No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Sir Joseph Yorke, Dutch Politics and the Origins of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
At the very end of December 1780 Britain formally broke off diplomatic relations with the Dutch Republic. The war which followed – the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War of 1780–84 – abruptly ended more than a century of friendship and alliance between the two states. It also proved to be a turning point in the Republic's domestic history: the shattering defeats inflicted by the superior British navy powerfully assisted the development of the Patriot movement, which was to break the mould of Dutch politics during the 1780s.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988
References
1 An earlier version of this paper was given to the ‘Seminar in European History 1500–1800’ at the University of London. I am grateful to the members of this seminar for their helpful and constructive comments, which have done much to clarify my arguments. I also acknowledge with gratitude the permission of the earl of Mansfield to consult and make use of the Stormont papers at Scone Palace in Perthshire.
2 For a description of this meeting see Historical Manuscripts Commission: Knox MSS (‘Various collections, VI’; London, 1909), pp. 271–2Google Scholar; the cabinet minute is in Stormont papers, box 13; cf. Stormont to the king, undated but clearly 16 Dec. 1780, The correspondence of King George III from 1760 to December 1783, ed. SirFortescue, John (6 vols. London, 1927–1928), V, 14–15Google Scholar.
3 The correspondence for the second half of December 1780 is in Public Record Office, State Papers 84/573.
4 For examples of this view see: Horn, D. B., Great Britain and Europe in the eighteenth century (Oxford, 1967), pp. 103–4Google Scholar; Christie, I. R., The end of North's ministry 1780–82 (London, 1958), pp. 244–8Google Scholar; de Madariaga, Isabel, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (London, 1962), pp. 234–8, 294–5Google Scholar; Carter, A. C., Neutrality or commitment: the evolution of Dutch foreign policy 1667–1795 (London, 1975), pp. 96–101Google Scholar; Nordholt, J. W. Schulte, The Dutch Republic and American independence (1979Google Scholar; English translation by H. H. Rowen, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), pp. 146–55; Schama, Simon, Patriots and liberators: revolution in the Netherlands 1780–1813 (London, 1977), pp. 61–3Google Scholar; Renaut, F.-P., De la neutralité à la belligérance (1775–1780) (‘Les Provinces Uniés et la guerre d'Amérique’, vol. I) (Paris, 1924), passimGoogle Scholar; Edler, F., The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1911), passimGoogle Scholar; Van Wijk, F. W., De Republiek en Amerika 1776 tot 1782 (Leiden, 1921), especially pp. 107–10Google Scholar; Mackesy, Piers, The War for America (London, 1964), pp. 377–9Google Scholar; Bemis, S. F., The diplomacy of the American Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957 edn), pp. 130–63Google Scholar; Miller, D. A., Sir Joseph Yorke and Anglo-Dutch relations 1774–80 (The Hague, 1970), passimCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 The phrase was Suffolk's: to Yorke, 14 Apr. 1778, PRO SP 84/561. The standard authority on the diplomacy of neutral rights during the American War is Professor de Madariaga's magisterial Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality, on which I have drawn heavily in the discussion that follows.
6 Osinga, J., Frankrijk, Vergennes en de Amerikaanse Onafhankelijkheid 1776–1783 (Amsterdam, 1982), p. 166Google Scholar.
7 It is dated 20 December 1780 and printed in The parliamentary history of England from the earliest period to the year 1803 (36 vols. London, 1806–1820), XXI, cols. 968–72Google Scholar.
8 This is to be found in Stormont papers, boxes 59 and 113.
9 The only diplomats who had longer continuous service than Yorke were all at minor courts: men such as Sir Horace Mann (Florence, 1740–86) or Walter Titley (Copenhagen, 1731–68).
10 There is obvious scope for a full political biography of Sir Joseph Yorke. Some basic biographical information can be found in Miller, , Yorke, pp. 11–29Google Scholar.
11 See, e.g., his correspondence with his brother Hardwicke for 1772–4 in British Library, Additional Manuscripts 35370.
12 It was revealing that in December 1777 he was still talking of the ‘Maritime Powers’, though most of his contemporaries had abandoned this usage: BL Add. MSS 35511, fo. 156.
13 There are numerous examples of these reports in Stormont papers, boxes 59 and 113.
14 Cf. Edler, , Dutch Republic, p. 14Google Scholar.
15 See, e.g., the views of the Prussian representative at The Hague: Dépêches van Thulemeyer 1763–1788, ed. Colenbrander, H. T. (Amsterdam, 1912), pp. 56, 61Google Scholar; Archives ou correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, 5th series, ed. Krämer, F. J. L. (3 vols. Leiden, 1910–1915), II, 307Google Scholar; cf. Nordholt, Schulte, Dutch Republic, p. 21Google Scholar.
