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‘That Horrid Electorate’ or ‘Ma Patrie germanique’? George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

T. C. W. Blanning
T. C. W. Blanning
Affiliation:
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge
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Extract

The League of Princes (Fürstenbund) was founded on 23 July 1785, when the representatives of Prussia, Hanover and Saxony signed at Berlin a main treaty and several secret articles relating to the domestic affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. During the following months a number of other German princes joined the League, notably the elector of Mainz, the landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, the margrave of Baden and the dukes of Brunswick, Saxony-Gotha and Saxony-Weimar.s Its general objective was the preservation of the imperial status quo. More specifically, it was aimed at the Emperor Joseph II and the innumerable schemes of expansion popularly attributed to him, not always without justification. More specifically still, the League was designed to prevent any renewal of Joseph's most cherished ambition - the exchange of the Habsburg possessions in the Netherlands (which embraced the larger part of present-day Belgium) for the Electorate of Bavaria. From the European perspective, the League was soon overshadowed by the reopening of the Eastern Question in 1787, eclipsed by the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1788 and finally extinguished by the Austro-Prussian rapprochement in 1792, but during 1785–6 it assumed great importance. Not the least affected was Great Britain, whose king - albeit in his capacity as elector of Hanover - was a founder-member of the League and one of its most enthusiastic protagonists. Despite the official British view - repeated ad nauseam to sceptical foreign diplomats - that Georg Kurfürst von Hannover and George III King of England were two entirely separate beings and that consequently the actions of the former could have not the least effect on the latter's domains, British policy could not help but be influenced.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1977 , pp. 311 - 344
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

1 The best recent account of the German side of the League is Freiherr von Aretin's, Karl OtmarHeiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806, 2 vols (Wiesbaden 1967)Google Scholar.

2 Lodge, R., Great Britain and Prussia in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1923), p. 139Google Scholar.

3 Ward, A. W., Great Britain and Hanover: some aspects of the personal union (Oxford, 1899)Google Scholar; Lecky, W. E. H., A History of England in the eighteenth century (London, 1887) v, 84Google Scholar.

4 Brooke, John, King George III (London, 1972), p. 314Google Scholar. Watson, J. Steven, The reign of George III 1760–1815 (Oxford, 1960) p. 293Google Scholar. Briggs, Asa, The age of improvement (London, 1959)Google Scholar.

5 Cobban, Alfred, Ambassadors and secret agents: The diplomacy of the first earl ofMalmesbury at the Hague (London, 1954), p. 50Google Scholar. For the statement that the League was founded in January, see the chronological table on page 216.

6 Ranke, Leopold von, Die deutschen Mächte und der Fürstenbund, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1871–1872), I, pp. 227–8Google Scholar.

7 Wittichen, F. K., Preussen und England in der europäischen Politik 1785–1788 (Heidelberg, 1902), pp. 21–2Google Scholar.

8 For example: Aretin, , Heiliges Römisches Reich, I, 178Google Scholar. Bernard, Paul P., Joseph II and Bavaria: two eighteenth century attempts at German unification (The Hague, 1965), pp. 211–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kohler, Alfred, ‘Das Reich im Spannungsfeld des preussisch-österreichischen Gegensatzes: Die Fürstenbundbestrebungen 1783–1785’, Fürst, Bürger, Mensch. Untersuchungen zu politischen und soziokuUurellen Wandlungsprozessen im vorrevolutionaren Europa, ed. Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Klingenstein, Grete & Lutz, Heinrich (Vienna, 1975), p. 83Google Scholar.

9 Salomon, Felix, ‘England und der deutsche Fürstenbund von 1785’, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, VI (1903)Google Scholar; William Pitt der jüngere (Leipzig, Berlin, 1906), vol. IGoogle Scholar.

10 Wittichen was obliged to accept the validity of some of Salomon's criticisms but in general remained unrepentant - see the postscript to his article ‘Die Politik des Graf en Hertzberg 1785–1790’, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, ix(1906)Google Scholar. For later versions of Salomon's thesis: Rose, J. Holland, William Pitt and national revival (London, 1911)Google Scholar; Clapham, J. H., ‘Pitt's first decade 1783–1792’, The Cambridge history of British foreign policy, ed. Sir Ward, A. W. and Gooch, G. P. (Cambridge, 1922)Google Scholar; Gerhard, Dietrich, England und der Aufstieg Russlands (Munich, Berlin, 1933)Google Scholar. The most satisfactory account is in Ehrman's, JohnThe Younger Pitt: the years of acclaim (London, 1969), pp. 473–6Google Scholar. Horn's, D. B. references to the League in Great Britain and Europe in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1967)Google Scholar are curiously inconsistent. In the chapter on Prussia he wrote that the British Foreign Office maintained that Austria was the natural ally and that the only men working for an alliance between Britain and Prussia were Joseph Ewart and Hertzberg. But in the following chapter on the lesser states he added this apparently contradictory passage: ‘Especially under George II Hanoverian policy was remarkably active and independent, and often directed in a way diametrically opposite to the wishes of George II's British ministers. Under George III this was no longer the case and in the last years of Frederick II's reign Hanover, which under George II had helped to keep Britain and Prussia apart, now became a bridge between them. Britain and Hanover had a common interest in the 'eighties in resisting the designs of Joseph II in the Empire, and both rallied to the Prussian side in the Fürstenbund crisis since Prussia was dearly the only power in Germany capable of effective resistance to Austria’ (pp. 164–5182).

