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The Overrated adversary: Rhodes and Ottoman naval power*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Palmira Brummett
Palmira Brummett
Affiliation:
University of Tennessee
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Abstract

This essay examines the relative power of the Rhodian and Ottoman fleets in the first decades of the sixteenth century, taking as its context the commercial and diplomatic relations of the eastern Levantine states. After the Aegean wars of 1499–1503 Rhodes failed to mobilize a Christian alliance against the Ottomans. Nor did the rise of Ismail Safavi in Iran provide the hoped for relief from Ottoman expansion. While the Ottoman state was preoccupied with the succession struggle for Bayezid's throne and with plans to extend its hegemony to the Indian Ocean, Rhodes was fighting for survival. Although the development of the Ottoman fleet provoked great fear in Rhodes, Venice and the Mamluk kingdom, Ottoman naval power until the conquest of Cairo in 151J was directed primarily to defensive and transport activities. Further the Ottoman fleet provided security against corsairs for merchant shipping. By supporting the corsair activities of Order members, Rhodes alienated the Mamluk state, Venice and France (allpotential allies in an anti-Ottoman coalition) but refrained from directly challenging the Ottoman navy. Naval engagements during this period cannot be understood without taking into consideration the prolonged conditions of grain shortage in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Both aggressive and defensive measures taken by the Ottoman, Venetian and Rhodian fleets Were ordinarily related to the competition for foodstuffs during this period rather than the conquest of territory or the establishment of commercial dominance (as in the Indian Ocean).

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , September 1993 , pp. 517 - 541
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

1 Setton, Kenneth M., The papacy and the Levant 1204–1571 (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1978), III, 51–171Google Scholar.

2 Note that names in the text and notes have been anglicized rather than given a direct romanization from the Arabic script (Ottoman, Persian and Arabic words). In the notes, citations for Ottoman works and authors have been rendered in the usual (if unsatisfactory) transcription based on modern Turkish usage. For a description of the Ottoman–Venetian wars from an Ottoman perspective see Sadeddin, , Tac üt-tevarih (2 vols., Istanbul, 1279/1862), II, 88–103Google Scholar; Re'is, piri, Kitab-i bahriye (Istanbul, 1935), p. 301Google Scholar. Rhodes had participated in the joint fleet actions against the Ottomans.

3 Sanuto, Marino, I Diarii (54 vols., Venice, 1880–1887), X 708Google Scholar.

4 Luttrell, A. T., ‘Venice and the knights hospitallers of Rhodes in the fourteenth century’, Papers of the British School at Rome, XXVI (1958), 196–200Google Scholar. Venetian ships stopped at Rhodes on the way to Turkey, and Venice was the embarcation point for goods and monies coming to Rhodes. With its ties to the pope, Genoa and France, Rhodes also served as a harbour for the ships of these nations engaged either in commerce or war in the eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes was an entrepot for cloth and nails from Venice; grain, wine and cheese from Crete; salt from Cyprus, and slaves.It was an emergency port for ships avoiding foul weather or corsairs. Sanuto, , Diarii, X, 885Google Scholar on the Beirut galleys using Rhodes as a waystation.

5 Luttrell, , ‘Venice’, p. 197Google Scholar. The Knights' self imposed duties included preventing illegal Christian trading of war materials to Syria and Egypt.

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8 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 454–7Google Scholar. In March the Grand Master told Bernardino Loredano, an envoy from Cyprus, that several large barks carrying merchandise from Chios to Istanbul had been seized by the Rhodian fleet.

9 Luttrell, , ‘Venice’, pp. 198, 203–5, 210Google Scholar. Venice and Rhodes had participated in a series of alliances against the Ottomans after 1328. Quarrels over corsairs, slave trade, transit duties and who was responsible for defence against the Ottomans, however, were endemic. Also the Genoese had used Rhodes as a base against Venice in the late fourteenth century and early fifteenth century.

10 This prince was probably Mustafa ibn Hamza who led an unsuccessful revolt in Karaman in 1500–1 and had fled to Shah Ismail's camp and thence to Aleppo. Sanuto, , Diarii, IV, 481Google Scholar. Slightly later, Qansuh al-Ghuri had received an envoy from Ismail, and the Karamanid prince, in exile in Aleppo, had asked Andrea Moresini about preparing a galley to take him back to Karaman (from the letter dated Aug. 1502 in Aleppo). Perhaps this was in part the result of the Grand Master's letter. There was also a second Karamanid prince, Mahmud Turgudoğlu, who had fled to Aleppo in 1487.

