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The Resignation of Anthony Eden*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Norman Rose
Norman Rose
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Extract

On Sunday 20 February 1938, Anthony Eden, accompanied by the cheers of the waiting crowd, left the foreign office for an emergency cabinet session. That same evening he tendered his resignation as foreign secretary. Ten years later Churchill recollected his feelings on learning of the news.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , December 1982 , pp. 911 - 931
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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References

1 Winston, Churchill, The second World War (6 vols. London, 1948–1954), 1, 201.Google Scholar

2 Sir John, Wheeler-Bennett, Knaves, fools and heroes (London, 1974), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

3 Eden had in fact been informed that he was ‘to have the Foreign Office’. But Baldwin, on the advice of Chamberlain and Geoffrey Dawson, eventually decided on Hoare. Eden remained at the foreign office as the newly created minister for league of nations affairs, despite the obvious danger of ‘duality’ and ‘conflicting advice’. See Avon, , Facing the dictators (London, 1962), pp. 216–19Google Scholar; Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J., Baldwin (London, 1969), pp. 822–3Google Scholar; Templewood, , Nine troubled years (London, 1954), pp. 135–6Google Scholar; Feiling, K., The life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1947). P 264.Google Scholar

4 See Avon, Dictators, p. 410.

5 Ibid. pp. 384–5.

6 His diary entry for 17 June 1936, quoted in Feiling, Chamberlain, p. 296.

7 See Cowling, M., The impact of Hitler (Cambridge, 1975), p. 163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See his paper of 2 April 1937, circulated almost two months before his accession, F.P. (36) 23, F.O. 371/20735, C. 2618/270/18, outlining his ideas for a European settlement. All F.O., Cab. and Prem. references are located at the Public Record Office.

9 Halifax, , Fulness of days (London, 1957), p. 193; see also Avon, Dictators, p. 445.Google Scholar

10 Feiling, Chamberlain, p. 330; also Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 Aug. 1937, Neville Chamberlain papers, located at Birmingham University Library (hereafter cited as NC.P.), 18/1/1014.

11 Diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938, extracts of which have been published in Feiling, Chamberlain, pp. 330–1, and MacLeod, I., Neville Chamberlain (London, 1962), pp. 211–17. The original, used here, is located in the Chamberlain papers.Google Scholar

12 See Toscano, M., ‘Eden's mission to Rome on the eve of the I talo-Ethiopian conflict‘ in Sarkissian, A. O., ed. Studies in diplomatic history and historiography in honour of G. P. Gooch (London, 1961), p. 126; and Avon, Dictators, pp. 220ff.Google Scholar

13 See his remarks in favour of an agreement with Germany-‘it must be a general agreement and not one of “sops”’ - to the Foreign Affairs Committee in Nov. 1937, Nicolson, N. (ed.),Harold Nicolson: diaries and letters, 1930–39 (London, Fontana edn, 1969), p. 308Google Scholar. And in the same connexion Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany: the search for agreement 1930–37 (London, 1969), pp. 20–1, 25, 26.Google Scholar

14 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 12 Sept. 1937, NC.P. 18/1/1020.

15 Hoare to Chamberlain, 17 March 1937, NC.P. 7/11/30/74.

16 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 Aug. 1937, NC.P. 18/1/1014.

17 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 Oct. 1937, NC.P. 19/1/1025.

18 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 8 Aug. 1937, NC.P. 18/1/1015.

19 Ibid.

20 Chamberlain to Halifax, 7 Aug. 1937, F.O. 954/13A (Part 1), [the Eden papers]. Once again, it is not without significance that Chamberlain chose to renew his initiative during Eden's temporary absence from the foreign office.

21 Those in attendance included: Halifax, Sir Robert Vansittart (permanent under secretary of state at the foreign office), Sir Eric Drummond (ambassador to Italy), Sir Lancelot Oliphant (deputy under secretary of state), and the legal advisers to the foreign office.

