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The Failure of Popular Counter-Revolution in Risorgimento Italy: the Case of the Centurions, 1831–1847

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Alan J. Reinerman
Alan J. Reinerman
Affiliation:
Boston College
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Extract

In contrast to the innumerable studies of the revolutionary movement in risorgimento Italy, the popular counter-revolutionary movement has received scant attention from historians. Reasons for this neglect are not hard to find: distaste for what is perceived as a retrograde movement on behalf of a deservedly lost cause reinforces the normal tendency of historians to concentrate on the ‘winners’ rather than the ‘losers’ who by their very nature seem of less significance. That the Italian popular counter-revolution, was among the losers of history is undeniable: it did not succeed in its own time, nor did it contribute to any of the great progressive movements that transformed European society over the next century. Nonetheless, this neglect seems unjustified. To ignore a movement that had the support of a sizeable part of the Italian people – indeed, greater support at times than the risorgimento itself, which few historians would deny was the work of a small elite – can only result in a very distorted picture of nineteenth-century Italy. Moreover, to understand the development of a complex historical event such as the risorgimento, it is not sufficient to study only the winners, for the nature and weaknesses of the losers may also have played a major role in determining the outcome. This raises a fundamental question concerning the Italian counter-revolution: enjoying as it did wide popular support, why did it accomplish so little? It had its moments of triumph, but in general its record was unimpressive. Why did not this reservoir of popular support give conservatives the upper hand and abort the risorgimento? Why, in particular, did conservative governments make so little use of this apparently potent ally?

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Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 21 - 41
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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References

1 The only attempt at an overall study of the Italian counter-revolution is Leone, Francesco, Storia della controrivoluzione in Italia, 1798–1859 (Naples, 1975)Google Scholar, brief and uneven. The Italian counter-revolution may be divided into three branches: the official, i.e. the repressive actions of governments; the intellectual, the attempt to refute liberal theories and to establish an effective anti-revolutionary ideology, by the numerous Italian followers of such figures as de Maistre or the early Lamennais; and the popular, the focus of this article. The first two have attracted some attention from historians, the third, very little.

2 Much has been written on the 1831 revolution in the papal state; see the survey of the literature inBibliografia del'età del Risorgimento (3 vols., Florence, 1972), II, 241–3, 281–4Google Scholar.

3 On Bernetti's policy during the 1831 revolution, see Reinerman, Alan J., ‘The papacy and Austrian intervention in the 1831 revolution’, Proceedings of the 1983 consortium on revolutionary Europe (Athens, Georgia, 1935), pp. 562–82Google Scholar. On Bernetti, see Morelli, Emilia, La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti (Rome, 1953)Google Scholar.

4 Archives du Ministère des Affairs Étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique: Rome, St Aulaire to Broglie, 13 Nov. 1832.

5 On the sanfedisti and the background of their uprising, see Rodolico, Niccolo, Il popolo agli inizi del Risorgimento nell' Italia meridionale (Florence, 1925)Google Scholar, and Marotta, Gerardo et al. , La Notte comincia ancora una volta (Cosenza, 1985)Google Scholar. On Canosa, see Maturi, Walter, Il Principle di Canosa (Florence, 1944)Google Scholar.

6 Archivio Segreto Vaticano (hereafter cited: AV), R190, ‘Disposizioni sull' organizzazione della Truppa Ausiliaria di Riserva’, 1 Sept. 1831. Archivio di Stato di Roma (hereafter: ASR), Affari speciali, busta 1428, Bernetti to Presidenza delle Armi, 30 Nov. 1835; Presidenza delle Armi, to Resta, 15 Dec. 1835; Barbieri to Presidenza delle Armi, 21 Jan. 1836; Lambruschini to Presidenza delle Armi, 12 Feb. 1836.

