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V. British Policy in the Balkans, 1908-9

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2010

M. B. Cooper
M. B. Cooper
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
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Extract

Britain acted as a principal arbitrator of the Eastern Question throughout the nineteenth century. During the 1890's, however, Britain lost this position owing to diplomatic isolation, the hostility of the Sultan of Turkey—who had found a new ally in Germany—and an equal hostility to the Sultan in Britain, where he was regarded as a brutal oriental despot presiding over an empire in the last stages of decay. The immediate cause of Britain's loss of status in Turkey was her failure to provide vigorous support to Sultan Abdul Hamid in the critical period following the Congress of Berlin. Turkey was bankrupt, but the Sultan's appeal for a loan met with no response in Britain; Turkey's European provinces were on the verge of slipping out of the Sultan's control but Britain refused to extend the terms of the Cyprus Convention (which guaranteed the Sultan's dominions in Asia Minor) to cover the more turbulent Balkans. The Convention itself had an alienating effect, since the guarantee was dependent upon the introduction of administrative reforms in Asia Minor under the direction of British military consuls. Britain's insistence on the application of this provision aroused the suspicion that she was actually seeking political control over this area. Turkey's loss of confidence in Britain, however, had deeper roots. ‘Many Muslims believed that Britain had deserted Turkey in the hour of need, that her protection of Islam was disproved by her war with Afghanistan, that her desire for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was shown to be a pretence by the occupation of Cyprus, and that her power to rule provinces properly was doubtful after her failures in Egypt.’ In fact as early as 1879 Britain had lost the special position which she had held in Turkey for nearly half a century; and thereafter her prestige diminished rapidly, especially after the strong public reaction to the Armenian massacres of 1894-95.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 1964 , pp. 258 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1964

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References

1 The terms ‘Balkans’ and ‘Near East’ were used interchangeably in the period under review; the same practice will be followed here.

2 Medlicott, W. N., The Congress of Berlin and After (London, 1938), p. 313Google Scholar.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. p. 343.

5 ‘D.N.I. Memorandum on Naval Policy, October 28,1896’; printed in Murder, Arthur J., British Naval Policy 1880-1905 (London, 1940), Appendix IVGoogle Scholar.

6 Albcrtini, Luigi, The Origins of the War 0f 1914 (London, 1952), I, 194–7Google Scholar.

7 Nicolson to Hardinge, 2 February 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 2/08. The private papers of Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-secretary at the Foreign Office, 1906-10, are located in the Cambridge University Library.

8 Nicolson to Grey, 26 February 1908, Grey MSS., vol. 34. Grey's private papers are located in the Foreign Office Library.

9 Goschen to Hardinge, 21 February 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 1/08.

10 Albertini, op. cit. pp. 194-5.

11 Pichon to ambassadors at Rome, St Petersburg and Constantinople, 24 February 1908, Documents diplomatiques français, second series, xi, no. 297.

12 Gooch, G. P., Before the War (London, 1938), II, 20–31Google Scholar.

13 Memorandum by Hardinge, 12 June 1908 (British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. eds., II vols. (London, 1927–1937), v, no. 195 (hereafter referred to as B.D.))Google Scholar.

14 A decision to this effect was made at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 30 March (Hardinge to Nicolson, 1 April 1908; Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08).

15 Hardinge to Barclay (Constantinople), 14 July 1008, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08.

16 J. A. C. Tilley, ‘Memorandum respecting the Turkish Revolution and its Consequences’, 1 March 1909, Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereafter referred to as C.P.) 9531, no. 38. An abridgement of the Tilley memorandum is printed in Gooch and Temperley, v, Appendix I. I have consulted the copy of the Confidential Print which is now available in the History Faculty library at Cambridge.

17 Hardinge to Block (Constantinople), 21 September 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08.

18 Hardinge to Lowther (Constantinople), 21 September 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08.

19 Grey to Lowther, 11 August 1908, B.D. v, no. zorj.

20 Albertini, op. cit. p. 195.

21 The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 conferred on Austria-Hungary the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina for an indefinite period and ‘to maintain garrisons and possess military and trading roads over the entire area’ of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar.