22 Eden to Halifax, 11 Aug. 1937, F.O. 954/13A (Part 1); also Avon, Dictators, pp. 454–7.

23 A Mediterranean Locarno had proved unacceptable as far back as Jan. 1932. See Cab. 27/476, or Cab. 24/227, C.P. 17(32).

24 Halifax to Eden, 12 Aug. 1937, F.O. 954/13A (Part 1).

25 Halifax to Chamberlain, 15 Aug. 1937, NC.P. 7/11/30/64, and Halifax to Chamberlain, 19 Aug. 1937, F.O. 954/13A (Part 1); also Avon, Dictators, p. 457. In an earlier letter to Halifax, 1 Aug. 1937, Eden commented on the prospects of an Anglo-Italian agreement: ‘We should also go slow about Anglo-Italian rapprochement and talk as little as possible in the press about Abyssinia. The Italians will try to push us into concessions or the promise of them in advanc of negotiation. It is sinister that their list of demands, in their own press, is growin steadily. It is, I am sure, to our interest to “lay off” discussion of Anglo-Italian relations for the present except an occasional hint that the presence of 50,000 Italians in Spain is a shadow over them that we should like to see removed.’ [I am grateful to Mrs G. Bennett for bringing this letter to my attention.]

26 See also his statement to the commons in Nov. 1937 when he responded forthrightly to Mussolini's ‘bleating democracies’ speech supporting Germany's colonial claims. Chamberlain, having warned Eden ‘to say nothing to upset the Dictators’, reacted angrily to Eden's unsolicited firmness. ‘They [the F.O.] never can keep the main objectives of foreign policy in mind with the result that they give smart answers to some provocative foreign statement.’ See Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 6 Nov. 1937, NC.P. 18/1/1027; also Harvey, J. (ed.), The diplomatic diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1937–1940 (London, 1970), pp. 56, 58, and Avon, Dictators, pp. 506–8.Google Scholar

27 See cabinet minutes for 29 Sept. 1937, Cab. 23/89.

28 The details are in Prem. 1/276, memoranda dated 31 Dec. 1937; see also Harvey diaries, pp. 65, 67.

29 Eden to Chamberlain, 1 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/2 76. This was a covering letter to the memoranda of 31 December.

30 Eden to Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1937, F.O. 954/78 (Part 2).

31 Harvey diaries, p. 63; also Avon, Dictators, p. 547.

32 Eden to Chamberlain, 31 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

33 Chamberlain later complained that Ribbentrop's appointment as German foreign minister (announced on 4 Feb.) had scotched his plans and left him ‘all at sea again’. (See Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 30 Jan. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1037.) If so, this made the Italian agreement even more imperative.

34 Chamberlain to Eden, 13 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276. Sir Horace Wilson read, minuted, and frequendy drafted Chamberlain's replies. See also Chamberlain to Eden, 7 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276, and Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Jan. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1033.

35 Eden to Chamberlain, 9 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

36 An accurate summary is in Cab. 23/92, secret addendum to cabinet meeting of 24 Jan. 1938; see also Avon, Dictators, pp. 547ff.

37 The original telegram from Lindsay conveying Roosevelt's plan is in F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45. The scheme was to incorporate ‘fundamental principles’ governing international relations; to achieve ‘limitation and reduction of armaments’; to grant to ‘all peoples‘ access to raw materials and ‘other elements necessary for their economic life‘; and, in the event of war, to guarantee the ‘rights and obligations’ of neutrals.