7 This account of the origins of the centurions, a subject of which little detailed and definite information is available, is based on: AV, R165, Reports of Bartolazzi to Bernetti, December 1831 – May 1832, and directions of Bernetti to Bertolazzi, especially 21 Jan. 10 July, 19 July 1832, and to Grasellini and Ciacchi, 10 July 1832 and his circular of 20 Apr. 1832 to the delegates of the Marches; Haus-, Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter: HHSA), Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 4 Nov. 1832, fo. 365-E, 30 June 1833, fo. 414-C. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (hereafter: AMAEP), St Aulaire to Broglie, 13 Nov. 1832, fo. 76. The only scholarly study is Di Iorio, M. G., ‘I Centurioni’, Archivio della Societa Romano di Storia Patria, LXXXIV (1966), 193–270Google Scholar. The centurions are described by most nineteenth-century historians of this period, e.g. Gualterio, F. A., Gli ultimi rivolgimenti italiani (4 vols., Florence, 1852), I, 130–2Google Scholar; Vesi, Antonio, Rivoluzioni di Romagna del 1831 (Florence, 1881), pp. 207–17Google Scholar; Farini, Luigi Carlo, The Roman state from 1815 to 1850 (London, 1851), I, 71–4Google Scholar; Bianchi, Nicomede, Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia 1814–1861 (8 vols., Turin, 1865–1872), III, 14953Google Scholar; but their accounts reflect more the political passions of the age than an attempt at serious scholarship, and are perhaps most useful in indicating the degree of alarm which the centurions aroused in their enemies. The same tends to be true of the scattered references to the centurions and volunteers in the literature in English, though Berkeley, G. F. H., Italy in the making, 1815 to 1846 (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 131–4, 262–3Google Scholar, gives as usual a balanced account, though brief and not entirely accurate, while Hales, E. E. Y., Revolution and papacy (New York, 1960), pp. 255–6, 274–5Google Scholar, discusses them from the viewpoint – generally unfavourable – of Bishop Mastai of Imola, the future Pius IX.

8 ‘So far, they haven't cost the government as much as a thousand scudi,’ Bernetti wrote with satisfaction in 1833: AV, R165, to Spinola, 9 April 1833. Throughout the restoration the financial situation of the papal state was precarious, and the 1831 revolution and the cost of repressing it had driven the state close to bankruptcy; this was among the reasons why the centurions enjoyed such wide support in the papal government – they seemed an inexpensive way to maintain papal control, in contrast to regular troops or even more expensive Swiss mercenaries such as Metternich urged Rome to hire, e.g. HHSA, Metternich to Lützow, 13 March, fo. 6, 19 March, fo. 4, 5 May 1832, fo. 2.

9 AMAEP, St Aulaire to Sebastiani, 7 July 1832, fo. 36.

10 HHSA, Lützow to Metternich, 4 Nov. 1832, fo. 365-E; circular from Bernetti to the delegates in the Marches, 20 Apr. 1833, Iorio, Di, ‘I Centurioni’, pp. 239–41Google Scholar.

11 Bernetti disapproved of this terrorism and tried ineffectually to check it, but was handicapped by his unwillingness to discourage the zeal of the centurions, e.g. AV, R190, Bernetti to Babini, 2 Dec. 1834.

12 Crosa's report of 9 Sept. 1834, in Bianchi, , Storia documentata, III, 150Google Scholar: ‘He wished that everything be done secretly, so that no one would know precisely the numbers, strength, or means of action of this militia, which would only be revealed unexpectedly, in case of need. This method best suited Cardinal Bernetti's idea of using this mysterious force to fight the equally mysterious plots of the revolutionaries, above all by inspiring greater fear of the militia and of papal authority.’

13 Few records have been preserved that include the social origins of the centurions and their successors, the papal volunteers; but those few I have found confirm the contemporary belief that they were recruited primarily from the peasantry with some recruits from the lower classes of the towns, e.g. of a group of twenty candidates for membership at Forli in 1834, four were small farmers, seven tenants, six farm labourers, and three town workers: AV, R190, ‘Ruolo dei volontari’, 2 May 1834. Similar lists from 1837 and 1844 show the same preponderance of peasants and farm workers, with a minority of town workers: Archivio di Stato di Bologna (hereafter: ASB), Legazione, Riservata, 1837, ‘Ruolo dei Volontari Pontifici’, and Curzi to the Legate, 30 06 1844Google Scholar.

14 AV, R165, Bartolazzi to Bernetti, 28 March, 17 July 1832, HHSA, Rom: Varia Sebregondi to Metternich, 28 June 1833; Hrabowski to Metternich, 17 Apr. 1833. Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna, pp. 208–9Google Scholar, Farini, , The Roman state, I, 72Google Scholar.

15 AV, R165, Bernetti to Bartolazzi, 24 Nov. 1832, and circular to the delegates of the Marches, 20 Apr. 1833; R190, Macchi to Lambruschini, 5 Jan. 1838. HHSA, Rom: Varia, Hrabowski to Metternich, 17 Apr. 1833.

