Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-04T09:30:42.609Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Britain and the New Europe: The Search for Identity Since 1940*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

David Reynolds
David Reynolds
Affiliation:
Christ's College, Cambridge
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Review Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 1988 , pp. 223 - 239
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 He adds that ‘the one notable exception, of course, was Edward Heath’. Schmidt, Helmut, A grand strategy for the west: the anachronism of national strategies in an interdependent world (New Haven, 1985) P. 52Google Scholar.

2 Macmillan, Harold, Pointing the way, 1959–1961 (London, 1972), p. 318Google Scholar.

3 Gladstone to General Grey, 17 April 1869, in Morley, John, The life of William Ewart Gladstone (3 vols., London, 1903), II, 317Google Scholar.

4 Aldcroft, Derek H. and Richardson, Harry W., The British economy, 1870–1939 (London, 1969), p. 70CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Hobsbawm, E. J., Industry and empire (Harmondsworth, 1969), p. 148Google Scholar.

5 Sir Eyre Crowe told Sir Edward Grey on 31 July 1914 that to adopt ‘the theory that England cannot engage in a big war means her abdication as an independent state… A balance of power cannot be maintained by a State that is incapable of fighting and consequently carries no weight.’ Steiner, Zara S., Britain and the origins of the First World War (London, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a particularly radical attack on the Eurocentric explanation for Britain's entry into the war, arguing for the paramountcy of Imperial interests, see Wilson, Keith M., The policy of the entente: essays on the determinants of British foreign policy, 1904–1914 (Cambridge, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 French, David, British economic and strategic planning, 1905–1915 (London, 1982)Google Scholar.

7 First COS annual review of defence policy, 22 June 1926, quoted in Orde, Anne, Great Britain and international security, 1920–1926 (London, 1978), p. 161Google Scholar.

8 Article on ‘The United States of Europe’, 15 Feb. 1930, in Wolff, Michael (ed.), The collected essays of Sir Winston Churchill (4 vols., London, 1976), II, 184–5Google Scholar.

9 SirChamberlain, Austen, ‘Great Britain as a European power’, Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, IX, 2 (1930), 188Google Scholar.

10 House of Commons, Debates, 5th series, vol. 292, col. 2339, 30 07 1934Google Scholar.

11 See Howard, Michael, The continental commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in the era of the two world wars (Harmondsworth, 1974)Google Scholar; Gibbs, N. H., Grand strategy, vol. I, rearmament policy (History of the Second World War: U.K. military series) (London, 1976)Google Scholar; and Peden, G. C., British rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 (Edinburgh, 1979)Google Scholar.

12 Chamberlain commented: ‘I entirely agree with the memorandum’. See memo by Sargent and minute by Cadogan, 28 Feb. 1940; minutes by Halifax, 29 Feb. and Chamberlain, 1 Mar. 1940, Foreign Office General Political Correspondence, F.O. 371/24298, C4444/9/17 (Public Record Office, London). These and other Crown copyright documents are quoted by permission of the controller of H.M. Stationery Office.

13 SirWoodward, Llewellyn, British foreign policy in the Second World War (5 vols., London, 1970–1976), I, 288Google Scholar.

14 Board of Education, ‘The schools in wartime’, memo no. 18, Apr. 1940, ‘France and ourselves’, ED 138/27 (P.R.O.).

15 See Reynolds, David, ‘Churchill and the British “decision” to fight on in 1940: right policy, wrong reasons’, in Langhorne, Richard (ed.), Diplomacy and intelligence during the Second World War: essays in honour of F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 147–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Halifax to Hankey, 15 July 1940, F.O. 371/25206, W8602/8602/49 (P.R.O.).

17 Hankey to Hoare, 19 July 1940, Templewood papers, XIII/17 (Cambridge University Library).

18 Now published as SirColville, John, The fringes of power: Downing Street diaries, 1939–1955 (London, 1985)Google Scholar.

19 Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with Stalin, tr. by Petrovich, Michael B. (London, 1962), p. 105Google Scholar.

20 Churchill to Eden, 5 Nov. 1942, PREM 4/27/1 (P.R.O.).

21 See Hathaway, Robert M., Ambiguous partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947 (New York, 1981)Google Scholar; Edmonds, Robin, Setting the mould: The United States and Britain, 1945–1950 (Oxford, 1986)Google Scholar.