38 The most forceful and public of Roosevelt's attempts to reawaken American interest in world affairs was, of course, his famous Quarantine speech in October 1937. But see also his letter to Mussolini injuly 1937; his idea to announce to the diplomatic corps on armistice day 1937 a scheme of world appeasement; and his longstanding notion to convene a meeting of world leaders at sea for the same purpose. In these lesser-known moves one can detect most of the elements of his January proposal. See Roosevelt, E. (ed.), The Roosevelt letters, 1928–1945 (3 vols. London, 1956), iii, 213–14Google Scholar; Cordell, Hull, Memoirs (2 vols. London, 1948), 1, 546Google Scholar; Sumner, Welles, The time for decision (Cleveland, 1945), pp. 65–6Google Scholar. Although an American initiative could not have taken the British by total surprise, they must have been considerably puzzled by the crash timetable Roosevelt had imposed upon them. Were they meant to interpret this as a serious, considered measure in international politics? Or was it just a meaningless gesture, strong in public relations, weak in content, and typically flamboyant in the American style? Roosevelt's impatience angered the more experienced British who had been grappling with these complicated problems for a number of years. See Dilks, D. (ed.), The diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (London, 1971), p. 36; also the Harvey diaries, p. 69.Google Scholar

39 Hull, Memoirs, p. 539.

40 For example, the reports of 18 June and 29 July 1936, C.P. 174(36) and C.P. 211(36), Cab. 24/263; and of 26 Feb. 1937, C.P. 73(37), Cab. 24/268. See also Hankey to Phipps, 21 Feb. 1938, Cab. 63/53.

41 Avon, Dictators, p. 559.

42 This is not to argue in favour of trusting Mussolini's word. But British policy-makers had to answer a different, though related, question. Was there a reasonable chance of American involvement resulting from Roosevelt's initiative? On balance, the evidence is clear. The latest contribution [Dallek, R., Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 1932–1945 (Oxford, 1979), p. 156]Google Scholar adds nothing to Langer and Gleason's earlier conclusion: ‘ Mr Roosevelt and his advisers sympathised with the British and wished them well in whatever efforts they felt constrained to make in the direction of peaceful adjustment, but there was never any question of approving or supporting their specific policy and certainly no thought of assuming any political or military commitment in connection with it.’ The challenge to isolation (2 vols., Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1964), 1, 32.Google Scholar

43 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, i6Jan. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/2035, and Cadogan to Eden, 13jan. 1938, F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45.

44 Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 23 Jan. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1036.

45 Chamberlain to Sir Ronald Lindsay, 13 Jan. 1938, F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45; also cabinet minutes of 24 Jan. 1938, Cab. 23/92.

46 Lindsay to F.O., 15 Jan. 1938, F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45.

47 Avon, Dictators, p. 552.

48 Chamberlain to Lindsay, 13 Jan. 1938, F.O. 371/21526.

49 Cadogan diaries, p. 37.

50 See Eden to Chamberlain, 17 Jan. 1938, F.O. 959/29A (Part 1); also Avon, Dictators, PP 553–6.

51 Harvey diaries, p. 72. Cranborne was particularly influential, and he often provided the verbal ammunition which Eden later used. See his memoranda of 30 Aug. 1937 (F.O. 800/296), and 4 Feb. 1938 (Prem. 1/276).

52 Ibid. p. 73; and Avon, Dictators, pp. 558–60.

53 Roosevelt's answer was included in Lindsay to F.O., 18 Jan. 1938, F.O. 371/21526.

54 See Cab. 27/622. Capt. Roskill has explained [Hankey (London, 1974), III, 299] that Hankey ‘kept, as was his custom, a full record of the discussions‘. Later his notes were destroyed, but not before Lord Avon's research assistant had summarized them in preparation for the writing of his memoirs. Roskill concludes that the summary ‘corresponds closely to Hankey's original‘.Google Scholar

55 Cadogan diaries, p. 40, and Harvey diaries, p. 76.

56 See Cab. 23/92, minutes of meeting of 24 Jan. 1938; and Avon, Dictators, p. 565.

57 Chamberlain to Eden, 13 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

58 See Cab. 23/92.

59 In all, four telegrams were sent, two for Roosevelt's enlightenment and two for Lindsay's guidance. [See F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45.] Chamberlain no longer felt ‘justified in asking the President to delay the announcement of his scheme any longer... As I have already said I warmly welcome [it], and I will do my best to contribute to the success of the scheme whenever he decides to launch it.‘

60 Avon, Dictators, p. 564.

61 Lindsay to F.O., 23 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/259, and 24 Jan. 1938 and 3 Feb. 1938, F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45.

