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The British White Paper on Palestine, May 19391 Part II: The Testing of a Policy, 1942–1945

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Michael J. Cohen
Michael J. Cohen
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University
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Extract

The 1939 White Paper remained the basis of British rule in Palestine during the first three years of war. The military crises that erupted in the Middle East between 1940 and 1942 did not permit consideration of any alternatives - if only because Britain could not be certain that in would still be in the area at the end of the war. Since his appointment to the War Cabinet in September 1939, Churchill had tried, in vain, to halt the implementation of the White Paper.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1976 , pp. 727 - 757
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

The author's first article on this document appears in The Historical Journal, xvi, 3 (1973). This article was written under the auspices of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.Google Scholar

2 The Land Transfers Bill was seen by the Zionists - and indeed intended by the Colonial Office - to be an attempt to restrict Jewish settlement in Palestine to those areas which might one day become a ‘token’ Jewish state. Under the new regulations, the High Commissioner assumed control of all land transfers in Palestine except for those within a coastal strip between Tantura (near Haifa) and a point just south of Tel Aviv - an area already heavily populated with Jews - and in all municipal areas. All the hill country, together with the Gaza and Beersheba sub-districts were prohibited to Jewish purchasers. In the areas of the Plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, in Eastern Galilee and the Negev, the High Commissioner would permit land transfers to Jews only in those cases where they consolidated plots already held. For terms of the Regulations, see Cmd. 6180; for the cabinet discussion of, on 12 Feb. 1940, see CAB 65/5; for further analysis of, see Hurevitz, J., The Struggle for Palestine, (New York, 1950), pp. 134–8.Google Scholar

3 For a fuller analysis of the interplay of departmental influence on the evolution of the government's policy in Palestine, see the author's ‘Direction of Policy’, in Middle Eastern Studies, 10, 1975, v. 11/3.Google Scholar

4 Senator Stimson was Secretary of State for War.

5 See Lampson-Eden, , 4 Jan. 1943Google Scholar, in E443/87/31, F.O. 371/35031. SirLampson, Miles (later Killearn, Lord) was British ambassador to Egypt from 1936–1946.Google Scholar

6 This scheme was in fact initiated by St John Abdullah Philby, for many years a close adviser to Ibn Saud. At meetings with Dr Weizmann in London in September and October 1939 Philby had claimed that Ibn Saud was prepared to agree to a Jewish State in all of Western Palestine, provided the Arabs in other lands of the Middle East gained their independence, and in return for Jewish financial aid. Weizmann told Philby that he would be able to raise an amount in the region of £10–20 million. When Philby reported back to Ibn Saud, in January 1940 the latter had raised no objections, but had sworn Philby to secrecy and proposed that the scheme be ‘imposed’ upon him by Britain and the United States. When Philby reported back to Weizmann, the latter raised the idea with Churchill, in March 1942. Churchill advised the Zionist leader to mobilize the support of President Roosevelt, so that the scheme might be implemented after the war. Weizmann discussed the scheme at the State Department, in January and in March 1943. In July 1943 Roosevelt sent an expert on Middle Eastern affairs, Colonel Hoskins, to broach the scheme with Ibn Saud himself. The Arab leader, perhaps embarrassed by the many leakages that had occurred, now completely disowned it, and refused to negotiate with Weizmann, for whom he expressed a personal hatred for having impugned his honour with the suggestion that he, Ibn Saud, might be bribed over Palestine. On this curious episode, see Bauer, Y., From Diplomacy to Resistance (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 224–7Google Scholar; Kirk, G., Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946, The Middle East in the War (London, 1952), pp. 312–14Google Scholar; for Weizmann's meetings at the State Department, see minutes of 19 Jan. and 3 Mar. 1943 at the Weizmann Archives, Rehovot (hereafter cited as W.A.); for Hoskins' report on his visit to Ibn Saud, see his memorandum of 3 Nov. 1943, in E6945/87/31, F.O. 371/35041. See also Monroe, Elizabeth, Philby of Arabia (London, 1973), pp. 221–5.Google Scholar

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9 Minute by SirPeterson, Maurice (head of the Middle Eastern Department at the Foreign Office), 25 Mar. 1943, in E1196/506/65, F.O. 371/34955.Google Scholar

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11 Cranborne, Lord, (former Colonial Secretary, at the time Lord Privy Seal), had spoken in this sense during a debate on Jewish refugees from Nazi atrocities on 23 Mar. 1943. See Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th Series, col. 850.Google Scholar

12 Churchill, minute of 18 Apr. 1943, in E2340/87/31, F.O. 371/34955.Google Scholar

13 Stanley, Colonel in particular, the current colonial secretary and minister at the Board of Trade in May, 1939, took personal offence.Google Scholar

14 For this and following, see Churchill's, memorandum of 28 Apr. 1943, in W.P. (43)178, in CAB 66/36. It included Weizmann's letter as an annexe.Google Scholar

15 Minute by SirPeterson, M., 1 May 1943, in E2341/87/31. F.O. 371/35033.Google Scholar

16 See W.P. (43)200 of 10 May, 1943 in CAB 66/36.

17 See Cranborne, memorandum of 4 May 1943, W.P. (43)187, in CAB 66/36.Google Scholar

18 Ibid.

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20 For minutes of the Council's meetings between 10 and 13 May 1943, see E3234/2551/65, ibid.; also W.P. (43)247 of 17 June 1943 in CAB 66/37.

