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Usurpation, Obligation and Obedience in the Thought of the Engagement Controversy1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Glenn Burgess
Glenn Burgess
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Cambridge
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Extract

Some time soon after the execution of Charles I, the new rulers of England began seriously to consider imposing an oath of loyalty to the new republic. On 22 February the Council of State were directed to take an ‘Engagement’ to the regime, and for the rest of 1649 there were periodic suggestions to extend this Engagement to wider sections of the political nation, and especially to office holders. Finally, on 2 January 1650, the Rump decided that all men over the age of 18 would take an Engagement, of the form I do declare and promise, that I will be true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England, as it is now established, without a King or House of Lords

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 515 - 536
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

2 Quoted in Gardiner, S R (ed), The constitutional documents of the puritan revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford, 3rd edn 1906), p 391Google Scholar

3 The above paragraph is based on Worden, Blair, The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653 (Cambridge, 1974), pp 226–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar The quotation is from p 231

4 Quotations from Prothero, G. W. (ed.), Select statutes and other constitutional documents illustrative of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I (Oxford, 4th edn, 1913), p. 259Google Scholar; and Gardiner, , Constitutional Documents, p. 269Google Scholar.

5 Parker, Henry, Scotland's holy war (London, 1651), p. 68Google Scholar.

6 This is most fully treated in Judson, Margaret, From tradition to political reality (Hamden, Connecticut, 1980), ch. II and p. 64Google Scholar; and in Wallace, James M., Destiny his choice (Cambridge, 1968), ch. IIGoogle Scholar. For Skinner's views see the articles cited below.

7 Wallace, , Destiny his choice, p. 30–8, 54 ffGoogle Scholar.

8 Judson, , From tradition to political reality, pp. 60, 64–5Google Scholar.

9 Ibid. pp. 29 ff.

10 Skinner, Quentin, ‘Conquest and consent’, in Aylmer, G. E. (ed.), The Interregnum (London, rev. edn, 1974), p. 90Google Scholar.

11 Judson, , From tradition to political reality, pp. 82–3Google Scholar.

12 Wallace, , Destiny his choice, pp. 58 ffGoogle Scholar.

13 Ibid. p. 62.

14 That is to say originate in this context. The component ideas of the de facto position are not particularly new, and can be found in much previous thought on such subjects as conquest and necessity. There is a good statement of some probable sources of de facto theory in Skinner, Quentin. ‘Thomas Hobbes et la défense du pouvoir “de facto”’, Revue Philosophique, LXIII (1973), 142 n. 1Google Scholar.

This account should be supplemented by Tuck, Richard, Natural rights theories (Cambridge, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar on the source of much ‘Hobbist’ and de facto thought in Selden and the Tew circle.

15 Basic histories of the idea of tyranny, tracing the sources of the early modern notions in classical and medieval thought, are Mousnier, Roland, The assassination of Henry IV, trans. Spencer, Joan (London, 1973), pp. 63–105Google Scholar; and Jaszi, Oscar and Lewis, John D., Against the tyrant (Glencoe, Illinois, 1957), part IGoogle Scholar. See also Laqueur, Walter (ed.), The terrorism anthology (New York, 1978), part IGoogle Scholar; and Armstrong, W. A., ‘The Elizabethan conception of the tyrant’, Review of English Studies, XXII, 87 (1946)Google Scholar. The fullest contemporary statements are probably Milton, JohnThe tenure of kings and magistrates in Complete prose works of John Milton, III (ed. Hughes, Merritt Y.) (New Haven, 1962)Google Scholar; and Sexby, Edward [and Titus, S. (?)], Killing no murder (London, 2nd edn 1659)Google Scholar.

16 Rous, Francis, The lawfulness of obeying the present government (London, 1649), p. 1Google Scholar.

17 Ibid. p. 1

18 Ibid. pp. 2–3.

19 Ibid. pp. 3–4.

20 Ibid. p. 6. Note that Rous here indicates the audience he is writing for, those who think the commonwealth unlawful (presumably royalists and presbyterians). The question of audience plays a part later in the argument of this paper.

21 Ibid. p. 7.

22 Ibid p 7

23 Ibid pp 7–8

24 Other works that use variations on this type of argument include A logical demonstration of the lawfulness of subscribing the new Engagement (London, 1650)Google Scholar, The exercitation answered (London, 1650)Google Scholar, Conscience puzzel'd about subscribing the new Engagement (London, 1649)Google Scholar, and the many works of John Dury The arguments are often used in these tracts in combination with other arguments both casuistic and republican The de factoist arguments are also used under the later interregnum regimes in such works as Reasons why the supreme authority of the three nations is not in the parliament but in the new-established councel of state (London, 1653)Google Scholar, and White's, ThomasThe grounds of obedience and government (London, 1655)Google Scholar, as well as the other works cited below

