Article contents
A Backbencher on Parliamentary Reform, 1831–1832
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
Historians have in recent years used several approaches to explain the first Reform Act. Michael Brock's elegant account sets the whole Reform crisis in its political context. D. C. Moore has attempted a ‘sociological’ explanation of ministers’ intentions, while John Milton-Smith has offered a more traditional analysis of their private papers. This emphasis on the men who framed and steered the measure through parliament perhaps obscures the role of the ordinary members in whose hands its fate rested. Like the ministers, the backbenchers also suffered intense periods of indecision, soul-searching and calculation based on a confused mixture of pragmatism and principle. This is especially true of the moderates, the men of the parliamentary centre, who provided the vital votes for the government's hair-breadth majority on the second reading in February 1831, but who deserted them to support General Gascoyne's motion a few days later. Only fifteen M.P.s voted both for the Bill and for Gascoyne's motion, thus locating themselves - at least temporarily - at the very centre of the political spectrum.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980
References
1 Brock, Michael, The great Reform Act (London, 1973).Google Scholar
2 Professor, Moore's works include: ‘The other face of reform’, Victorian Studies, v (1961), 7–34Google Scholar; ‘Concession or cure: The sociological premises of the first Reform Act’, Historical Journal, IX, no. 1 (1966), 39–59Google Scholar; ‘social structure, political structure, and public opinion in mid-Victorian England’, in Ideas and institutions of Victorian Britain, ed. R., Robson (London, 1967), pp. 20–57Google Scholar; ‘Political morality in mid-nineteenth century England: concepts, norms, violations’, Victorian Studies, XIII (1969), 5–36Google Scholar; reply to DrHennock, E. P., Victorian Studies, xiv (1971), 328–37;Google ScholarThe politics of deference; a study of the mid-nineteenth century English political system (New York, 1976).Google Scholar
3 Milton-Smith, J., ‘Earl Grey's cabinet and the objects of parliamentary reform’, Historical Journal, xv, no. 1 (1972), 55–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. John, Cannon, Parliamentary reform, 1640–1832 (Cambridge, 1973)Google Scholar, sets the question in larger perspective. Hamburger, J., James Mill and the art of Revolution (New Haven, 1963)Google Scholar, emphasizes the extra-parliamentary role of the philosophic radicals.
4 These were: Sir T. D. Acland, Bt., MP for Devonshire; Lewis W. Buck, Exeter; John Fane, Oxfordshire; T. Gladstone, Queensborough; W. F. Handley, Newark-on-Trent; G. A. L. Keck, Leicestershire; Sir C. Morgan, Bt., Monmouthshire; F. Mundy, Derbyshire; Robert Palmer, Berkshire; John W. Patten, Lancashire; Lord W. I. F. Powlett, Durham County; Sir George T. Staunton, Heytesbury; Thomas Wood, Breconshire; Sir Watkin Wm Wynn, Bt., Denbighshire; and the Right Hon. C. W. W. Wynn, Montgomeryshire. In the division on the Civil List in November 1830, in which Wellington's government was defeated, Fane and Morgan were recorded as absent, Munday [sic], Powlett and Wood voted with the government and eight of the others voted against it (Gladstone and Handley are not mentioned). See 3 Hansard I (15 November 1830), cols. 549–54. It seems unlikely that this group acted in concert, formally or informally. See Brock, Great Reform Act, pp. 179–82, for factors influencing the ‘doubtfuls’ to vote for the bill. However, Staunton was not totally immune to the example of others in voting against Wellington. ‘so reluctant indeed, was I to give a vote against the party with which I had hitherto acted, that I hesitated to the last moment; and did not, in point of fact, go out into the lobby until I saw Sir Thomas, Acland do so, of whose honesty and independence I had conceived a very high opinion.’ Memoirs of the chief incidents in the public life of Sir G. T. Staunton (London, 1856), p.115.Google Scholar
5 Staunton MSS, Duke University, William R. Perkins Library, henceforth cited as Staunton MSS, with date.
6 Staunton's memoirs, p. 10.
7 D.N.B.
8 Staunton's memoirs, pp. 109–10.
10 Ibid. p. 119.
11 Ibid. p. 110. Staunton gave ‘a general and independent support to Lord Liverpool's administration’, but ‘invariably opposed’ it on the Catholic question. ‘With them (the Whigs), I finally and entirely separated from that party, on the occasion of the Duke of Wellington's celebrated declaration of unqualified opposition to all Parliamentary Reform’. Ibid. pp. 110–11.
