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The British Press in the Suez Crisis*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Guillaume Parmentier
Guillaume Parmentier
Affiliation:
Association Française de Science Politique
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Type
Communications
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The Historical Journal , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 435 - 448
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

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References

1 See Appendices I and II below, p. 448.

2 “There was hostility from nearly all the press, including the Telegraph and Daily Mail; the Express and Sketch were Eden’s only newspaper friends. The Times had crossed over.’ Thomas, Hugh, The Suez affair (London, 1967), p. 133.Google Scholar

3 Lippman, Walter, Public opinion. (New York, 1922), p. 243.Google Scholar

4 The New Statesman and Nation, 3 Nov., leading article.

5 As The Times put it: ‘Egypt’saction [was], in a sense, merely an assertion of the power transferred to her in all good faith when Britain withdrew her most effective troops from the Canal zone.’ The Times, Wed. 1 Aug. ‘A hinge of history’, leading article, p. 9, also quoted by Sir Anthony Eden in his memoirs: Earl of Avon, Full Circle (London, 1960), p. 441.Google Scholar

6 The Times, Sat. 28 July, ‘Time for decision’, leading article p. 7.

7 Three treaties or international agreements had some bearing on the matter. A convention, agreed in 1888 between the Canal Company and therefore its main shareholder, the British government - and the Egyptian government, stated the solemn principle of freedom of navigation in the canal, defined itself as an ‘international asset’. This principle was further enhanced by a second document: the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 which allowed the British government to maintain a military base in the canal zone until 1968. On 19 October 1954, however, the British had agreed (‘ the 1954 agreements’) to withdraw their troops over a period of two years, provided that special facilities such as lower taxes and special conditions for the maintenance of British ships would be granted by the Egyptians. One should keep in mind at this stage that the principle of freedom of navigation had already been violated from 1948 onwards, as the Egyptians, with the implicit blessing of Western powers had prevented ships bound to and coming from Israel from using the canal. Finally, the 1950 tripartite declaration, quite distinct from the canal issue, provided that the British, French, and U.S. governments would intervene jointly in favour of either Israel or Egypt if they were attacked by a power from outside the region. This declaration had been tacitly accepted by both the Egyptian (royal, pre-Nasser) and by the Israeli governments. The interpretation of the tripartite declaration was difficult, as the document was unclear on two important points: should the three powers intervene jointly rather than separately, thus giving a veto to each of them? was it binding for Israel and Egypt, which were no party to it, but were obviously chiefly interested in its implementation? Though the tripartite declaration was not applicable in the context of 1956, as no outside power (save Britain and France) had attacked either Israel or Egypt, some journalists were at pains to use either or both ambiguities in order to prove that the government either was acting lawfully or was breaking international law.

8 E.g. The Spectator, 3 Aug.: ‘Safeguarding Suez’, leading article: ‘ …any attempt to use it [the Suez canal] as an integral part of the Egyptian economy would result either in essential maintenance work being neglected or else in the dues paid by shipping being raised to an extravagant level.’ Financial Times, Sat. 28 July, editorial comment p. 4: ‘The first point that is apparent is that Colonel Nasser will not be able to pay for the Aswan dam out of the current revenues of the Suez Canal Company. When he speaks of the annual revenue of J100M, he is referring to the gross revenues as though they were the net profits.’

9 The Times, Sat. 28 July, leading article ‘Time for decision’, p. 7: ‘An international waterway of this kind cannot be worked by a nation with low technical and managerial skills such as the Egyptians.’

10 Daily Telegraph, Sat. 28 July,’ Dictator off balance’, p. 6:’ What the Western Governments should be searching for, in fact, is that little strategic push which will totally overthrow a man who has already totally overreached himself.’

11 Mews Chronicle, Sat. 28 July, leading article, p. 6: ‘The British Government will be fully justified in taking retaliatory action’.

12 Daily Herald, Sat. 28 July, front page:’ What we think: No more Adolf Hitlers!…Britain and the other Powers must swiftly show Nasser that they are going to tolerate no more Hitlers!…There is no room for appeasement’.

13 Daily Mirror, Mon. 30 July, ‘Cassandra’, p. 4. Two days earlier, and in the same organ, Richard Crossman had expressed the strongest doubts about the possibility of a military intervention (Sat. 28 July, ‘Crossman says’, p. 6): ‘Nothing less than a military occupation is required to defeat Nasser and Sir Anthony knows that is not on the cards…After months, he will probably announce an agreement which assures the Canal is freely open to shipping, but leaves Nasser in possession.’ The exhortation by Cassandra on 30 July probably attempted to show Eden as weak and not equal to his own anti-Munich credentials.

