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PSYCHOLOGY AND REASONING IN THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT, 1935–1939
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2009
Abstract
This article will analyse the psychology and reasoning in the Anglo-German naval agreement and it will hence ask the following questions. First, how did preceding naval agreements influence the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement. Secondly, what were the reasons for Germany to conclude it? Thirdly, what were the reasons for Britain to conclude it? Fourthly, how does it fit into the larger strategy of arms limitations? And, finally, what part did the Anglo-German naval agreement play in the overall strategy of Germany and Britain in the interwar years? In order to come to a conclusion about the reasons behind the agreement it is the thesis of this article that it is essential to include later changes and additions to the agreement. This part has been neglected in previous analyses. Particularly the reasons behind the termination shed light upon the motives for initially concluding the Anglo-German naval agreement. For the British side this article will argue that the Anglo-German naval agreements fit into this general policy line of trying to limit naval armament through international agreements and that they actually fitted into the overall British policy of bringing Germany back into the circle of European powers as an equal partner. For Hitler's Germany, it will be shown that the Anglo-German naval agreement was the abortive step toward an eternal alliance between the two Arian races.
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References
1 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles, 28 June 1919 (hereafter Treaty of Versailles), Treaty Series no. 4 (1919), part 5.
2 Treaty of Versailles, part 5, section 2, arts. 181, 191.
3 The Anglo-French London Communiqué, London, 2 Feb. 1935, in: Templewood papers, part 9, file 5, document 46, p. 4, held in the University Library Cambridge.
4 Washington Treaties, 1922, (hereafter Washington Treaties) first schedule, part 4 – definitions. capital ship, arts. 5, 6; submarine clauses: Washington Treaties, 1922, second schedule, art. 1, in Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1922, vol. 1, pp. 247–66, Treaty Series no. 671.
5 London Naval Treaty 1930 (hereafter London Naval Treaty), His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1930, part 1, art. 1, see also Cabinet papers (hereafter Cab.) 21/339 (held in The National Archives (hereafter TNA).
6 London Naval Treaty 1930, part 4, art. 22.
7 Cab. 29/149 (held in the TNA), Naval Commission on Japan (hereafter NC(J)) 1st meeting.
8 The idea that submarines were mainly a defensive weapon was fully in line with British naval doctrine. For the position of the Japanese side, see ‘Report on the preliminary naval discussions with the Japanese delegation on 27 Oct. 1934’, in: Documents on British Foreign policy (hereafter DBFP), 2nd ser., vol. 13, 37, Naval Commission memorandum (hereafter NCM), (35) 22.
9 G. C. Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1979) p. 115.
10 Ibid., p. 9.
11 Watt, D. C., ‘The Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935’, Journal of Modern History, 28 (1956), pp. 155–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Cab. 29/148 (held in the TNA), which deals with the London naval conference and the Anglo-German naval agreement fell under the fifty-year rule for public access to these documents. Due to new legislation in 1967 the fifty-year rule was relaxed to the thirty-year rule. As a consequence of this the documents concerned were made available in the late 1960s.
13 É. H. Haraszti, Treaty-breakers or ‘Realpolitiker’? The Anglo-German naval agreement of June 1935 (Boppard am Rhein, 1974).
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20 J. Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935–1939 (Boppard am Rhein, 1973).
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25 See DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 12, 571 [C 2122/55/18], also, Cab. 24/254 CP 69 (35) (held in TNA), ‘Notes of Anglo-German conversations, held at the Chancellor's Palace, Berlin, on 25 and 26 Mar. 1935, third meeting 26 Mar. 1935, at 10.30 a.m’.
26 Notes of the fourth meeting between the representatives of the United Kingdom and Germany, 6 June 1935, Naval Commission on Germany (hereafter NC(G)), in: DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 311, p. 378, see also Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, p. 9.
27 Exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the German government regarding the limitation of naval armaments, London, 18 June 1935, Treaty Series no. 2 (1935), London, 1935 (hereafter Anglo-German naval agreement), art. 1.