11 A notable exception was Salomon, who was well acquainted with the Foreign Office papers and the private papers of Pitt and the duke of Leeds (Carmarthen). Yet even he appears to have failed to gain access to, or overlooked, or not to have grasped the implications of certain documents, especially those in the Leeds collections.

12 Joseph II to the Austrian ambassador at Versailles, Count Mercy, 31 March 1783: Arneth, A. von and Flammermont, J. (eds.), Correspondance secréte du Comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec I'Empereur Joseph II et le Prince de Kaunitz (Paris, 1889), I, 175Google Scholar. See also Joseph's letter to Catherine the Great of 1 June 1782: Arneth, A. von, Joseph II und Katherina von Russland: Ihr Briefwechsel (Vienna, 1869), p. 130Google Scholar. In a letter to his brother Leopold of 13 January 1783 Joseph remarked 'Adieu la considération et la richesse de l'Angleterre', and on 31 March observed further that Great Britain had declined to the status of a second-rate power - comparable with that of Denmark or Sweden - Arneth, A. von (ed.), Joseph II und Leopold von Toscana: ihr Briefwechsel, (Vienna, 1872), I, 149–52Google Scholar.

13 Gerhard, , England und derAufstiegRusslands, pp. 158–63Google Scholar; Ranke, , DiedeutschenMächte, II, 247–8Google Scholar; Schmidt, Wilhelm Adolf, Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Unumsbestrebungen seit der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1851), I, 35Google Scholar. This belief in the fragility of British power antedated the outbreak of the American War, having been encouraged by the political instability of the 1760s - Roberts, Michael, Splendid isolation 1760s–1780 (Reading, 1970) pp. 4–7Google Scholar. Equally certainly, the belief was spread and intensified by British misfortunes in that war.

14 Aretin, , Heiliges Romisches Reich, II, 62Google Scholar.

15 Wittichen, , Preussen und England, 36Google Scholar.

16 See his letter to Finckenstein of 21 February 1784, quoted in Bailleu, P., ‘Der ursprung des deutschen Fiirstenbundes’, Historische Zeitschrift, XLI, (1879), 433Google Scholar.

17 Lodge, , Great Britain and Prussia, pp. 140, 152Google Scholar; Horn, , Great Britain and Europe, pp. 162–3Google Scholar.

18 Russell, Lord John, Memorials and correspondence of Charles James Fox, (London, 1853), I, 337–42Google Scholar.

19 Fox to Sir Robert Murray Keith, 10 May 1782: British Library, Additional Manuscripts (referred to hereafter as BL, Add. MSS) 35, 525, fo. 188. See also his dispatch to Keith of 4 June 1782, in which he is more explicit about Austrian hostility towards Great Britain (Ibid. fo. 257).

20 Russell, , Memorials and correspondence, II, 156Google Scholar. For the Russian rejection of British feelers, see Gerhard, , England und der Aufstieg Russlands, pp. 173–4Google Scholar.

21 Carmarthen to Keith, 23 January 1784: BL, Add. MSS 35, 531, fo. 39. Cf. his instruction to Alleyne Fitzherbert, the British ambassador in Russia, of 4 May 1784: ‘No one measure could I apprehend be productive of such real benefit to this Country as the putting an end to the alliance between Austria and France’ - London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers (referred to hereafter as P.R.O., F.O.) 65/12, no. 14.

22 Carmarthen to Keith, 23 April 1784: BL, Add. MSS 35, 531, fo. 231.

23 Browning, Oscar (ed.), The political memoranda of Francis fifth duke of Leeds (London, 1884), p. 101Google Scholar. On Pitt's more cautious outlook, see Ehrman, , Pitt, pp. 468, 524Google Scholar.

24 Moloney, Brian, ‘The third earl of Cowper’, Italian Studies, XVI (1961)Google Scholar. So far as I know, the following incident has not heen mentioned in any work on international relations. It is, however, recounted by Moloney, Brian in Florence and England: essays on cultural relations in the second half of the 18th century (Florence, 1969), pp. 108–9Google Scholar.