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14 It was not unusual for Ottoman governors to conduct negotiations with states on the frontiers, but such negotiations were supposed to be confirmed by the Porte. See for example: Setton, , Papacy, III, 88Google Scholar, on the negotiations of Firuz Beg in Bosnia with Maximilian in 1510. The vassal frontier governors had a certain leeway in negotiations because they provided the Ottoman frontline defence system. See Inalcik, Halil, Gazavat-i Sultan Murad b. Mehemmed Han (Ankara, 1978), pp. 88–91Google Scholar, on the üç begs in fifteenth century Ottoman–Balkan affairs.

15 Uluçay, Çagatay, ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim, nasil padişah oldu?’, Tarih Dergisi, IX (1953), 60Google Scholar. Korkud later mentioned Rhodes as a possible refuge in a letter written while he was in Egypt where he fled after gaining his father's disapproval. A regular and amicable correspondence between Bayezid and d' Aubussone had existed in the years before the Aegean wars of 1499–1502, however the tone of this correspondence was determined to a large extent by the Rhodian and European exile of Cem Sultan, Bayezid's rival. Some of these letters from the years before Cem's death have been edited in Lefort, Jacques, Documents Grecs dans les archives Topkapt Saray (Ankara, 1981), pp. 36–108Google Scholar.

16 Sanuto, , Diarii, IV, 404Google Scholar, reports that Rhodian galleys had captured three fustas and two brigantines in August and that of the forty-six Turkish prisoners fifteen were executed. Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 462–3Google Scholar, writes that the galley which circumnavigated the island caught four fustas and captured forty-seven Turks, most of whom were executed. It is unlikely that one galley could capture four fustas unless the latter had been beached for an attack on shore. Bosio's version is presumably a bastardization of the more accurate account in Sanuto. It was not unusual for the Rhodian captain to return to the island with captured ships and prisoners.

17 Sanuto, , Diarii, IV, 293–4Google Scholar, says thirteen ships were left for defence. Such a large force indicates the precarious nature of the victory.

18 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 463–4Google Scholar; Setton, , Papacy, III, 14–15, 34–5Google Scholar. The French were decisively defeated on 28 Dec. 1503 and soon after Louis XII was obliged formally to cede Naples to King Ferdinand.

19 Setton, , Papacy, III, 18Google Scholar, has pointed out that the ambitions of both the pope and Venice on the mainland worked against co-operative efforts.

20 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 472–3Google Scholar claims that the letters' intent was to assure the sultan that Rhodes was not weakened by the Grand Master's death, under ‘pretence’ of maintaining the commerce and peaceful relations. Given its compromised position at the time, however, Rhodes was in need of assurances of Ottoman goodwill.

21 Sanuto, , Diarii, V, 354, 973Google Scholar. At this time there was a grain shortage in the Aegean. The proveditor of the armada in Oct. 1503 reported ship seizures, high prices and, in Corfu, no bread for sale for three days. He blamed the sultan's ban on grain exports. In Mar. 1504, grain was so scarce in Candia that the people forced a grain ship stopped in port to unload.

22 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 473–4Google Scholar claimed that these knights defeated a force of 600 Turks, clearly an exaggeration.

23 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 474–5Google Scholar.

24 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 475Google Scholar. After the Rhodian punitive fleet returned from Macri the sailors and oarsmen who had been brought to Rhodes from Finale by Fra Fabrizio del Caretto three years earlier asked leave to return home. This leave was granted, causing a crew shortage.

25 Sanuto, , Diarii, V, 958Google Scholar. At this time Bayezid had sent a punitive expedition against the Turkish corsair Kara Durmuş and had his house burned for interfering with the coastal trade.

26 Sourassari, a fortress, may be on the gulf near Macri. Lefort, , ‘Documents’ pp. 61–4Google Scholar on the use of another Ottoman captive in negotiations between the Grand Master and Bayezid in 1487.

27 Sanuto, , Diarii, V, 307Google Scholar. In Sept. or Oct. 1503, six Turkish fustas sailed from Valona and attacked Capo Santo Maria carrying off sixty people. They also seized a grain ship from Taranto. Thirty ducats apiece were demanded for the captives.

28 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 477Google Scholar.

