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Asquith, Bonar Law and the First Coalition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Martin D. Pugh
Martin D. Pugh
Affiliation:
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne
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Extract

The debate over the reasons for the establishment of the Coalition Government in May 1915 continues to resist a conclusion despite the use of new collections of private papers. Unless the papers not so far available to researchers happen to contain an unusually convincing letter in the hand of one of the three mens responsible for the decision, this question seems well placed to defy solution indefinitely. It is the purpose of this article, therefore, to attempt a clarification of the immediate causes by taking a slightly wider perspective than is normally done. In this way one can recognize the Coalition of 1915 for what in essence it was, an attempt to avoid a ‘ Khaki Election ’ on the pattern of 1900.

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Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , December 1974 , pp. 813 - 836
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1974

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References

1 See the bibliography in Hazlehurst, C., Politicians at War (London, 1971).Google Scholar

2 For example Charles Masterman and F. E. Smith.

3 Asquith, Lloyd George and Bonar Law.

4 Asquith, H. H., Memories and Reflections (London, 1928), ch. VII, VIII, IX.Google Scholar

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7 Politicians and the War, ch. VII

8 Blake, Robert, The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), p. 241 ff.Google Scholar

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16 Politicians at War, p. 236. The Government's majority was of course vulnerable to a revolt by its two allies (see Taylor, A. J. P., ‘ Politics in the First World War ’, in Politics in Wartime, London, 1964); however, it is argued here that Labour fully shared the Liberals’ apprehension about an election, while the Nationalist collapse before Sinn Fein was still in the future: before May 1915 the three-party alliance still held.Google Scholar

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18 On Long's figures 189 Unionists to 270 Liberal and Labour Members in January.

19 Unionists gained at by-elections 4 seats (1911), 5 (1912) 3 (1913). 4 (1914) and lost one to the Liberals in 1913.

20 Liberal Ministers tried to insist upon postponing the dissolution until after the War: see Montagu, CAB 37/148/44; Samuel and Montagu, CAB 37/150/29; Harcourt, CAB 37/152/9

21 H.C.Deb., 14/12/15, col. 1969.

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26 Runciman to McKenna, 19/5/15, McKenna Papers 5/8. In fact Runciman was kept in complete ignorance of the situation until he received a printed invitation to the first Cabinet meeting on 27 May; on this card he wrote, ‘ This was the only intimation which I received of my retention of my office and seat in the Cabinetl ’, Runciman Papers vol. 136. Other reactions show that his colleagues took a dim view of Asquith's decision and his methods: J. A. Pease to Runciman, 9/6/15, Runciman Papers vol. 136; Charles Hobhouse commented to Runciman, 28/5/15, on Asquith's explanations: ‘ Thus do we deceive ourselves, and, perhaps, others … nothing will persuade me that this is not the end of the Liberal Party as we know it: and that you and others will not find yourselves made responsible for measures you disapprove but cannot in the supposed “ national interest ” reject ’, Runciman Papers vol. 136.

27 Dated 26/5/15, Samuel Papers A/48/II; Dr Hazlehurst dismisses this remark out of hand, (Politicians at War, p. 237), but I take it, as does Dr Koss, (Lord Haldane, p. 187), to mean what it says - the whole episode was inexplicable on the basis of the known facts; this was a common view in the Liberal Party.

28 Diary, 19/5/15, Burns Papers 46338.

29 Addison, Christopher, Four and a Half Years (London, 1934), p. 80; also Richard Holt's Diary, 30/5/15.Google Scholar

30 MacCallum Scott's Diary, 19/5/15; I am grateful to Mr John MacCallum Scott for permission to quote from his father's Diary.

31 Diary, 26/5/15, Burns Papers 46338.

32 Francis Hirst to C. P. Scott, 21/5/15; C. P. Scott Additional MSS, vol. III.

33 Four and a Half Years, p. 80.

34 Downfall of the Liberal Party, pt. I.

35 Asquith Papers, vol. 26; the truce expired on 31/12/16 because the Unionist and Lloyd Georgian Whips ignored a series of appeals from Gulland (Asquith Papers, vol. 26, fol. 25–34), to renew it.

36 Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, 13/6/16, Bonar Law Papers 64/G/8.

37 Minutes of the National Union, 18/2/15.

38 H.CDeb., 3/2/15, c. 71.

39 The Party Agents had a vested interest in keeping Registration work going, otherwise some local Parties were tempted to stop paying them once war broke out (Liberal Agent, XVII, No. 78, Oct. 1914). John Gulland urged Liberal Agents to conduct Registration as carefully as ever because the election might be fought on the new Register (Liberal Agent, XVIII, No. 81, July 1915); Gulland and Geoffrey Howard begged the constituency parties ro retain their agents so as to keep the organisation alive (Liberal Agent, XVIII, No. 82, Oct. 1915). Similar advice was given in the Conservative Agents' Journal (No. 36, Jan. 1915), against the closure of Unionist Associations: ‘ It is not at all necessary that peace should be declared before the election is fought, and fought on party lines ’. The Labour Party was also actively considering Registration and concluded that the best course would be to secure a postponement of the election: Minutes of the National Executive, 26/4/15.

40 CAB 37/127/14, 8 Apr. 1915; the problem arose from the fact that the Register was abnormally inaccurate, and the Cabinet feared either to risk an election from which the soldiers were effectively barred or to attempt reform of the whole Registration procedure; see CAB 37/126/23 8e 31; CAB 37/128/18; CAB 37/130/10.

41 Legislation had to be introduced in July 1915 (for local elections only), Jan. 1916, Aug. 1916, Apr. 1917 and July 1918.

