Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
On the fourth of July 1754 a garrison of Virginians, under the command of the young George Washington, marched its British colours out of a small log fort in an isolated valley of the Appalachian mountains, where it had capitulated to a French detachment the previous evening. Washington's defeat had an impact upon world history no less significant than did his more famous victories subsequent to a more dramatic removal of British colours, on another fourth of July twenty-two years later. The French expulsion of British colonials from the Ohio valley led to nine years of war in America and quickly escalated into seven years of general war, so wide in its geographical extent that Churchill called it the first world war. At the end of hostilities in 1763 the acquisition from France of Canada and a number of West Indian islands laid the foundations of the nineteenth-century British empire.
1 The standard French accounts of the war are Waddington, R., Louis XV et le renversement des alliances (Paris, 1896),Google Scholar and Waddington, , La Guerre de Sept Ans, 5 volumes (Paris, 1899–1914).Google Scholar The only British account, Corbett, J. S., England in the Seven Years' War (London, 1907),Google Scholar says virtually nothing about the American background. That gap was partly filled by Gipson, L. H., The British Empire before the American Revolution, volumes IV-VI (New York, 1939–46),Google Scholar but it was not Gipson's purpose to make a serious study of the way in which intelligence of the American situation was interpreted in London. Some of the documents used in this article have been printed in Pease, T. C. (ed.), Anglo-French boundary disputes in the west, 1749–1763, volume XXXVII of Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library (Springfield, Illinois, 1936)Google Scholar but extracts which refer to disputes outside the mid-west were omitted by Pease and this can be misleading. The only serious study of the formulation of policy in London with regard to the American situation is confined to the period after September 1754: Dominick, Graham, ‘The planning of the Beauséjour operation and the approaches to war in 1755’, New England Quarterly, XLI (1968), pp. 551–566.Google Scholar
2 Patrice, Louis-Rene Higonnet, ’The origins of the Seven Years' War’, Journal of Modem History, XL (1968), 57–90.Google Scholar
3 ibid.. pp. 72, 58 64, 68.
4 For these fears, and the events of 1747–9 which gave rise to them, see the documents from French archives published in Pease, T. C. (ed.), Illinois on the eve of the Seven Years' War, volume XXIX of the Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library (Springfield, Illinois, 1941), pp. 1–95.Google Scholar Galissonière's most famous analysis of the insecurity of New France was his ‘ Mémoire sur les colonies de la France, dans L’Amérique-septentrionale’, in O’Callaghan, E. B. et al. (eds.), Documents relative to the colonial history of the state of New York (10 vols. Albany, 1853–1887), x, 220–32.Google Scholar
5 La Galissonière to Rouillé, 26 June 1749, in Pease (ed.), Illinois, pp. 96–9 and associated documents pp. 100–217.
6 Henretta, James A., ‘Salutary neglect’: colonial administration under the duke of Newcastle (Princeton, 1972). PP. 279–81.Google Scholar
7 The best study of this type is Reed Browning, The duke of Newcastle (New Haven, 1975). The scattered arrangement of the ninety-five volumes in the Newcastle papers covering the period 1748–55 perhaps explains why Higonnet derived a misleading impression of Newcastle's priorities from the use of the wrong type of correspondence: Home correspondence, January 1748–December 1754, British Library Additional Manuscripts (hereafter cited as BL Add. MSS) 32,714–32,737; Diplomatic correspondence, January 1748-December 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,811–32,851; General correspondence, January 1755-December 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852–32,861; Cabinet minutes and Newcastle memoranda 1748–1755, BL Add. MSS 32,994–32,996; Newcastle diplomatic papers 1748–1755, BL Add. MSS 33,010–33,021; Letter books and despatches to the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Albemarle, 1749–1754 BL Add. MSS 33,026–33,027; Newcastle papers: America and West Indies, BL Add. MSS 33,028–33,030. Miscellaneous items of interest can also be found in other volumes of the Newcastle and Hardwicke papers.Google Scholar
8 E.g. Horace Walpole and Smollett. See e.g. Francis, Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 2 vols. (London, 1884), 1, 178.Google Scholar
9 Henretta, ‘Salutary neglect‘; Stanley, Nider Katz, Newcastle's New York: Anglo-American politics, 1732–1753 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).Google Scholar For a less critical view of Newcastle's use of patronage see Philip, Haffenden, ‘Colonial appointments and patronage under the duke of Newcastle, 1724–1739’, English Historical Review, LXXVIII (1963), 417–35.Google Scholar
10 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years' War’, pp. 58–71, particularly pp. 64, 68, 70, 72.
11 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August 1749, BL Add. MSS 32,719, fos. 69–74.
12 For evidence of the importance which British ministers attached to Cape Breton Island, and the conditions which compelled its return, see Sosin, Jack M., ‘Louisburg and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle’, William and Mary Quarterly, third series, XIV (1957), 516–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
13 The European background of Newcastle's policy has been studied by Browning, The duke of Newcastle, pp. 159–67, 175–83, and in two articles by Browning, ‘The duke of Newcastle and the imperial election plan, 1749–1754’, Journal of British Studies, VII (1967), 28–47,Google Scholar and ‘The British orientation of Austrian foreign policy, 1749–1754’, Central European History, 1 (1968), 299–323.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Horn, D. B., ‘The cabinet controversy on subsidy treaties in time of peace’, English Historical Review, XLV (1930), 463–6. The quotation is from Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August 1749, BL Add. MSS 32,719, fos. 69–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14 ibid.. Hardwicke to Newcastle, 30 August 1749, in Yorke, Philip C. (ed.), The life and correspondence of Philip Yorke, earl of Hardwicke, lord high chancellor of Great Britain (Cambridge, 1913), 11, 16–22.Google Scholar
16 Newcastle to Pelham, 9/20 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 79–84. For similar sentiments see Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9/20 June 1750, ibid.. fos. 85–6; Newcastle to Pelham, 17/28 June 1750, ibid.. fos. 119–28; ‘I think we must support this affair of Nova Scotia and its Extended Boundary Whatever is the Consequence’; Newcastle to Pitt, 26 June/7 July 1750, ibid., fos. 192–3; ‘Heads of several points of business now depending’, 21 June 1751, BL Add. MSS 32,994, fos. 275–9; Newcastle to Albemarle, 27 April/8 May 1752; ‘We cannot sacrifice the National Interests in America for the sake of a quiet uncontested Election [of the King of the Romans] - and therefore if You should find That to be the Real View of the Court of France, you must cut it short at once’, BL Add. MSS 32,835, fos. 291–3. Further examples of Newcastle's concern about French encroachments will be cited as the argument proceeds.
