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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
1 Dadaistisches Manifest (Berlin, 1918)Google Scholar, quoted in Beth, Irwin Lewis, George Grosz. Art and politics in Weimar (Princeton, 1991), pp. 57–8.Google Scholar
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