25 Ascham, Anthony, The bounds & bonds of publique obedience (London, 1649)Google Scholar, title page

26 Ibid p 2

27 Ascham, Anthony, Of the confusions and revolutions of governments [sic] (London, 1649), p. 131Google Scholar.

28 Ibid. p. 99.

29 Ascham, , Bounds & bonds, pp.22–3Google Scholar.

30 Throughout, the terms ‘mediate’ and ‘immediate’ are used in a sense common in seventeenth-century thought to distinguish between actions done directly (immediate) and those done through agents (mediate). See Davis, J. C., ‘Pocock's Harrington: grace, nature and art in the classical republicanism of James Harrington’, Historical Journal, XXIV, 3 (1981)Google Scholar; and Smart, Ian Michael, ‘Edward Gee and the matter of authority’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, XXVII, 2 (1976) 117Google Scholar

31 Ascham, , Bounds & bonds, p. 3Google Scholar.

32 Ibid. p. 32.

33 Ibid. p. 20.

34 Ibid. pp. 18–19.

35 Ascham, , Confusions and revolutions, p. 137Google Scholar.

36 Ascham, Bounds & bonds, p. 32Google Scholar.

37 This account of Ascham does underplay the electicism and untidiness of his thought. He piles into his writings many other arguments that do not fit into the complex of ideas outlined above, and which sometimes contradict one another. For a brief outline see Burgess, P. G., ‘Usurpers, tyrants, and the problems of resistance and obedience’, unpubl. MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1984, pp. 118–21Google Scholar.

38 The argument here concentrates on Gee for purposes of clarity and concision. Nevertheless the interpretation given here is extendable to many other anti-Engagement tracts, though they are not usually presented as clearly or effectively as in Gee's works. See, for example, Ward, Nathaniel, A religious demurrer, concerning submission to the present power (London, 1649)Google Scholar; An enquiry after further satisfaction concerning obeying a change of government beleeved to be unlawfull (London, 1649)Google Scholar; Prynne, William, The arraignment, conviction and condemnation of the Westminsterian-Juncto's Engagement, (London, 1649)Google Scholar; Arguments and reasons to prove the inconvenience & unlawfulness of taking the New Engagement (n.p. 1650)Google Scholar; Ward, Nathaniel, Discolliminium (London, 1650)Google Scholar; and A copie of a Letter, against the Engagement (London, 1650)Google Scholar. The anonymous A second part of the religious demurrer (London, 1649)Google Scholar is very similar in style and argument to Gee's works, leading one to suggest that it may indeed be by Gee.

39 Skinner, , ‘Conquest and consent’, p. 79Google Scholar.

40 Rous, Lawfulness of obeying the present government, title page.

41 The issue of previous oaths and engagements is arguably the most widely and deeply discussed issue of all in the Engagement controversy. In any full and rounded historical acount of the controversy the issue would require much greater treatment than it has hitherto received from historians, in whose accounts it has been treated, if at all, as peripheral.

42 This implication is stated in Gee, Edward, An exercitation concerning usurped powers (London, 1649), pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

43 Ibid. p. 12.

44 Ibid. pp, 12–13.

45 Ibid. p. 13.

46 Gee, Edward, The divine right and original of the civill magistrate from God (London, 1658), p. 255Google Scholar. cf. Smart, , ‘Edward Gee’, pp. 121–2Google Scholar, 127.

47 Gee, , Exeratation, p. 13Google Scholar.

48 Ibid. p. 4.

49 Thomas Hobbes does reject traditional notions of tyranny, and this is a key difference between his thought and that of Ascham. Hobbes, therefore, makes himself less vulnerable to Gee's to charge of legitimating tyranny, by embracing the position with open arms. In De cive Hobbes demonstrates that ‘a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy’. He concluded, rather contemptuously, ‘The case therefore is brought to this pass: that a king, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a king, if not, they count him a tyrant. Wherefore we see a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a tyrant in way of contumely and reproach.’ (Hobbes, Thomas, Man and citizen (ed. Gert, Bernard) (n.p., 1978 edn, pp. 191, 193–4)Google Scholar. He is more succinct in Leviathan: ‘they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny’ (Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (ed. Macpherson, C. B.) (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 240, see also p. 722.Google Scholar)

50 Gee, Edward, A plea for non-scribers (London, 1650), p. 28Google Scholar.

51 Gee, , Exercitation, p. 15Google Scholar.

52 Gee, , Plea, p. 33Google Scholar

53 Ibid., appendix (separately paginated), p. 19.

54 Gee, , Exercitation, p. 16Google Scholar.

55 Cf. Zagorin, Perez, A history of political thought in the English revolution (London, 1965), p. 77Google Scholar: Gee's ‘arguments were not really answerable by any who supported the commonwealth on grounds of principle’; and Smart, , ‘Edward Gee’, p. 127Google Scholar: ‘Gee, it seems, had the best of the argument’ (a comment on the inadequacy of a reply to Gee by John Dury).