17 Greene, Jack P., ‘“A posture of hostility”: a reconsideration of some aspects of the American Revolution’, Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, LXXXVII (1977), 27–68;Google ScholarGreene, , ‘The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: the causal relationship reconsidered’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, VIII (1979–80), 85–105.Google ScholarGreiert, Steven G., ‘The earl of Halifax and British colonial policy, 1748–1756’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Duke University, 1976)Google Scholar also uses some of the documents employed in this article. However most of those documents had also been consulted independently by the present writer before this dissertation came to my attention. On the origins of the Seven Years’ War it will be argued that even Greiert accepts verbatim the Higonnet line, and that Greiert's view of Newcastle is rather blinkered. Blackey, Robert A., ‘The political career of George Montagu Dunk, second earl of Halifax, 1748–1771: a study of an eighteenth-century English minister’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, New York University, 1968), is useful for biographical details and the earl's political career after 1761, but does not analyse in any detail the type of questions discussed in this article.Google Scholar
18 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 63 and n. 33. See also Halifax to Newcastle, 12 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,732, fo. 450. The first lord of trade was born George Montagu and he took the name Dunk after his marriage to a wealthy heiress, Anne Richards, whose fortunes had been inherited from an uncle, Sir Thomas Dunk. He has been called everything from the first to the fifth earl of Halifax, but he was in fact the second earl of the third creation. The contemporary line of Wood Halifax is not related. See the entries under Dunk Halifax in the Dictionary of National Biography;John, Burke, A genealogical history of dormant, abeyant, forfeited and extinct peerages of the British Empire (London, 1883);Google Scholar and Cokayne, ‘G. E.’, The complete peerage (London, 1926).Google Scholar
19 Bedford to Newcastle, 11 August 1748, BL Add. MSS 32,716, fo. 38; Newcastle to Bedford, 21 August 1748, ibid.. fos. 96–7. In Halifax to Newcastle, 18 June 1746, BL Add. MSS 32,707 fo. 328, the earl referred to that’ intimacy and affection which you say should subsist between such near relations’. For Halifax as organizer of Newcastle's electoral interests in Northamptonshire see BL Add. MSS 32,714, fos. 395, 422 and BL Add. MSS 32,718, fo. 271.
20 Newcastle to Halifax, 7 November 1751, BL Add. MSS 32,725, fo. 378; ‘Lord Halifax's paper’, 17 December 1751, BL Add. MSS 32,994, fos. 286–7. For the expansion of the powers of the Board of Trade in 1752 see Basye, Arthur H., The lords commissioners of trade and plantations, 1748–1782 (New Haven, 1925), pp. 63–88.Google Scholar
21 For an exhaustive study of the colonization of Nova Scotia see Bell, Winthrop P., The ‘Foreign Protestants’ and the settlement of Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1961).Google Scholar
22 ‘Extract of a Plan Presented to His Majesty by the Earl of Halifax for the Settlement of His Majesty's Colony of Nova Scotia’ appended to a letter from the duke of Bedford to the Board of Trade, 6 March 1748/9, House of Lords Record Office, ‘ Papers Relating to the Settlement of Nova Scotia, 1753’; Bell, The ‘ Foreign Protestants’, p. 49 n. 32, pp. 79, 104–5. Halifax often wrote to Newcastle about Nova Scotia like a proud father writing about his prodigy: e.g. Halifax to Newcastle, 5 November 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,723, fo. 243.
23 On these negotiations see Max, Savelle, The diplomatic history of the Canadian boundary, 1749–1763 (New Haven, 1940), pp.21, 42.Google Scholar
24 Lords of trade to Bedford enclosing ‘Draft of Instructions…’ for Shirley and Mildmay, 19 July 1750, Public Record Office, Colonial Office papers (hereafter cited as P.R.O., CO.) CO. 324/13, fos. 253–530; CO. 323/13 and CO. 324/14 also contain many associated documents. The quotation is from lords of trade to Bedford, 18 July 1750, P.R.O., CO. 5/6, fos. 61–3.
25 Lords of trade to Bedford, 29 November 1750, P.R.O., CO. 324/15, pp. 30–40.
26 For French activities in Nova Scotia before 1748 see Savelle, Diplomatic history, pp. 1–24, and for the actions of La Galissonière after 1748, ibid.. pp. 27–9.
27 Nova Scotia: see the letters from Edward Cornwallis to Bedford in P.R.O., CO. 5/13, fos. 166–8, 189–92, 193–4, 205–9 219–22. In the latter Cornwallis stated that the French had taken over the whole of Acadia north of the St John's river and east of the bay of Fundy, had burned a British fort, and taken British subjects as prisoners. On 26 June 1751 (ibid.. fos. 287–8) Cornwallis stated that the French were now building a fort on the St John's river and intended to build another at Beaubassin.
Massachusetts: Shirley to Bedford, 10 May 1749, P.R.O., CO. 5/13, fo. 154; Lords of trade to Bedford, 3 August 1749, P.R.O., CO. 5/918, pp. 242–4.
