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VII. Great Britain and the League Council Crisis of 1926

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

David Carlton
David Carlton
Affiliation:
North-Western Polytechnic, London
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Extract

When, on 16 October 1925, the leading European statesmen initialled the famous Locarno agreements, a new era of international tranquillity and peace appeared to have dawned. The British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, carried away by euphoria, wrote of ‘feeling like a little child again in spirit’ and of having ‘lived such days and celebrated such a birthday as it is given to no man to experience twice’. In reality, however, the agreements were built on inadequate foundations. As Viscount Cecil of Chelwood foresaw, limited regional security guarantees were an unsatisfactory substitute for the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) and the Geneva Protocol (1924), whose rejection by successive British Governments had spelt the end of hopes that wider collective security provisions and measures of disarmament might be achieved simultaneously. The Locarno agreements were only finally torn up in March 1936 when Adolf Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland; but the spirit which underlay them began to evaporate from the day of their signature. In this essay attention is given only to the first post-Locarno crisis, which was in itself sufficient to disillusion many optimists and to reveal that Franco-German tension was still a potent force in European relations. This crisis arose out of Germany's decision, in part fulfilment of her obligations under the agreements, to apply for membership of the League of Nations.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , June 1968 , pp. 354 - 364
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1968

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References

1 Chamberlain to Sir William Tyrrell, 18 October 1925. The letter is reprinted in full in Petrie, Sir Charles, The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.G., P.C., M.P. (London, 1939–1940), II, 287–90. Tyrrell was Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office.Google Scholar

2 See Carlton, David, ‘Disarmament with Guarantees: Lord Cecil 1922–1927’, Disarmament and Arms Control, III, no. 2 (Autumn, 1965Google Scholar). For two further, somewhat critical assessments of the agreements see Johnson, Douglas, ‘Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements’, University of Birmingham Historical Journal, VIII, no. 1 (1961)Google Scholar; and Grün, George, ‘Locarno: Idea and Reality’, International Affairs, xxxi, no. 4, (10, 1955).Google Scholar

3 The League Council at the end of 1925 consisted of four permanent members (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) and six non-permanent members. The permanent members were considered to be Great Powers. Non-permanent members were required to retire after three years and could not be re-elected until a further three years had elapsed.

4 Viscount D'Abernon, , An Ambassador of Peace: Lord D'Abernon's Diary (London, 1929–1930) III, 231.Google Scholar

5 Ibid. p. 229.

6 Conclusions of Meetings of the Cabinet, Public Record Office (hereafter abbreviated to Cabinet Minutes), Cab. 23/52, 6(26)3A, 17 February 1926.

7 Cabinet Minutes, 23/51, 52(25)3, 11 November 1925. This Cabinet had left the Foreign Secretary ‘a discretion’ with regard to other claims which might arise. Chamberlain to Cecil, 9 February 1926, Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

8 Chamberlain Memorandum, 1 February 1926, Medlicott, W. N., Dakin, Douglas and Lambert, M.E. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, series iA, vol. 1 (hereafter abbreviated to B.D. IA/I) (London, 1966), no. 233.Google Scholar

9 Chamberlain to Sir Max Muller (Warsaw), 8 February 1926, ibid. no. 252.

10 Cecil to Chamberlain n.d., (? February, 1926), Austen Chamberlain unpublished Papers in the University of Birmingham Library. See also Cecil Memorandum, 8 February 1926, B.D. IA/I, no. 253.

11 Chamberlain to Cecil, 9 February 1926, B.D. 1 A/I, no. 257.

12 Cecil to Chamberlain, 11 February 1926, Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

13 Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 15 February 1926, B.D. I A/I, no. 275.

14 Minute by Walford Selby, 15 February 1926, Foreign Office Confidential Prints, Public Record Office, F.O. 411/3.

15 The Times, 18 February 1926.

16 Lord Stamfordham to Chamberlain, 19 February 1926, quoted in Sir Nicolson, Harold, King George the Fifth: His Life and Reign (London, 1952), p. 411.Google Scholar

17 Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 19 February 1926, Chamberlain Papers. D'Abernon was unimpressed by Chamberlain's characteristic criticism of the Germans. ‘I doubt’, he wrote in his diary, ‘whether—if Germany had not protested so strongly against the extension of the Council—there would have been any effective check to that proposal.' D'Abernon, , op. cit., III, p. 225.Google Scholar

18 The Times, 19 and 24 February 1926.

19 Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 19 February 1926, D'Abernon Papers, Add. 48929.