62 Lindsay to F.O., 25 Feb. 1938, F.O. 371/21526, A. 2127/64/45.

63 Details in A. Bullock, Hitler: a study in tyranny (Pelican edn, 1962), pp. 416–20, 422–5.

64 Report of interview between Grandi and Eden, 10 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276; also Avon, Dictators, p. 572, and Harvey diaries, p. 83.

65 Muggeridge, M., (ed.), Ciano's diaries, 1937–38 (London, 1952), pp. 72–3.Google Scholar

66 Ciano's diaries, p. 71.

67 Eden to Chamberlain, 1 Jan. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

68 Was not Eden's faith that Roosevelt would eventually deliver the goods rather naϊve? Technically Eden was right: Roosevelt had not yet sent his official reply, and it was not to arrive until mid-March. But long before then it was perfectly obvious that the Roosevelt plan had been put into cold storage indefinitely. Even by the end of January, judging from the reports reaching the foreign office, it must have been abundantly clear that Roosevelt would not break with Chamberlain over the Italian talks. On the contrary, when pressed he invariably offered his unqualified support.

69 Refers to a suggestion of July 1937 which the British submitted to the Non-intervention Committee, whereby belligerent rights would be granted to both sides in the civil war in return for the withdrawal of a ‘substantial proportion’ of volunteers.

70 Avon, Dictators, p. 570, from his minutes of 30 Jan. 1938.

71 Harvey diaries, pp. 84, 90.

72 See memorandum by Cranborne, 4 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276; also Avon, Dictotors, p. 572.

73 Cadogan diaries, p. 44.

74 Lady Chamberlain should certainly not be considered as her brother-in-law's agent, and she had in fact informed Eden of her intention to spend the winter in Rome. Her friendship with Mussolini dated back to the heyday of Anglo-Italian relations at Locarno when British foreign policy was under the direction of her husband, Sir Austen Chamberlain. Eden himself had on occasion used her good offices as an intermediary (see Cowling, , The impact of Hitler, p. 164). However, it is patently clear that the Italians exploited her gullibility to widen the breach between Eden and Chamberlain and, as will become apparent, her meetings with Mussolini and Ciano were distinguished by the utmost indiscretion on her part.Google Scholar

75 From Chamberlain's diary entry 19–27 Feb. 1938, NC.P.; see also Ciano diaries, p. 68, and Perth to Cadogan, 6 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

76 Chamberlain to Eden, 8 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

77 Perth to Cadogan, 6 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276, reporting on a conversation with Mussolini.

78 Harvey diaries, p. 86.

79 Eden to Chamberlain, 8 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276; also Avon, Dictators, pp. 573–4.

80 They had met on 4, 5 and 10 Feb. 1938. See report of interview, 10 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276, also Avon, Dictators, p. 575.

81 Whispers of Eden's irresolution may, however, have come to Chamberlain's notice. ‘ Chips‘ Channon, gossip, diarist, and Conservative M.P., hints at the crisis to come. ‘ I was suddenly sent for to go to the PM's room; at first I hoped wildly that I was to be offered a Government post: he was calm and smiled gently at me as I entered. What were my impressions of Italy? he asked. I told him frankly what I thought, that Italy wanted to be friends with us and that the only drawback to better relations was Anthony Eden. The PM smiled enigmatically...The interview only lasted 4 minutes.‘ [James, R. R., ed.,‘ Chips’: the diaries of Sir Henry Channon (Penguin edn, 1970), p. 180.] In the aftermath of Eden's resignation, Channon rose to the highest political office he was to attain, that of parliamentary private secretary to R. A. Butler, Cranborne's replacement as under secretary of state at the foreign office.Google Scholar