21 For this and following, see memorandum by Casey, R. G. (minister of State at Cairo, March 1942–January 1944), W.P. (43)246 of 17 June 1943, in CAB 66/37.Google Scholar

22 Minute by SirPeterson, M., 25 June 1943, in E4081/2551/65, F.O. 371/34975.Google Scholar

23 For meeting of 2 July 1943, see CAB 65/39.

24 The Peel Commission's partition plan, published in July 1937, attempted to divide Palestine into a Jewish and Arab State based respectively on already-existent Jewish and Arab settlement concentrations, as well as setting aside ‘strategic’ areas that would remain under Mandate. One of the most contentious aspects of the Peel plan was the proposal that mainly Arab-populated Galilee should be allotted to the Jewish State. The narrow mandated strip that was to run from Jerusalem to Jaffa (taking in the strategic Lydda airfield and Sarafand army complex) was castigated by Lord Samuel in the Lords as another ‘Danzig corridor’. The Peel Commission's Report was published as Cmd. 5479. See Map 1.

25 Minute by Law, R. K. (Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office), 10 Aug. 1943, in E4336/87/31. F.O. 371/35036.Google Scholar

26 Churchill appointed the following: H. Morrison (home secretary), Chairman; L. Amery (secretary of State for India); Colonel Stanley (colonial secretary); A. Sinclair (secretary of State for Air); and after a special appeal by Eden himself, R. K. Law on behalf of the Foreign Office.

27 Churchill-Eden, , 11 July 1943, in M458/3. Premier (Prem.) 4/52/1.Google Scholar

28 Eden, minute of 6 Sept. 1943, in E5697/87/31, F.O. 371/35038.Google Scholar

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30 For following, see memorandum of 2 Aug. 1943, in CO 733/444 PT.1 - it was evidently written some time before and circulated posthumously, for Cazalet, British liaison officer to General Sikorski, had perished with the latter in an air crash on 4 July 1943.

31 For minutes of first meeting on 4 Aug. 1943, see CAB 95/14.

32 Minute by SirPeterson, M., 5 Sept. 1943, in £5697/87/31, F.O. 371/35038.Google Scholar

33 The Foreign Office suspected, with justice, Amery and Stanley; Weizmann had been told by Amery on 2 Sept. that the scheme of partition then under discussion would include the Negev (southern desert) and Akaba, and the whole coastline up to the Lebanon, with the exception of Acre - see record of their meeting in Z4/302/27, in Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter, C.Z.A.).

34 Minute by SirPeterson, M., 5 Sept. 1943, in E5697/87/31, F.O. 371/35038.Google Scholar

35 See note of meeting of 25 Oct. 1943, in W.A. The extension was announced in the Commons on 10 Nov. 1943.

36 Minute by Hankey, R. M. A., 5 Feb. 1944, in E724/67/31, F.O. 371/40129.Google Scholar

37 For following, see memorandum by Law, R. K. of 12 Aug. 1943, P.(M) (43)7, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

38 See Amery memorandum of 25 Aug. 1943, P(M) (43)Google Scholar, in ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 For this and following, see Foreign Office memorandum of 1 Nov. 1943, P(M) (43)16, in CAB 95/14.

41 Ibid. my emphasis.

42 Memorandum by Casey, , 2 Nov. 1943, P.(M) (43), in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

43 Ibid.

44 For following, see memorandum by Stanley, of 1 Nov. 1943, P.(M) (43)14, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

45 See memorandum by Moyne, Lord of 1 Nov. 1943, P.(M) (43)15Google Scholar, ibid.

46 For minutes of meeting of 4 Nov. 1943, see CAB 95/14.

47 See minute of 18 Oct. 1943, in E6616/87/31, F.O. 371/35040.

48 See minutes of meeting of 16 Nov. 1943, in CAB 95/14.

49 Minute by Baxter, of 7 Dec. 1943, in E7847/87/31, F.O. 371/35043.Google Scholar

50 See minutes of meeting of 10 Dec. 1943, in CAB 95/14.

51 See P.(M) (43)28 of 10 Dec. 1943, ibid.

52 See below, p. 741.

53 For following see draft memorandum of 23 Dec. 1943, in E8176/87/31, F.O. 371/35042.

54 See minutes of meeting of 25 Jan. 1944, in CAB 65/45.

55 Churchill, minute of 16 Jan. 1944, in Prem. 4/52/1.Google Scholar

56 Amery-Churchill, 22 Jan. 1944Google Scholar, in ibid.

57 For this and following, see Eden, to Middle East Ambassadors, 1 Feb. 1944Google Scholar, ibid.

58 Killearn-Eden, , 16 Feb. 1944Google Scholar, ibid.

59 Cornwallis (ambassador at Baghdad)-Eden, , 24 Feb. 1944Google Scholar, ibid.

60 For the following, see Eden, -Middle East ambassadors, 1 Feb. 1944Google Scholar, ibid.; for the American documents relative to the Trusteeship idea, see F.R.U.S. 1945, vol. VIII (Washington, 1969), pp. 683–7.Google Scholar