12 Ibid. pp. 112–13, quoted with approval an 1831 speech by a fellow Canningite, G. G. V. Harcourt, M.P. for Oxfordshire.
13 See, for example, Staunton MSS, 16 July 1831 and 10 May 1832. Staunton's admiration for Peel bears out Brock's speculation that the whigs settled for a sweeping bill to discredit Peel before he could present himself as a ‘moderate’ (Brock, Great Reform Act, p. 150). This seems more plausible than Aspinall's suggestion that ‘had Wellington been sufficiently far-sighted to broaden the base of his ministry and to accept a moderate measure of parliamentary reform, the leading Huskissonites might never have separated themselves from the progressive Tories led by Peel’. A. Aspinall, ‘The last of the Canningites’, English Historical Review, L (1935), 667. Brock, op. cit. pp. 119–20, discounts the possibility of conservative-led moderate Reform in 1830–1.
14 For a discussion of the significance and prevalence of ‘independence’ see Beales, D. E. D., ‘Parliamentary parties and the “independent” member, 1810–1860’, R., Robson (ed.), Ideas and institutions of Victorian Britain (London, 1967), pp. 1–19. The care which Staunton took to justify himself with reference to Canning's principles, his tendency to be swayed by Peel despite his nominal loyalty to the whig ministers, and the freedom he felt to vote against the government even on major issues like Gascoyne's motion confirm that in some cases ‘independence’ was more than a figment of electoral rhetoric. Staunton, as a former Liberal—tory who had gone over to the whigs was ‘on all occasions studious to show that I did so on principle; not on party grounds, and that I looked to the measures rather than to the men’ (Staunton, op. cit. p. 140).Google Scholar
15 ‘Parliamentary reform’, Quarterly Review, XLIV (February 1831), 554–98Google Scholar (henceforth cited as QR), attributed by the Wellesley index to Victorian periodicals, 1824–1900, vol. 1, ed. Houghton, W. E. (Toronto, 1966), to John Fullarton.Google Scholar
16 QR, XLIV,556–7, 559, 561, 573, 564, 563, 564.
17 QR, XLIV, 564, 565–6.
18 In a later memorandum (3 March 1831) Staunton argued that the constitutional balance between the powers of the Commons, the king and the Lords had to exist within the Commons since the latter two institutions had lost their political power. Logically this would seem to imply that the Lords at least had no function. However, on 10 November 1832 he noted that there was ‘no substitute for the very important function which the Bishops perform in Parliament’. On 10 March 1832 he had stated that the ‘aristocratic influence... is too great and ought to be reduced’, but went on to say that the bill was not an attack on the peerage as such but on the excessive influence of landed property.
19 QR, XLIV, 563–4.
20 QR, XLIV, 587–9, 560, 571–2.
21 QR, XLIV, 574, 575, 585–7.
22 Staunton MSS, 25 February 1831. In December 1831, Staunton was briefly attracted by an idea thrown out by The Times that men should exercise power in relation to their property. If this meant one vote for the £10 householder and 1,000 votes for a man whose property was worth £1,000,’ I would willingly give them universal Suffrage Ballot & whatsoever else they might ask for’ (Ibid. 19 December 1831).
23 Staunton MSS, 3, 10 March 1831.
24 QR, XLIV, 580–1.
25 Staunton MSS, 3 March 1831. Staunton's sudden reservations about the ‘Middle Class of Society’ bear out Norman McCord's warnings about the imprecision of contemporary class terminology. ‘ Some difficulties of parliamentary reform’, Historical Journal, x (1967), 376–90.Google Scholar
26 Staunton also disagreed with a comparison drawn by the Quarterly Review between owning an advowson and owning a borough. Compensation would be required for the acquisition of the former, as there was an income attaching to clerical preferment, but it would not apply to the latter, as a seat in parliament was purely honorific. Staunton MSS, 15 January 1832; QR, XLIV, 612–4.
27 Anti-reformers alleged that there had been no petitions for parliamentary reform between 1824 and 1829. This was not strictly true, but public opinion certainly seemed to take little interest in the question. Brock, op. cit. p. 15; Cannon, Parliamentary reform, p. 186 n.