22 Donovan, Robert J., Conflict and crisis: the presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948 (New York, 1977), P. 230Google Scholar.

23 Gardner, Richard N., Sterling–dollar diplomacy in current perspective: the origins and prospects of our international order (New York, 1980 edn), p. xiiiGoogle Scholar. This remains the best survey of the loan negotiation, despite being first published in 1956, long before official archives were opened. For a recent study of some aspects of Anglo-American financial diplomacy during the war see Dobson, Alan P., US wartime aid to Britain, 1940–1946 (London, 1986)Google Scholar.

24 House of Commons, Debates, 5s, 417, 468 (Boothby, 12 Dec. 1945) and 669 (Lee, 13 Dec. 1945)

25 See R. F. Holland, ‘The Imperial factor in British strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945–63’, and Darwin, John, ‘British decolonization since 1945: a pattern or a puzzle?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History XII, 1 (1984), 165–86Google Scholar and 187–209. On the lack of wartime industrial modernization see Barnett, Correlli, The audit of war: the illusion and reality of Britain as a great nation (London, 1986)Google Scholar.

26 Memo of 13 March 1946 quoted in Edmonds, , Setting the mould, p. 28Google Scholar.

27 Quoted in Yergin, Daniel, Shattered peace: the origins of the Cold War and the national security state (London, 1978), p. 223Google Scholar.

28 See Sherry, Michael S., Preparing for the next war: American plans for postwar defense, 1941–5 (New Haven, 1977)Google Scholar; and Leffler, Melvyn P., ‘The American conception of national security and the beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–8’, American Historical Review, LXXXIX (1984), 346–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 For fuller discussion see an earlier review article: Reynolds, David, ‘The origins of the Cold War: the European dimension, 1944–1951’, Historical Journal, XXVIII, 2 (1985), 497–515CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also the important article by Lundestad, Geir, ‘Empire by invitation? The United States and western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research, XXIII, 3 (1986), 263–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pollard, Robert A., Economic security and the origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York, 1985)Google Scholar, provides a good survey from this standpoint. Among recent books on the role of Anglo-American relations in the development of the Cold War (some of them overstating the case), see Anderson, Terry H., The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944–1947 (Columbia, Missouri, 1981)Google Scholar; Ovendale, Ritchie, The English-speaking alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London, 1985)Google Scholar; Harbutt, Fraser J., The iron curtain: Churchill, America, and the origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986)Google Scholar; Best, Richard A. Jr, ‘Co-operation with like-minded peoples’: British influences on American security policy, 1945–1949 (New York, 1986)Google Scholar; Ryan, Henry B., The vision of Anglo-America: the US-UK alliance and the emerging Cold War, 1943–1946 (Cambridge, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also those cited in note 21.

30 For a recent evaluation see Zeeman, Bert, ‘Britain and the Cold War: an alternative approach. The treaty of Dunkirk example’, European History Quarterly XVI, 3 (1986), 343–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 On the emergence of these problems in 1948–50 see the essays in Poidevin, Raymond, (ed.), Histoire des débuts de la construction européene, mars 1948–mai 1950 (Brussels, 1986)Google Scholar, which are particularly useful on French policy.

32 For a briefer study, also emphasizing Labour's Europcanism, see Warner, Geoffrey, ‘The Labour governments and the unity of western Europe, 1945–51’ in Ovendale, Ritchie (ed.), The foreign policy ofthe British Labour governments, 1945–51 (Leicester, 1984), pp. 61–82Google Scholar. An incisive review essay of Young and Warner by Melissen, Jan and Zeeman, Bert, ‘Britain and western Europe, 1945–51: opportunities lost?’, International Affairs, LXIII, 1 (1986–1987), 81–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, also draws attention to British globalism and worldwide economic interests. Of particular use on this latter point are the essay by Peden, George, ‘Economic aspects of British perceptions of power on the eve of the Cold War’, in Becker, and Knipping, (eds.), Power in Europe, pp. 237–60Google Scholar; and two articles by Newton, Scott, ‘The sterling crisis of 1947 and the British response to the Marshall plan’, Economic History Review, 2nd series XXXVII, 3 (1984), 391–408CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘The 1949 sterling crisis and British policy towards European integration’, Review of International Studies, XI, 3 (1985), 169–82Google Scholar. For a broader survey see Hines, Alister E., ‘Sterling and imperial policy, 1945–1951’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XV, 2 (1987), 148–69Google Scholar.

