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Review Article: British Foreign Policy, 1762–5

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Herbert Butterfield
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The Historical Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , March 1963 , pp. 131 - 140
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1963

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References

1 [Die] Auflösung [des preussisch-englischen Bündnisses im Jahre 1762].

2 ‘The Anglo-Prussian Breach of 1762: An Historical Revision’, History, XLI (1956), 108–9.Google Scholar

3 Printed in von Ruville, Auflösung, 49–50.

4 Chatsworth MSS., 4th Duke of Devonshire, ‘State of Affairs Memoranda’, 5 February 1762. The Duke of Bedford is reported here as saying also that Bute had told him that he had ‘given orders for the transports to be ready to bring the troops home’. Bute's dispatch to Yorke on 12 January (P.R.O., S.P. 84/495) seems to confirm Bedford's allegation about his intention. He puts it on the Dutch to offer to co-operate with Britain.

5 Chatsworth MSS., as above, 1 February 1762. Although Bute objected to the Duke of Bedford's motion for the withdrawal of troops that day, the Duke of Devonshire exposes his essential agreement with that policy; for he objected to Newcastle's avowed purpose of ‘ entering into the merits of the question’ in the Lords Debate, saying that if Newcastle did this, he himself would have to declare his views and expose the divisions in the ministry. He preferred to evade the issue by moving the previous question, but he furthered his own policy and offended Newcastle by putting it about that Bedford could be thwarted only by moving the previous question, i.e. was bound to prevail in a straight vote on the merits of the case.

6 Polit[ische] Corr[espondenz Friedrichs des Grossen], xxi, 307. In an explicit reference to this passage, ProfessorDorn, surely goes too far when he says (‘Frederick the Great and Lord Bute’, Journal of Modern History, I (1929), 544–5)Google Scholar that Frederick 'peremptorily ordered Goltz to conceal from Keith his promise to Peter III to guarantee Schleswig and Holstein'. Dr Spencer (History, XLI, 109) simply says that Frederick told Goltz on 20 March that the British were not to be informed of the negotiations if that might hamper them. His view that, by this date, Frederick was ' clearly safe' is contradicted by Frederick's letter of 23 April (see n. 8, below). Frederick had no reason to feel safe if he failed to support Peter III in his Danish plan.

7 Polit. Corr. xxi, 313, 388. On 25 March Frederick wrote to Goltz (Ibid. 317) that in view of Galitzin's dispatch, ‘je crois qu'il faudra cacher notre jeu aux Anglais’.

8 Ibid. 319—20. According to our representative in Prussia, the news of Bute's apparent unfaithfulness ‘had a visible effect upon the King of Prussia's health and temper’ (Bisset, A., Memoirs… of Sir Andrew Mitchell, II, 289).Google Scholar

9 Ibid. 387–8. ‘Vous observerez… qu'autant que j'en puis juger, l'Empereur est de l'intention ferme de vouloir retirer du Danemark le Schleswig, et qu'ainsi, s'il me propose son alliance, la garantie du Holstein ne lui suffira pas, mais qu'il demandera encore que je lui garantisse ce qu'il a perdu dans le Schleswig. Dans ma situation presente, oú il faut que je songe à me tirer de mon embarras présent plutôt qu'a des choses qui regardent l'avenir futur, il faut bien que nous entrions aveuglement dans toutes les vues de l'Empereur, et que nous nous prêtions absolument à ses demandes là-dessus. En sorte que je veux même condescendre au nombre des troupes que l'Empereur me demandera en auxiliaires à ce sujet…. Dans la situation où je me trouve, et pour être aidé, afin de me tirer de mes embarras présents et critiques, et surtout comme j'ai fort à craindre que les ministres anglais me planteront l, il ne faut point que je reste tout isolé, et voilà pourquoi il faut que je me prête absolument aux vues de l'Empereur sur les Danois, sans faire remarquer la moindre répugnance. Les circonstances où je me trouve actuellement, sont telles que j'ai à faire à des ennemis bien supérieurs en nombre encore, de sorte que j'ai de la peine à me remuer.’

10 E.g. Polit. Corr. xxi, 325—6, 387—8, 410—12. In connexion with this last, a letter to the Czar of 1 May 1762, Frederick writes to Goltz on the same day (Ibid. 407–8): ‘Comme les affaires de Holstein font actuellement le principal objet de I’Empereur, et qu'il prend principalement à coeur, il faut bien se garder pour ne pas le contrarier ou de l'en déconseiller directement, car, si nous le ferions, nous ferions autant que de rompre tout avec lui. Voilà pourquoi je ne lui dissuaderai pas la guerre avec les Danois, si une fois il y paraitra tout-à-fait déterminé; mais je lui dirai avec toute la candeur et la sincérité’ du monde ce qu'il lui faut et ce qu'il faut préparer.’ In his Histoire de la Guerre de Sept Arts (Oeuvres Posthumes, in (1789), 68) he is referring to his letter of I May to the Czar when he writes: ‘II fallait s'expliquer avec une réserve infinie au sujet de ce qui touchait les Danois. Pour le dissuader d'entreprendre d'abord la guerre contre le Danemarck, le Roi lui détaillait toutes les raisons pour en renvoyer l'éxecution à année prochaine…’.