14 The Times, Wed. 1 Aug., leading article, p. 9: ‘Quibbling whether or not he [Nasser] was “legally entitled” to make the grab will delight the finicky and comfort the faint-hearted, but entirely misses the real issues.’

15 Ibid., Mon. 30 July, ‘What is at stake?’, leading article, p. 9: ‘The Western Powers have clearly with the utmost speed to decide on stern measures to safeguard the Canal and all that depends on it. Nothing is more certain than that if Nasser’s challenge goes ignored, other extremist demands against western interests... will soon be raised across the Middle East. Obviously, Britain and her partners have to balance many risks before any decisive action is launched.’ Ibid., Sat. 28 July: ‘Time for decision’: ‘The possibilities of economic measures, such as boycott, should be examined, though these are apt to be two-edged weapons.’

16 The Manchester Guardian, Sat. 28 July, leading article, p. 4: ‘How would economic retaliation against Egypt be regarded by the uncommitted countries of the world? What British interests would be served if, by injuring Egypt, we forfeit friends and sympathy in parts of the world important to us?’

17 The New Statesman and Nation, 4 Aug. p. 124:’ Nasser was within his legal rights. For Egypt to nationalize an Egyptian company is a simple act of sovereignty’. (The Canal Company was of course international, not Egyptian.) Tribune, 3 Aug., leading article: ‘There is no legal case against Egypt’.

18 The Economist, 4 Aug.: ‘Europe’s Achilles heel’, leading article: ‘The British reaction to Colonel Nasser in the past week has called Lear to mind; Government and public, caught off balance, have been threatening force without having apparently either defined the problem to be faced, or formulated the purpose of action.’

19 The Times, Wed. 1 Aug., ‘Hinges of history’, leading article, p. 9: ‘It is good that some British warships and troops have already been alerted. But the main question is what corrective or preventive measures should be taken now. The first instinct last weekend was to take the strongest action to ensure that the Canal was in proper hands, and that instinct was right; but time is passing, consultations are going on, and now the idea seems growing of calling a conference of the chiefly interested powers.’

20 Cf. The Times, Wed. 31 Oct.: ‘Twelve hours’, leading article, p. 9.

21 In terms of ill-timing, the coincidence of the Suez intervention with the Soviet invasion of Hungary was unfortunate, though Eden can scarcely be held responsible for it. Many periodicals were quick to compare the two events, e.g. Tribune, 1 Nov.: ‘A same crime’; Manchester Guardian, Fri. 2 Nov. leading article, p. 8: ‘Russia will have followed Sir Anthony Eden’s example’; News Chronicle, Mon. 5 Nov., leading article p. 4: ‘Britain and France must be held at least in some part responsible for what is happening now [in Hungary]’; Daily Mirror Mon. 5 Nov., Cassandra, p. 6: ‘Sir Anthony has given the green light to the Red Army’, etc. Few newspapers (The Times 5 Nov., ‘Repression’ leading article p. 9; Daily Express, Daily Telegraph) underlined the differences between those events. It is difficult not to agree with The Observer’s (4 Nov., ‘Fallacy’, p. 9) remark: ‘The diversion of world attention from what is happening in Hungary is perhaps its [the intervention’s] most evil effect.’

22 Lord Butler of Walden, Saffron, ‘The art of the possible’ (London, 1971), p. 187.Google Scholar

23 Compare their front page article of Wed. 31 Oct. to their editorial of Wed. 7 Nov. (p. 6).

24 E.g. The Daily Telegraph, leading articles of Thurs. 1 Nov., Tues. 6 Nov., Wed. 7 Nov.; The Sunday Times 4 Nov.; The Spectator, 2 Nov.

25 Tribune, 9 Nov., headline over leading article.

26 Vattel, , ‘Law of nations’, iii (London, 1834), p. 380.Google Scholar

27 Though popular newspapers were likely to be ignorant of the circumstances of the outbreak of the Korean war (e.g. Daily Herald, Wed. 31 Oct. ‘This is folly’, front page), The Manchester Guardian’s editorial of Mon. 5 Nov. (p. 6) seems to be based on an intentional lapse of memory, as the leader-writer could scarcely be ignorant of the United Nations Charter’s basic rules.

28 The Daily Express, Thurs. 1 Nov., leading article p. 6: ‘The “Foundations of Internal Order” is a pompous way of referring to UNO. UNO, a body whose proved futility and passive assistance to every law-breaking state insults the idealism of those who set it up!’ It may be worth noting that the Daily Express was the only newspaper that deplored the transfer of the peacekeeping operation from the French and British armies to the U.N. (leading article, Tues. 6 Nov.).