New York: for reports of French intrigues with the Five Nations, and the threat posed by the French fort at Crown Point, see P.R.O., CO. 5/1063, passim, but particularly fos. 11, 21–2, 41–3, 61–4, 79, 135–7, 140–1 146 154; PRO., CO. 5/1064, fos. 1–3, 25–6, 27–8; Letters from Lords of trade to Bedford in P.R.O., CO. 5/1127, fos. 17–18, 21–4, 29–30, 43, and in CO. 5/1128, passim; P.R.O., CO. 5/1087, fos. 5–61.
28 Newcastle to Pelham, 9/20 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 79–83.
29 Pelham to Newcastle, 5 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 39–43. Both Newcastle and Pelham indicated that they had heard from Halifax but not from Bedford (see also BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 153–60). Another member of the Board of Trade, Lord Dupplin, also wrote to Newcastle stressing that the British title to the whole of Nova Scotia was ‘incontestable’: Dupplin to Newcastle, 9 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 91–4. Newcastle sent to Halifax copies of his secret despatches to Lord Albemarle, adding that it would ‘be taken very ill if it was known’: BL Add. MSS 32,722, fos. 1–3.
30 Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,721, fos. 145–50.
31 Halifax to Newcastle, 12 August 1750, BL Add. MSS 32,722, fo. 110.
32 Minutes 14, 21, 28 June 1750, BL Add. MSS 35,870, fos. 161, 163, 166.
33 Lords of trade to Cornwallis, 8June 1750, in Atkins, Thomas B. (ed.), Selections from the public documents of the province of Nova Scotia, 1714–1768 (Halifax, 1869),1, 611.Google Scholar
34 Minutes, 16 August 1750, BL Add. MSS 35,870, fo. 188.
35 Savelle, Diplomatic history, p. 49.
36 Newcastle to Albemarle, 27 April/8 May 1752, BL Add. MSS 32, 835, fos. 291–3.
37 Holdernesse to Newcastle, 25 May 1752, BL Add. MSS 32,727, fo. 184; Newcastle to Albemarle, 24 May/4 June 1752, BL Add. MSS 32,836, fos. 296–8; Holdernesse to Newcastle, 19June 1752, BL Add. MSS 32, 837, fos. 238–9; Halifax,’ Remarks on the Fort Built by the French at Crown Point in North America’, BL Add. MSS 32,837, fos. 240–2.
38 Although in practice Dinwiddie acted as governor of Virginia, he was officially only lieutenant-governor. The titular governor was Lord Albemarle, the British ambassador in Paris. For the letters see Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 62.
39 ibid.. pp. 61–2. On the Ohio Company seeBailey, K. P., The Ohio Company of Virginia and the westward movement, 1748–1792 (Glendale, California, 1939).Google Scholar
40 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, pp. 60, 63.
41 Governor Clinton of New York to lords of trade, 19 December 1750, P.R.O., CO. 5/1063, fo. 146; Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania to the lords of trade, 8 February 1750/51, P.R.O., C.O. 5/1233, fos. 225–9. The Proprietors of Pennsylvania offered to contribute money for the erection of forts at the forks of the Ohio river: Thomas Penn to Governor Hamilton, 1751, Pennsylvania colonial records, v, 551; Governor Clinton to Dinwiddie, 30 April 1753, P.R.O., C.O. 5/13, fo. 333; Governor Hamilton to Dinwiddie, 7 May 1753, ibid.. fos. 335–6; Governor Clinton to Board of Trade, 30 June 1753; O’Callaghan, Documents, VI, 778.
42 Governor Glen of South Carolina to Holdernesse, 25 June 1753, P.R.O., C.O. 5/13, fos. 321–8; Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 61 uses this letter to argue that Glen thought that the Ohio belonged to France, and misquotes the document cited by K. P. Bailey. The quotations in the text above make it clear that this document does not say what Higonnet claims.
43 Circular letter to Governors, 19 July 1750, P.R.O., C.O. 324/13, pp. 251–2.
44 The map is P.R.O., C.O. 700, Virginia, no. 15; Mitchell, ‘Some Additions to the Accounts from Virginia concerning the Extent and Limits of that Colony and the Encroachments that have been Made upon it’, P.R.O., CO. 5/1327, fos. 429–40.
45 For this, and the way in which Mitchell's essay proved, by extensive documentation, British claims to the Ohio valley, and stressed the importance of that area, seeEdmund, and Berkeley, D. S., Dr John Mitchell: the man who made the map of North America (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1974), pp. 175–89, particularly pp. 182–9.Google Scholar
46 In addition to Mitchell these included the cartographer to the prince of Wales, Thomas Jeffreys: see his 1752 map of ‘North America Performed under the Patronage of Louis Duke of Orleans, First Prince of the Blood; By the Sieur D’Anville…’ and its use of colour to indicate French claims not admitted: P.R.O., CO. 700, America North and South, no. 19.
47 Lords of trade to Privy Council committee for plantation affairs, 2 September 1748, P.R.O., CO. 5/1366, fo. 208.
48 Lords of trade to Sir William Gooch, 13 December 1748, P.R.O., CO. 5/1327, pp. 61–4. An order in council of March 1749, empowering Gooch to grant the Ohio Company a charter for land in the vicinity of the forks of the Ohio river, specifically stated that the grant lay within the colony of Virginia, and promised a grant of a further 300,000 acres as soon as the company erected a fort and settled two hundred families: Order in Council, 16 March 1749, P.R.O., CO. 5/1327, pp. 93–6; Bailey, The Ohio Company, pp. 19–31; Lords of trade to Bedford, 16 January and 28 June 1750, House of Lords Record Office, Main papers, 24 February 1756, nos. 40 and 54; Lords of trade to Bedford, 3 August 1749, PRO., CO. 5/918, pp. 242–4; Lords of trade to Dinwiddie, 29 November 1752, P.R.O., CO. 5/1366, pp. 518–22. For further Board of Trade encouragement of western settlement see lords of trade to Holdernesse, 16 March 1753, P.R.O., CO. 5/1367, pp. 20–2.