33 Minute of meeting on 5 Jan. 1949, in SirClarke, Richard (ed. SirCairncross, Alec), Anglo-American economic collaboration in war and peace, 1942–1949 (Oxford, 1982), pp. 208–9Google Scholar.

34 Donoughue, Bernard and Jones, G. W., Herbert Morrison: portrait of a politician (London, 1973), p. 481Google Scholar.

35 On the French political background see Gerbet's, Pierre essay, ‘Les origines du plan Schuman’ in Poidevin, (ed.), Histoire des débuts de la construction europe'ene, pp. 199–222Google Scholar, where he contrasts Schuman's pre-occupation with the Franco-German problem and Jean Monnet's larger federalist vision.

36 Similar, if more limited, ideas for a Franco-German rapprochement centred on coal and steel had been advanced by the French in the mid-1920s, leading to the steel cartel and commercial treaty of 1926. See, e.g. McDougall, Walter A., France's Rhineland diplomacy, 1914–1924: the last bid for a balance of power in Europe (Princeton, 1978), esp. pp. 372–4Google Scholar.

37 He wrote: ‘I am not opposed to a European Federation including (eventually) the countries behind the Iron Curtain, provided that this comes about naturally and gradually. But I never thought that Britain or the British Commonwealth should, either individually or collectively, become an integral part of a European federation, and have never given the slightest support to the idea… Our first object is the unity and consolidation of the British Commonwealth and what is left of the former British Empire. Our second, the “fraternal association” of the English-speaking world; and third, United Europe, to which we are a separate, closely- and specially-related ally and friend.’ Memo of 29 Nov. 1951, C (51) 32, CAB 129/48 (P.R.O.).

38 Whitehall's approach to the negotiations came close to this attitude: ‘We cannot stop the six countries doing what they want, but if we accept their invitation we can seek to ensure that their actions are as little prejudicial to our interests as possible. And it may be possible to guide their thought towards suggestions for forms of co-operation in which we would be willing to join.’ ‘Report by officials’, circulated to the cabinet on 29 June 1955, CP (55) 55, CAB 129/76.

39 For surveys of British policy in the 1950s see the articles by Young, John W., ‘Churchill's “no ” to Europe: the ‘rejection’ of European union by Churchill's post-war government, 1951–1952’, Historical Journal, XXVIII, 4 (1985), 923–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and ‘Britain, Messina and the dawn of the E.E.C, 1955’, in Dockrill, M. L. and Young, J. W., (eds.), Aspects of British security policy, 1945–56 (London, 1989, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

40 Including the useful oral history of British policy towards European integration, 1945–63, by Charlton, Michael, Price of victory (London, 1983)Google Scholar, which pulls together recollections of British policy-makers of the time.

41 Cf. Grosser, Alfred, The western alliance: European–American relations since 1945, translated by Shaw, Michael (London, 1980)Google Scholar. The book was written in the mid-1970s and peters out after 1973.

42 See Reynolds, David, ‘A “special relationship”?: America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, International Affairs, LXII, 1 (1985–6), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also the essays in WmLouis, Roger and Bull, Hedley (eds.), The ‘special relationship’: Anglo-American relations since 1945 (Oxford, 1986)Google Scholar. More generally see Dimbleby, David and Reynolds, David, An ocean apart: the relationships between Britain and America in the twentieth century (London, 1988)Google Scholar.

43 Cf. Vaughan, Richard, Twentieth-century Europe: paths to unity (London, 1979)Google Scholar; Taylor, Paul, The limits of European integration (London, 1983)Google Scholar.

44 Cf. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech in Brussels on 16 Mar. 1987 noting the American drift towards the Pacific an d envisaging ‘in the longer term…a greater responsibility on the part of Europeans for the defence of Western Europe – in other words for a more truly equal second pillar of the Alliance’ in SirHowe, Geoffrey, East-West relations (London, 1987), p. 21Google Scholar.