22 Nicolson to Grey, 13 August 1908, Grey MSS., vol. 34.

23 The Treaty of Berlin had made Bulgaria an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan and Eastern Roumelia an autonomous Turkish province. The two were virtually united after 1885 when the Prince of Bulgaria became Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia. Bulgaria aspired to liberate herself from Turkey and rise to the rank of an independent state.

24 A breach of etiquette was not involved since the Bulgarian Agent, technically the representative of a vassal state to the suzerain power, did not qualify as a member of the diplomatic corps although he had often been treated as such in the past.

25 Nicolson to Grey, aa September 1908, C.P. 9456 no. 108.

26 Lowther to Grey, a4 September 1908, C.P. 9456, no. 114.

27 Grey to Nicolson, a6 September 1908, C.P. 9456, no. 124.

28 Nicolson to Grey, 29 September 1908; C.P. 9456, no. 136. Nicolson concluded this telegram: ‘…I do not think that the Russian Government are really much pleased with the new situation in Turkey, although they assert that they regard it with benevolent interest. In the first place, they expected that the curtailment of Turkish rule in Europe to the profit of the Slav populations would have been gradually brought about by the old system; and, in the second place, they are apprehensive lest a strong Turkey, governed by Liberal tendencies, should lead to a movement among the Moslem races of the Russian Empire, which might prove embarrassing to the Government. A short time ago the Russian Government were willing to join in an admonition to Bulgaria not to raise embarrassing questions, but since the Buda-Pesth meeting I notice that they are not so eager to adopt this course, and I think that Russia, though of course anxious that no serious complications should occur, would be glad that a settlement of pending questions favourable to Bulgaria rather than to Turkey should be found…’

29 Austria announced the renunciation of her rights in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar as compensation to Turkey for the loss of the provinces.

30 Foreign Office to Admiralty, 8 October 1008, C.P. 9400, no. 108.

31 Buchanan to Hardinge, 14 October 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 1/08.

32 Lowther to Grey, 6 October 1908, C.P. 9456, no. 230 and B.D. v, no. 313.

33 Hardinge to Cartwright, 15 June 1009, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

34 Bertie to Grey, 4 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 293.

35 Hardinge to Nicolson, 13 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 372.

36 Nicolson to Grey, 13 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 366.

37 Grey to Nicolson, 14 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 379.

38 Hardinge to Nicolson, 13 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 37a.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Memorandum by Grey, 14 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 377.

42 Grey to Isvolsky, 15 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 387.

43 King Edward to Nicolson, 27 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 409.

44 Hardinge to Goschen, ao October 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08.

45 Pribram, A. F., Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914 (London, 1951), p. 112Google Scholar.

46 Grey to Whitehead (Belgrade), 28 October 1908, C.P. 9456, no. 643. Hardinge was present at the interview with Isvolsky, in which ‘we never went further than to promise diplomatic support to Russia in putting forward Servian claims’ (Hardinge to Cartwright, 15 June 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09).

47 Grey to Nicolson, 27 October 1908, B.D. v, no. 412. ‘I have not, myself, much sympathy with the clamour of Servia and Montenegro for territorial compensation. If they are afraid of the Austrian advance, they had better sit still, put their own houses in order, make friends with Turkey, and hope that she will get strong under the new regime. But I do not want to coldshoulder Isvolsky on the Servian question, if the Russians are keen about it, and I will do my best to support him. For the moment, I am taking the line that we must first see how the difficulties of Austria with Turkey, and Bulgaria with Turkey can be got over; and that when that bit, which is the larger half of the road, is accomplished, we can go into what remains. It will, however, be useful to me to know how far Isvolsky means to go in support of Servia, if he has definite ideas on the subject and if you can ascertain what they are.’