82 Avon, Dictators, p. 576.

83 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 Feb. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1039. He had also been instrumental in inserting a notice in the Sunday Times to the same effect. [See Cadogan diaries, p. 47.] As before, Chamberlain's cordiality should be related to the German question. Henderson had just been recalled from Berlin for preliminary discussions about the most profitable way to attain a settlement. Eden was party to all these discussions, the main point relating to new colonial arrangements in Central Africa, and, although he did not display great enthusiasm, he did not deviate from the general line. For Chamberlain's ideas on the colonial settlement, see his memorandum of 24 Jan. 1938, Cab. 27/623. And in the same connexion, Cadogan diaries, pp. 43, 45Google Scholar; Harvey diaries, pp. 81, 85; Chamberlain's diary entry of 19–27 Feb. 1938, NC.P.; and Middlemas, K., Diplomacy of illusion (London, 1972), pp. 140–3.Google Scholar

84 Perth to F.O., 17 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

85 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938.

86 See Eden to Chamberlain, 8 Feb. 1938, Prem. 1/276.

87 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938.

88 Avon, Dictators, pp. 572–3, 582. Grandi put off Eden's advances with the most transparent of excuses, claiming he had a ‘golfing engagement (I hate golf but pretend to play it when necessary)‘ see Muggeridge, M. (ed.), Ciano's diplomatic papers (London, 1948), p. 165.Google Scholar

89 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938.

90 All three participants left a record. See Avon, Dictators, pp. 580–3, and appendix C; Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938; and Ciano's diplomatic papers, pp. 164–84. The most oft-quoted of these recollections is Grandi's, mainly for his picturesque description of Chamberlain and Eden as ‘two enemies confronting each other, like two cocks in true fighting posture‘. For additional flourishes, see Harvey diaries, pp. 93–4, and Cadogan diaries, pp. 49–50.

91 This committee was composed of National Government supporters. Eden, deceived by the superficial militancy of the gathering, concluded that it ‘appeared to be unanimous against attempting to buy Italian friendship‘ in exchange for de jure recognition. See Avon, Dictators, p. 579; also Nicolson diaries, p. 316, and Amery diaries, 17 Feb. 1938 (unpublished). I am grateful to the Rt Hon. J. Amery for allowing me access to his father's diaries.

92 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938; also Avon, Dictators, p. 582.

93 That evening the Italian embassy issued a thoroughly tendentious press communiqué. Ostensibly 'semi-official‘, it welcomed the British government's ‘new approach‘, and emphasized that the conversations would include ‘recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia‘. To round off this fanciful version, the British were reported to have ‘ waived the Spanish question and the question of the Bari broadcasts which had hitherto been used as a pretext for failure to start conversations‘. This was just the kind of wheeling and dealing most likely to inflame Eden's inherent distrust of the Italians.

94 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 Feb. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1040.

95 The record is in Cab. 23/92.

96 Cadogan diaries, p. 51.

97 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938.

98 See minutes of the meeting, Cab. 23/92; also Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938, Cadogan diaries, p. 19, Harvey diaries, pp. 95–6 and Avon, Dictators, p. 591.

99 From Halifax's account of the crisis, quoted by Douglas, R.,‘ Chamberlain and Eden, 1937–38‘, Journal of Contemporary History, xiii (1978), 97–116.Google Scholar