61 See Stanley-Churchill, , 10 June 1944, in Prem. 4/52/1.Google Scholar

62 Churchill-Stanley, , 24 June 1944Google Scholar, ibid.

63 MacMichael's, dispatch of July 1944 is to be found in W.O. 216/121.Google Scholar

64 See minutes of meeting of 9 Aug. 1944, in CAB 65/47.

65 See Colonial Office memorandum of 11 Sept. 1944, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

66 Of the Jerusalem State, the Committee had the following to say: ‘The creation of this new State, which will safeguard for ever the Holy City, preserve its associations and guarantee freedom of access to the adherents of all those creeds which hold it sacred deserves in our opinion, pride of place in a project which is otherwise one of expediency.’ The report is in CAB 95/14.

67 See Eden, memorandum of 15 Sept. 1944, P.(M) (44)11, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

68 For minutes of meeting of 19 Sept. 1944, see CAB 95/14.

69 For minutes of meeting of 26 Sep. 1944, see ibid.

70 For the following, see The Second Report of the Palestine Committee, P.(M) (44)14Google Scholar, ibid.; also minute by Sir Edward Bridges (secretary to the cabinet) of 3 Nov. 1944, in Prem. 4/52/1. See Map 2.

71 See report of Churchill's speech of 17 Nov. 1944, in The Times of the next day.

72 See Morrison-Churchill, , 26 Feb. 1945, in Prem. 4/51/2.Google Scholar

73 See Bauer, , From Diplomacy to Resistance, pp. 323–31.Google Scholar

74 In his Commons announcement of 10 Nov. 1943, Stanley had announced that there remained some 31,078 of the 75,000 immigration certificates provided for under the 1939 White Paper.

75 See Morrison-Churchill, , 26 Feb. 1945, in Prem. 4/51/2.Google Scholar

76 For following, see memorandum by Stanley, of 30 Mar. 1945, P.(M) (45)1, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

77 The Biltmore programme, which became official Zionist policy in 1942, demanded Jewish Agency control of immigration into Palestine, and progress towards the establishment of Western Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth.

78 For this and following, see memorandum by Grigg, of 4 Apr. 1945, W.P. (45)214, in CAB 66/64.Google Scholar

79 See memorandum by Stanley, of 16 May 1945, W.P. (45)306, in CAB 66/65.Google Scholar

80 ‘V.E.’ Day was on 8 May 1945.

81 Bevin, the new foreign secretary, sat in person on the Committee, as did Lawson (secretary of State for War) and Viscount Stansgate (secretary of State for Air).

82 As late as May 1945, at the Party's Election Conference, the Labour Party National Executive had reaffirmed the Party's ‘Palestine plank’ enunciated the previous year, which called for the abrogation of the White Paper, unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and Arab emigration from there, and the extension of Palestine's territory. Quoted by Hurevitz, , Struggle for Palestine, p. 227.Google Scholar

83 For a description of ‘gentile Zionism’, see Rose, Norman, The Gentile Zionists (London, 1973). especially, pp. 5, 123, 132.Google Scholar

84 See memoir by Colville, John, in Action This Day, Working with Churchill, ed. Wheeler-Bennett, J. (London, 1968), p. 105.Google Scholar

85 See Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945, ed. Dilks, D. (New York, 1972), which on p. 384 quotes Dalton-Attlee, 25 Sept. 1941, from the Dalton Papers, held at the London School of Economics.Google Scholar

86 The aforegoing section on the attitudes of Labour Ministers to Zionism, leans heavily on Crossman, R., Palestine Mission: A Personal Record (New York, 1947); also on the Creech-Jones papers held in the Rhodes House collection of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, in particular, file ACJ 33/2.Google Scholar

87 For following, see memorandum by Hall, G. of 1 Sept. 1945, in P.(M) (45)10, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

88 See minutes in CAB 95/14; present were Morrison (again Chairman), Bevin, Lord Pethwick-Lawrence (secretary of State for India), Lawson, Stansgate and Dalton (chancellor of the exchequer).

89 Ibid. my emphasis.

90 See memorandum by Bevin, , of 9 Oct. 1945, P.(M) (45)15, in CAB 95/14.Google Scholar

91 Ibid.

92 Bevin was furious when on 24 Sept. 1945, Truman had publicly requested - following his expert's report that there remained some 100,000 stateless European Jews outside the Russian zone of occupation - that Britain make an immediate grant of 100,000 immigration certificates for Palestine.

93 Crossman, , op. cit. p. 66.Google Scholar