16 Wraxall, N. W., Historical memoirs of my own time (1772–1784) (2 vols. London, 1815 edn), I, 180Google Scholar.
17 See, e.g., the views of the Pensionary, Van Bleiswijk, and of the Prince of Brunswick: Archives…Orange-Nassau, 5th series, I, 456, 457–8.
18 Richard Pares came to a similar conclusion after a study of Yorke's conduct during the Seven Years War: Colonial blockade and neutral rights 1739–63 (Oxford, 1938), p. 246Google Scholar and, more generally, pp. 242–79.
19 See, e.g., the comments of the Prince of Brunswick: Archives…Orange-Nassau, 5th series, I, 287.
20 Yorke to Stormont, 21 Mar. 1780, Stormont papers, box 59. Even for the ambassador, this was an extraordinary outburst, though he did remark on another occasion that ‘My long familiar acquaintance with him [the Stadtholder] allows me to speak plain though decent truth’: 2 May 1780, ibid.
21 Cf. the comments of the French ambassador: Archives du Ministère des Relations Extérieures (Paris), Correspondance Politique (Hollande) 540, fo. 297.
22 The American privateer John Paul Jones – though admittedly a scarcely unbiased witness – wrote towards the end of his sojourn at the Texel that ‘our cause has been helped by the arrogance of Sir Joseph Yorke's demands and the style of dictator which he assumes for his master the King’: quoted by Van Wijk, , Republiek, p. 191Google Scholar.
23 As he frequently recalled when emphasizing his own unique experience in dealing with the issue of neutral rights: e.g. PRO SP 84/569, fo. 56.
24 As early as August 1776 he was talking of ‘the unlimited cupidity of the Dutch merchants’: BL Add. MSS 35443, fo. 1.
25 For some account of his attitude and conduct during the earlier war see Pares, , Colonial blockade, pp. 242–79Google Scholar.
26 Yorke to William Eden, 13 Jan. 1775, PRO SP 84/546; cf. Yorke to Suffolk, 14 Feb. 1775, ibid.
27 See, e.g., BL Add. MSS 35434, fo. 49.
28 Yorke's attitude was reinforced by his extensive correspondence with Sir James Marriott, the British government's leading authority on prize law, from whom he received guidance over particular cases and over the general principles governing neutral rights: BL Add. MSS 35443. Marriott was a notorious ‘hawk’ over neutral rights and his judgements were frequently highly partisan.
29 E.g. Yorke to Stormont, 9 Nov. 1779, Stormont papers, box 59.
30 For example s of such conduct: Dépêches van Thulemeyer, pp. 138, 164, 204.
31 E.g. Archives…Orange-Nassau, 5th series, I, 455.
32 From scattered references it seems clear that Yorke had also exchanged private letters with Suffolk, who had been Northern secretary during the first half of the American War; but this correspondence had been on a much smaller scale and had possessed nothing like the same importance.
33 Corr. Geo. III, IV, 519, 539; V, 31, 41.
34 For example, ibid. IV, 20; there are occasional hints that the king pressed Yorke's arguments for a firm policy on Stormont: see, e.g., his letters to the Northern secretary, 16 and 21 Nov. 1779, Stormont papers, box 14.
35 This is also suggested by the great care which Stormont took during the debate in the house of lords on the Anglo-Dutch War (25 January 1781) not to reveal the real motive of British policy: The parliamentary history of England, XXI, cols 997–1009.
36 This becomes apparent from a close comparison of the official despatches (in PRO SP 84/567, 569–73) with the secret letters (in Stormont papers, boxes 59 and 113), which makes clear that the official instructions were usually drawn up after private discussions between the two men had determined British policy.
37 This was first pointed out by Flammermont, Jules, Correspondances des agents diplomatiques étrangers en France (Paris, 1896), pp. 502–3Google Scholar; cf. British diplomatic instructions 1689–1789, vol. VII: France, part IV: 1745–1789, ed. Legg, L. G. Wickham (London, 1934), p. 128Google Scholar.
38 See his letter of 21 Dec. 1779, Stormont papers, box 113; cf. Stormont to Yorke, 1 Aug. 1780, ibid. box 59, for some revealing remarks about the purpose of the secret correspondence.