25 Cowper to Carmarthen, 7 March 1784: BL, Add. MSS 28, 060, fo. 107.

26 Carmarthen to Cowper, 8 April 1784: Ibid. fo. 125.

27 The undated ‘Cowper de la réponse recue de Vienne' is enclosed in Cowper's letter to Carmarthen of 5 June 1784: Ibid. fo. 129. Cowper was quite unrepentant about the failure of his ham-fisted initiative, suggesting that Joseph was merely buying time to enable him to consult his Russian ally. Cowper even suggested that George III make him duke of Kent' or some other title’.

28 Kageneck, to Kaunitz, , 6 January, 16 March, 13 July 1784: Vienna, , Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatskanzlei, England (referred to hereafter as HHSta), Berichte, Kart. 123, nos. 2, 22, 56Google Scholar.

29 Carmarthen to Pitt, 9 June 1784: BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 36. Cf. his memorandum of II June, reprinted in Browning, , Political memoranda, p. 106Google Scholar, and Ehrman, , Pitt, p. 467Google Scholar.

30 Ibid.

31 Dietrich Gerhard was particularly fond of drawing attention to this persistent failing of British statesmen - England und der Aufstieg Russlands, pp. 18, 178–9, 206, 372Google Scholar.

32 Carmarthen to Keith, 17 August 1784 (BL, Add. MSS 35, 532, fo. 201).

33 Carmarthen to Keith, 7 and 21 September, 1784 (Ibid. fos. 234, 259).

34 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 3,6,17 and 31 August (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 123, nos. 62,63,66, 70). Their task was made a good deal easier by the presence of Prince Henry of Prussia at Versailles during August (Wittichen, , Preussen und England, p. 10Google Scholar). Joseph Ewart had reported from Berlin on 17 July 1784 that he had been assured that Frederick was indeed working hard for a French alliance, despairing of recapturing Russia and greatly alarmed about Joseph's German projects: Ewart to Fraser, 17 July 1784: P.R.O., F.O. 64/6, no. 11.

35 Bindoff, S. T., The Scheldt question to 1839 (London, 1945), p. 138Google Scholar.

36 Keith to Carmarthen, 8 September 1784: P.R.O., F.O. 7/9, no. 90.

37 Stormont to Keith, 8 August, 14 November 1780,9 January 1781: BL, Add. MSS 35,519, fos. 158; 35,520, fos. 69, 267.

38 Wittichen, , Preussen und England, pp. 9–10Google Scholar. Bindoff, , Scheldt question, p. 139Google Scholar.

39 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 2 April, 26 May 1784: HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 123, nos. 27 and 42.

40 Carmarthen to Keith, 8 November 1784: BL, Add. MSS 35,532, fo. 353. See also his dispatches to the duke of Dorset of 7 November and 12 November 1784 cited in Barral-Montferrat, Horace Dominique de, Dix Ans de paix armée entre la France et I'Anglelerre 1783 à 1793 (Paris, 1894), pp. 40–1Google Scholar.

41 Carmarthen to Pitt, 8 November 1784; Pitt to Carmarthen, 9 November 1784 (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fos. 72–4).

42 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 24 December 1784 (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 123, no. 103).

43 See, for example, Keith's report from Vienna of 8 December and Kageneck's observations to Carmarthen of 23 December (P.R.O., F.0.7/9, no. 120; BL, Add. MSS 28,059, fo. 52).

44 Harris to Carmarthen, 21 December 1784 (BL, Add. MSS 28,060, fo. 209).

45 The implications were soon demonstrated when in 1805 Prussia secured the necessary French approval for the annexation of Hanover.

46 Aretin, , Heiliges Romisches Reich, I, 149–51Google Scholar.

47 Stormont to Keith, 23 June, 4 July, 22 August 1780 (BL, Add. MSS 35,519, fos. 72,75,98, 177). The election of Max Franz on 7 and 16 August respectively meant in effect that he would become archbishop and elector of Cologne and prince-bishop of Münster when the present incumbent died. That also of course meant a substantial increase in Habsburg power in North-West Germany. For a full account of the coadjutor elections, see Braubach, Max, Maria Theresias jüngster Sohn Max Franz (Vienna, Munich, 1961)Google Scholar.

48 Aretin, , Heiliges Römisches Reich, I, 151Google Scholar. Beulwitz had already reported to George 111, in a most critical manner, on what he considered to be the unconstitutional actions of Austria.

49 Except of course during Fox's tenure of office. For details of the incidents listed, see Ranke, , Die deutschen Māchte, I, 34–47, 91–8Google Scholar; Aretin, , Heiliges Römisches Reich, I, 15–17Google Scholar, 44–5, 137–47, 151–60.

50 Bailleu, , ‘Ursprung’, pp. 411–14Google Scholar.

51 Andreas, Willy (ed.), Politischer Briefwechsel des Herzogs vmd Orossherzogs Carl August von Weimar (Stuttgart, 1954), I, 6–10Google Scholar. Kohler, ‘Das Reich im Spannungsfeld’, passim.