49 When English traders in the Ohio valley applied to Dinwiddie for protection in late 1752 he refused to permit their making reprisals ‘as we are at peace with the French, but I pray your Lordships directions how to behave on such applications for the future’ because English subjects were being robbed and scalped. Dinwiddie continued that the forts which France was building from Canada to the Mississippi’ will in time much annoy our backcountry’ and perhaps it was time to build some ‘forts of defence’: Dinwiddie to lords of trade, 10 December 1752, P.R.O., CO. 5/1327. PP 531–3.
50 For this, and French attacks on British traders and their Indian allies, see Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, pp. 273–93. Dinwiddie was allowed to authorize the construction of two small wooden blockhouses’ but permission to make reprisals was ‘a matter of a very delicate nature’ and no such permission was given until August 1753: lords of trade to Privy Council committee for plantation affairs, P.R.O., CO. 5/1367, pp. 31–4; lords of trade to Dinwiddie, 6 June 1753, ibid.. PP- 35–40.
51 Dinwiddie to lords of trade, 16 June 1753, PRO., CO. 5/1327, fos. 292–4; Intelligence from Philadelphia also indicated that the French were occupying neutral islands in the West Indies, which would hinder British communications with Jamaica, P.R.O., CO. 5/1233, fo. 230.
52 Halifax to Newcastle, 12 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,732, fos. 450–1, enclosing extracts in Halifax's hand from Dinwiddie to lords of trade, 16 June 1753, ibid.. fos. 452 3.
53 Halifax, ‘The Proceedings of the French in America of which Great Britain has cause for complaint’, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fos. 96–101.
54 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 63.
55 Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, pp. 294–5 is here following the argument of Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 64. The Board of Trade letter of 16 August 1753 (P.R.O., CO. 5/1367, pp. 43–7) did state that the Ohio flowed through Virginia as if this was an indisputable fact, but many reliable observers in addition to Dinwiddie had argued that this was the case. Dr John Mitchell's justification of this did not just rest on the Charter of 1609. The letter also implied that the British traders who had stressed their fears to Dinwiddie had made some sort of settlements, but that was not an unreasonable assumption. The letter did not state that the province of Pennsylvania had been invaded as Higonnet claims. The lords of trade letter stressed that Dinwiddie's letter did not make it clear on which part of the Ohio river the French had settled, but that it was a reasonable assumption that they had settled the same area which they had attempted to settle in 1749 ‘near to the Province of Pennsylvania’, not ‘the eastern end’ of the Ohio. They did add that this area was probably not more than 200 or 250 miles from the sea coast. Higonnet argues that this ambiguity was important because ‘two hundred miles would, in some instances, have put them on the Atlantic side of the Alleghenies’. However it is abundantly clear from their letter that the lords of trade were referring to the area to the west of the Allegheny watershed. The new map of Virginia (cited above n. 44) may have been used by the Board, and its scale places the most westerly ridge of the mountains at only 170 miles from Chesapeake Bay. The distance from that bay to the junction of the Ohio and Monongahela could have been similarly measured as only 225 miles.
56 Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, p. 293 is again following the argument of Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 64 of ‘Newcastle's supposed total indifference’. Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes in the west, p. iii refers to’ forces hurrying the pacific Newcastle towards paths of aggression’. But it is clear from the tone of Halifax's private letter to Newcastle on 12 August 1753 (see above n. 52) that he thought their opinions to be similar on this point. The duke of Newcastle's private correspondence of the previous months makes it clear that their opinions were the same. ‘The Objects of France’, said Newcastle, were constantly unfolding as he had predicted: ‘They make new Pretensions every day upon us with Regard to Trade, Prizes and Limits’. In May 1753 France was still not pushing those pretensions but keeping them ‘all depending, in order to make use of them’: Newcastle to Albemarle, 24 May 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,844, fos. 327–32. For examples of Newcastle's frequent concern about the rise of D’Argenson and the ‘military party’ in Paris, new French military camps, their armaments at Toulon, and the fortifications at Dunkirk in contravention of the treaties of Utrecht and Aix-la-Chapelle, see ibid.; Newcastle to Yorke, 6 April 1753, ibid.. fos. 54–5; Newcastle to Bentinck, 17 April 1753, ibid., fos. 108–117; Newcastle to Albemarle, 28 May 1753, ibid.. fo. 327; Newcastle to Albemarle, 12 July 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,845, fos. 302–5.
57 For example, earlier intelligence of the march of the French to the Ohio had alarmed Newcastle, but was ignored by Holdernesse: Newcastle to Hugh Valence Jones, 28 July 1753, BL Add. MSS 35,413, fo. 261.
58 Cabinet minutes, 21 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fos. 26–7. Part of this document has been published in Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, p. 45. The intelligence from the West Indies was sent by Captain Pye, commander of the Barbados Station: Holdernesse to Albemarle, 24 August 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,846, fos. 128–9.
59 Circular instructions, 28 August 1753, P.R.O., CO. 5/6, fos. 92–3.
60 See Gipson, , The British Empire, IV, 290–3 for the problems which this caused in Pennsylvania, even though Governor Hamilton had earlier advocated the use of force.Google Scholar
61 ibid.. p. 291.
62 ibid.. pp. 294–9.
63 ibid.. pp. 308–10.
64 Gipson, , The British Empire, VI, 20–43.Google Scholar
65 Higonnet,’ The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 72. For exactly the same view see Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, p. 319.
66 Newcastle to Pelham, 17 July 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,732, fos. 295–300.
67 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 September 1753, ibid.. fos. 628–32. See also Newcastle to Pelham, 27 July 1753, ibid.. fos. 363–8. For an explanation by Newcastle of his general policy since 1748 see Newcastle to Keith, 22 October 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,846, fos. 401 5. On Newcastle's concern about the French fortifications at Dunkirk in late 1753 see BL Add. MSS 32,847, particularly fos. 76–7, 115, 117–19, 130.