20 D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 21 February 1926, Foreign Office Private Collections, Public Record Office, F.O. 800/259. See also D'Abernon to Chamberlain, 15 and 17 February 1926, B.D. 1 A/I, nos. 274 and 279.

21 For Baldwin's, speech see House of Commons Debates (Hansard), CXCII, cols. 1693–7, 4 March 1926.Google Scholar

22 Cabinet Minutes, Cab. 23/52, 9(26)2, 3 March 1926.

23 Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 26 February 1926, D'Abernon Papers, Add. 48929.

24 Tyrrell to Chamberlain, 11 March 1926, B.D. I A/I, no. 335.

25 Sweden's role in the crisis is described in a study of her Foreign Minister, Osten Undén. See Lönnroth, Erik, ‘Sweden: The Diplomacy of Osten Unden’ in Craig, Gordon A. and Gilbert, Felix (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919–1939 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1953), pp. 92–9. Sweden's action was not quite as disinterested as it appeared. As a Baltic Power she particularly feared that a thwarted Germany might forge an exclusive alliance with the Soviet Union.Google Scholar

26 Chamberlain to D'Abernon, 29 March 1926, Chamberlain Papers.

27 Cecil to Chamberlain, n.d., Cecil Papers, Add. 51078. Italics added.

28 As late as 15 March Chamberlain in a remarkable misreading of the situation believed that there would be no objection to an arrangement whereby Brazil and Spain would be given definite promises of permanent seats for the autumn. He accordingly sought and received the reluctant consent of the Prime Minister to agree to such an arrangement. See Chamberlain in London (Geneva) to Tyrrell, 15 March 1926, B.D. I A/I, no. 349. See also Tyrrell to London, 15 March 1926, ibid. no. 351; and Cabinet Minutes, Cab. 23/52, 11 (26), appendix, 15 March 1926. The plan was of course completely unacceptable to Sweden and Germany.

29 Cecil to Chamberlain, pencilled note, n.d. (? 16 March 1926), Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

30 Chamberlain to Cecil, pencilled note, n.d. (? 16 March 1926), Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

31 Cecil to Chamberlain, 16 March 1926, Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

32 Chamberlain to Cecil, n.d. (? 17 March 1926), Cecil Papers, Add. 51078.

33 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography (London, 1941), p. 178. For Chamberlain's version of the quarrel see Chamberlain to Baldwin, 18 March 1926. This letter is reproduced in full in , Petrie,op. cit. II, 297–303. Although Cecil consented to stay on this occasion, he was to insist on resigning a year later following the spectacular failure of the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference.Google Scholar

34 For a lengthy account of the proceedings of the Motta Committee see Scelle, Georges, Une Crise de la Société des Nations: La Réforme du Conseil et I'Entrée de l'Allemagne à Genève (03–09, 1926) (Paris, 1927Google Scholar). For a strongly pro-Cecil summary see Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960 ed.), pp. 323–5. For Cecil's own description of the proceedings see his numerous despatches in Foreign Office Confidential Prints, Public Record Office, F.O. 411/3 and 4.Google Scholar

35 British and French delegates no doubt also felt dismay at the German decision to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union, which was regarded in some quarters at least as being directly attributable to the outcome of the abortive Special Assembly. (See, for example, D'Abernon, , op. cit. III, 245Google Scholar). This judgement, however, is not confirmed by modern accounts of the diplomatic background to the Treaty of Berlin (signed on 24 April 1926). For example, Freund, Gerald, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (London, 1957) p. 243Google Scholar, n. 1, claims that the treaty was hastened but not caused by the March débâcle. It was also at one time fashionable to argue that the success of the Polish coup d'état of 12 May 1926 was in part the result of a number of recent foreign policy failures, which obviously included the rejection of the Polish claim to a permanent seat on the League Council. But this view, too, finds no support in the most recent scholarly study of the subject. See Rothschild, Joseph, Pilsudski's Coup d'État (New York, 1966), pp. 295–6.Google Scholar

36 Chamberlain to Anthony Buxton, 30 March 1926, Chamberlain Papers.

37 The following kindly gave consent for the reproduction of copyright material for which they have responsibility: Mr Francis Noel-Baker, M.P., Professor Ann Lambton, Colonel Terence Maxwell and the Librarian of the University of Birmingham. Extracts from Crowncopyright records in the Public Record Office appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.