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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 December 2010
1 For excellent critiques of Shirer's book, see Epstein, K., Review of Politics, 04 1961, pp. 230–45, andGoogle ScholarBroszat, M., Historische Zeitschrift, CXCVI (1963), 112–23Google Scholar.
2 Whiteside, A., ‘The Nature and Origins of National Socialism’, Journal of Central European Affairs, XVII/I (04 1957), 48–73Google Scholar.
3 Goebbels, J., Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei (Munich, 1934), p. 10Google Scholar.
4 Stampfer, F., Die ersten vierzehn Jahre der Deutschen Republik (Offenbach, 1947), p. 670Google Scholar.
5 Exactly parallel exculpatory self-justifications are to be found in the explanation given for Germany's defeat in 1945. The examples are too legion to cite. It is surely significant that a series of lectures given on the Nord-deutsche Rundfunk in 1962 and later published in book form, entitled The Road to Dictatorship 1918-33 (Munich, 1962),Google Scholar with contributions by ten of the leading West German historians, contained no discussion at all of the contribution of the army or of the industrial interests to the Machtergreifung.
6 Munich, 1961, English ed.
7 London, 1962, English ed.
8 , Buchheim, op. cit. pp. 5–6Google Scholar.
9 , Mau and , Krausnick, op. cit. pp. 17–18Google Scholar.
10 Dorpalen, Andreas, ‘Historiography as History: the Work of Gerhard Ritter’, Journal of Modern History (03 1962), p. 11.Google Scholar As Kollmann noted, Professor Ritter, as late as 1953 described the meeting of Hitler, Papen and Schroeder in Cologne on 4 Jan. 1933 as a legend, and tried to distract attention away from the part played by Hindenburg and his camarilla, by pinning the responsibility for Hitler's coming to power on ‘the shortsighted selfishness of the parties’ and on the German people (Kollmann, E. C., ‘The Weimar Republic’, Journal of Central European Affairs, xxi/4, 01. 1962, p. 439; see alsoGoogle Scholar, Ritter's chapter in The Third Reich, for UNESCO, London, 1955, pp. 386ff.)Google Scholar.
11 Friedensburg, F., Die Weimarer Republik (Hanover, 1957), p. 260Google Scholar.
12 Sethe, P., Deutsche Geschichte im letzten Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1960), p. 328Google Scholar.
13 Ritter, G., Europa und die deutsche Frage (Munich, 1948), p. 51Google Scholar.
14 See Vermeil, E., Germany's Three Reichs (London, 1944)Google Scholar; Butler, Rohan, The Roots of National Socialism (London, 1941); orGoogle ScholarMcGovern, W. M., From Luther to Hitler (New York, 1941), andGoogle ScholarViereck, P., Metapolitics (New York, 1941)Google Scholar.
15 Dehio, Ludwig in Deutsche Korrespondenz, 01. 1963Google Scholar; the same ideas are to be found in more extended form in his book, Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century (London, 1959)Google Scholar; see also his replies to Professor Ritter: ‘Um den deutschen Militarismus’, Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXX (1955), 43–64, and LXCIV (1962), 130-8Google Scholar.
16 Taylor, A. J. P., The Course of German History (London, 1961 ed.), p. 248Google Scholar.
17 Greenwood, H. P., The German Revolution (London, 1934), p. 41. See alsoGoogle ScholarPassant, E. J., A Short History of Germany (London, 1949)Google Scholar.
