with France was good. It may even have been the decisive factor in heading Germany towards a settlement and not a rupture’. minute, Grey, 10 Nov. 1911: F.O. 371/1127/44442.Google Scholar

53 Pease Diary, 4 July 1911.

54 See the lists of British interests in Pease, ibid.; Cab. 41/33/20; B.D., vii, no. 359.

55 Pease Diary, 21 July 1911. There is no evidence that Grey actually did this. He already knew that Bertie had carried out his instructions to this effect on 19 July (B.D., vii, nos. 397, 400); and Grey's telegrams and letters following up this approach had been pocketed by Bertie for fear of alarming the French, and he came to London to impress this on Grey (ibid. nos. 402, 405, 407; Bertie-Crowe, , 21 July 1911: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/171).Google Scholar

56 Pease Diary, 21 July 1911.

57 They might have argued that as Metternich had ignored Grey on 4 July he was quite likely to do so again, and that therefore some additional communication of a different character was called for. The Foreign Office certainly thought so: the first efforts against Germany had failed: so another, and one less easy to ignore – even a sort of reply in kind – had to be made. They may all have been encouraged by Goschen's report that Jules Cambon had attributed Kiderlen's more amenable attitude on 9 July almost entirely to Asquith's statement in the House of Commons on the 6thGoschcn-Grey, , 1108:658 July 1911Google Scholar, B. D., vii, no. 367). What they sought was a repeat performance on a slightly larger scale, with a correspondingly greater effect. And the Mansion House speech did have one effect that, on the model of Asquith's of the 6th, it might have been expected to have. Grey attributed to it Metternich's ‘tardy response’ of the 24th (Scott, C. P. MSS, B.M. Add. MSS 50901, 25 July 1911). This was all, however: the content of that response was not what was wanted. The impression was left that British policy had only one side to it; and Ramsay MacDonald with room to make the criticism he did (Hansard, 5th ser., xxvm, cols. 1830–1, 27 July 1911).Google Scholar

58 Hale, O. J., in Publicity and Diplomacy 1890–1914 (New York, 1940), pp. 388–92Google Scholar, makes some interesting speculations as to how far the remarkable promptness with which the press took up Lloyd George's speech, and the equally remarkable harmony of interpretation of it, were due to inspiration on the parts of Lloyd George, Churchill, Asquith and Grey. He provides little direct evidence, but the behaviour of the Daily Chronicle, whose editor, Robert Donald, was a close journalistic associate of Lloyd George's, is suspicious, for on 22 July that paper reproduced only that part of his speech which he had read out, with the headline: ‘Great Britain warns Germany – National Honour is at stake’. Moreover, the papers of C. P. Scott do clearly reveal the attempts of Lloyd George to keep the Manchester Guardian quiet. On 21 July Scott received a telegram embodying Lloyd George's urgent request as a personal matter not to write anything about the German business without seeing him. Scott returned to London to breakfast with Lloyd George on the 22nd, at which the Chancellor endeavoured to persuade him not to let it be inferred that the government had no sufficient backing in the country, because this would ‘give a dangerously false impression of their determination’ (Scott, C. P. MSS, uncat. 1911Google Scholar; B.M. Add. MSS 50901, 22 July 1911). The telegram succeeded but the conversation did not. On 24 July the Manchester Guardian returned to foreign affairs with a leader saying that British interests were not really relevant and warning the government against being more French than the French. The Manchester Guardian's line represented too closely for the government's comfort the whole of its own thinking, which it did not want to be publicized, and especially not at a time when some of its members wanted publicly to stress only a certain part of this thinking. Hence the attempts at persuasion and dissuasion.