48 Schmitt, Bernadotte E., The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909 (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 100–25Google Scholar.

49 Cartwright to Grey, 21 December 1908. This telegram does not appear in the appropriate volume of the Confidential Print but it is quoted in Alwyn Parker's ‘Memorandum respecting the Near Eastern Crisis’, 26 July 1909, C.P. 9566, no. 59. The Part of the memorandum printed in the British Documents (v, Appendix 11) deals only with the Montenegrin negotiations.

50 Vide supra.

51 Rodd to Grey, 12 January 1909, C.P. 9503, no. 116.

52 Schmitt, op. cit. pp. 125-44.

53 Russia was prepared to pay to win Bulgaria. Isvolsky offered to advance the compensation money to Bulgaria, to be repaid at a low rate of interest over a 50-year period. The Russians renounced forty of the remaining seventy-four annuities due from the Turkish war indemnity of 1879 and the Porte secured the right to capitalize the rest at four per cent. Turkey did not receive any cash but she realized 125 million francs by this arrangement, whereas financial authorities in Paris had calculated that Bulgaria was unable to pay more than 100 million francs in compensation. Prior to the Russian offer the Bulgarians tried to restrict the settlement to 82 million francs.

54 Hardinge to Lowther, 6 February 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

55 Grey to Lowther, 8 February 1909, Grey MSS., vol. 40.

56 Schmitt, op. cit. pp. i44-229.

57 Nicolson to Grey, 18 February 1909, B.D. v, no. 581.

58 Grey to Nicolson, 27 February 1909. B.D. v, no. 621.

59 Grey to Goschen, 25 March 1909, B.D. v, no. 768, 770.

60 Grey to Nicolson, Bertie and Rodd, 26 March 1909, B.D. v, no. 771.

61 Nicolson to Grey, 6 April 1909, B.D. v, no. 828.

62 Grey to Nicolson, 10 November 1908, B.D. v, no. 441. Hardinge to Nicolson, 11 November 1908, Hardinge MSS. vol. 3/08.

63 Pribram, op. cit. p. 110.

64 Hardinge to Buchanan, 29 December 1908, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/08.

65 Hardinge to Rodd (Rome), undated, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

66 Tilley Memorandum, supra, n. 16.

67 Grey to Whitehead, 1 December 1908, C.P. 9492, no. 299.

68 Hardinge to Lowther, 4 May 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

69 Grey to Hardinge, 13 January 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 4/09.

70 Hardinge to Lowther, 18 May 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

71 Memorandum by Hardinge, 4 May 1909, on the question: ‘In the event of a reactionary Government assuming office in Russia and of His Majesty's Government being asked whether they would be ready to give material aid to Russia in the event of war with Germany and Austria, what should the answer be?’ (Hardinge MSS., vol. 4/09). This copy includes the minutes of Grey and Asquith whereas the copy in Gooch and Temperley, v (Appendix III), dated ‘April?’, does not.

72 France had been negotiating with Germany for a settlement of the Casablanca incident of September 1908 and did not take a very active part in the crisis. An agreement was reached on 9 February 1909 in which France undertook to respect the integrity of Morocco and to guarantee equality in the economic field to Germany. Germany, on her tide, recognized France's special political interest in the maintenance of law and order in Morocco. Hardinge felt the French were ‘secretly coquetting’ with Austria in the Balkans in the hope of obtaining a free hand from Germany in Morocco (Hardinge to Cartwright, 26 January 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09). He contrasted the attitudes of Britain and France in supporting Isvolsky: ‘(Britain's) has been perfectly loyal which is more than can be said of the attitude of the French which has been incomprehensible to me.’

73 Nicolson to Grey, 24 March 1909, B.D. v, no. 764.

74 Hardinge Memorandum, supra.

75 Hardinge to Cartwright, 18 May 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

76 Hardinge to Lowther, 18 May 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.

77 Hardinge to Cartwright, 4 October 1909, Hardinge MSS., vol. 3/09.