18 Bullock, A., ‘The Political ideas of Adolf Hitler’, The Third Reich (London, 1955), pp. 350 ffGoogle Scholar.
19 Laqueur, W., ‘Remembering Stalin’, Encounter, 03. 1062. D. 21Google Scholar.
20 Klein, F., ‘Zur Vorbereitung der faschistischen Diktatur’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtsioissenschaft, 1/4 (1953), 878.Google Scholar Their case was strengthened by such books as Thyssen, F., I paid Hitler (London, 1941)Google Scholar or Schacht, Hjalmar, Account Settled (London, 1948).Google Scholar ‘To substantiate this a priori political viewpoint all agencies of historical scholarship have marshalled old and new documentary evidence from the East German Zentralarchive (Potsdam and Merseburg) and Länder archives, especially those of Brandenburg and Saxony, put new constructions on printed sources, and woven their literature into an exotic pattern. The D.D.R.'s biggest guns have been three historical reviews: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft (Berlin), Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich Schiller Universitdt Jena, and the Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg. The historical institute s linked with the universities of Leipzig, Jena, Halle-Wittenberg, Greifswald and Berlin have been used for the same purpose’ (Maehl, W., ‘Recent Literature on the German Socialists 1891–1932’. Journal of Modern History, 33/3, 1961, 30)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
21 Dietrich, Otto, With Hitler on the Road to Power (London, 1934), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar Also the account of Walter Funk at Nuremberg: Nuremberg Document EC-440 and 2828-PS. On 19 June, for example, Hitler and Stinnes discussed plans for the extension of German Lebens-raum, see Klein, F., Die diplomatischen Beziehung Deutschlands zur Sowjetunion 1917-32 (Berlin, 1953), P. 179Google Scholar.
22 Brüning, H., a letter in Deutsche Rundschau, 7/ 1947, 6Google Scholar.
23 See Feder, G., Kampf gegen die Hochfinanz (Munich, 1932)Google Scholar.
24 On 14 Oct. 1930, the Nazi party in the Reichstag introduced a measure designed to limit interest rates to 4 per cent, to nationalize the big banks, and to expropriate the entire property of the ‘bank and stock-exchange magnates’ without compensation. For reasons of political strategy, rather than economic conviction, Hitler demanded the measure's instant withdrawal.
25 Stechert, K., Wie war das möglich? (Stockholm, 1945), p. 367:Google Scholar For Schroeder's view, see Nuremberg Document PS-3337, printed in Wickert, E., Dramatische Tage in Hitler's Reich (Stuttgart, 1952), pp. 22 ffGoogle Scholar.
26 Indiana University Press, 1964.
27 Ibid. p. 51.
28 Ibid. p. 43.
29 Hallgarten, G. W. F., Hitler, Reichswehr und Industrie (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 118,Google Scholar translated in Journal of Economic History, XII (summer 1952), 245.Google Scholar Hallgarten is now resident in the United States. Undoubtedly, the present political conditions in Western Germany have deterred historians there from a more thorough examination of this subject.
30 The occasion for this protest by the landed interests was due, according to Wheeler-Bennett, to the political ineptitude of Schleicher, who had sought to purchase the support of the socialists and trade unions by promising them to reactivate Briining's scheme to resettle landless labourers on the bankrupt estates of the Junkers. The only result was, however, to increase the antagonism of the landlords, and to lose another possible basis of political support. Although, as Bracher points out, no direct connexion can be proved, it is presumed by Eyck, Bullock and others that the landed interests used their well-established connexions with Hindenburg to persuade him to oppose and if necessary to dismiss Schleicher. Wheeler-Bennett maintains that Schleicher sought to compel the Junker interest to withdraw their opposition and to join their military friends in support of his government, by threatening t o allow a Reichstag investigation to proceed into the allegations of corruption in the disposition of the Osthilfe loans of 1927-28, the purchase of Hindenburg's own estate in East Prussia, and even the sources of the money used to ensure Hindenburg's own re-election. Bullock says the same weapon was used, only this time successfully, by Hitler in a private interview he had with Hindenburg's son on 22 Jan. Oskar von Hindenburg, says Wheeler-Bennett, was the ' weakest link' and the choice was a sign of the ' uncanny psychological insight which Hitler so frequently displayed in personal relations'. Since the accounts differ widely, it is not now possible to determine how far the elder Hindenburg was affected by Hitler's threats or how far the younger Hindenburg was influential in drawing the support of the Junker interest over to the Nazi side. The significant fact is that these interests were no longer willing to accept a government headed by Schleicher.
31 Berlau, J., The German Social Democratic Party 1914-21 (New York, 1949)Google Scholar; Gay, P., The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; Schorske, C., German Social Democracy 1905–1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).Google Scholar But see the useful article in defence of the S.P.D.: Maehl, W. H., ‘Recent Literature on the German Socialists, 1891-1932’, Journal of Modern History (09. 1961), pp. 292–306Google Scholar.
32 See the Western oriented study by Flechtheim, O., Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik (Offenbach-am-Main, 1948), alsoGoogle ScholarFischer, R., Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), andCrossRefGoogle ScholarPlamenatz, John, German Marxism and Russian Communism (London, 1954)Google Scholar.
33 Franzel, Dr Emil in Deutsche Korrespondenz, 12. 1962Google Scholar; for a sympathetic Englis h study, see Anderson, E., Hammer or Anvil: The Story of the German Working Class Movement (London, 1945)Google Scholar.