29 Macmillan, Harold, Memoirs: Riding the storm 1956–59 (London, 1971), P. 124.Google Scholar

30 Cf. The Times, leading articles of 28 July, 1 Nov., 2 Nov.; The Financial Times, editorial comment, 31 Oct. and front page of 7 Nov.; The Spectator, leading article 2 Nov.; The Sunday Times, leading article 4 Nov.

31 Daily Telegraph, Thurs. 1 Nov., front page.

32 E.g. The Sunday Times 4 Nov., ‘The Anglo-American alliance will survive’ by H. V. Hodson (the editor) p. 10: ‘There is far more understanding in the United States of Britain’saction in Suez than appears on the surface.’

33 The Times, Wed. 31 Oct., ‘Twelve hours’, leading article p. 9.

34 Daily Express, Sat. 3 Nov., pp. 1, 2, 3. On the other hand, the condemnation by Nehru was received without the slightest surprise by all newspapers, and even Labour organs did not exploit it. The Commonwealth’s image was still that of the Old, or White Commonwealth.

35 Lippmann, Public opinion, p. 234.

36 Macmillan, Memoirs, p. 155.

37 On 2 Aug., Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the opposition said in the House: ‘It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war.’ Hansard, Debates, vol. 557, 1613.

38 E.g. quotation over note 14 above, The Times, leading article Wed. 1 Aug.; Daily Herald, Sat. 28 July; and the quite extraordinary piece entitled ‘ Dictator Nasser, a warning about a sticky end’, in the Daily Mirror, Mon. 30 July, front page.

39 Eden, Memoirs, p. 584.

40 E.g. Daily Mirror, Wed. 28 July, front page: photograph under the heading: ‘Grabber Nasser’.

41 Tribune, 3 Aug., Aneurin Bevan, p. 3.

42 Cf. note 9 above.

43 E.g. The Daily Telegraph, Sat. 28 July, ‘Dictator off balance’, leading article p. 6; The Spectator, 3 Aug., ‘Political commentary’; The Financial Times, Sat. 28 July, ‘Editorial comment’, p. 4.

44 E.g. News Chronicle, Sat. 28 July, p. 4; The Observer, 29 July, ‘Comment’, p. 6; Tribune, 3 Aug., Aneurin Bevan, p. 3.

45 Typical was the analysis of Nasser’s personality by the editor of The Spectator, 4 Aug. (Political commentary by Charles Curran): ‘ Bitterness of foreign domination, private anger with corruption and luxury, a sense of inferiority turned into hatred - Nasser is Egypt in microcosm’.

46 The Times, Sat. 3 Nov., ‘A way out’, leading article p. 7.

47 Cf. Wed. 31 Oct. and Thurs. 1 Nov., front page articles.

48 E.g. The Sunday Times, 4 Nov.: ‘Doing UNO’s Business’, leading article p. 10.

49 E.g. Folly: News Chronicle, Thurs. 1 Nov., p. 4; The Observer, 4 Nov. p. 9; Daily Herald., Fri. a Nov., front page. Immoral: The Manchester Guardian, Mon. 5 Nov., p. 6; Daily Mirror, Mon. 5 Nov., ‘Cassandra’ p. 6. Crime: News Chronicle, Mon. 5 Nov., front page; Tribune, 2 Nov., leading article by Michael Foot, p. 5.

50 The Daily Herald, Fri. 2 Nov., ‘What goes on by Michael Foot’, p. 4.

51 Lippmann, Public opinion, p. 243.

52 The Times, Sat. 28 July, ‘Time for decision’, leading article, p. 7.

53 Especially as its attitude did not change, even after the intervention.

54 Daily Mirror, Thurs. 1 Nov., ‘Cassandra’, p. 6.

55 Daily Herald, Fri. 2 Nov., ‘What we say’, front page.

56 Mews Chronicle, Tues. 6 Nov., ‘The cost of continuing’, leading article, p. 4.

57 The Mew Statesman and Motion, 10 Nov., ‘The return from Port Said’, leading article.

58 The Economist, 19 Jan. 1957, leading article.

59 Macmillan, Memoirs, p. 117.

60 Kissinger, Henry A., ‘The Congress of Vienna’ in World Politics, Jan. 1956, p. 329Google Scholar. For a study of the provincial press during the Suez crisis, see Epstein, Leon D., British politics in the Suez crisis. (Urbana, 1964), pp. 153–65. He does not, however, notice the difference between the attitudes of the press at the time of the nationalization and at the time of the intervention and distorts reality by dividing between ‘Pro-Suez’ and ‘anti-Suez’ periodicals.Google Scholar