68 BL Add. MSS 32,846 9 passim. For example on 16 January 1754 secret intelligence from Toulon and Rochefort indicated that the French had constructed eighteen new vessels of between fifty and eighty guns since 1748: BL Add. MSS 32,848, fo. 91 (see also ibid.. fo. 329 on this point); 8 February 1754, France was amassing supplies on the Flanders frontier and ‘it is certain that they will be prepared to strike a Blow whenever they have a mind’: BL Add. MSS 32,848, fo. 214–5; On French aggression in India see Albemarle to Holdernesse, 23 January 1754, ibid.. fo. 101. Newcastle never emphasized the events in India and they were probably only important as part of a general picture of French aggression.
69 Halifax to Newcastle, 7 December 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,733, fo. 386. Significantly this letter was in reply to interest expressed by Newcastle about recent intelligence from Nova Scotia. Lords of trade representation to Holdernesse, 19 December 1753, P.R.O., CO. 5/753, fos. 240–2; Lords of trade to Holdernesse, 7 December 1753, P.R.O., CO. 218/3, pp. 494–500; Lords of trade to Holdernesse, 16 January 1754, PRO., CO. 5/1128, pp. 315 16; Lords of trade to Robinson, 29 March 1754, P.R.O. CO. 5/918, pp. 289–90. By early 1754 Holdernesse was usually in complete agreement with Newcastle on these matters; see e.g. Holdernesse to Keene, 25 January 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,848, fos. 155–71.
70 Governor Hopson of Nova Scotia to Newcastle, 18 October 1753, BL Add. MSS 32,733, fo. 93; France had now built two forts and stationed 260 regular troops on the St John's river. With the aid of a thirty gun vessel in the bay of Fundy France now controlled both the bay and the fur trade: Dinwiddie to Newcastle, 16 April 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fo. 120.
71 The first lord of the admiralty, Lord Anson, was very worried about reports he received of the French having occupied some of the Bahama Islands and imprisoned British seamen en route from the Bermudas: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 27 August 1753. BL Add. MSS 32,732, fos. 556–7; Hugh Valence Jones to Newcastle, 30 August 1753, ibid.. fos. 576–7.
72 Dinwiddie to lords of trade, 17 November 1753, P.R.O., CO. 5/1328, fos. 8–9; 29 January 1754, ibid.. fos. 93–100 (intelligence that the French were building two forts in the Ohio valley, where they had three hundred regular troops, and nine hundred more in winter quarters on Lake Erie. In the spring they intended to build many more forts); Dinwiddie to Holdernesse, 26 April 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,735, fos. 186–7. Sometimes Dinwiddie also wrote private letters to Halifax. See Brock, R. A. (ed.), The official records of Robert Dinwiddie, lieutenant-governor of the colony of Virginia, 1751–1758 (Richmond, 1883), 1,Google Scholar 100–1, 134–6, 162–3. However these letters differed little from the official despatches to the Board or the secretary of state. Halifax was impressed by the information sent to Dinwiddie, not by the lieutenant-governor's elaboration of it. Dinwiddie's earlier conduct of relations with the lower house in Virginia had annoyed Halifax, and it is possible that Dinwiddie's private letters, and his conduct of affairs regarding French encroachments, were an attempt by the governor to regain the favour of the first lord of trade because he was aware of Halifax's ‘great Concern for His M’ys Int’t in the interior part of this Cont’t and flattering myself with Y’r Friendship and Patronage’ (ibid.. pp. 100–1). For the many letters from Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts to the Board see P.R.O., CO. 5/753, fos. 224 5, 227–43; C.O. 5/754, fos. 98–108; CO. 5/866, fos. 37–8, 281–5; C.O. 5/887, fos. 1 4.
73 Lieutenant-Governor De Lancey of New York to Holdernesse, 24 November 1753, PRO., CO. 5/13, fo. 348; De Lancey to lords of trade, 29 November 1753, P.R.O., CO. 5/1065, fos. 145–6; De Lancey to Holdernesse, 22 April 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,735, fos. 47–51. In these letters De Lancey often stressed the disastrous consequences for New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia if the French were allowed to settle in the Ohio valley. In November 1753 a Philadelphia merchant, William Allen, sent a report of French movements and stressed that in his opinion the French could be defeated at that point in time, but if they were not quickly driven from the Pennsylvania backcountry it would be too late to prevent the French from taking over the rest of the North American continent; P.R.O., CO. 5/1233, fo. 232.
74 Newcastle to Yorke, 15 January 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,848, fos. 85–7. For a more detailed exposition of these sentiments and his ‘whole scheme of politicks’ see Newcastle to Keene, 24 January 1754, ibid.. fos. 142–9.
75 Halifax, c. 30 April 1754, ‘Proposal for Building Forts’, BL Add. MSS 33, 029, fos. 109–12 and ‘The Proceedings of the French in America’, ibid.. fos. 113–18. The latter was essentially an up-dating of his paper of 15 August 1753.
76 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,735, fos. 268–71.
77 The sections of this document quoted by Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, pp. 68, 72 convey a misleading impression: the whole document is based on ‘the present’ disposition of France. Newcastle remained convinced that his long-term view of French ambitions was the right one: Newcastle to Bentinck, 17 May 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,849, fos. 154–67.
78 Newcastle to Walpole, 14 May 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,735, fos. 268–71.
79 Newcastle to Keene, 24 January 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,848, fos. 142–9.
80 Newcastle to Bentinck, 17 May 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,849, fos. 154–67; Keene to Robinson, 31 July 1754, ibid.. fo. 441.