34 Op. cit. pp. 101-2.
35 Op. cit. pp. 305–6.
36 For Hindenburg, the latest studies are Lucas, F. L., Hindenburg als Reichspräsident (Bonn, 1959)Google Scholar; Dorpalen, A., Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1965). See alsoGoogle ScholarWheeler-Bennett, J. W., Hindenburg, the Wooden Titan (London, 1936).Google Scholar For a conservative view, see Gorlitz, W., Hindenburg, ein Lebensbild (Bonn, 1953)Google Scholar; for a Marxist view, see Kulischer, W., Hindenburg und das Reichspräsidentenamt im ‘Nationalen Umbruch’ 1932–34 (Berlin, 1957).Google Scholar For Papen, see his Memoirs (London, 1952)Google Scholar and his testimony at the Nuremberg , Trials, International Military Tribunal, xvi, 236ff.,Google Scholar also supporting documents in XL, 548 ff. For Brüning, see Phelps, R. H., The Crisis of the German Republic 1930-32 (Cambridge, Mass., 1947),Google Scholar and his own letter, see n. 22; see also the diary of his assistant, Pünder, H., Politik in der Reichskanzlei, Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1929-32, ed. Vogelsang, T. (Stuttgart, 1961).Google Scholar For Meissner, see his Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler (Hamburg, 1950),Google Scholar also his appearance at the Nuremberg Trials, see Doc. PS-3309, International Military Tribunal, XXXII, 146 ff., and the protocol of the Wilhelmstrasse Trial of 4 May 1948. The book by his relative Meissner, H. O. and Wildes, H., Die Machtergreifung (Stuttgart, 1938)Google Scholar is superficial. For Hugenberg, see Hugenberg und die Hitler Diktatur (Detmold, 1949), 2 vols.,Google Scholar also his citation at Nuremberg in Doc. PA-87, International Military Tribunal, XL, 51-4. See also Schoeningen, H. Schlange, Am Tage Danach (Hamburg, 1946)Google Scholar, and Groener-Geyer, D., General Groener, Soldat und Staatsmann (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1955)Google Scholar.
37 Neumann, S. in Germany's New Conservatism by Klemperer, K. Von (Princeton, 1957), p. xvGoogle Scholar.
38 See also the parallel work, Mohler, A., Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-32 (Stuttgart, 1950),Google Scholar with an excellent bibliography.
39 New York, 1953, pp. 238-9.
40 Op. cit. p. 445.
41 Quoted in , Bracher, , Sauer and , Schulz, Die Nationalsozialistiche Machtergreifung, p. 693Google Scholar See also the published accounts of Liebmann, General in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, IV (1954), 397–436.Google Scholar An equally severe indictment has been made about the attitudes of the navy, see Choltitz, D. von, Soldat unter Soldaten (Constance, 1951), p. 45, quoted inGoogle ScholarBaum, W., ‘Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XI (1963), 16 ffGoogle Scholar.
42 See ‘Die Reichswehr Generalitaet in der Weimarer Republik’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenshaft, III (1955), 934–9Google Scholar.
43 See his Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 1 and 11 (Munich, 1954 and 1960),Google Scholar also his articles in Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXVII (1954), 21 ff.,Google Scholar and cxciv (1902), 646-68.
44 Hallgarten's book, see n. 29, covers the relations between the army and Hitler only in 1923.
45 The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, ed. Baynes, N. (Oxford, 1942), II, 556Google Scholar.
46 Stuttgart, 1962.
47 , Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power (London, 1956), p. 226Google Scholar.
48 No attempt has yet been made to write a biography of Schleicher. However, a series of documents have been printed in Vogelsang's book, see note 46; also Deist, W. ‘Schleicher und die deutsche Abrüstungspolitik’ in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitsgeschichte, VIII/2, 04 1959.Google Scholar Professor Bracher has made use of the unpublished Schleicher-Nachlass.
49 , Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, p. 235Google Scholar.
50 For Hitler's own account of the final negotiations leading up to January 30th, recorded nine years later, see Hitler's Table Talk, 21 May 1942 (London, 1953), pp. 495 ffGoogle Scholar.
51 New York, 1951.
52 London, 1952.
53 , Sauer, op. cit. pp. 690–1Google Scholar.
54 J. Goebbels, op. cit.
55 Germany enters the Third Reich (London, 1933), p. 95Google Scholar.