52 Haüsser, Ludwig, Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Orossen bis zur Gründung des deutschen Bundes, 3rd edn (Berlin, 1861), I, 165Google Scholar.

53 Hertzberg to the duke of Brunswick, 14 January 1784; Finckenstein to Frederick, 7 March 1784; duke of Brunswick to Hertzberg, 27 March 1784 (Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 26, 54, 71)Google Scholar.

54 Hanover Niedersdchsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (referred to hereafter as Hanover), Hanover 92, LXI, nr. 1 a. It was reprinted by Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, p. 63Google Scholar.

55 The Hanover Privy Councillors to George III, 7 May 1784: Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, nr. 1 a, fos. 1–7. The reply to Prussia was sent the same day (Ibid. fo. 10).

56 George III to the Hanover Privy Councillors, 28 May 1784 (Ibid. fo. 11).

57 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 84–5Google Scholar. Cf. Salomon, , ‘England und der deutsche Fürstenbund’, p. 225Google Scholar.

58 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, p. 163Google Scholar.

59 Bernard, , Joseph II and Bavaria, p. 150Google Scholar.

60 Joseph, to Catherine, , 13 May 1784; Catherine to Joseph, 23 May–3 June 1784 (Arneth, , Joseph II und Katherina von Russland, pp. 224–5, 231)Google Scholar.

61 Joseph, A. to Kaunitz, A., 4 July 1784 (Beer, A.Joseph II, LeopoldIIundKaunitz: IhrBriefwechsel (Vienna, 1873), p. 180)Google Scholar. See also above p. 319.

62 Joseph, to Antoinette, Marie, 19 November 1784 (Arneth, (ed.), Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II, Ihr Briefwechsel (Leipzig, Paris, Vienna, 1866), p. 47)Google Scholar. See also his letter to Mercy of 6 November: Arneth, and Flammermont, , Correspondance secrète, p. 332Google Scholar.

63 Ibid. p. 353, n. 1.

64 Tratchevsky, A., La France et I'AUemagne sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1880), I, 70Google Scholar. The memorandum is reproduced in full in vol. II, pp. 51–6Google Scholar.

65 The memoranda of Ségur, Castries, Breteuil, Calonne, Ossun and Soubise are all to be found in Tratchevsky, , II, 57–82Google Scholar. Vergennes was almost certainly playing a double game. In view of his deep suspicion and dislike of Austrian policy, it is inconceivable that he was really in favour of the exchange. It is far more likely that he expressed his support to avoid the wrath of Marie Antoinette, secure in the knowledge that his colleagues on the Council of State would vote the plan down (Bernard, , Joseph II and Bavaria, p. 203)Google Scholar.

66 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, p. 129Google Scholar.

67 P.R.O., F.O. 64/7, no. 7.

68 Häusser, , Deutsche Geschichte, p. 174Google Scholar.

69 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 142, 145Google Scholar; Hanover, Cal. Br. 24, Nr. 893, fos. 1–2; Gödeke, K., ‘Hannovers Anteil an der Stiftung des deutschen Fürstenbundes’, Archiv des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen (1847), pp. 74–5Google Scholar; Aspinall, A. (ed.), The later correspondence of George III, (Cambridge, 1962), I, 132–5Google Scholar. Aspinall cited as his source for Frederick's memorandum the Ann Arbor typescript. The original can in fact be found in the Royal Archives at Windsor - but in the wrong place. Its number is RA 5219, the original arranger of George's letters having misread the date.

70 Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 133Google Scholar.

71 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 146–7Google Scholar. In the Royal Archives at Windsor there is a copy of a note written by the duke of York in which it is stated that he had been commissioned by his father to thank Frederick for communicating his views on the present state of German affairs and to assure him that his own views were identical and that his ministry in Hanover had been instructed to open negotiations on the subject with Prussia. This copy was not dated by its original author, but some later hand has pencilled in ‘18 August 1785’. This date is most improbable, for the contents of the note make it clear that it is a reply to Frederick's communication of 19 February. This note was not published by Aspinall.

72 See above, p. 323.

73 Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, Nr. 1 a, fos. 28–34. It was reprinted by Gödeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, p. 75Google Scholar.

74 Ibid. fos. 48–9. It too was reprinted by Gödeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, pp. 90–4Google Scholar.

75 Notably by Gödeke, op. cit., passim, and by Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 155–350Google Scholar.

76 Gödeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, p. 92Google Scholar. The ‘present circumstances’ probably referred to Pitt's problems over Irish trade and parliamentary reform and more generally to the fact that his ministry was not yet firmly established.