81 Minute, 13 June 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fo. 266; Robinson to lords of trade, 14 June 1754, P.R.O., CO. 323/13, fo. 312. The Board of Trade was not simply being led by William Shirley. As early as 20 February 1754 Shirley had written to the Board with news that the French were making a considerable settlement on a carrying place between the rivers Kennebec and Chaudière, which was the shortest passage from Quebec to western Massachusetts. However the Board did not pass this on to Robinson until 24 May when they had received confirmation of this from the elected council and house of representatives of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts legislature also stressed the threat which the French posed to the security of their province, and insisted on the need for immediate action if the colonies were not to be encircled: Shirley to lords of trade, 20 February 1754, P.R.O., CO. 5/754, pp. 92–4; Massachusetts council, 19 April 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,735, fos. 123–8; Lords of trade to Robinson, 24 May 1754, P.R.O., CO. 5/886, fos. 37–8. When Shirley arrived at Falmouth on 25 May he could not find any Frenchmen. But that does not mean that Shirley had been wrong to check out the earlier intelligence from Fort Richmond, or that Shirley had a’ provocative purpose’ (Higonnet,’ The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 59). In his letter of 19 April 1754 Shirley documented at length what he believed to be the British claim to the area, and was thus authorized to drive out the French by virtue of Holdernesse's instructions of August 1753. Yet Shirley wrote to Holdernesse that since Britain had never settled so close to Quebec the point would probably give umbrage to the French, and therefore he would not use force without further approval. This was despite the fact that virtually all sectors of public opinion in Massachusetts were militantly anti-French and would certainly have welcomed any campaigns designed to teach the French a lesson. (On this point see Paul, Henri Menig, ’Public opinion in Massachusetts relative to Anglo-French relations, 1748–56’, unpublished dissertation, University of Washington, 1962). In May 1754 Shirley's letters and actions did become more provocative. But those letters did not arrive in London before the changes in cabinet policy in June. A letter from Shirley on 24 May was not read on 19 June as Higonnet claims (p. 73), rather a letter from the Board of Trade of that date passing on Shirley's letters of 20 February and 19 April 1754. For Shirley's policy in May 1754 and thereafter see Graham, ‘The planning of the Beauséjour Operation’, p. 558.Google Scholar
82 Minute, 19 June 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fo. 267.
83 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 72 claims that three ‘Heads of Papers’ were considered, two based on the suggestions of Shirley, the other based on ‘Dinwiddie's letters, together with a report Washington had filed in January’. But apart from the latter the only letter from Dinwiddie actually consulted by the cabinet was that of 12 March 1754 (P.R.O., CO. 5/1328, fo. 193) passed on by the Board on 22 May (P.R.O., CO. 5/1367, p. 65). Since this letter contained no intelligence of the march of the French to the Ohio, Higonnet no doubt assumes that the cabinet thought the Kennebec the most important area of conflict. In fact the minute shows that nine different ‘Heads of Papers’ were considered. These included letters from French deserters, the Board of Trade's representation on Nova Scotia of 29 March 1754, and the letters and papers mentioned in the text.
84 Lords of trade to Robinson, 25 June 1754, P.R.O., CO. 5/1128, p. 336; De Lancey to lords of trade, 21 May 1754, P.R.O., CO. 5/1066, fos. 20–5; Dinwiddie's letter of 10 May 1754, containing the same information as that of De Lancey, did not arrive in London until 2 July 1754.
85 Cabinet minute, 26 June 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fo. 124. Part of this document has been published in Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, p. 48. Sharpe later acknowledged the assistance of his cousin, Lord Halifax. But all eighteenth-century appointments were based on patronage to some degree and perhaps the real aim of Halifax was to circumvent Dinwiddie's unpopular connection with the Ohio Company at this critical juncture. Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, P. 323.
86 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, pp. 73, 72. Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, p. 321 repeats this view. The reader will now clearly appreciate that the quotation from Newcastle's letter of 29 July (Higonnet, p. 72) simply repeats the sentiments which Newcastle had been expressing for several years.
87 Newcastle, ‘Notes of a Memorandum to the King’, 5 August 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 159–61. This was at the same time Higonnet argues Newcastle's concern was characterized by a greater interest in the sending of pineapple trees to Madame de Pompadour and his search for a French cook. However that author only cites evidence from Newcastle's diplomatic correspondence and a very different Newcastle is revealed in his domestic correspondence.
88 Newcastle to Albemarle, 8 August 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,850, fos. 47–8.
89 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 424–5.
90 Newcastle to Albemarle, 5 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,850, fos. 218–20; Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 50–2.
91 Graham, ‘The planning of the Beauséjour operation’, pp. 554–5; Riker, Thad W., ‘The politics behind Braddock's expedition’, American Historical Review, 13 (1907–1908), p. 746;Google ScholarEvan, Charteris, William Augustus, duke of Cumberland, and the Seven Years’ War (London, 1925), pp.126–9;Google ScholarCorbett, J. S., England in the Seven Years’ War, 1, 25;Google ScholarPargellis, Stanley M., Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven, 1933), pp. 26–7;Google Scholar Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 76. The quotations are from Browning, The duke of Newcastle, p. 210 and Sherrard, O. A., Lord Chatham: Pitt and the Seven Years’ War (London, 1955), p. 49; Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, p. 341.Google Scholar
92 Newcastle Memorandum, ‘Points for Consideration with the Lord Chancellor’, 11 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fo. 319; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 554–6; Newcastle to Murray, 28 September 1754, ibid.. fos. 591 4. Hardwicke discouraged the sending of any regiments: ibid.. fos. 559–60. On Robinson's approach to Cumberland see Robinson to Newcastle, 15 September 1754, ibid.. fos. 529–30.
93 Robinson to Newcastle, 22 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 563–4 and 23 September, ibid.. fo. 569. The latter is printed in Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 53–4.