59 Nicolson-Goschen, , 24 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.Google Scholar

60 Taylor, , op. cit. pp. 470–1.Google Scholar

61 D.D.F., 2nd ser., xiv, nos. 22, 36, 44; B.D., vii, nos. 366, 368, 379; Nicolson-Bertie, , 10 July 1911Google Scholar: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/171; Tyrrell-Hardinge, , 13 July 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. XCII.Google Scholar

62 B.D., vii, no. 377; Pease Diary, 4 July 1911; Cab. 41/33/20.

63 B.D., vii, no. 408.

64 Ibid. nos. 377, 407.

65 Ibid. nos. 408, 405; Bertie-Crowe, , 21 July 1911Google Scholar: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/171. Cosgrove prints the relevant part of Bertie's letter in his article. Bertie and Crowe at the F.O. shared a private passion about German designs on Africa. Indeed Grey's letter of 20 July answered not only Bertie but also a minute by Crowe of II July, which ran: ‘Whether “compensation outside Morocco” is entirely a matter for settlement between France and Germany, must depend altogether upon what shape such compensation may take. The terms “French Congo” and “rectification of frontier” are exceedingly elastic terms, and it will be well that H.M.G. should not rush into assurances of disinterestedness which may hereafter be found embarrassing as well as rash.' Langley, following this, found it not easy to see how England could be affected by a rectification of frontier in the French Congo. Minutes by Crowe, and Langley, , II July 1911Google Scholar, on Goschen-Grey, 10 July – printed without the minutes as B.D., vii, no. 367: F.O. 371/1164/27021. The Crowe-Bertie passion was still alight in August, Bertie trying to infect Nicolson with it (Bertie-Nicolson, , 6 Aug. 1911Google Scholar: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349) and Crowe wanting Bertie to be asked for his comments ‘on the foreshadowed proposal to cede to Germany territory that would bring her on to our Sudan frontier’ (B.D., vii, 436, 8 Aug. 1911). Grey was unmoved. His answer was the same, given in advance this time in a letter to Mallet of 5 August: ‘I do not think it matters very much whether we have Germany or France as a neighbour in Africa’ (B.D., vii, no. 461). Bertie brought up again in 1912 the matter of Germany in Africa. Bertie-Grey, , 12 Jan. 1912: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/53.Google Scholar

66 For another example of not seeing things through the eyes of those concerned, see Taylor, , op. cit. p. 400, where there is the striking conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance confirmed rather than marked the end of British isolation. How, one wonders, would Lord Lansdowne have reacted to this, in view of his statement: ‘In approaching the Japanese we have virtually admitted that we do not wish to continue to stand alone.’ B.D., 11, no. 92.Google Scholar

67 Taylor, , op. cit. pp. 430–1.Google Scholar

68 B.D., 11, no. 105.

69 Ibid. no. 116.

70 Memo by Lansdowne, 1 Jan., and by Salisbury, 7 Jan. 1902: Cab. 37/60/1, 3.

71 Ibid.; B.D., 11, no. 124, p. 114, no. 125, p. 118.

72 Ibid. no. 148.

73 Magnus, Philip, King Edward VII (London, 1964), p. 335.Google Scholar

74 Hardinge-Graham, , 23 Oct. 1908: Hardinge MSS, vol. xiii.Google Scholar

75 B.D., v, nos. 748, 753, 761, 775; Grey minute on Nicolson-Grey, , 29 Mar. 1909,Google Scholaribid. no. 801: ‘Isvolsky did not give either us or France the chance of saying whether we should help him to make better terms.’ Also ibid. no. 842.