77 Walpole to Keith, 18 January 1785 (BL, Add. MSS 35,533, fo. 177). An earlier dispatch to Carmarthen had been even more terse: ‘I have nothing to trouble your Lordship with from this Court, but to acquaint you that the Elector continues to enjoy a perfectly good state of health’ - Walpole to Carmarthen, 6 January 1785 (P.R.O., F.O. 9/4, no. 17).

78 Ibid. no. 20, Walpole to Carmarthen, 10 February 1785.

79 Keith to Carmarthen, 26 January 1785 (P.R.O., F.O. 7/10, no. 10). On the same day Keith wrote to Ewart: ‘I give you my word that the secret has been so well kept here, that previous to the receipt of your letter, I had never heard of the smallest mention made of the existence of the Treaty in question’ (Papers of Monro of Williamwood, bundle 129). I am greatly indebted to Mr Hector Monro, J.P. D.L. M.P., for permission to examine the papers of Joseph Ewart, which form part of this collection.

80 Ewart was the secretary of Sir John Stepney, envoy extraordinary to the Prussian court from 1782 until die summer of 1784, when he returned to England on leave. Although Stepney did not formally resign his post until July 1785, he did not return to Prussia, leaving Ewart in effective control from June 1784 until the arrival of Viscount Dalrymple as the new envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the end of November 1785. Ewart was appointed secretary of legation in October 1785.

81 P. 324.

82 Ewart to Carmarthen, 15 and 19 February 1785: P.R.O., F.O. 64/7, nos. 19 and 20. See also his reports of 18, 22,24 January, 12,26 February; 22,26 March; 2,5,9,12 April (Ibid. nos. 8, 9, 11, 17, 23, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36)

83 Ewart to Carmarthen, 22 January 1785: P.R.O., F.O. 64/7, no. 9. On the Luxemburg-Namur offer see Grosjean, G., La Politique rhénane de Vergennes (Paris, 1925), p. 111Google Scholar.

84 Dorset to Carmarthen, 17 February 1785; Keith to Carmarthen, 24 March 1785; Harris to Carmarthen, 9 February and 15 March 1785: Barral-Montferrat, , Dix ans de paix armée, p. 50Google Scholar; P.R.O., F.O. 7/10, no. 31; BL, Add. MSS 28,060, fo. 254. Malmesbury, , Diaries and correspondence, II, 112Google Scholar. Both Keith and Harris began by believing that France must have opposed the exchange, a fact which may have made their subsequent conversion all the more convincing.

85 BL, Add. MSS 35,534, fo. 74; Egerton MSS 3501, fo. 80.

86 Not unreasonably, the sudden announcement in April that the Elector of Bavaria was to leave Munich for Mannheim - the capital of his Palatinate territories - persuaded many that Bavaria was about to be handed over to Austria. This was also Carmarthen's interpretation (Keith to Carmarthen, 7 May 1785; Walpole to Carmarthen, 14 April 1785; Carmarthen to Walpole, 29 April 1785: P.R.O., F.O. 7/10, no. 46; 9/4, nos. 26 and 6). Carmarthen wrote to the duke of Richmond on 20 May 1785 that ‘it is reported from different quarters that the exchange of Bavaria is ultimately to procure the cession of the Netherlands to France, in exchange for Alsace and Lorraine, which are to be given to the Elector’ (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 219). Keith wrote to Ewart on 23 April: ‘The Elector Palatine is going to Mannheim, and it is said with a view to bring about a reconciliation with the Duke of Deux Ponts - if it be true that France favours the Bavarian Exchange, I shall begin to comprehend these mysterious intrigues, as well as the jealous inquietude of His Prussian Majesty, which in that case would have a very serious object’ (papers of Monro of Williamwood, bundle 129).

87 The memorandum is reprinted in full by Browning, Political memoranda, pp. 111–13Google Scholar.

88 Carmarthen to Ewart, 14 May 1785 (P.R.O., F.0.64/7, no. 5). A draft of this dispatch was sent to the king on the following day with a note to say that if it were approved the courier would be sent off that night. Carmarthen added: ‘Lord Carmarthen has thought it advisable to open more largely upon the subject to Mr Ewart, in order that that Gentleman may be enabled to direct his enquiries, and in general to form his language in the manner most likely to promote your Majesty's interests at the Court of Berlin, with expedition and effect’ (Windsor Castle, RA 6015). Pitt approved the draft on the same day (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 116)

89 Carmarthen to Ewart, 14 May 1785: P.R.O., F. 0. 64/7, no. 5. Cf. Carmarthen's letter to the duke of Richmond of 20 May (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 219). T o clarify the situation Ewart was also sent a deliberately vague but friendly ostensible dispatch, designed to be shown to Frederick for his comments. Wittichen knew only of this ostensible dispatch, assumed that it represented actual British policy and concluded that British and Hanoverian policy was proceeding in harmony and harness (Prevssen und England, p. 29)Google Scholar. Cf. Salomon, , ‘England und der Fürstenbund’, pp. 230–5Google Scholar, and Pitt, n, 313.