16 HHSA, Rom: Varia, Hrabowski to Metternich, 17 Apr. 1833. See also the report of the Austrian ambassador, Lützow, to Metternich, HHSA, Rom: Berichte, 18 May 1836, fo. 28-B, surveying the attitude of the various classes towards the papal regime, with the conclusion that there was no class among the educated provincial laity upon which Rome could count: as for ‘the upper and lower nobility, and the class of landowners, I look there in vain for affection and devotion to the papal government’. Rome could rely only upon the clergy and the lower classes. Lützow felt that even the Roman princes, though not hostile to the papacy, ‘regard its difficulties with a certain indifference’, to Metternich, 10 March 1832.

17 E.g. the revisionist works of Blois, Paul, Paysans de l'Quest (Le Mans, 1960)Google Scholar; Faucheux, Marcel, L' Insurrection vendéenne de 1793 (Paris, 1964)Google Scholar, Tilly, Charles, The Vendée (Cambridge, 1964)Google Scholar; andSutherland, D. M. G., The chouans (Oxford, 1982)Google Scholar.

18 This is true of both published works and archival sources. The latter are in any case scanty, and what we have are the ‘external’ records, the documents originating with the central or provincial administrations; the ‘internal’ records kept by the centurions themselves have not survived, and may well have been destroyed, as the records of the militia in the Legations seem to have been destroyed by its inspector-general, Delia Noce, after his dismissal in 1836. The difficulties which this creates for ascertaining the motives of the centurions, as well as their social origins, are apparent.

19 HHSA, Rom: Varia, Hrabowski to Metternich, 17 Apr. 1833. AV, R165, Spinola to Bernetti, 4 May 1833. Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna, pp. 208–18Google Scholar.

20 Farini, , The Roman state, I, 72Google Scholar. See also the diatribe on this point by Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna quoted on p. 9Google Scholar.

21 On the importance of such fears in turning not only liberals but moderate conservatives against the centurions, see ibid. pp. 8–11.

22 As early as November 1832, pressure from the land owners had driven some centurions to ask permission to resign, but others had refused to bow to such pressures. Bernetti directed that no effort should be made to persuade those who wished to resign to remain, since with divided loyalties they would not be reliable in a crisis: AV, R165, Bernetti to Bartolazzi, 24 Nov. 1832. He ordered the local authorities to be on the watch for such pressures and to try to prevent them: ibid., circular to the delegates in the Marches, 20 Apr. 1833. Despite his orders, such pressure continued to be exerted at least down to 1838, though it did not prevent the expansion of the military from taking place nonetheless: AV, R190, Macchi to Lambruschini, 5 Jan. 1838.

23 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 4 Nov. 1832, fo. 356-E. AV, R165, circular to the delegates in the Marches, 20 Apr. 1833, aIorio, Di, ‘I Centurioni’, pp. 239–41Google Scholar. How many of these recruits were in fact actively involved in the organization, doing more than passively signing up as members, is another question, but one to which the available evidence does not allow us to give an answer.

24 AV, R165, to Spinola, 9 Apr. 1833.

25 Ibid.

26 AV, R190, Macchi to Lambruschini, 5 Jan. 1983. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lützow, 16 Jan. 1834, 16 July 1834, fo. 1.

27 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 4 Nov. 1832, fo. 365-E. AMAEP, St Aulaire to Broglie, 13 Nov. 1832, fo. 76.

28 E.g. AV, R165, Grassellini to Bernetti, 3 July 1832; Ciacchi to Bernetti, July 1832; Bernetti to Bartolazzi, 10 July, 19 July 1832. Bernetti's only reply was they need feel no concern, for the sole function of the centurions was to uphold the government, and only its enemies need fear them: Ibid., to Grassellini and Ciacchi, 10 July 1832. Not until April of 1833 did he bother to send local authorities an explanation of the nature and purposes of the centurions: ibid. circular of 20 Apr. 1833, to the delegates in the Marches.

29 AV, R190, Bernetti to Freddi, 14 March 1833.

30 ‘At once’ is no exaggeration: in many cases, violence erupted on the first day that the centurions appeared in town: ASB, Circular of 8 Jan. 1834; also, Serafini, Alberto, Pio Nono (Vatican City, 1958), pp. 1232–5Google Scholar.