76 B.D., 11, nos. 77, 82.

77 Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), p. 200.Google Scholar

78 B.D., 11, no. 91, p. 75; for Sanderson, ibid. no. 85.

79 Note by Grey, , 1 Aug. 1911:Grey MSS, F.O. 800/93.Google Scholar

80 Cartwright-Tyrrell, , 8 Dec. 1908: Cartwright MSS.Google Scholar

81 Cartwright-Grey, , 24 Dec. 1908: B.D., v, No. 490.Google Scholar

82 Tyrrell-Cartwright, , 12 Jan. 1909: Cartwright MSS.Google Scholar

83 Minute by Mallet, 15 May, on Nicolson-Grey, , 7 May 1909: F.O. 371/729/18278.Google Scholar

84 Minute, by Campbell, , 19 Apr. 1909: F.O. 371/599/14552.Google Scholar

85 Minute, by Crowe, , Apr. 1909,Google Scholaribid./16563. My italics.

86 Bertie's Annual Report for France, 1908: F.O. 425/319, para. 62.

87 Minute, by Spicer, , 6 Aug. 1909: F.O. 371/668/29484.Google Scholar

88 Grey-Bertie, , 15 Jan. 1906, B.D., iii, no. 216.Google Scholar

89 Grey-Bertie, , 31 Jan. 1906Google Scholar, ibid. no. 219.

90 Minutes, by Crowe, , Hardinge, , Grey, , Oct. 1908Google Scholar: F.O. 371/488/35889. The words were omitted.91 Minute, by Spicer, , 4 July 1908Google Scholar: F.O. 371/456/21042. Bertie had written (para. 50): ‘I believe that France is now so dependent in matters of foreign policy on England that pressure might be used to bring the French Government to show a more accommodating spirit in some of the questions in which the two countries are at present not entirely agreed.’

92 Annual Report for France 1909: F.O. 425/335.

93 Memo, by Salisbury, , 7 Jan. 1902: Cab. 37/60/3.Google Scholar

94 See I. Geiss, July 1914 (London, 1967), Docs. 11, 18, 28, 30, 31, 33.

95 Nicolson-Rodd, , 30 Nov. 1912: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/360.Google Scholar

96 e.g., Murray, Arthur, Master and Brother (London, 1945), pp. 116–17Google Scholar; Masterman, Lucy, C. F. G. Masterman (London, 1939), p. 265Google Scholar. And see Bethmann-Hollweg in B.D., xi, no. 293; Geiss, , op. cit. Doc. 122.Google Scholar

97 Hendrick, B. J., The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (London, 1926), p. 309. Several of the theories advanced in this paragraph might not have occurred to me had it not been for some valuable discussions with Professor A. E. Campbell of Birmingham University. Personally, I believe George V was referring to Great Britain's obligation in respect of her guarantee of Belgian neutrality. The sentiment, however, remains the same.Google Scholar

98 Minute, by Crowe, , 21 July 1911: F.O. 371/1164/28529. The French communication is printed without Crowe's minute as B.D., vii, no. 403.Google Scholar

99 Bertie-Nicolson, , 14 May 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/348.Google Scholar

100 Bertie-Nicolson, , 21 June 1911: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/179.Google Scholar

101 Bertie-Nicolson, , 16 July 1911: Carnock MSS, F.O. 800/349.Google Scholar

102 Bertie-Crowe, , 21 July 1911: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/171.Google Scholar

103 Cambon, P., Correspondence, 11, 328–9.Google Scholar

104 Hardinge-Nicolson, , 2 Aug. 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. xcii.Google Scholar

105 Minute, by Villiers, , 11 July 1911, on Goschen-Grey, 10 July: F.O. 371/1164/27021.Google Scholar

106 Minute, by Crowe, , 14 July 1911,Google Scholar on Bertie-Grey, 14 July, ibid./27630.

107 Minute, by Crowe, , 15 July 1911; B.D., vii, no. 383.Google Scholar

108 Goschen-Hardinge, 15 July, Tyrrell-Hardinge, , 13 July 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. xcii.Google Scholar

109 For all that was done, see B.D., vii, no. 387.

110 Minute by Nicolson, B.D., vii, no. 383.

111 Hardinge-Nicolson, , 24 Aug. 1911: Hardinge MSS, vol. xciiGoogle Scholar

112 Minute, by Villiers, , 14 July 1911: B.D., vii, no. 383. My italics.Google Scholar

113 Minute, by Villiers, , 11 Sept. 1911,Google Scholaribid. no. 538.