28 Ibid.
29 Cab. 24/254 (held in TNA), third meeting 26 Mar. 1935; invitation to the London naval conference given to Hitler by Simon.
30 Anglo-German naval agreement 1935, art. 2b.
31 Ibid., art. 2f.
32 Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 56 (held in TNA), para. 4.
33 Anglo-German naval agreement 1937, art. 27.
34 Protocol modifying the Anglo-German agreement of 17 July 1937 for the limitation of naval armaments, London, 30 June 1938, Germany no. 56 (1938), London, 1938.
35 Templewood papers, part 9, file 5, document 3, p. 4, see also Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, p. 252.
36 Admiralty papers (hereafter Adm.) 116/3765 (held in TNA), German government's communication of 10 Dec. 1938, paras. 2, 3.
37 Ibid., para. 1.
38 Ibid., para. 4. The background to this perceived Soviet threat were the negotiations in Montreux in July 1936. There Britain had accepted a Soviet proposal that the Bosporus should be closed in the event of war – Turkey being neutral – which allowed Russia to concentrate its naval forces in the Baltic Sea. For details see Pratt, East of Malta, west of Suez, p. 143, for reference to Cabinet papers see ibid., n. 19.
39 Adm. 116/3765, ‘German government's communication of the 10 Dec. 1938’, para. 4.
40 Adm. 116/3765, ‘British reply to the German communication from the 10 Dec. 1938, London 14 Dec. 1938’, paras. 2, 3, 4.
41 Adm. 116/3765, PD.07325/38, Plans Division Naval Staff, 22 Dec. 1938.
42 See cypher telegram to Sir G. Ogilvie Forbes (Berlin), Foreign Office papers (hereafter FO), 14 Dec. 1938, 5.30 p.m., Adm. 116/3765; see also Adm. 116/3765, ‘Memorandum for the guidance of the British representatives at the Berlin naval discussions, Dec. 1938’.
43 Adm. 116/3765, ‘Full record of conversations between British and German representatives on 30 Dec. 1938, at the Marineamt, Berlin’, pp. 5, 15; see also ‘Conversation between Admiral Cunningham and General Admiral Raeder’.
44 Adm. 116/3765, ‘Full record of conversations between British and German representatives on 30 Dec. 1938, at the Marineamt, Berlin’, p. 15.
45 ‘Notes of the fourth meeting between the representatives of the United Kingdom and Germany’, 6 June 1935, NC(G), in: DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 311, app. 1, pp. 378, 380.
46 Lord Chatfield, It might happen again, the Navy and defence, ii (London, 1947), p. 74.
47 Adm. 116/3765, ‘Full record of conversations between British and German representatives on 30 Dec. 1938, at the Marineamt, Berlin’, p. 5.
48 Adm. 116/3765, ‘Memorandum for the guidance of the British representatives at the Berlin naval discussions, Dec. 1938’, p. 2.
49 Notes of the first meeting between the representatives of the United Kingdom and Germany, 4 June 1935, NC(G), in: DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 289, p. 340; see also Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, p. 134, reference to prime ministerial papers in Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, n. 125.
50 Hitler's speech in the Reichstag 28 Apr. 1939, in: Akten der deutschen Außenpolitik (hereafter ADAP), ser. D, vol. 6, no. 277.
51 Letter from Sir John Simon (FO, London) to Sir Eric Phipps (Berlin) on 5 Apr. 1935, FO 800/290 (held in TNA) fos. 193–7.
52 Reply to letter from Sir John Simon (FO, London) from 5 Apr. 1935 by Sir Eric Phipps on 11 Apr. 1935, FO 800/290 fos. 204–5.
53 ‘Memorandum on the present position of naval conversations and recommendations as to future procedure, Jan. 13, 1935’ [A 901/22/45], DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 111, para. 12.
54 Ibid.
55 E. Raeder, Struggle for the Sea (London, 1959) p. 52.
56 Adm. 116/3373 (held in TNA), General Board papers, ser. 13, statement of MacDonald on 14 Nov. 1935.
57 Naval Staff memorandum, Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 3, para. 4.
58 Ibid., p. 1.
59 Ibid., p. 5.
60 Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, p. 284.