31 Cronaca di Bologna (Bologna, 1960), I, 215Google Scholar.

32 Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna, pp. 210–11Google Scholar. Another if lesser cause for their unpopularity was that their tax exemptions had to be made by their neighbours: AV, R.190, Lambruschini to Macchi, 6 July 1837.

33 HHSA, Rom: VAria, Report of Lt. Zorzi, 15 Apr. 1833, with Hrabowski to Metternich, 26 Apr. 1833. The accuracy of this report is confirmed by the complaint of the bishop of Faenza to Bernetti of 12 Apr. 1833, in AV, R190. Similar complaints came in from all the towns of the Legations, but the situation at Faenza remained particularly bad, since it had become the chief centre of the centurions in the Legations. According to Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna, pp. 211–17Google Scholar, ‘in Faenza alone some eight hundred of its best and most respected citizens were killed or injured’, and he gives many graphic details of atrocities by the centurions. His account is polemical, but contains at least a basis of truth.

34 AV, R190, Spinola to Bernetti, 3 Apr. 1833; also, 9, 29 Apr. 1833.

35 Ibid. Spinola to Bernetti, 15 May 1833.

36 This account of Metternich's views on the centurions and volunteers is based on: HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lützow, 16 Nov. 1832, fo. 1, 19 Apr. 3 May, 8 June fo. 2, 14 June, 12 July, 24 July, 1833, 16 Jan., fo. 1, 16 July 1834, fo. 1, 8 Apr., fo. 1, 30 May, 1835, secret, 6 February, 19 March, fo. 3, 23 Apr., fo. 2, 29 Oct. 1836; and to Mareschal, 20 Sept., fo. 1 and fo. 2, 30 Oct. 1834, fo. 2.

37 Ibid. Metternich to Lützow, 18 March, 19 Apr., 3 May 1833.

38 For Metternich's views on reform and his efforts, largely unsuccessful, to secure it, see: von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (3 vols., Munich, 1925–1954), I, 429–64Google Scholar; Radvany, Egon, Metternich's projects for reform in Austria (The Hague, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, Arthur J., Metternich, reorganization and nationality, 1813–1818 (Wiebaden, 1936)Google Scholar; Reinerman, Alan J., ‘Metternich and reform: the case of the papal state’, The Journal of Modern History, XLII (1970), 524–48CrossRefGoogle Scholara.

39 See Reinerman, ‘Metternich and reform.’

40 AV, R25, Bernetti to Consalvi, 4 Nov. 1815. O n the reactionary convictions of the Roman ruling class, the reasons for them, and the way in which they defeated every effort to reform, see Reinerman, Alan J., Austria and the papacy in the age of Metternich, 1809–1848, vol. 1: Between conflict and cooperation (Washington, 1979), pp. 35–44 and 124–49Google Scholar.

41 Reinerman, Alan J., ‘The concert baffled: the Roman conference of 1831’, International History Review, V (1983), 20–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Reinerman, , Austria and the papacy, pp. 32–5, 128–9Google Scholar.

43 Raccolta delle leggi (15 vols., Rome, 1834–1936), VII, 138–45Google Scholar, ‘Regolamento’, 1 June 1833.

44 AV, R190, Sebregondi to Armellini, 22 May, 28 May 1833; Spinola to Bernetti, 15 May 1833. R165, Bernetti to Spinola, 21 May 1833. HHSA, Rom: Varia, Sebregondi to Metternich, 24 May 1833.

45 HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lützow, 16 Jan. 1834. AV, R190, Spinola to Bernetti, 29 Aug. 1833.

46 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 10 Aug., fo. 418-D, 25 Aug., fo. 424-A, 1833, 25 Jan., fo. 452-E, 31 May 1834, fo. 470-B.

47 AV, R190, Spinola to Bernetti, 9 Apr. 1835.

48 AV, R190, Lützow to Bernetti, 23 July 1834. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 31 May, fo. 470-B, 19 July 1834, fo. 481. Canosa also had great influence over the volunteers, and the pope even considered appointing him as inspector general, but Della Noce would not yield his post: Canosa to Berardi, 4 Oct. 1834, with Puchner to Metternich, 18 Nov. 1835, HHSA, Rom: Varia.