56 On this distinction see Tuck, Richard, ‘Power and authority in seventeenth-century England’, Historical Journal, XVII (1974), 43–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a good outline of the basic features of Gee's political thought see Smart, ‘Edward Gee’.

57 Gee, , Divine right and original, p. 15Google Scholar.

58 Ibid. p. 28.

59 Ibid. p. 136.

60 In respect of the comparison with Hobbes, ‘Conquest and consent’ marks a further refinement on Skinner's, earlier article ‘The ideological context of Hobbes's political thought’, Historical Journal, XI (1966), 286–317CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The earlier article emphasized parallels between Hobbes and, in particular, Ascham. ‘Conquest and consent’ also does this, but provides a more balanced account by considering as well Hobbes's greater secularity, and the more definitive and systematic nature of his work. Both of these articles have appeared in revised versions: see Skinner, ‘Thomas Hobbes et la défense du pouvoir “de facto”’ (a revision of ‘Conquest and consent’); and Skinner, , ‘The context of Hobbes's theory of political obligation’ in Cranston, Maurice and Peters, Richard S. (eds.), Hobbes and Rousseau: a collection of critical essays (New York, 1972), pp. 109–42Google Scholar.

61 Skinner, , ‘Conquest and consent’, p. 93Google Scholar.

62 Ibid. p. 79.

63 Ibid. p. 90.

64 Ibid. p. 85.

65 Ibid. p. 86.

66 Ibid. p. 84.

67 Ibid. p. 93.

68 Ibid. p. 87.

69 Skinner points out that later engagers began to doubt that it was necessary to call a usurping power unjust at all, and then advanced to the axiom that possession itself conveys legitimate title (ibid. pp. 89, 92). These positions would only add to the effectiveness of Gee's strictures.

70 Canne, John, The golden rule (London, 1649), p. 23Google Scholar.

71 Ibid. p. 23.

72 Some of these later tracts are interesting also for the way in which they recognize and try – rather unsuccessfully – to avoid the weaknesses in providential de facto theories pointed out by Gee. See Burgess, ‘Usurpers, tyrants, and the problems of resistance and obedience’, part II, sect. 2c. (See also n. 24 above.)

73 Nedham, Marchamont, The case of the commonwealth of England, stated (ed. Knachel, Philip A.), (Charlottesville, 1969), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

74 Ibid. p. 9.

75 Ibid. p. 13.

76 Ibid. p. 15 (this is the title of chapter two).

77 Nedham, Marchamont, A true state of the case of the commonwealth (London, 1654), pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

78 Osborne, Francis, A persuasive to a mutuall compliance under the present government (London, 1652), p. 1Google Scholar.

79 Ibid. p. 2.

80 Ibid. p. 4.

81 Smith, George, Gods unchangeableness: or Gods continued providence (London, 1655)Google Scholar, title page.

82 Ibid. p. 2.

83 Ibid. p. 4.

84 Ibid. p. 5.

85 Ibid. p. 13.

86 Moore, John, Protection proclaimed (London, 1655), p. 1Google Scholar.

87 Ibid. PP. 1–2.

88 Ibid. pp. 6–7.

89 Hall has recently attracted the attention of James Daly as one of the few thinkers in the seventeenth century to show signs of being much influenced by Sir Robert Filmer. See Daly, James, Sir Robert Filmer and English political thought (Toronto, 1979), p. 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 Hall, John, The true cavalier examined by his principles (London, 1656), p. 45Google Scholar.

91 Ibid. p. 67.

92 Skinner's methodological ideas have been set forth in a series of papers, each relating to a different intellectual context. Those that established his basic position are: Skinner, , ‘The limits of historical explanations’, Philosophy, XLI, 157 (1966), 199–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skinner, , ‘Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’, History and Theory, VIII (1969), 3–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skinner, , ‘Conventions and the understanding of speech acts’, Philosophical Quarterly, XX, 79 (1970), 118–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Skinner, ‘Motives, intentions and the interpretation of texts’, Mew Literary History, III, 2 (1972), 393–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93 Though this should not be taken to imply that Hobbes himself is a secular thinker, at least not in any straightforward sense of the term. Rather one can say that his God interacts with civil authority in a much more complex way than the God of the providential de factoists. See Pocock, J. G. A.. ‘Time, history and eschatology in the thought of Thomas Hobbes’, in his, Politics language and time: essays on political thought and history (London, 1972), p. 148–201Google Scholar.

94 Skinner, ‘Limits of historical explanations’.

95 For other views of Skinner on Hobbes and the context of Hobbes's thought see King, Preston, ‘The theory of context and the case of Hobbes’, in King, P. (ed.), The History of Ideas London, 1983), pp. 285–315Google Scholar; and State, Stephen, ‘Text and context: Skinner, Hobbes and theistic natural law’, Historical Journal, XXVIII, 1 (1985), 27–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This latter article appeared after mine was completed. Its interpretation of such thinkers as Ascham and Nedham complements that presented here, and strengthens the case against labelling them as secular thinkers in any way.