29 Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 93Google Scholar. Bosio makes no mention of this attack which may mean that it was carried out by knights with their own private armed ships. This is likely since the Rhodian fleet was in port in September because of the arrival from France of the Grand Master. Another explanation might be that the seizure was not included in Bosio's chronicle because the ship was Genoese and its seizure was something of an embarrassment.

30 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 479–81Google Scholar.

31 Note that at this same time a single Ottoman fleet cruising the Aegean consisted of eighteen vessels, only one segment of the Ottoman armada which numbered well over 100 ships. Sanuto, , Diarii, V, 465–6Google Scholar; VI, 63–4.

32 Among the extraordinary expenses listed during this council meeting was the maintenance of Cem's son Murad, the current sultan's nephew. Like extra fleet maintenance, his stipend was considered an extraordinary defence expenditure. Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 482–3Google Scholar.

33 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 486Google Scholar.

34 Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 137, 151, 162–3, 180Google Scholar.

35 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 484Google Scholar; Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 137, 151, 162, 180Google Scholar. Kemal attacked Lango in June.

36 Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 356, 386, 401, 416Google Scholar; Luttrell, , ‘Venice’, p. 200Google Scholar. The Knights controlled estates on Cyprus, especially sugar producing land.

37 This event, combined with a report from Rhodes in Oct., would seem to indicate that the account in Bosio of a Mamluk attack on Rhodes by seven fustas sent from Alexandria may well be spurious: Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 487Google Scholar. The attack was supposed to have taken place in autumn 1506 and all seven fustas were supposedly taken by two Rhodian galleys: Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 488–9Google Scholar. There is no mention of this attack either in Sanuto or in Ibn Iyās, the Mamluk chronicler.

38 Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 190, 198, 218Google Scholar. Later Ottoman punitive expeditions were also justified as being in response to Rhodian raiding: Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 554Google Scholar.

39 Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 337–461Google Scholar.

40 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 489, 497Google Scholar.

41 Kemal Re'is was reported to have sailed to N. Africa early in 1506 with between eleven and twenty-three ships (varying reports): Sanuto, , Diarii, VI, 300, 344, 368Google Scholar. Re'is, Piri, Kitab, pp. 636, 654–5, 671Google Scholar mentions Kemal Re'is' visits to the Maghrib. He does not, however, give the years, saying only that the voyages occurred in times past. He mentions the size of Kemal's fleet as three kadirga. It is likely that Piri Re'is was referring to Kemal's 1506 voyage when he mentioned the letter, sent via Kemal to the Porte from Tripoli, requesting aid. Bosio, , Istoria, p. 486Google Scholar reports that an Ottoman fleet of eleven ships (galiots and fustas) sailed from Gallipoli. This is probably the same fleet mentioned in Sanuto. Also, about forty fustas were reported arming on the borders of Sourassari to attack Rhodes.

42 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 487Google Scholar. See Guilmartin, John, Gunpowder and galleys (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 77–8Google Scholar, on cannon and port siege tactics. Guilmartin speaks of the ‘convertible’ use of men and of guns.

43 Sanuto, , Diarii, VII, 164, 168Google Scholar; Bosio, , Istoria, p. 490Google Scholar. Kemal arrived in Alexandria in September.

44 Sanuto, , Diarii, X, 255, 389Google Scholar. On the history of Sicily's grain trade with the mainland and in the Levant see: Bresc, Henri, ‘La Sicile et la mer: marins, navires, et routes maritimes’, Navigation et gens de mer en Mediterranée de la préhistoire à nos jours (Paris, 1980), pp. 59–61Google Scholar, and Un monde Mediterranéen (Paris, 1986)Google Scholar; Braudel, Fernand, Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century (3 vols., New York, 1979), III, 163Google Scholar.

45 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 490–1Google Scholar. Sanuto mentions that Rhodes had seized a Genoese ship with 600 muslim merchants en route from Tunis to Alexandria with a cargo of oil, carpets, and cotton in autumn 1507. It is unclear whether this is the same vessel. Sanuto, , Diarii, VII, 239Google Scholar.

46 The escalation of Ottoman aid to the Mamluks coincident with Ismail's attack was no accident. Sanuto, , Diarii, VII, 534–5, 538Google Scholar. Another preoccupation for the Ottomans was a major earthquake in Anatolia on 10 Sep. 1509 which ruined 1,500 houses and killed 4,000 people in Istanbul: Sanuto, , Diarii, IX, 261Google Scholar.