94 Sherrard, Lord Chatham, p. 50; Osgood, H. L., The American colonies in the eighteenth century, 4 vols. (New York, 1924), IV, 344;Google ScholarBasil, Williams, The life of William Pitt, earl of Chatham, 2 vols. (London, 1914), 1, 252–3; Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, pp. 341–2.Google Scholar
95 ibid.. On the Board of Trade plan of union see ibid.. pp. 321–30; Olson, Alison G., ’ The British Government and colonial union, 1754’, William and Mary Quarterly, third series, XVII (1960), 22–34; P.R.O., CO. 5/6, fos. 112–19 and associated documents, fos. 119–35. The abandonment of the plan was no doubt due in part to the fears expressed by the Speaker and the attorney general that the presentation of the plan to the Commons as legislation would uncover latent fears of colonial independence at a criticaljuncture (Greiert,’ The earl ofHalifax’, p. 334). But perhaps more important was Newcastle's belief that ‘no scheme of that kind can be of service in the present exigency’: Newcastle to Murray, 28 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 591 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
96 Robinson to Newcastle, 22 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32, 736, fo. 561 and 23 September, ibid.. fo. 569; Dinwiddie to Halifax, 24 July 1754, in Brock (ed.), Official records, pp. 250–2. The private papers of the earl of Halifax for this period have not survived. Thus when the first lord of trade did not write to Newcastle his position can only be inferred indirectly. However Newcastle later insisted that only Cumberland had been involved in drawing up the plan of operations: Newcastle to Walpole, 26 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,737, fos. 207–11. There are several letters about French encroachments dated before September 1754 in the Cumberland papers, but it is impossible to be sure that these copies were not passed on at a later date. See papers of William Augustus, duke of Cumberland, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Cambridge University microfilm manuscripts 1627, Box 45, numbers 29, 30, 49, 50–3, 57, 58–74.
97 Newcastle to Murray, 28 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 591–4; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 21 September 1754, ibid.. fo. 583. Newcastle opposed Granville's suggestion to send between five and six thousand troops to the St John's river in the spring as the first operation. To start military action there, and at a time by which the French would have strengthened their position, would make a general war more likely.
98 Newcastle to Murray, 28 September 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 591–4; Newcastle to Page, October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,737, fos. 4–6.
99 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,737, fos. 24–6.
100 ibid.. BL Add. MSS 32,736, fos. 583, 592–4.
101 Riker, ‘The politics behind Braddock's expedition’, pp. 747–8; Browning, The duke of Newcastle, p. 211; Cabinet, 9 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fo. 328.
102 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,737, fos. 107–9; Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 October 1754, ibid.. fos. 147–8.
103 Newcastle to Albemarle, 10 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,851, fo. 561.
104 Newcastle to Walpole, 26 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,737, fos. 207–11.
105 Albemarle to Robinson, 23 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,027, fo. 279; Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 80 argues that in this interview Rouillé was conciliatory, and he implies that the French foreign minister did not insist that the Ohio was French territory, only that France had a perfect right to send a force there and that it was ‘the most effectual way to prevent a war in those parts’. However Albemarle also reported that when he complained about the hostile French actions in the Ohio valley, Rouillé replied that ‘they only retook possession of their own’ territory, onto which Britain had encroached. Moreover Rouillé insisted that the Ohio could never be recognized as the boundary of the British possessions. The meeting closed with mutual recriminations on the attempts of their respective governments to blacken the other's reputation in the courts of Europe.
106 Albemarle to Sir Thomas Robinson, 30 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,851, fos. 118–20; Robinson to Albemarle, 4 November 1754, ibid.. fos. 129–30; Albemarle to Robinson, 27 November 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,027, fo. 283.
107 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 31–5.
108 Halifax, , ’Methods of Disappointing the French in North America delivered by Lord Halifax, 7 November 1754’, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fos. 138–42.Google Scholar
109 Instructions for Major General Edward Braddock, 25 November 1754, P.R.O., CO. 5/6, fos. 3–12; Secret Instructions, fos. 14 18.
110 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 October 1754, BL Add. MSS 35,414, fos. 203–6; Browning, The duke of Newcastle, p. 216.
111 Walpole to Mann, 6 October 1754, quoted in Sherrard, Lord Chatham, p. 56.
112 Halifax, ‘Methods of Disappointing’. See note 108.
113 Albemarle to Robinson, 13 November 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,027, fo. 282; 17 November, ibid.. fo. 283; 18 December, ibid.. fo. 287. Albemarle died on 22 December 1754 leaving sixteen children, eight of them illegitimate, a destitute wife, and an even more destitute mistress (Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, p. 83).
114 Instructions for Mirepoix, 30 December 1754, Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 60–5; Private memoir for Mirepoix, ibid.. pp. 65–83.
115 Cabinet minute, 16 January 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,995, fo. 5; Halifax paper on French encroachments since the treaty of Utrecht, no date but after 16 January 1755 since it begins with an extract from the cabinet minutes, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fo. 332; Robinson memoir to Mirepoix embodying the cabinet recommendations of 16 January 1755, Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 99–101.
116 Rouillé to Mirepoix, 3 February 1755, Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 106–8; Cabinet minutes, 7, 9, 10 February 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,996, fos. 25–30; For Halifax's papers see above n. 115 and his ‘Representation of the State of the British Colonies in North America, 1754’, no date, but after 16 December 1754, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fos. 156–64.
117 Newcastle to Bentinck, 17 December 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,851, fos. 325–8. For similar pessimism about the conduct of Austria see Newcastle to Holdernesse, 4 January 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852, fos. 83–4; Newcastle to Keith, 7 January 1755, ibid.. fos. 100–1.
118 Horn, D. B., ‘The duke of Newcastle and the origins of the diplomatic revolution’, in Elliott, J. H., AND Koenigsberger, H. G. (eds.), The diversity of history (London, 1970), pp. 247–68.Google Scholar
119 ibid.. p. 257; Newcastle to Bentinck, 17 December 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,851, fos. 325 8.