28 Staunton MSS, 10 March 1831.
29 Unidentified press cutting in Staunton MSS dated 24 April 1831.
30 Staunton MSS, 18 July 1831. He had spoken briefly in parliament on 25 March to correct a ‘mis-statement which had gone forth’ that he gave ‘unqualified assent’ to the bill. His true position was that he saw the issue on 23 March as ‘one of Reform or no Reform’ and had voted for the bill trusting ‘ that in Committee it would be so modified as to effect a fair and moderate Reform’. 3 Hansard, III (25 March 1831), cols. 931–2.
31 Staunton MSS, 26 March 1831.
32 Ibid. 18July 1831.
33 Ibid. 30 April 1831. See Brock, op. cit. 197—8, for the prevalence of intimidation.
34 Staunton MSS, letter to press, 23 April 1831.
35 Staunton MSS, 2 May 1831.
36 3 Hansard, v (16 August 1831), cols. 130–1.
37 Staunton MSS, 24 June 1831. For Russell's speech see 3 Hansard, iv (24 June 1831), cols. 322–46.
38 Ibid. It is fair to note that Staunton was one of the very few Irish landlords to renounce his rents during the famine. Cecil, Woodham-Smith, The great hunger: Ireland, 1845—9 (London 1962), p. 123.Google Scholar
39 Staunton MSS, 24 June 1831.
40 Ibid. 18 July 1831.
41 Ibid, date illegible (early July 1831).
42 Ibid. 14 July 1831.
43 Ibid. 18July 1831.
44 3 Hansard, iv (13 July 1831), cols. 1206–46. The motion, proposed by C. W. Wynn, was defeated by 292 to 174.
45 To allay this fear government spokesmen declared that the list of boroughs would be considered part of the first clause and could therefore be amended in committee. It is significant that despite his doubts he did not instinctively vote for the government, but for an amendment proposed by Peel, 3 Hansard, IV (14 July 1831), col. 1291. The amendment was defeated by 290 to 193, ibid. col. 1302.
47 Mackinnon's motion was defeated by 75 votes, 3 Hansard, v (19 July 1831), cols. 36–54.
48 The government opposed the motion to hear counsel and won by 285 to 187; 3 Hansard, IV (12 July 1831), cols. 1105–26. The motion to preserve Appleby was defeated by 302 to 228; 3 Hansard, v (19July 1831), cols. 54–77.
49 See 3 Hansard, v (21 July 1831), cols. 74–184. The government majority fell to 30.
50 See 3 Hansard, v (26 July 1831), cols. 343–63.
51 See 3 Hansard, v (28 July 1831), cols. 491–506. A government supporter (F. T. Baring) argued that one of the objects of the bill was to end the under-representation of the north.
52 See 3 Hansard, v (29 July 1831), cols. 529–42. The only petition from Guildford mentioned in the debate was one asking that the town be left with two M.P.s.
53 See 3 Hansard, v (28 July 1831), cols. 483–91.
54 See 3 Hansard, v (9 August 1831), cols. 1062–89. There was no mention in the debate of the corruption of Rochester; indeed there seemed to be a consensus that Rochester was independent and that Chatham was a government nomination borough. This may have been euphemistic, however, as Brock (op. cit. p. 24) describes the Rochester freemen as ‘notoriously corrupt’ and Gash includes the town in his list of ‘government boroughs’ (post 1832); Normal, Gash, Politics in the age of Peel (London, 1953), p. 337.Google Scholar
55 See 3 Hansard, v (3 August 1831), cols. 663–719.
56 See 3 Hansard, v (5 August 1831), col. 840. In spite of his concern about the provision of adequate representation for the colonial, commercial and funded interests, Staunton was not swayed by Althorp's argument that Gateshead was entitled to an M.P. of its own in order to give due weight in parliament on the shipping interest.
57 See 3 Hansard, v (4August 1831), cols. 767–74. His advocacy of double representation seems to contradict his earlier statement of the sufficiency of one M.P., albeit for small towns. It may be significant that the case for double representation was put forward by Peel.
58 See 3 Hansard, v (10 August 1831), cols. 1134–47. An amendment was proposed by Colonel Wood (ibid. cols. 1134–9) to give Merthyr Tydfil separate representation but the final division was on the ‘original question’. Staunton's name appears in the list of ‘Ayes’, suggesting that he voted contrary to his intentions.