49 HHSA, Rom: Varia, Hrabowski to Metternich, 13 Dec. 1833. Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 25 Jan. 1834, fo. 452-E, 31 May 1834, fo. 470-B AV, R190, Della Noce to Bernetti, 18 March, 19 March 1834; Spinola to Bernetti, 5 May 1834.

50 AV, R190, Bernetti to Spinola, July 1834.

51 Ibid.; also, Bernetti to Ostini, 26 July 1834, and to Lützow, 26 July 1834, and in HHSA, Rom, fo. 470-A, 29 July 1834, fo. 484-B.4.

52 AV, R190, Bernetti to Spinola, 19 July 1834.

53 Copies of the two notices annexed to Lützow to Metternich, 29 July 1834, fo. 484-B, HHSA, Rom: Berichte.

54 AV, R190, Lucciardi to Bernetti, 23 July 1834; Bernetti to Della Noce, 27 Sept. 1834. HHSA, Rom: Varia, Puchner to Metternich, 7 Apr., 17 May 1835; Sebregondi to Metternich, 23 Aug. 1834.

56 Historical parallels are tricky, but there do seem to be genuine analogies between the centurions and volunteers of the 1830s, and the squadristi of the Fascist era. Martin Clark, in a recent attempt to define squadrismo and its place in Italian history – Clark, Martin, ‘Squadrismo’;, synopsis of paper in Newsletter of the Association for the Study of Modern Italy (England), Autumn, 1984, p. 3Google Scholar– considers it a recurrent phenomenon of Italian society, likely to appear whenever certain conditions exist. His treatment is limited to twentieth century; but a comparison of his description of the squadristi with the centurions and volunteers suggests that the phenomenon may be found as early as the 1830s. He defines squadrismo as relatively small-scale extra-legal violence carried out by an unofficial, and hence ‘subversive’ paramilitary organization against another ‘subversive’ group, with the approval of the local elite and government officials, and hold that it is likely to recur when the position of a local elite was threatened, provided that the normal state means of force were ineffective or nonexistent. If we take as the local elite whose position was threatened the clerical ruling class of the papal state and its allies, rather than the middle class and landowners as in the 1920s, this description seems to fit the centurions and volunteers. They too were at first unofficial, spontaneous in origin, and if they later became an official organization, they-were always restive in that role, always inclined to reject authority or indeed to dominate it; and after all, the squadristi also acquired an official role after 1922, and like the volunteers came to be seen as a problem rather than an asset by the regime which they served, so that they too had to be tamed, after which their original enthusiasm and force dwindled until they become virtually useless. Moreover, Clark's, Martin comment on squadrismo in his Modern Italy, 1871–1982 (London, 1984), p. 216Google Scholar, that it was ‘not just class conflict, nor was it just thuggery…Above all, the squads were convinced of their own righteousness’, is also applicable to the militia of the 1830s. And, needless to say, there is a definite resemblance between the methods, and the atrocities, of the volunteers and those of the squadristi – the account of the volunteers' activities in Faenza given in Vesi, , Rivoluzioni di Romagna, pp. 211–17Google Scholar, could equally well be a description of those of the squads eighty years later. Both groups even originated in the same region – central Italy, especially Emilia-Romagna. Perhaps squadrismo had an older pedigree in Italian history, and deeper roots in Italian society, that students of fascism have suspected?

56 HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Mareschal, 20 Sept., fo. 3, 18 Oct., 30 Oct. 1834, fo. 2. Rom: Varia, Sebregondi to Metternich, 2 Aug. 1834. AV, R190, Spinola to Bernetti, 23 Sept. 1834.

57 HHSA, Rom: Varia, Sebregondi to Metternich, 2 Aug., 15 Nov., 22 Nov. 1834. Bernetti did not try to deny the abuses of the volunteers, but held that they resulted, not from the nature of the organization or the privileges given it, but only from the failure of its commanders to set proper standards for admission to the corps and to maintain proper discipline for its members, ‘From that premise’, he replied to Spinola's complaints, ‘I conclude that the dissolution of the volunteers or the withdrawal of their privileges would not remedy the disorder and that the only way to cure it is to inflict prompt and exemplary punishment on the guilty… I will not cease to insist on that’, AV, R190, Bernetti to Spinola, 12 Feb. 1835. Bernetti may well have been sincere in this stand; but in practice, though he frequently directed the volunteer leaders to insist on proper discipline, it was usually easy for Delia Noce and other leaders to convince him that the charges against the volunteers were baseless or exaggerated. For example, Bernetti to Della Noce, 27 Sept. 1834, 21 Feb. 1835; Della Noce to Bernetti, 7 Oct. 1834, 4 Dec. 1834, 1 May 1835.

