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Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd George Replaces Asquith: the Issues Underlying the Drama

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Michael Fry
Affiliation:
University of Southern California

Extract

On 7 December 1916 David Lloyd George became prime minister, leading the second coalition government of the war. No archival sources of significance remain to be consulted to help explain how and why the particular composition of the new government emerged. A great deal has been written on the first years of the war, from many perspectives, but a satisfactory political history of Asquith's two administrations remains to be crafted. A sustained narrative, set in the appropriate context, which relates the political significance of the issues to the drama of politics, to the way individuals lose office and governments fall, which establishes trends, and measures cumulative effects is still unwritten.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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References

1 Koss, S. summarized the state of the literature in his ‘Asquith versus Lloyd George: the last phase and beyond’, in Sked, A. and Cook, C., Crisis and controversy (London, 1976), pp. 6689CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ten years on one should consult Turner, J. A., ‘The formation of Lloyd George's “garden suburb”: Fabian-like Milnerite penetration?The Historical Journal, XX, 1 (1977), 165–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fair, J. D., ‘Politicians, historians and the war: a reassessment of the political crisis of December 1916’, Journal of Modern History, XLIX, 3. (1977), abstract, iiiGoogle Scholar; Fraser, P., ‘Lord Beaverbrook's Fabrications in Politicians and the War, 1914–1916’, The Historical Journal, XXV, 1 (1982), 147–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fraser, P., ‘British war policy and the crisis of Liberalism in May 1915’, Journal of Modern History, LIV, (1982), 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McEwen, J. M., ‘The struggle for mastery in Britain: Lloyd George versus Asquith, December 1916’, The Journal of British Studies, XVIII, 1 (1978), 131–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lloyd George's Liberal supporters in December 1916: a note’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, LIII, 128 (1980), 265–72Google Scholar. As a result of this work and the many recent biographies, the mixture of accurate paths and false trails laid out by participants on the events of December 1916 are more easily followed and avoided.

2 Lloyd George raised the question of a coalition government and resurrected his 1910 memorandum for the benefit of Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain in January 1915 (A. Chamberlain memorandum, 29 January 1915. A. Chamberlain papers, AC/13/2/2 and Lloyd George papers, C/3/14/8). See also Gilbert, Bentley L. B., ‘Lloyd George and the historians’, Albion, II, 1 (1979), 7486CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Lloyd George to Montagu, 24 January 1915, Lloyd George papers, C/1/2/5. In a similar vein he deplored the way social connexions preserved incompetents in their positions at the Admiralty. (Scott diary, 27, November 1914, C. P. Scott papers, Add 50901.)

4 Turner, J. A., ‘State purchase of the liquor trade in the First World War’, The Historical Journal, XXIII, 2 (1980), 589615CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hazlehurst, C., Politicians at War (New York, 1971)Google Scholar; and Scally, Robert J., The origins of the Lloyd George coalition (Princeton, 1975)Google Scholar.

5 Montagu to Lloyd George, 26 April 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/17/16/1.

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7 Ibid. pp. 273–9 and 288–9.

8 Cecil memorandum, 20 September 1915, Balfour papers, file 49737, and Cecil to Asquith, 10 October 1915, FO/800/196. The mishandling of Balkan and Near Eastern affairs necessitated, in Cecil's view, a small cabinet to direct the war.

9 War committee, 1 December 1916, Cab. 42/26/6.

10 Balfour-Lloyd George correspondence, 5 and 6 March 1915. Lloyd George papers, C/3/3/1 and 2; Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 1 November 1915, ibid. D/17/8/9; Cecil memoranda, 20 September and 17 October 1915 and 27 November 1916, Cecil papers, Add 51105 and Cab. 37/160/21; Riddell diary, 11 September 1914, 7 March and 29 October 1915 and 1 October and 26 November 1916, Riddell, Lord, War diary, 1914–1918 (London, 1933), pp. 31, 65, 130, 213 and 222Google Scholar.

11 War policy committee, August-September 1915, Cab. 27/2; Lloyd George to his brother, 15 April 1916, George, W., My brother and I (London, 1958), p. 254Google Scholar; Lloyd George to Asquith, 30 May and 26 September 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/18/2/11, and E/2/23/5; Lloyd George-Robertson correspondence, 23 and 26 June and 27 September, ibid. D18/8/18, 19 and 20, and E/1/5/2, and 12 October 1916, Asquith papers, file 30; Lloyd to D.M.O., 4 September 1916, Carson papers, D/1507/1. 1916–25; Derby to Lloyd George, 12 November 1916, Lloyd George papers, E/1/1/9; and Woodward, David R., Lloyd George and the generals, (Newark, 1983), pp. 15130Google Scholar.