100 Minutes in Cab. 23/92.

101 The news reached Chamberlain, via Sir Horace Wilson, by yet another of those mysterious ways which so infuriated Eden. Wilson brought a message to this effect in the morning, and it was confirmed by the same source just before the cabinet met. Even Chamberlain was not absolutely certain as to the identity of the emissary. ‘ I did not ask... who the intermediary was and he [Wilson] did not actually tell me but I assume it was Joseph Ball [director of Conservative Research Department] who had once or twice before given me information of what Grandi, whom he knows well, was doing or thinking‘ (Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938), After the war Grandi's exposé of these events, including sensational, clandestine meetings, one in ‘ an ordinary public taxi‘ with Chamberlain's agent, was published in Ciano's diplomatic papers (pp. 164–84). Years later Grandi denied having participated in this melodrama: ‘My dispatch was ornamented a little to impress them in Rome‘, now claiming that one Dingle, a British subject acting as legal adviser to the Italian embassy, was the intermediary with Ball. These refinements add little, and even if known at the time would scarcely have assuaged Eden's anger. The atmosphere of backstairs intrigue remained, except to the chain of secrecy - Grandi—Ball-Wilson-Chamberlain - was added an extra link—Dingle. In all this the foreign office remained a spectator, although Ball had previously informed the officials of his contacts. See MacLeod, , Chamberlain, pp. 218–20Google Scholar, and Colvin, I., Vansittart in office (London, 1965), p. 191.Google Scholar

102 Avon, Dictators, p. 592. Eden had made this remark to Chamberlain before the cabinet meeting.

103 As Lord Hailsham put it to his son: ‘ I can't tell you why Anthony resigned because I couldn't make out myself. ’ [Quoted by Thompson, N., The anti-appeasers (Oxford, 1971), p. 145]Google Scholar In the same connexion see Cooper, A. Duff, Old men forget (London, 1957), p. 214, and R. Douglas, ‘Chamberlain and Eden‘.Google Scholar

104 Cadogan diaries, p. 51; also Harvey diaries, p. 96 and Nicolson diaries, p. 317.

105 Chamberlain's diary entry for 19–27 Feb. 1938. His official reply to Eden was more formal, describing Eden's parting as ‘painful to all of us‘. The official correspondence is in Prem. 1/276; see also Avon, Dictators, pp. 596–7.

106 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 27 Feb. 1938, NC.P. 18/1/1040.

107 In France, the press discovered in Eden a contemporary Delcassé. In political circles it was rumoured that Delbos, the foreign minister, had several times offered his resignation, and there was serious talk of reconstructing the government. This panicky reaction soon died down, mainly as a result of Chamberlain's firm handling of the crisis. See Phipps's reports in F.O. 371/21590, C. 1192, 1193, 1203, 1235, 1250, 1284, 1384/13/17.

108 See Lindsay to F.O., i March 1938, F.O. 371/21547, A. 1890/1409/45. Dorothy Thompson coined the first phrase, Walter Lippmann the second.

109 For example, Ernst Woermann, the German charge d‘affaires in London, reported that Eden hoped to place himself at the head of the Conservative party, or of a new party combining left-wing Conservatives, the National Labour party, remnants of the Liberal party, and even the right wing of the Labour party. See Documents on German foreign policy, 1918–45, series D, 1, no. 120.

110 See Parliamentary debates, Commons, 332, cols. 45–50.

111 Nicolson diaries, p. 318. See also the Amery diaries, 21 Feb. 1938, and Duff, Cooper, Old men Forget, p. 214.Google Scholar

112 Interview with Lady Vansittart, 27 Aug. 1980.

113 Elliot to Mrs Dugdale, B., quoted by Norman Rose, ‘Baffy’: the diaries of Blanche Dugdale, 1936–47 (London, 1973), pp. 85–6.Google Scholar

114 Labour's motion of censure was defeated by 330 to 168 votes. For details see Parliamentary debates, Commons, 332, cols. 209—322.

115 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 March 1938, NC.P.-18/1/1040.

116 Hankey to Sir Eric Phipps, 21 Feb. 1938, Cab. 63/53; see also Roskill, , Hankey, pp. 303–4.Google Scholar

117 See Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J., Baldwin, pp. 1042–3.Google Scholar

118 See James, R. R., Victor Cazalet: a portrait (London, 1976), p. 208.Google Scholar