90 Ewart to Carmarthen, 26 May 1785 (P.R.O., F.0.64/7, no. 50). For the dispute in Prussia between the pro-French Finckenstein and the pro-British Hertzberg, decided by the king in the former's favour, see Wittichen, , Preussen und England, pp. 29–35Google Scholar.

91 Carmarthen to George III, 16 June 1785 (Aspinall, , Correspondence, 219)Google Scholar.

92 Browning, , Political memoranda, p. 115Google Scholar.

92 BL Add. MSS 35,534, fos. 261–2.

93 Salomon, , ‘England und der Fürstenbund’, p. 236Google Scholar.

94 Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, pp. 224–30Google Scholar, 319–23; Hanover, Cal. Br. 11, E. I, nr. 1021, fos. 126–7; nr. 1002, fos. 2–9; von Dohm, C. W., Denktviirdigkeiten meiner Zeit (Lemgo & Hanover, 1817), pp. 66–8Google Scholar.

95 Carmarthen's instructions to Fitzherbert were dated 23 June; Beulwitz arrived in Berlin on 24 June; the Hanoverian replies were dated 10 June and 29 July.

96 P.R.O., F.O. 65/13, no. 28. Cf. Salomon, Pitt, II, 315.

97 Salomon, , ‘England und der Fiirstenbund’, p. 238Google Scholar.

98 Keith to Carmarthen, 18 and 22 June 1785; on 24 September Keith reported further: ‘I am greatly mistaken if the Germanic Confederacy does not give to this Court full as much Inquietude and Occupation as the Dutch Affairs’ (P.R.O., F.O. 7/11, nos. 58, 59, 89).

99 BL, Add. MSS 34,420 (Auckland Papers), fo. 57.

100 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 9 August 1785 (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 124, no. 63).

101 HHSta, Weisungen, Kart. 129, fo. 26.

102 BL, Add. MSS 28,060, fo. 355. This letter was not published in the Malmesbury edition.

103 Thurlow to Carmarthen, 5 August 1785; Sydney to Carmarthen, 6 August 1785: BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fos. 209, 243. Thurlow's letter was reprinted by Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 177Google Scholar, n. 2. Part of Sydney's letter ran: ‘I am so far behindhand in Foreign Politicks, that I am rather more at a loss, than I should otherwise have been. I must now try with your assistance to get up part of my Lee Way. I do not like the Business entirely, but we have been so long wrong that it is very difficult to get tolerably right. Excuse my giving you this trouble, but this business has occupied me all night, and I have found the Empress a bad Bedfellow.’

104 Carmarthen to Thurlow, 5 August 1785; Carmarthen to Sydney, 6 August 1785 (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fos. 211, 245).

105 In a letter to Carmarthen of 10 May 1785 Pitt stated that he too had had no knowledge of what the Hanoverian ministers were doing (Ibid. fo. 112).

106 Carmarthen had been informed of the main treaty and all the various secret articles by Ewart in his dispatches from Berlin during July: P.R.O., F.O. 64/7, nos. 63–7. He did not believe that he knew them all, however, for in his letter to Thurlow he referred to his inability to discover anything about‘ certain secret and separate Stipulations, which I am free to confess I most seriously apprehend may be productive of very unpleasant Consequences to this Country’ (BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 245).

107 For a very good example of the detail with which George followed - and sometimes led - recruiting to the League, see Hanover, Cal. Br. 11, E I, 1024, fos. 64–5. For Carmarthen's statement to Kageneck, see the latter's report to Kaunitz of 16 September 1785 (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 124, nr 74).

108 Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 177Google Scholar.

109 Carmarthen to Harris, 8 August 1785: BL, Add. MSS 28,060 fo. 395. Perhaps a faint shadow of Lord Bute can be detected in that final remark.

110 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 25 October 1785 (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 124, no. 85). He also told Kageneck that George regarded Hanoverian affairs as his prime concern, that previous foreign secretaries (himself included) had felt obliged to protest about it, that George had deliberately concealed Hanoverian business from his British ministers and that he always displayed grave displeasure when his ministers were rash enough to mention the subject. See also Fox's letter to Fitzpatrick of November 1785, in which he complained about - among other things - ‘The Elector of Hanover taking a step which precludes England from any possible connection with the Imperial Courts; France riveting the Dutch still more to her, preserving the Emperor and King of Prussia, and gaining ground even with Russia, without losing her influence with the Porte, and secured by the conduct of the Elector of Hanover against the only alliance that can ever make us formidable to her … there is not one instance in the whole reign where the mischief of the King's acting separately from his Ministers can be made so plain to the commonest understanding as this of the German League’ (Russell, , Memorials and correspondence, II, 272–4)Google Scholar.