58 ‘Is it possible,’ Bernetti asked one of the most fervent defenders of the volunteers, their chaplain, Babini, ‘that of the ten or twelve different reports I receive every day, all full of complaints against the corps, none has any truth in it?’, AV, R190, 2 Dec. 1834. Babini, a parish priest of Faenza, had been one of the first and most enthusiastic supporters of the volunteers, and his efforts were largely responsible for making Faenza their greatest stronghold.

69 Ibid. Bernetti to Della Noce, 27 Sept. 1834.

60 Ibid. also, 11 Oct. 1834.

61 Ibid. Della Noce to Bernetti, 4 Dec. 1834; Lucciari to Bernetti, 19 Dec. 1834; Bernetti to Spinola, 12 Feb. 1835; Freddi to Bernetti, 9 March 1835. Th e resumption of violence in the spring of 1835 was partly in reaction to reports that Mazzini and other radicals were organizing bands of guerrillas to operate in the Romagna, which seemed to indicate the need for volunteer action to avert this new threat. There was in fact much discussion of this strategy among the radicals, inspired by the ideas of Carlo Bianco di Saint-Jorioz, but nothing came of it.

62 AV, R190, Spinola to Bernetti, g Apr. 1835. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 13 June, fo. 27-B, 20 June, fo. 28-A, 27 July 1835, fo. 33-A.

63 HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lützow, 27 June 1835.

64 Morelli, , La politica estera, pp. 162–8Google Scholar.Narciso Nada, Metternich e le reforme nello Stato Pontificio 1832–1836 (Turin, 1957), pp. 182–4Google Scholara.

65 On Lambruschini's views on the centurions and volunteers, see: AV, R190, Lambruschini's dispatch of 20 June 1986: ‘Istruzioni da darsi’, July 5 1836; ‘Prospetto per l'indienza di N.S.’, 25 Dec. 1836. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 23 Jan., fo. 5-A, 21 Feb. fo. I3-C, 4 March fo. 14-A & B, 16 Apr., fo. 22-A, 6 May, fo. 25-B, 14 May, fo. 27-A, 18 May 1836, fo. 28-B.

66 HHSA, Rom: Berichte Lützow to Metternich, 21 Feb. 1836, fo. 12-C.

67 Ibid. 5 March 1836, fo. 14-B.

68 Ibid. 21 Jan., fo. 2-C, 4 Feb., fo. 4-A, 5 Aug., fo. 37-B, 2 Sept. 1837, fo. 46-A. ‘It wouldn't be too much to say that the Holy Father feels himself compelled to a sacrifice that is against his personal convictions, for his spirit is too much in favour of the volunteers,’ reported Lützow on 28 May 1836, fo. 30-A.

69 During 1835–7, various cardinals and prelates presented projects to increase the number of volunteers, expand their activities to Rome itself, or assign them a secret police role.

70 The principal concession was a change in the administration of the Legations. Since the 1831 revolution they had been governed by a cardinal-commissioner, with a pro-legate, usually a layman, for each Legation. This system had been intended to placate the popular demand for lay administration, but it aroused strong opposition from the cardinals who resented the loss of their former monopoly of high posts in the provincial administration. Lambruschini's plan linked his proposed reform of the volunteers with a restoration of the old system of a cardinal-legate for each Legation.

71 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 21 Feb., fo. 12-C, 5 March, fo. 14-B, 6 May, fo. 25-B, 14 May, fo. 27-A, 18 May 1836, fo. 28-B.

72 AV, R90, Notificazione del 30 June 1836, amplified by Lambruschini's ‘Istruzioni da darsi ai Cardinal-Legate’, 5 July 1836. On the meeting of 15 May, see ‘Promemoria per la Seduta del 15 maggio 1836’, R190, and HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 18 May, 1836, fo. 28-B. R247, Lambruschini to Ostini, 11 June 1836.

73 AV, R190, ‘Istruzioni da darsi ai Cardinali-legati’, 5 July 1836; HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 9 July 1836, fo. 36-A, with copy of Lambruschini to Macchi, 6 July 1836, directing him to watch Delia Noce carefully to ensure that he did not continue to influence the volunteers.