120 Newcastle to Wall, 26 January 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852, fo. 272; Newcastle to Keene, 27 January 1755, ibid.. fo. 277; Wall to Newcastle, 5 March 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,853, fo. 115; Secret Intelligence Scheffer to Hopken, 14 February 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852, fos. 452–7.
121 Mirepoix was not believed to reflect accurately the views of his court and, as Robinson wrote to Albemarle, Rouillé's expressions of his desire to preserve peace would not be ‘productive of any good consequences when checked and controlled by the activity of the Abbé de la Ville, whose talents have never yet been employed in the reconciling of differences’: Robinson to Albemarle, 5 December 1754, BL Add. MSS 32,851, fos. 288–9. Military preparations: on 20 January Robinson instructed the admiralty to prepare seventeen ships of the line for immediate service when further ordered, P.R.O., ADM I/4120 (folios not numbered). On 3 February the cabinet authorized William Shirley to raise an additional one thousand men. It was decided that a bounty of £3 should be offered to all men who volunteered to join the navy and the activity of press gangs was increased: Cabinet minute, BL Add. MSS 32,996, fo. 19.
122 Cabinet minute, 20 February 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,996, fo. 34; English counter-project, 7 March 1755, Pease, Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 148–54.
123 Higonnet, ‘The origins of the Seven Years’ War’, pp. 83–7.
124 Halifax encouraged the cabinet to take ‘vigorous measures to be ready to oppose the French’ and on 13 March he calculated that ‘in two weeks it will be known whether peace or Warr’: Peter Collinson to Cadwallader Colden, 13 March 1755, The letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, volume LIV of the Collections of the New York Historical Society (New York, 1921), p.7 quoted in Greiert, ‘The earl of Halifax’, p. 389. Newcastle told Bentinck that the counter-project was ‘Just in every Part’ and an attempt to ‘protect the just rights of the crown in North America till a final definitive settlement can be made by mutual consent’. He believed that France might break off negotiations but an immediate declaration of war was unlikely because ‘they know We are at present superior in North America’. If war did break out it would be better later rather than sooner because Britain's land forces were inconsiderable: ‘We shall make an augmentation, but that will take up time’ and a number of defensive arrangements remained to be concluded in Europe: Newcastle to Bentinck, 11 March 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,853, fos. 193–203.Google Scholar
125 Halifax, ‘Observations on Sir Thomas Robinson's Paper of Points’, BL Add. MSS 33,029, fo. 167.
126 Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 February 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852, fos. 505–6.
127 ‘A Map of the British and French Dominions in North America, with Roads, Distances, Limits, and Extent of the Settlements humbly Inscribed to the Right Honourable The Earl of Halifax And the other Right Honourable The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, by their Lordships most obliged and humble servant Jno. Mitchell’. The map is dated 13 February 1755.
128 Newcastle to Keith, 21 February 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,852, fos. 568–9.
129 Rouillé to Mirepoix, 17 March 1755, Pease (ed.), Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 159–64. Within three weeks the French had been presented with two completely contradictory sets of proposals. In the French Project for a preliminary convention, which he had sent to Mirepoix on 19 February (ibid.. pp. 126–30), Rouillé had, in effect, decided to accept Robinson's proposals of 10 February as the basis for negotiations. He replied to Robinson's willingness to use the mountains as a boundary with an offer to evacuate the eastern part of the Ohio valley and to destroy French forts built in that region. Since Rouillé believed that France had an ‘indisputable right’ to the Ohio valley he probably thought that he had made an important concession.
130 Pease (ed.), Anglo-French boundary disputes, pp. 155–247. From mid-March 1755 Rouillé insisted that Britain recognize the Allegheny mountains as the proper eastern boundary of the French colonies, and surrender all claims to the St John's river in Acadia.
131 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 23 May 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,855, fos. 112–21.
132 Newcastle to Hartington, 17 May 1755, ibid.. fos. 35—7.
133 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 6 June 1755, ibid.. fos. 352–9. On 11 March Newcastle had still been confident that, even though he was not sure about Austrian policy, Vienna would ‘act that Part and give His Majesty that Assistance which the King has a Right to demand of them’. Newcastle to Bentinck, 11 March 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,853, fos. 193–203.
134 Corbett, England in the Seven Tears’ War, pp. 50–5.
135 Browning, The duke of Newcastle, p. 222.
136 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 7 June 1755, BL Add. MSS 35,414, fo. 272; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 30 June 1755, ibid.. fo. 284.
137 Cabinet Minute, 1 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,856, fos. 486–9.
138 See the very detailed narrative of Boscawen's defeat in Gipson, , The British Empire, VI, 107–17.Google Scholar
139 Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 July 1755, BL Add. MSS 32,857, cited Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War, p. 58.
140 C. Amyand to Lords of Admiralty, P.R.O. ADM I/4120 folios not numbered.
141 On the formulation of British policy after the outbreak of the naval and colonial war in the summer of 1755, particularly the events which led to the Convention of Westminster, see Karl, Wolfgang Schweizer, ’Frederick the Great, William Pitt, and Lord Bute: the origin, development and dissolution of the Anglo-Prussian Alliance 1756–1763’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1976).Google ScholarMiddleton, Richard C., ‘The administration of Newcastle and Pitt: the departments of state and the conduct of war, 1754–1760’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Exeter University, 1969),Google Scholar does not discuss the formulation of policy before 1755 in any detail but is useful for the way in which the various state departments worked during war. Robert, Nelson Middleton, ’French policy and Prussia after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle: a study of the prehistory of the diplomatic revolution of 1756’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1968)Google Scholar is an interesting study of the formulation of French policy, and similar work on other aspects of French foreign relations in this period needs to be done. Some of the historiography of the Diplomatic Revolution has been discussed by Sir Herbert, Butterfield in ‘The reconstruction of an historical episode: the history of enquiry into the origins of the Seven Years’ War’, in his Man on his past (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 142–70.Google Scholar