111 Carmarthen to Harris, 11 November 1785 (BL, Add. MSS 28,060, fo. 475).

112 That was finally made clear by Lord Cornwallis' military-cum-diplomatic mission to Berlin (Cornwallis to Carmarthen, 20 September 1785: P.R.O., F.O. 64/8). He enclosed a paper entitled ‘Heads of what the King of Prussia said to Lord Cornwallis at Sans Souci the 17th of Sept. 1785.’ Carmarthen had made it clear to Cornwallis that ‘it is our wish rather to listen to what may be proposed by His Prussian Majesty than to make any direct proposals on our part’ (Ibid).

113 HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 125, no. 21.

114 For examples of Carmarthen's criticism of Hanover and the king, see his letters to Harris of 11 November and 6 December 1785, to the duke of Richmond of 2 January 1786, to Pitt of 4 January 1786 (BL, Add. MSS 28,060 fos. 475,497; 28,061, fo. 1; Cambridge University Library, Add. MSS 6958 (i), fo. 37). See also Kageneck s reports to Kaunitz of 13 December 1785 and 21 March 1786 and his successor Count Reviczky's report of 4 July 1786 (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 124, no. 98; Kart. 125, nos. 21 and 7). Reviczky was/has been spelt in half-a-dozen different ways; I have preferred the version used by himself. For Carmarthen's insistence on the need for an Austrian alliance and Britain's approval of Austrian expansion see his dispatches to Sir Robert Keith, especially those of 17 January 1786 and 16 January 1787 (BL, Add. MSS 35,536, fo. 10; 35,537, fo. 300). See also Kageneck's reports to Kaunitz, especially that of 28 February 1786, in which he reported Carmarthen as saying that the days of the League of Princes were numbered, that Britain would not participate in anything which might displease the emperor and that he and all his colleagues were convinced that an increase in the power of Austria could only be advantageous to Great Britain (HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 125, no. 15).

115 Carmarthen to Dalrymple, 16 November 1785 (BL, Egerton MSS 3501, fo. 43).

116 For an account of this organization see the very valuable article of Conrady, S., ‘Die Wirksamkeit König Georgs III für die hannoverschen Kurlande’, Niedersachsischesjahrbuch fur Landesgeschichte, xxxix (1967)Google Scholar.

117 George III to Carmarthen, 6 July 1784 (Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 73)Google Scholar.

118 George III to Lord Bute, 5 August 1759 (Sedgwick, Romney (ed.), Letters from George III to Lord Bute 1756–1766 (London, 1939), p. 28)Google Scholar.

119 Brooke, , King George III, p. 88Google Scholar. Mr Brooke insists that ‘Britain’ rather than the usual ‘Briton’ was what was originally intended. In another letter to Bute in 1762 George managed to combine disparagement of Hanover with devotion to Great Britain:‘tho’ I have subjects who will suffer immensely whenever this Kingdom withdraws its protection from thence [Hanover], yet so superior is my love to this my native country over any private interest of my own that I cannot help wishing that an end was put to that enormous expence by ordering our troops home' (Sedgwick, , Letters, p. 78)Google Scholar.

120 Conrady, , ‘Die Wirksamkeit’, p. 190Google Scholar; Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, p. 350Google Scholar; Cannon, John, The Fox-North coalition: crisis of the constitution 7782–4 (Cambridge, 1969), p. 79Google Scholar. In the event George never did visit Hanover - but he did occasionally express a wish and intention to do so: see, for example, his letter of 24 March 1789 to Prince Adolphus (Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 403)Google Scholar.

121 Conrady, , ‘Die Wirksamkeit’, p. 159Google Scholar. He cites as his authority Runge, ‘Die Politik Hannovers’, p. 5. Runge, however, makes a simple assertion, citing no evidence whatsoever.

122 Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, nr. 1 a, fos. 48–9. This is reprinted by Godeke, ,‘ Hannovers Anteil’, pp. 90–3Google Scholar. See above, p. 327.

123 For a review of the surviving material, see Haase, Carl, Übersicht üfiber die Bestdnde des Niedersacksischen Staatsarchivs in Hannover, vol. 1 (Gottingen, 1965)Google Scholar.

124 See, for example, Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, nr. 1 a, fo. 34.

125 See above, p. 333.

126 See above, p. 335.

127 George III to Pitt, 7 August 1785 (Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 178)Google Scholar.

128 Carmarthen to Thurlow, 5 August 1785: BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 245. He added sarcastically: ‘I wish the King of Prussia may remain as quiet when the same Answer is given him as I did.’

129 Hanover, Cal. Br. II, E I, nr. 1021, fo. 169.

130 See above, p. 329.

131 The wish was mentioned very briefly, in a single sentence, at the end of a dispatch to the Hanoverian Privy Councillors of 17 May 1785: Hanover, Cal. Br. 11, El, iO2i, fo. 71. This was reprinted by Gödeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, p. 130Google Scholar. It is perhaps not without sigificance that George spoke only of a better understanding (‘ein besseres Vernehmen’) and not of a connexion, let alone an alliance.