39 The analysis which follows is based on the correspondence in ibid. boxes 59 and 113.
41 See, e.g., the officially-inspired ‘Considerations upon the Représentation Verbale delivered by M. de Simolin…’, 5 Mar. 1781, PRO Foreign Office 97/323.
42 For a particularly clear statement of this assumption, see Suffolk to Yorke, 13 Sept. 1776, PRO SP 84/554.
43 For this expectation see, e.g., Suffolk to Yorke, 11 Apr. 1775, ibid. 84/546; cf. Suffolk to Yorke, 2 Jan 1776, ibid. 84/552. In an important recent article Dr Hugh Dunthorne has pointed out that it was only at the end of the 1740s that ‘the Orange dynasty began actually to be dependent politically upon Britain’: ‘Prince and Republic: the House of Orange in Dutch and Anglo-Dutch politics during the first half of the eighteenth century’, Studies in History and Politics, IV (1985), at p. 32Google Scholar.
44 The Englishman and the foreigner (‘The English satirical print’; Cambridge, 1986), p. 30Google Scholar.
45 See, e.g., Suffolk's two letters to Yorke of 7 Mar. 1775, PRO SP 84/546.
46 See Stormont's, remarks: The parliamentary history of England, XXI, col. 644Google Scholar.
47 Address to the rulers of the slate (1778), quoted by Duffy, , The Englishman and the foreigner, p. 31Google Scholar
48 Historical memoirs, I, 168.
49 For notably unflattering portraits of the Stadtholder see: Cobban, Alfred, Ambassadors and secret agents: the diplomacy of the first earl of Malmesbury at The Hague (London, 1954), pp. 21–5Google Scholar; Schama, , Patriots and liberators, 56–7Google Scholar. For a rather more sympathetic Dutch portrait see Schutte, G.J. in Nassau en Oranje in de Nederlandse geschiedenis, ed. Tamse, C. A. (Alphen a.d. Rijn, 1979), pp. 202–24Google Scholar.
50 Quoted in Cobban, , Ambassadors, p. 22Google Scholar.
51 For example Yorke to Stormont, 1 Sept. 1780, Stormont papers, box 113.
52 This he described on one occasion as ‘the usual Windings of this Interior’: PRO SP 84/572, fo. 164.
53 This is reproduced in Duffy, The Englishman and the foreigner, plate 78.
54 Yorke of course had first arrived in the Republic only four years after the Revolution of 1747, which had restored the Stadtholderate, which had been backed by Britain and in which British agents had played a part: Dunthorne, , ‘Prince and Republic’, p. 29Google Scholar. It seems probable that the ambassador's ideas owed most to this example.
55 Yorke to Stormont, 30 May 1780, Stormont papers, box 59; Stormont came round to this view himself: see his remarks in the house of lords in January 1781: The parliamentary history of England, XXI, col. 1001.
56 His campaign began with his long private letter of 9 Nov. 1779, Stormont papers, box 59.
57 Ibid. box 113.
58 14 Jan. 1780, ibid. box 113.
59 See in particular his letter of 15 Aug. 1780, ibid. box 59.
60 PRO SP 84/572, fo. 44.
61 For these hopes, Stormont to Yorke, 17 Oct. 1780, Stormont papers, box 113.
63 Yorke to Hardwicke, 7 Nov. 1780, ibid. 35372, fo, 270: only Guelderland, Zealand and Utrecht now remained under the control of the House of Orange. Little more than a fortnight earlier the ambassador had believed that five of the seven Dutch provinces were still controlled by the Stadtholder: ibid. 35434, fo. 133.
64 This became fully apparent on the morning of 27th October: PRO SP 84/572, fo. 164.
65 See Stormont's official despatch of 31 Oct. 1780, written on receipt of the news that the Stadtholder no longer controlled a majority of provinces: ibid. fos. 166–8.
66 For Stormont's final disillusionment with William V, see his private letter to Sir Robert Murray Keith, 26 Dec. 1780, BL Add. MSS 35520, fo. 231; cf. Stormont to Yorke, 31 Oct. 1780, Stormont papers, box 113.
67 Stormont to Yorke, 31 Oct. 1780, PRO SP 84/572, fos. 167–8; cf. ibid. 84/573, passim. Yorke meanwhile poured his resentment and his contempt for the Stadtholder into a conversation with the latter's Secretary, De Larrey, in early November: Nordholdt, Schulte, Dutch Republic, p. 150Google Scholar.
68 For Harris's decisive role during the 1780s see Cobban, Ambassadors, passim.