61 DBFP, 2nd ser., 13, 357 [A 5484/22/45], para. 5.
62 Naval Staff memorandum, Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 3, para. 6.
63 Ibid., para. 16.
64 Ibid., para. 20.
65 Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 56, annex 1, para. 3.
66 Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, pp. 386, 387 (translation mine).
67 Ibid., pp. 332–3.
68 London Naval Treaty 1930, part 3, art. 16.
69 Templewood papers, part 9, file 6, document 4, BBC speeches ‘The protection of merchant shipping in times of war by Paymaster Rear-Admiral Sir Eldon Manisty, 30 Oct. 1936’, p. 10.
70 Naval Staff memorandum, Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 3, para. 18.
71 Sir S. Hoare, Nine troubled years (London, 1954) p. 142.
72 Capital ship tonnage of the British Commonwealth: 525,000 tons, in Foreign Office memorandum (Mr Craigie) on the Washington and the London Naval Treaties from 29 June 1934 in Baldwin papers, vol. 131, fos. 142, 143; German battleships: Schlesien 13,191 tons (5 May 1908); Schleswig Holstein 13,191 tons (6 July 1908); Deutschland 11,700 tons (1 Apr. 1933); Admiral Scheer 12,100 tons (12 Nov. 1934); Admiral Graf Spee 12,100 tons (6 Jan. 1936); Gneisenau 31,800 tons (21 May 1938); Scharnhorst 31,800 tons (7 Jan. 1939); Bismarck 41,700 tons (1940/1); Tirpitz 42,900 tons (1940/1)=210,482 tons.
73 DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, app. to no. 526 [A 8991/22/45], para. C.
74 London Naval Treaty 1930, part 3, art. 16.
75 See J. Thompson, The Imperial War Museum book of the war at sea: the Royal Navy in the Second World War (London, 1996), see also Pratt, East of Malta, west of Suez, pp. 179–80, for reference to primary sources see ibid., n. 53.
76 Adm. 116/3765, discussions with the German Naval Staff, para. 4.
77 DBFP, 2nd ser., 13, annex 4 to no. 282 [A 5099/22/45].
78 Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, p. 115.
79 Naval Staff memorandum, Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 3, para. 3.
80 Ibid., 2b.
81 Wark, The ultimate enemy, p. 152, see also Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, p. 115, reference to Admiralty and Cabinet primary sources in Peden, British rearmament and the Treasury, n. 36.
82 See Wark, The ultimate enemy, pp. 126–30.
83 Ibid., p. 151.
84 This policy of preference to imperial defence only changed with the denunciation of the Anglo-German naval agreement on 28 Apr. 1939 which made clear the aggressive intent of the Third Reich. Still, the Kriegsmarine was not considered a direct threat to British security, but it had considerable potential of destroying Great Britain's lifelines of outside supplies in its raiders, such as the pocket battleships and ultimately the wolf packs formed by the U-boats. Hence the majority of the British battle fleet was assembled in home waters in easy striking distance of the Mediterranean. The Far East was thought to be able to endure – the Singapore fortified base being the embodiment of British sturdy resilience – and it was hoped that the United States would handle the initial Japanese threat. Once the British fleet had destroyed all potential threats in British home waters, i.e. the German and the Italian fleets, it could finish the Japanese and regain its positions in the Far East. For more details see Pratt, East of Malta, west of Suez, pp. 179–80; for reference to primary sources see ibid., nn. 51, 52.
85 Simon to R. MacDonald, 27 July 1934, FO 800/291 (held in TNA).
86 For details see The earl of Avon, the Eden memoirs: facing the dictators (London, 1962) p. 237.
87 See M. Cowling, The impact of Hitler (Chicago, IL, 1977) pp. 65–9.
88 Letter from Sir John Simon (FO, London) to Sir Eric Phipps (Berlin) on 5 Apr. 1935, FO 800/290, fos. 193–7.
89 Ibid.
90 Foreign Office, America Department, assistant under secretary, second negotiator for the Anglo-German naval agreement 1935.