47 In 1509 there are reports in Sanuto of French vessels sailing the Aegean to attack Venetian ships. Bayezid took measures to garrison extra troops on the Aegean coasts against the European League members: Sanuto, , Diarii, IX, 86, 166Google Scholar. According to the captain of the Beirut galleys, the Grand Master even prevented French ships in the canal of Rhodes from sailing out to attack the Venetian galleys. There seemed to be a concerted effort to maintain the relative peace in the Aegean, despite affairs on the Italian mainland.

48 Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī al-Zuhūr fī waqa-ī al-Duhūr (4 vols., Cairo, 1961), IV, 146Google Scholar.

49 Sanuto, , Diarii, V, 824Google Scholar; X, 105. The Aegean grain shortage continued and impounding foodstuffs from ships in port was not an uncommon practice. Sanuto, , Diarii, XI, 265Google Scholar. In Sep. 1510, when Lorenzo Justinian returned to Venice from his post as luogotenente of Cyprus he reported that there was not enough grain on the island for food. He had purchased 12,000 moza from Damietta (100 moza of Cyprus = 38 stera of Venice). Lane, Frederic, Venice and history (Baltimore, 1966), p. 358Google Scholar estimates the stera of wheat = 132 litre/62.9 kg. Earlier in Justinian's term Cyprus had had surpluses (37,000 ducats worth of grain and produce had been sent to Venice during his term according to Justinian). He added that Cyprus was now impoverished, and that only the trade with Syria kept it alive. Sanuto, , Diarii, XXI, 202–3Google Scholar notes that later, in 1515 when the Candians complained about Rhodian raiding on their shipping, Venice asked the Grand Master for reparations. The Grand Master responded cordially but did not pay.

50 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 492Google Scholar; Sanuto, , Diarii, VII, 607, 630, 711, 769–70Google Scholar. There was a skirmish between Kemal's fleet and some Rhodian vessels late in 1508.

51 Sanuto, , Diarii, VII, 588, 649Google Scholar; IX, 81. Escalating grain prices only increased the temptation for corsairing on all sides. The capture some years later in 1512 by Rhodians of eighteen Turkish grain transports caused the price of wheat in Istanbul to increase from nine to fourteen aspers a measure: Setton, , Papacy, III, 122Google Scholar.

52 The fleet numbered approximately eleven galleys. In Nov. 1508, Ala al-Din returned to report to Qansuh on the preparations: Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī, IV, 129–30, 139Google Scholar.

53 Sanuto, , Diarii, XI, 265Google Scholar. In 1510 the luogotenente of Cyprus reported that he needed 5,000 men adequately to defend the island. He reinforced his point by stating that when the Mamluk fleet had been armed in 1508, he had been unable to mobilize even 500 men for the defence of the island. He had arms only for 250 men. Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī, IV, 129Google Scholar reported that this Mamluk fleet was being prepared for use against European corsairs. Bosio, , Istoria, p. 492Google Scholar, said the fleet was intended both to attack Rhodes and to gather lumber. Note that this fleet should not be confused with the escort fleet which took the Mamluk ambassador to Istanbul in 1509. That fleet was armed at Alexandria: Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī, IV, 156Google Scholar.

54 Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī; IV, 153–5, 157–8Google Scholar.

55 Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī, IV, 153–6Google Scholar. A report from Cyprus in Sanuto, , Diarii, X, 109, dated 02 1510Google Scholar claims that Korkud's brother Ahmed in Amasia had conspired against him in a plot to have Korkud's janissaries murder him. Another report, Sanuto, , Diarii, IX, 12Google Scholar, from Istanbul says that Korkud left because he was disdained by his father Bayezid, and adds, on the authority of Hersek Paşa, that Bayezid wished to replace his son with someone else. Sanuto, , Diarii, XI, 76Google Scholar contains a report from Alexandria claiming Korkud had fled to Cairo because Bayezid tried to kill him. Selim sent an envoy to demand that Qansuh return Korkud. Ulucay, , ‘Yavuz’, pp. 58–60Google Scholar, dates the quarrel between Ahmed and Korkud to 1502 when Bayezid transferred Korkud from the governorship of Saruhan to that of Antalya (Teke province). He attributes this transfer to Ahmed's ambitions and adds that Korkud also was at odds with Ahmed's ally, the Sadrazam. See Sadeddin, , Tac, II, 130Google Scholar.