12 War committee, 1 March, 10 May and 28 November 1916, Cab. 42/10/1, 42/13/6 and 42/ 26/1; Scott diary, 6–8 June 1916; Scott papers, Add 50902.

13 In fact in November 1915, Asquith agreed to rusticate Kitchener by dispatching him to the Near East, in order to bring greater harmony between the war office and the munitions ministry. In this way, they would avoid the need to dismiss Kitchener, secure greater efficiency, and satisfy Bonar Law. Asquith concluded, ‘I have told no one else – but you and I must act together’. (Asquith to Lloyd George, 3 November 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/18/2/12.)

14 Asquith to Lloyd George, 22 May and Margot Asquith to Lloyd George, 23 May 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/14/1/5 and 7.

15 Lloyd George to Long, 12 June 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/14/2/32, where he announced that he had relinquished the negotiations and resigned from the government because of Long's opposition; Lloyd George to Asquith, 2 letters of 12 June 1916, ibid. D/14/2/29 and 30. The first was a letter of resignation and was not sent; the second recorded a decision to fight Cecil and the Unionists. Asquith to Lloyd George, 17 June 1916, enclosing a Selbourne letter to Asquith, ibid. D/14/3/9; Lloyd George to Dillon, 20 June 1916, ibid. D/14/3/22, where he reported that only Balfour, Bonar Law and F. E. Smith supported him and the prime minister, and that the ungentlemanly and treacherous Long was spreading lies in Ulster and seeking to discredit Carson; Austen Chamberlain to Asquith, 22 June, and Lloyd George to Asquith, 23 June 1916, ibid. D/14/3/34.

16 Lloyd George to Carson, 3 June 1916, Carson papers, D1507/1, 1916/25; Henry Wilson to Milner, 11 April 1916, Milner papers, file 142; Scott diary, 14 June 1916, Scott papers, Add 50902; and Carson to Lloyd George, 1 October 1916, Lloyd George papers, E/2/7/2.

17 Grey to Asquith, 29 December 1915, Asquith papers, file 28. He regretted the fact that he had not resigned with Haldane in May.

18 Lloyd George memoranda, 22 February 1915, Cab. 42/1/39, and 29 June 1916, Cab. 42/15/14; War policy committee, 16 and 18 August 1915, Cab. 37/132/21, Mun. 5/123, and Cab. > 3713228.

19 Scott diary, 3 September and 26 October 1915, Scott papers, Add 50901 and 50902; Riddell diary, 23 October 1915, Riddell, , War diary, p. 129Google Scholar; Lloyd George speeches, 20 December 1915, Parl. Deb. H. of C, 5th Ser. LXXVII, 95–122, and 6 May 1916, George, D. Lloyd, Slings and arrows (Toronto, 1929), p. 246Google Scholar.

20 Devonport to Lloyd George, 20 April 1916, Lloyd George papers D/6/11/3; C. Bathurst to Lloyd George, 28 December 1915, ibid. D/16/5/1; F. G. Kellaway M.P. to Lloyd George, 4 December 1916, ibid. E/2/19/16.

21 Margot Asquith to McKenna, December 1915, McKenna papers, file 5/9/4.

22 Lloyd George-Chamberlain correspondence, 8 January 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/16/7/4 and A. Chamberlain papers, AC/13/2/–104.

23 Cabinet meeting, 31 December 1915, Cab. 37/139/70; House diary, 11 January 1916, E. M. House papers and diary, vol. VIII; Curzon to Lloyd George, 26 March, 5 August and 15 September 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/16/10/1, 4 and 5; Riddell diary, 10 October 1916, Riddell, , War diary, p. 213Google Scholar.

24 War committee, 13, 21, 23 and 30 November 1916, Cab. 42/24/5, Cab. 42/25/1, Cab. 42/ 25/7, and Cab. 42/26/4; Lloyd George memorandum on Food Supply, 10 November 1916, Cab. 42/24/3; Army Council to Lloyd George, 28 November 1916, Cab. 37/160/25.

25 Gilbert Murray to Bertrand Russell, 25 December 1915, Bertrand Russell papers; Riddell diary, 11 June and 9 November 1915, Riddell, , War diary, pp. 104 and 136–7Google Scholar.

26 Massingham to the Daily News, 8 and 11 September 1916, Lloyd George papers, E/3/4/1. See also L. T. Hobhouse to McKenna, 29 December 1915, McKenna papers, 5/9/12.

27 Asquith to Balfour, 18 September 1915, Asquith papers, file 28.

28 Rowntree to R. Cross, 26 April 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/20/2/90. See also N. Buxton to Lloyd George, 13 March 1917, Buxton papers.