59 Staunton MSS, 21 January 1832.
60 Ibid. 21 January 1832.
61 See Brock, op. cit. p. 226 and Moore's comment in his Politics of deference, pp. 150–1.
62 Staunton MSS, 17 November 1831.
63 Ibid. 10 December 1831.
64 Ibid. 24 December 1831.
65 ‘The progress of misgovernment’, Quarterly Review, XLVI January 1832), 544–622Google Scholar. Also attributed to John Fullarton by the Wellesley index.
66 QR, XLVI, 588–9, 621
67 QR, XLVI, 603.
68 Staunton MSS, 15 January 1832, quoting QR, XLVI, 603.
69 See QR, XLVI, 580, 601, 606, 608.
70 Staunton MSS, 8 March 1832.
71 Ibid. 12 March 1832.
72 Staunton MSS. This entry follows that of 12 March 1832, which is written with a different pen, and from which it is separated by two short strokes. The next entry is on 10 May 1832.
73 ‘The revolutions of 1640 and 1830’, Quarterly Review, XLVII (March 1832), 261–300Google Scholar, attributed by the Wellesley index to J. W. Croker and J. G. Lockhart. Staunton referred particularly to pp. 290, 288.
74 Ibid. 10 May 1832. Ebrington's motion expressed the most intense interest and anxiety at the fate of the bill, and ‘deep regret’ at the retirement of the ministers. 3 Hansard, XII (10 May 1832), cols. 787–8.Google Scholar
75 This entry is divided from that of 10 May 1832 by two short strokes, but seems to have been written soon after it.
76 Ibid. 4 November 1832. The same list of subjects also appears in one of Staunton's letters to the Hampshire electors, Staunton MSS, unidentified press cutting, 25 July 1832.
77 Staunton MSS, 25 August 1832.
78 Especially in his ‘Concession or cure’ and in Politics of deference, pp. 137–67. Moore's explanations assume a greater measure of ministerial control over backbenchers than in fact existed. Although (in ‘The other face of Reform’) he stresses the importance of the Ultra Tory revolt in the fall of Wellington, he seems to lose sight of parliamentary forces thereafter. There is no extended reference to the hairbreadth passage of the crucial second reading in March 1831. The passage of the Chandos clause is attributed to a 'somewhat improbable coalition of Tories, Whigs, and Radicals’ (‘Concession or cure’, p. 53) and to the Radicals’ 'social naiveté and their ignorance of rural society’ (Politics of deference, p. 167). Moore's theory of a ministerial ‘cure’ is presented as a reaction to those historians who stress extra-parliamentary forces, thus fostering the idea of a ‘concession’. The backbenchers tend to vanish between the thesis and antithesis. To stress a single clause in the original bill is dangerous, given the poor standard of legislative draughtsmanship, shown by the wording of clause 18, which would have excluded substantial urban £10 householders from the county vote, but not the 40-shilling freeholders. In any case, it was well understood (certainly by Staunton) that major legislation was subject to amendment during its passage. Features which failed to arouse the enthusiasm of the moderate M.P. could be jettisoned at a later stage, especially if an intervening election had swung the temper of the House so far towards Reform that the moderates no longer mattered - a difference between March and August 1831 which should not be overlooked. A cabinet which as late as January 1831 was divided over a question as major as the ballot can hardly be said to have possessed an immutable prescription for the entire shape of the political structure. (Cf. Brock, op. cit. pp. 136–42.) The inefficiency of clause 18 in separating borough and county voters may not have been the only reason why the issue attracted little support to the government. We should beware of two fallacious assumptions: that all towns were parliamentary boroughs, and that all manufacturing districts were towns. Dozens of small market towns remained part of the county constituencies: no doubt their economic interests were similar to those of the landlords, but they were often local strongholds of Nonconformity and radicalism. Moore's passing reference to voters ‘whose properties were located in towns which still did not have borough status’ (‘Concession or cure’, p. 51; emphasis added) seems to underestimate their numbers. As he says elsewhere, one Wisbech could swamp a hundred Little Abingtons (Politics of deference, p. 47). Similarly, in many areas industrial villages predominated, and most of these remained in the counties. Thus even if all voters in parliamentary boroughs had been eliminated from the counties (which would probably have required the politically impossible price of the equalization ofthe county and borough franchises), the counties would still have retained a significant ‘ urban’ element.
79 3 Hansard, 11 (3 March, 1831), col. 1190. There are slight variations of wording in other versions of Macaulay's speech. The Paymaster was Lord John Russell.
80 Staunton, op. cit. p. III.
- 1
- Cited by