42 Four and a Half Years, p. 78.

43 For comment on this, see The Times editorials 3/2/15 and 4/5/15.

44 See Bonar Law Papers 36/1/12, 14, 18 for correspondence with Crewe on this point.

45 Also in Sir Charles Petrie, Life and Letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain (London, 1940), II, 18–19.Google Scholar

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47 The Times II/I/15.

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49 Balfour Papers 49693 (with 1 letter from Bonar Law to Balfour dated 29/1/15).

50 Bonar Law to Curzon (copy), 29/1/15, Balfour Papers 49693.

51 Balfour to Bonar Law (copy), 30/1/15, Balfour Papers 49693.

52 Lansdowne to Bonar Law, 28/1/15, Bonar Law Papers, 36/2/48.

53 Letters of Austen Chamberlain, II, 20.

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56 Diary, 10/5/15, C. P. Scott Papers, vol. I.

57 Dated 15/3/16, Spender Papers 46388.

58 Diary, 28/3/15, Burns Papers 46337.

59 Diary, 13/5/15, Burns Papers 46338.

60 Long to Bonar Law, 12/5/15, Bonar Law Papers, 37/2/19; he again offered to stand down in a letter of 20 May: SirPerrie, Charles, Walter Long and His Times (London, 1936), p. 192.Google Scholar

61 Steel-Maitland to Lord Robert Cecil, 26/6/15, Cecil of Chelwood Papers 51071.

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64 Lord Haldane, p. 186 (Fisher's report of the meeting to Mrs McKenna, 16 and 29 May), and Politicians at War, p. 238.

65 Churchill, W. S., The World Crisis 1911–1918 (London, 1923), Mentor edition, II, 524.Google Scholar

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68 The World Crisis, II, 518.

69 Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher (London, 1934), III, 236–7.Google Scholar

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73 Asquith, Memories, p. 96; Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 246–7.

74 Lord Haldane, p. 187; Dr Koss maintains that Fisher was both anxious and expecting to return to office, which would have mollified the Opposition, but Hazlehurst (Politicians at War, pp. 237–8), has refuted this.

75 Unknown Prime Minister, p. 247.

76 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 136.

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81 Bonar Law Papers 37/5/26.

82 Chamberlain to Bonar Law, 17/5/15, Bonar Law Papers 37/2/37.

83 See Asquith Papers vol. 22, fol. 196–200 for a series of lists of hypothetical Cabinets made out by Asquith. The important point is that the Liberals retained almost all the key posts; the general distribution was: Cabinet: 12 Liberals, 8 Unionists, 1 Labour. Non-Cabinet Ministers: 8 Liberals, 6 Unionists, 1 Nationalist. Junior Ministers: 15 Liberals, 11 Unionists, 2 Labour.

84 Letters of Austen Chamberlain, p. 25.

85 Long, Walter, Memories (London, 1923), pp. 220–21.Google Scholar

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87 Chamberlain to Bonar Law, 17/5/15, Bonar Law Papers 37/2/37.

88 Chamberlain even expressed the hope that Curzon could be kept out of the Cabinet altogether: Bonar Law Papers 37/2/37.

89 Balfour to Alverstone, 21/5/15 (copy), Balfour Papers 49864.

90 For his supposed weakness in dealing with enemy aliens. It is clear that McKenna was resented just as much as Haldane: Long to Bonar Law, 20/5/15, Petrie, Walter Long, pp. 192–3.

91 Long to Bonar Law, 23/5/15, Bonar Law Papers, 50/3/39.

92 The Times, 22/5/15.

93 The Times, 24/5/15; see also Asquith Papers vol. 22: W. M. R. Pringle told Asquith on 20/5/15, “ we regard (Churchill's) presence in the Government as a public danger ”; and Emmott, also on 20/5/15, chinking of the Colonial Office vacancy, said, “ I do implore you, for the sake of the Dominions, not to put Churchill there ”.

94 Jenkins, Asquith, pp. 405–6; Lord Haldane, pp. 202–14.

95 Balfour's view: see Lady Cynthia Asquith's Diaries (London, 1968), p. 27.Google Scholar

96 Midleton to Strachey, 27/12/15, Strachey Papers 18/2/24.

97 Who had a well qualified candidate in Sir Robert Finlay, advocated by Lansdowne, 23/5/15 Bonar Law Papers 50/3/41, and by Balfour, 21/5/15 (copy), Balfour Papers 49864.

98 He turned it down: Viscount Simon, Retrospect (London, 1952), p. 103.Google Scholar

99 Asquith to Lloyd George, 28/5/15, Lloyd George Papers D/18/2/2.

100 Crewe to Lloyd George, 24/5/15, Lloyd George Papers C/4/1/22.

101 Ibid.

102 Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 248–52.

103 Chamberlain to Bonar Law, 17/5/15, Bonar Law Papers 37/2/37.

104 Robbins, Keith, Sir Edward Grey (London, 1971), pp. 321/3.Google Scholar

105 Midleton to Strachey, 27/12/15, Strachey Papers 18/2/24.

106 Balfour to Asquith, 19/5/15 (copy), Balfour Papers 49692.

107 Stevenson, Frances, Lloyd George: a Diary, ed. Taylor, A. J. P. (London, 1971), p. 52.Google Scholar

108 Lloyd George Papers C/4/1/22; and Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: a Diary, p. 52.

109 Margot Asquith to Lloyd George (undated), Lloyd George Papers C/6/12/16.

110 Lloyd George Papers C/4/1/22.

111 Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 25.

112 Letters of Austen Chamberlain, p. 25; in fact by 22 May Long had taken advice, denounced coalition as ‘ a practical impossibility ’, and begun to lay down terms for acceptance, too late: Petrie, Walter Long, pp. 193–4.