29 Lloyd George speech at Conway, 6 May 1916, George, Lloyd, Slings and arrows, p. 246Google Scholar; Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 13 December 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/16/5/2; Asquith to McKenna, 25 March, and McKenna to Asquith, 16 June 1916. McKenna papers, 5/10/18 and 5/8/9; Samuel memorandum, 7 December 1916, Samuel papers, A/55; Esher to Scott, 24 J November 1916, Scott papers, Add 50909. At Conway he said: ‘It is the business of the statesman to strain every nerve to keep a nation out of war, but once they are in it, it is also their business to wage it with all their might.’

30 Montagu to Asquith, 20 June 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/17/10/5, Montagu distributed. his loyalty and the reserve fairly evenly between Lloyd George and Asquith.

31 Lloyd George, cabinet notes, 10 and 11 August, and Lloyd George-Churchill exchanges, October 1914, Lloyd George papers, C/13. On Churchill's record generally see the third volume of Martin Gilbert's biography.

32 Crewe to Lloyd George, 24 May 1915, Lloyd George papers, C/4/1/22. On Addison see , K. O. & Morgan, J., Portrait of a progressive. The political career of Christopher, Viscount Addison (Oxford, 1980), pp. 4757Google Scholar.

33 Crewe to Grey, 19 February 1928, Crewe papers, C/17.

34 Lloyd George to Sir F. Black, 24 September 1915, Mun. 4/526/45/6; Lloyd George to Sir E. Geddes, 22 May 1916, Mun. 4/7067/17/24 and 25; Scott diary, 22–23 February and 13—20 April 1916, Scott papers, Add 50902; Asquith to McKenna, 25 March 1916 and McKenna to Asquith, 16June 1916, McKenna papers, 5/10/18 and 5/8/9; McKenna to Hankey, 4 July 1916, ibid.; War committee, 21 June 1916, Cab. 42/15/10; Samuel memorandum, 5 December 1916, Samuel papers, A/55; and Geddes, A. C., The forging of a family (London, 1952), pp. 223–36Google Scholar.

35 Riddell, , War diary, p. 34Google Scholar. The Lloyd George-Churchill relationship was uneven, forfeit to political realities, opportunism, and policy difference. It benefited Lloyd George to maintain a certain distance from the discredited Churchill. (Churchill to Lloyd George, 5 and 7 April 1915, Lloyd George papers, C/3/16/24 and 25; Scott diary, 20–22 November 1915, Scott papers, Add 50902; Lloyd George to his brother, 13 March 1916, George, W., My brother, p. 253Google Scholar.) In November 1914, Lloyd George blamed Churchill for the Admiralty's poor performance, for the Antwerp affair, and for Turkey's belligerence (Scott diary, 27 November 1914, Scott papers, Add 50901). After May 1915 he did not protest at Churchill's humiliation and never made his return to office an issue. Yet Lloyd George attempted to preserve Churchill's reputation against unfair allegations over the Dardanelles and Mesopotamian campaigns, and insisted that they recognize his contribution to the development of the tank (War committee, 11 July and 18 September 1916, Cab. 42/16/5 and Cab. 42/20/2; Dardanelles commission of enquiry, 30 October 1916 and 2 April 1917, Cab. 19/29 and 33; unsigned memorandum, 9 October 1916, Carson papers, D/1507/5/26).

36 Asquith to Lloyd George, 25 May 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/18/2/1. Riddell recorded critical comments by Lloyd George about Asquith for the first time in March 1915 (Riddell, , War diary, pp. 65 and 70)Google Scholar. See also Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 13 December 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/16/5/2.

37 Margot Asquith to Lloyd George, 3 November 1914, 24 March and May 1915, ibid. C/6/ 12/13, 15 and 16. By December she had become decidedly hostile. (Margot Asquith to McKenna, December 1915, McKenna papers, 5/9/4; Margot Asquith to Hankey, 15 October and 31 December 1915.) See also Roskill, S., Hankey, man of secrets, I (London, 1970), 228 and 240–1Google Scholar.

38 Lloyd George statements, 13 and 15 July 1916, W. O. 32/5089 and Lloyd George papers, E/10/4/1; Lloyd George to W. George, 26 September 1916, ibid. I/2/2/53; Riddell diary, 19 September 1916, Riddell, , War diary, pp. 210211Google Scholar.

39 Procès-verbaux, Paris Conference, 26–28 March 1916, Cab. 37/144/77 and Cab. 28/1; War committee, 22 August 1916, Cab. 42/18/4; Lloyd George draft of P. M.'s statement for the Paris conference, Cab. 28/1; Lloyd George to his brother, 18, 22 and 27 November 1916, George, W., My brother, pp. 255–6Google Scholar; Paris conference, minutes, 15–16 November 1916, Cab. 28/1; War committee, 21 November 1916, Cab. 42/25/2.