91 DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 211, n. 3.
92 Notes on agenda for Anglo-German naval discussions, 3 June 1935, NCM (35) 49, Cab. 29/148, p. 2, DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 282.
93 C. E. Bechhofer, Sir John Simon (London, 1938) p. 290.
94 Schmidt, The politics and economics of appeasement, p. 335.
95 Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 1, para. 9.
96 Anglo-German naval discussions, NCM. (35) 50, para. 7, Cab. 29/148.
97 Original: ‘Qualitative Gleichberechtigung Deutschlands in allen Schiffstypen … daraus hervorgehend Aufhebung des Teils V des Versailler Vertrags betreffend Marine …’, in: Richtlinien für die Vorbesprechungen zur Flottenkonferenz 1935, ADAP, ser. C, vol. 4, 1, no. 100, para. 1a (translation mine).
98 Richtlinien für die Vorbesprechungen zur Flottenkonferenz 1935, ADAP, ser. C, vol. 4, 1, no. 100, para. 1b
99 Raeder, Struggle for the sea, p. 50.
100 Naval Staff memorandum, Cab. 29/148, NCM (35) 50, annex 3, para. 6.
101 E. Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, Die Wilhelmstraße in Frieden und Krieg: Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke, 1928–1945 (Stuttgart, 1950) p. 105.
102 ADAP, ser. D, vol. 7, 1, app. K, para. 4, p. 556.
103 For the concept of the Stufenplan see J. Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft: Die ‘Endziele’ Hitlers (Düsseldorf, 1976).
104 C. J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission, 1937–1939 (Munich, 1960) p. 348.
105 Richtlinien für die Vorbesprechungen zur Flottenkonferenz 1935, ADAP, ser. C, vol. 4, 1, no. 100, para. 1a.
106 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, p. 60.
107 Raeder, Struggle for the sea, p. 64.
108 K. Dönitz, Zehn Jahre (Frankfurt, 1963) p. 49.
109 Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, p. 494.
110 Geyr v. Schweppenburg, Erinnerungen eines Militäratachés (Stuttgart, 1949) p. 101.
111 See Dönitz's plan of scrapping the German surface fleet in favour of the U-boat arm. Approved by Hitler on 2 Feb. 1943, in C. Bekker, Hitler's naval war (London, 1974), app. 9.
112 Ibid., p. 41, for the concept of different spheres of interest see also Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935, ADAP, ser. C, vol. 4, no. 96, p. 175.
113 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf (London, 1992) p. 607.
114 Hoare, Nine troubled years, p. 147.
115 Reply to letter from Sir John Simon (FO) from 5 Apr. 1935 by Sir Eric Phipps on 11 Apr. 1935, FO 800/290, fos. 204–5.
116 P. O. Schmidt, Statist auf politischer Bühne, 1923–1945: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas (Bonn, 1954) p. 320.
117 Anglo-German naval agreement 1935, art. 1.
118 Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, p. 111.
119 See ibid., p. 110, also Cab. 24/254, CP 69 (35) (held in TNA), notes of Anglo-German conversations, held at the Chancellor's Palace, Berlin, on 25 and 26 Mar. 1935, third meeting 26 Mar. 1935, at 10.30 a.m.
120 Notes of the seventh meeting between the representatives of the United Kingdom and Germany, 18 June 1935, NC(G), in DBFP, 2nd ser., vol. 13, 348, p. 427.
121 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 564.
122 Ibid., p. 597.
123 Sir N. Henderson, Failure of a mission, 1937–1939 (London, 1940) p. vii.
124 Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, p. 117 (translation mine).
125 Ibid., p. 101 (translation mine).
126 CP 39(38) (held in TNA) of 17 Sept. 1938, Cab. 23/95 (held in TNA), notes of the conversation between Chamberlain and Hitler, 15 Sept. 1938, ADAP, ser. D, vol. 2., no. 487.
127 Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, p. 252.
128 Henderson, Failure of a mission, 1937–1939, p. 23.
129 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 261.