74 AV, R190, Macchi to Lambruschini, 30 Oct. 1836. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 23 July, fo. 38-B, 6 Aug., fo. 39-B, 20 Aug. 1836, fo. 41-A.

75 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 20 Aug. 41-A, 12 Nov. 1836, fo. 50-A.

76 Ibid. 6 Aug., fo. 39-B, 12 Nov. 1836, fo. 50-A.

77 AV, R190, Lambruschini to Presidenza delle armi, 9 Nov. 1836, HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 12 Nov. 1836, fo. 50-A.

78 AV, R190, ‘Supplica al Pontefice di alcuni dei commandanti… nei Marche’, 1836; Gizzi to Lambruschini, 7 May 1838; Direzione Generate di Polizia, Fermo, to Lambruschini, 16 Nov. 1843. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 19 March, fo. I5-C, 6 May 1836, fo. 25-B. Even Bernetti had realized that the centurions were no longer needed in such large numbers, and in 1835 had ordered that no further recruits be taken in, though in fact some continued to join clandestinely down to at least 1838, and sporadic incidents of violence by centurions continued to occur during the 1840s.

79 AV, R190, ‘Prospetto per l'undienza di N.S.’, 25 Dec. 1836. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 12 Nov., fo. 50-A, 24 Dec. 1836, fo. 56-A. 7 Jan., fo. 1-A, 4 Feb., fo. 4-A, 1 Apr., fo. 15-E, 29 Apr., fo. 18-A, 13 May 1837, fo. 20-A. Lambruschini fell ill in December 1836, during much of 1837 his life was in danger, and not until the end of that year was his health fully restored. Bernetti's partisans tried to use this occasion to persuade the pope to dismiss Lambruschini and restore the volunteers to their former status, but without success. Throughout this period, Metternich continued to throw the full weight of Austrian influence behind Lambruschini and his plans for the reform of the volunteers, probably with considerable impact on the outcome.

80 AV, R190, Freddi to Lambruschini, 15 Jan. 1841; Spinola to Lambruschini, 12 Feb. 1844. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lützow to Metternich, 22 Dec. 1838, fo. 61-B. Symbolic of their decline even in Faenza, once their stronghold, is the incident of 1843 described by D'Azeglio, Massimo, Degli Ultimi Casi di Romagna (Lugano, 1846), pp. 154–5Google Scholar: when the volunteers ‘gave signs of wanting to repeat the infamous aggressions of past years… appearing in the city openly armed and threatening with words and gestures… the citizens, irritated by this conduct, tolerated by the public force, joined together to the number of over a thousand’, and the volunteers hastily fled. After this display of force, the volunteers ‘no longer dared to disturb the peace of the land’.

81 AV, R190, ‘Supplica indirizza al Papa Gregorio da parte degli ufficiali delle due brigate di Forli e Ravenna’, March 1846.

82 On the future pontiff's difficulties with the volunteers while bishop of Imola in the Legations, see aSerafini, , Pio Nono, pp. 1230–79Google Scholara.

83 Manzini, Luigi M., Il Cardinale Luigi Lambruschini (Vatican City, 1969), p. 520Google Scholar, to Lambruschini, 1 March 1846.

84 HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lützow, 27 June 1835.

85 The papal state offers an extreme case of this situation. So weak was the papal regime materially and morally by 1838, so strong the opposition to it, that its rejection of the centurions and volunteers left it dependent not upon its own utterly inadequate regular army and police, but upon foreign military protection. When foreign support was cut off in 1870, the fall of the temporal power became inevitable, for it had no other resources at its command. After 1848, however, all the conservative Italian states were in much the same situation of dependence upon Austrian protection. The only one that attempted to use popular counter-revolutionary forces did so too late: after their overthrow by Garibaldi, the Neapolitan Bourbons turned to the sanfedisti option and stirred up the ‘war of the brigands’ of the 1860s, which caused the new Italy much difficulty. However, this final demonstration of the strength of popular counter-revolutionary enthusiasm also indicates its limitations – it did not succeed in overthrowing the new order, but was put down by massive and ruthless action by the regular army. To what extent earlier and more ruthless use of popular forces could have propped up the conservative order is a question to which no conclusive answer can be given; in all probability, given the dangers inherent in their use and the steady political and cultural evolution of nineteenth-century Italy in a direction unfavourable to the old order, they could have done no more than delay the inevitable.