56 Sanuto, , Diarii, X, 95, 110, 142, 885Google Scholar: XI, 65; Bosio, , Istoria, p. 492Google Scholar. The corsair was said to have a galion and a fusta, or a gallon and a brigantine. A corsair with the same name was still active in 1515: Sanuto, , Diarii, XX, 579Google Scholar. Venice at this time was also plagued by corsair attacks and, in spring of 1510, lost two ships at Saline to a corsair named Bernardin, said to be the ‘scourge of the seas’. Bernardin too was still active in 1515: Sanuto, , Diarii, XX, 309Google Scholar.

57 Iyās, Ibn, Bada-ī, IV, 156, 159Google Scholar; Bosio, , Istoria, p. 492Google Scholar.

58 Sanuto, , Diarii, VIII, 506Google Scholar.

59 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 493–4Google Scholar. Sanuto, , Diarii, XI, 645–6Google Scholar, contains a report of the attack from the captain of Famagosta. He writes that the battle took place on 20 Aug., the Rhodian fleet consisted of seventeen vessels and the captured vessels numbered twenty-two with all their artillery. He adds that Venice had been blamed for this attack which, combined with the capture of Nicolo Soror, a man accused of spying for Venice in Syria, had resulted in a disaster for the Venetian merchants in Mamluk territory.

60 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 495Google Scholar.

61 Setton, , Papacy, III, 116–18, 132–5Google Scholar. The French defeated the Spanish in this bloody battle but by the end of the year the French had been driven out of Italy. In spring 1513 Venice signed a treaty with France in response to the pact signed in Nov. 1512 by the pope and the emperor.

62 For example: Sanuto, , Diarii, XVII, 537, 539–40Google Scholar; XIX, 88. The latter reference comments on Selim's bellicosity with admiration, saying no ruler, with the possible exception of Xerxes, had ever commanded so many cavalrymen.

63 Bosio, , Istoria, p. 508Google Scholar. In 1514 a list of the extraordinary expenses of the Order included the following: maintenance of galleys, carracks, barks and heavy barks; ambassadors, messengers, spies; expenses of Cem's sons; presents to princes; transport of munitions to Rhodes such as artillery, powder, balls, iron spingards, etc. If there was a siege or clear threat of a siege the council would vote on whatever expenditures were necessary to meet the need.

64 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 501–3, 506Google Scholar. Pope Julius II was still at war with Louis XII of France. Caretto arrived in spring with two grain ships, bringing some relief to the city. Later that same year Caretto was elected Grand Master.

65 Sanuto, , Diarii, XX, 109, 361, 401Google Scholar. In Mar. 1515 Justinian, the Venetian bailo in Istanbul, reported that Selim planned to attack Ala al-Dawla. In July, a report from Edirne says that the armada was being prepared for an expedition against Alexandria.

66 Sanuto, , Diarii, XVII, 487, 505Google Scholar.

67 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 509–10Google Scholar; von Palumbini, Barbara, Bündniswerben abenländischer Mächte um Persien 1453–1600 (Wiesbaden, 1968), pp. 50–1Google Scholar. Under Grand Master d' Amboise regular communication, to which Pope Julius II was a party, was pursued with Ismail through the intermediary of an Italian named Manuflundino (sic) in 1508–9.

68 Sanuto, , Diarii, XXII, 355Google Scholar. Ismail's letter, dated 1 Oct. 1515, is a friendship letter, urging the Grand Master to strengthen their ties by sending him Cem's son, Murad, the current Ottoman sultan's cousin and a pretender to the throne.

69 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 511, 513Google Scholar.

70 Sanuto, , Diarii, XXII, 9, 204, 349, 458, 541Google Scholar. The Venetian bailo's report in Apr. 1516 indicated that the fleet in port at Istanbul numbered some 120 heavy galleys, 100 light galleys, 40 palandarias, etc. Venice was fearful that this armada might attack Chios.

71 Sanuto, , Diarii, XXII, 350Google Scholar.

72 Bosio, , Istoria, pp. 511–12Google Scholar; Sanuto, , Diarii, XXIII, 595Google Scholar. A dispatch from Corfu in Jan. 1517 claimed the Mamluk envoy had demanded and received 100 pieces of artillery from the Grand Master.

73 Bacqué-Grammont, Jean Louis, ‘Soutien logistique et presence navale Ottoman en Mediterranée en 1517’, Revue de l' occident musulman et de la Mediterranèe, XXXIX (1985), 7–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Using a Topkapi document from the Kapudan Cafer Paşa and Sanuto, Bacqué-Grammont comments on the size and organization of the fleet returning from Alexandria.