40 Lloyd George to Russell, 28 April 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/18/11/5.

41 Lansdowne to A. Chamberlain, 5 February 1915, Chamberlain papers, AC/13/2/1; Long to Bonar Law, 30 May and 13 June 1915, Bonar Law papers, 50/3/69 and 70; Long memorandum, 29 November 1916, Cab. 37/160/27; and Curzon memo, 7 December 1916, Austen Chamberlain papers, AC/15/3/1–44. See also R. R.James, Memoirs of a Conservative (London, 1969)Google Scholar and Vincent, J., The Crawford papers, 1892–1940 (Manchester, 1984)Google Scholar.

42 Cecil to Spring-Rice, 29 March 1916, FO/800/196; Cecil to Asquith, 8 December 1916, Asquith papers, file 17.

43 A. Chamberlain to Lord Chelmsford, 8 December 1916, Austen Chamberlain papers, AC/15/3/1–44.

44 Chamberlain wrote later that he and Lloyd George had never liked each other until after Bonar Law's breakdown, and that Lloyd George had offered him the treasury in 1918 only out of deference to Bonar Law (Chamberlain to Long, 11 December 1922, ibid. AC/15/3/1–44). In fact, in the euphoria of the party truce they had found some common ground (Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 8 August 1914, Lloyd George papers, C/3/14/1). See also Dutton, D., Austen Chamberlain: gentleman in politics (Bolton, 1985), pp. 130–4Google Scholar.

45 Lansdowne to Bonar Law, 1 December 1916, Bonar Law papers, 117/1/29.

46 Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 14 and 15 September 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/17/8/6 and 7; Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 15 September 1915, Bonar Law papers, 117/1/20; Lloyd George to Asquith, 16 September 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/18/2/17.

47 Spender memorandum of conversation with Bonar Law, 15 March 1916, J. A. Spender papers, Add 46388. Bonar Law no doubt expected this comment to get back to Asquith.

48 Lloyd George to Bonar Law, 7 April 1915, Lloyd George papers, C/5/8/31; Bonar Law to Lloyd George and Asquith, 17 May 1915, ibid. C/5/8/5; Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 28 June 1915, ibid. D/17/8/2; Bonar Law to Henry Wilson, 15 July 1915, Bonar Law papers, 53/6/33; Lloyd George to Bonar Law and Carson, 25 September 1915, Bonar Law papers, 51/3/21 and Lloyd George papers, D/20/2/30 and D/17/8/8; Scott diary, 20–22 November 1916, Scott papers, Add 50902. On Balfour see Egremont, M., Balfour (London, 1980), pp. 282–4Google Scholar and Mackay, R. F., Balfour: intellectual statesman (Oxford, 1985), pp. 304–9Google Scholar.

49 Amery to Milner, 20 May 1915, Milner papers, file 140.

50 Oliver to Waldorf Astor, 3 March 1914, Garvin papers, box 59.

51 Milner to Kerr, 20 August 1915, Milner papers, file 140.

52 Astor to Garvin, 16 November 1915, Garvin papers, box 48; Anon, , ‘The schism of Europe’, Round Table, V, No. 8 (1915), 345411Google Scholar. See also Barnes, J. and Nicholson, D. (eds.), The Leo Amery diaries, volume 1: 1896–1929 (London, 1980)Google Scholar.

53 The National Service issue established ties with Milner, Oliver, G. Robinson, Astor, Kerr and Henry Wilson.

54 Amery to Lloyd George, 6, 13, 14 and 20 April 1916, Lloyd George papers, D/16/2/2, 4, 5 and 8; Milner to Chamberlain, Austen Chamberlain papers, AC/13/3/1–104; Milner to Garvin, 4 December 1916, Garvin papers, box 45; Milner to Lady E. Cecil, 3, 5 and 8 December 1916, Milner papers, file 143. F. S. Oliver was hostile to Lloyd George, however, as late as June 1916. Turner's work on the Lloyd George secretariat amends conclusively that of Gollin and Lockwood.

55 Asquith memorandum, 28 October 1915, Lloyd George papers, D/23/1/8; Grey to Crewe, 22 October 1915, Crewe papers, C/7; Cabinet meetings, 21 October and 11 November 1915, Cab. 37/136/26 and Cab. 37/137/14; Lloyd George testimony before the Dardanelles committee of enquiry, 30 October 1916 and 2 April 1917, Cab. 19/33.

56 Lloyd George to Asquith, 1, 4 and 5 December 1916, Asquith papers, file 31.

57 Edward Goulding to Garvin, 13 February 1918, Garvin papers, box 72.