11 Bute at first wrote to Keith, the ambassador in Russia (6 February 1762, S.P. 91/69): ‘In case you see reason to apprehend… any thing against Denmark you will do everything in your power towards dissuading him [the Czar] from such a design’. After hearing from Newcastle, the same day [printed in von Ruville, op. cit. 53], how much the Czar was attached to the Danish scheme, Bute wrote to Keith, 7 February (S.P. 91/69): ‘ You should not carry into execution that article of your instructions which relates to Denmark…remain silent on that head.’ Frederick was in fact explaining his own policy to England, asking her ‘de ne pas se roider contre le nouvel Empereur dans ses vues … contre les Danois … il n'y a rien de plus pressé que de nous reconcilier lepluspromptement avec la Russie, pour nous retirer du bord du précipice. Si le Sieur Keith s'opposerait trop dans ce moment aux vues de I'Empereur à cet égard, on … risquerait de l'aigrir, et de gater tous dès le commencement; et nos ennemis en profiteraient pour l'entrainer dans leur parti en lui promettant tout’ (In Mitchell to Keith, 4 February, S.P. 90/79). Bute replied to Mitchell (Ibid. 23 February) that England was already carrying out Frederick's policy. Independent of this, Keith himself, in St Petersburg, formulated the very policy that Frederick was pursuing. He wrote (to Mitchell, in Prussia, Ibid. 23 February): ‘If I can form any judgment of the Emperor's temper, it is not proper to thwart him in his vivacity, but rather by seeming to approve his sentiments to gain time by means of which His Imperial Majesty, who is open to reason, especially when it comes from friends, may and will, I hope, be diverted from entering into hasty and violent measures.’

12 Once again it is necessary to read Frederick's own words (to Goltz, 28 March, Polit. Corr. xxi, 325): ‘ Si l'Empereur veut faire garantir le Holstein par les Anglais, et qu'il veut entrer en alliance avec eux, je suis persuadé qu'il est le maitre de les y mener, pourvu qu'il … fasse semblant de vouloir ou favoriser ou bien traverser leur commerce, selon les résolutions que les Anglais prendront.’

13 To Goltz, 27 March, Ibid. 312.

14 P. Yorke, Hardwicke, III, 344–6, 25 February 1762.

15 Ibid. 351, 18 April 1762.

16 Ibid. 348, 14 April 1762.

17 Von Ruville, op. cit. 40, 13 April 1762.

18 P. Yorke, op. cit. III, 359, 21 May 1762.

19 ‘Macartney in Russia, 1765–67’, Cam[bridge] Hist[orical] [Journal], III (1931), 263Google Scholar. On 23 December 1762, Buckinghamshire wrote (Buck[ingham]s[hire] Corr]espondence], 1, 115) ‘[The Empress] never misses an opportunity of expressing her partiality for … England’. By 12 July 1763, he was reporting (Ibid. n, 47) that there was ‘ much appearance of her Imperial Majesty being greatly cooled in those good dispositions to England’. and on 18 October he wrote (Ibid. 84) ‘ in general I am not pleased with appearances here’.

20 Cam. Hist. J. in, 265. Buckinghamshire reported on 9 December 1763 (Bucks. Corr. II, 114) that the Empress might have to fall in with the views of Prussia. On 23 December, after describing the Russo-Prussian treaty as ‘ in a degree of forwardness’, he drew attention to ‘the alteration that the connection with his Prussian Majesty must make in the political system of [Russia]’ (Ibid. 120).

21 To Buckinghamshire, 24 June 1763, Bucks. Corr. II, 39–40.

22 Halifax to Buckinghamshire, I July 1763 (Ibid. n, 42–3; cf. Ibid. I, 173–4).

23 ‘Great Britain and the Russo-Turkish War, 1768–74’, English Historical Review, LXIX (1954). 40, 58.Google Scholar

24 Cam. Hist. J. III, 265, 284.Google Scholar

25 Russland und Schweden 1762–1772 (Berlin, 1934), 81.Google Scholar

26 ‘Great Britain and the Russian Fleet 1769–70’, The Slavonic and East European Review, xxxi (1952–3), 151.Google Scholar

27 Buckinghamshire to Sandwich, 23 November 1763 (Bucks. Corr. II, 107): ‘He [Panin] seemed to give up the point in relation to Turkey …. He stopt me and said he did not see that the difficulties between us were insurmountable, and then asked me if I thought my Court could be induced to assist her Imperial Majesty with a sum of money.’ Cf. Buckinghamshire to Sandwich, 24 July 1764 (Ibid. 207): ‘I have no doubt but that the proposition with regard to Turkey would be waived, but the demand of subsidy will not, I fear, be so easily got over.’

28 Ibid. 1, vii.