132 Pares, Richard, King George III and the politicians (Oxford, 1953), p. 5Google Scholar, n. 3.

133 The Parliamentary Register (London, 1787), XIX, 33–4Google Scholar.

134 Ibid. pp. 35–6. Pitt was almost certainly referring to Count Kageneck, for in October of the previous year the Foreign Office had intercepted a dispatch from Kageneck to Kaunitz which contained a lengthy account of a conversation with Fox, in the course of which the lat ter sharply criticized both the king and his ministers for their role in the affair of the League (Carmarthen to Pitt, 28 October 1785: BL, Egerton MSS 3498, fo. 139.) Kageneck's dispatch was dated 25 October and is to be found in HHSta, Berichte, Kart. 124, no. 85.

135 In a letter to Richard Hurd, bishop of Worcester (Dobree, Bonamy (ed.), The Letters of King George III, new edn (London, 1968), p. 188)Google Scholar.

136 Conrady, , ‘Die Wirksamkeit Georgs III’, pp. 153–4Google Scholar.

137 The Hanoverian diplomats like Ompteda at the Reichstag and Mühl at Vienna were obliged to send reports to both Hanover and London. For good examples of the sheer bulk of material sent to George, see Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, no. 2.

138 Ibid. fos. 28–34, 48–9. George's rescript of 8 March was reprinted in Gödeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, pp. 90–3Google Scholar.

139 Conrady, , ‘Die Wirksamkeit Georgs III’, p. 156Google Scholar.

140 Prince Frederick to George III, 30 May 1783: Windsor Castle, RA 43576. He was not created duke of York until 27 November 1784. Significantly, Prince Frederick failed to make the same sort of impression on Joseph II during his visit to Vienna in the summer and autumn of 1784. In his letters to his brother Leopold, Joseph poured scorn on the young prince's excessive taste for dancing, complained about the inconvenience caused by the number of his followers and generally made it dear that the English party had outstayed their welcome (Arneth, , Joseph II und Leopold von Tbscana, I, 218, 222, 224–5)Google Scholar.

141 ‘I received last Friday a very handsome present of two beautifull horses from the King of Prussia, accompanied by a most gracious and if I dare say a most affectionate letter. I confess that it does not a little flatter me, that this great Man, though so near his end, should do me the honor to distinguish me so much’ (Duke of York to George III, 29 May 1786: Windsor Castle, RA 43791).

142 Beulwitz to George III, 28 June 1785 (Hanover, Hannover 92, LXI, no. 1 b, fos. 11–12.) Frederick returned to the subject of the duke of York's many excellent virtues in his letter to George of 1 July 1785 (Ibid. fo. 47).

143 See, for example, Godeke, , ‘Hannovers Anteil’, pp. 75 and 80Google Scholar, and Schmidt, , Unionsbestrebungen, p. 167Google Scholar.

144 4 April 1785 (Malmesbury, Diaries and correspondence, 11, 117).

145 Prince Frederick to George III, 24 October 1783 (Windsor Castle, RA 43611–13).

146 Joseph Ewart to Sir James Harris, 4 April 1785 (Malmesbury, Diaries and correspondence, 11, 117). On 17 May 1785 the Hanoverian official Georg August Freiherr von Steinberg wrote to Ewart: ‘Son Altesse Royale [the duke of York] est tout à fait dans les Intèrêts de Sa Majesté Prussienne, et qu'il fait l'impossible tant en Angleterre, qu'ici pour donner les mémes Sentiments aux Membres de la Régence aussi bien qu'au public’ (papers of Monro of Williamwood, bundle 159).

147 Prince Frederick to George III, 15 October 1784 (Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 103)Google Scholar.

148 See above, p. 325.

149 Steinberg to Ewart, 17 May 1785, papers of Monro of Williamwood, bundle 159. In a letter to Ewart of 27 May Steinberg added: ‘Son Altesse Royale…continue à avoir les meilleurs sentiments pour cette Affaire, et pour la Cour de Berlin. Ce Prince se donne toutes les peines pour ouvrir les yeux du Roi et des Ministres Electoraux sur la grandeur et la nècessitè rèelle de ces importantes nègotiations pour être tout à fait du parti de S. M. Pr. et de mettre par là un frein et empechement aux Vues ambitieuses de l‘Empereur’ (Ibid).

150 The best account is to be found in Ehrman, Pitt.

151 George III to Pitt, 12 October 1787 (Aspinall, , Correspondence, p. 343, n. 1)Google Scholar.

152 Kageneck to Kaunitz, 23 August 1785 (HHSta, Kart 124, no. 67).