Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dlnhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T15:14:36.544Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

2. World Power Status or World Dominion?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Meir Michaelis
Meir Michaelis
Affiliation:
Oranim College, Israel
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Review Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , June 1972 , pp. 331 - 360
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Heiden, K., Adolf Hitler. Eine Biographic II: Ein Mann gegen Europa, Zurich, 1937, p. 238;Google Scholar cf. the revised English edition, One Man against Europe, Harmondsworth, 1939.

2 One Man against Europe, p. 70.

3 Hitler, A., Mein Kampf (378th ed., München, 1938), p. 754: ‘Never suffer the rise of two continental Powers in Europe’ (Hitler's italics).Google Scholar

4 One Man against Europe, pp. 70–2.

5 Mein Kampf, p. 782: ‘A State which in this age of race-poisoning dedicates itself to the care of its best racial elements must some day become lord of the earth.’

6 The political ideas which Hitler picked up in Vienna were the stock-in-trade of the Pan-German Press. His originality was to appear in his grasp of how to create a mass movement (cf. Bullock, A., Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, revised ed., Harmondsworth, 1962, p. 44).Google Scholar

7 One Man against Europe, p. 276.

8 Ein Mann gegen Europa, p. 239.

9 Rauschning, H., Die Revolution des Nihilismus (5th ed., Zürich-New York, 1939).Google Scholar

10 Op. cit. passim, especially pp. 19–50.

11 Ibid. pp. 428–9, 435.

12 Ibid. pp. 157, 332, 428–35.

13 Rauschning, H., Gespräche mit Hitler (2nd ed., New York, 1940).Google Scholar

14 Op. cit. p. 5.

15 Ibid. p. 118.

16 Ibid. p. 64.

17 Ibid. pp. 138–9. In the light of the evidence now available it seems unlikely that Hitler revealed his plans to a group of staid conservatives in this manner as early as 1934. It should be borne in mind that Rauschning wrote under the impact of subsequent events and experiences (fifth-column activities of Austrian Nazi Party and Sudetan German Party in 1938) which he may well have projected into the past (Jacobsen, H.-A., Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt M. /Berlin, 1968, p. 606).Google Scholar

18 Ibid. pp. 64–5.

19 Ibid. p. 33.

20 Ibid. pp. 71–3.

21 Ibid. p. 190.

22 Ibid. p. 175.

23 Ibid. pp. 219–20.

24 Ibid. p. 212.

25 Ibid. pp. 127–30.

26 Ibid. pp. 114–15.

27 Ibid. p. 11.

28 Ibid. pp. 6–7, 239.

29 See New York Times of 16 Nov. 1938, p . 1, col. 6.

30 Chamberlain in Birmingham on 17 Mar. 1939 (cf. Northedge, F. S., The Troubled Giant. Britain among the Great Powers 1916–1939, London, 1966, p. 568).Google Scholar On 20 Mar. 1939, Chamberlain told his Cabinet that ‘if Germany showed signs that she intended to proceed with her march for world domination, we must take steps to stop her by attacking her on two fronts’ (Public Record Office, Cab. 23/98, p. 76). Quotations of Crown copyright material appear by permission of H.M. Stationery Office.

31 See Life of 1 July 1940.

32 Documents on American Foreign Relations IV, Boston, 1942, p. 28:Google Scholar ‘Hitler has often protested that his plans for conquest do not extend across the Atlantic Ocean. His submarines and raiders prove otherwise …For example, I have in my possession a recent map made in Germany by Hitler's Government - by the planners of the new world order. It is a map of South America and a part of Central America as Hitler proposes to reorganize it. Today in this area there are fourteen separate countries. The geographical experts of Berlin, however, have ruthlessly obliterated all existing boundary lines and have divided South America into five vassal states…In the place of the Bible, the words of Mein Kampf will be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ.’

33 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal L, Nuremberg, 1947 (hereafter cited as IMT).Google Scholar

34 Op. cit. pp. 225–6.

35 Ibid. p . 215.

36 Nuremberg Document PS–376 (IMT XXV, p. 393).

37 Flynn, J. T., The Truth about Pearl Harbour, Glasgow, 1945;Google Scholar id., The Roosevelt Myth, New York, 1948;Google ScholarChamberlin, W. H., America's Second Crusade, Chicago, 1950;Google Scholar Ch. Tansill, C., Back Door to War, Chicago, 1952.Google Scholar See also Murdock, E. C., ‘Zum Eintritt der Vereinigten Staaten in den Zweiten Weltkrieg‘, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4, 01 1956, pp. 93–114.Google Scholar

In the 1960s fresh attempts to reduce Hitler's responsibility for the Second World War were made by Hoggan, David L. (Der erzwungene Krieg. Die Vrsachen und Urheber des 2. Weltkrieges, Tübingen, 1961),Google Scholar followed by various German right–wing extremists (e.g. Walendy, U., Wahrheit fur Deutschland, Vlotho, 1964)Google Scholar and by Taylor, A. J. P. (The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1961, 6th ed., 1965).Google Scholar Both Hoggan and Taylor completely ignore the internal structure of the Third Reich and its implications for Hitler's expansionist policy. For a detailed criticism of their views, see Jasper, G., ‘Ueber die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, Vierteljahrshejte für Zeitgeschichte 10, 07 1962, pp. 311–40;Google ScholarHofer, W., Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Eine Stadie über die internationalen Beziehungen im Sommer 1939, Frankfurt M., 1964;Google Scholar and Bullock, A., ‘Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War’, Proceedings of the British Academy till,London, 1967, pp. 259–87.Google Scholar

38 Here we quote the revised and enlarged English edition (Jong, L. de, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, London, 1956).Google Scholar

39 Op. cit. pp. 221–7, 294.

40 Ibid. pp. 213–21. Cf. Remak, J., ‘Friends of the New Germany. The Bund and German-American Relations’, The Journal of Modern History XXIX, 03 1957, pp. 38–41;CrossRefGoogle ScholarJacobsen, H.-A., op. cit. pp. 528–49.Google Scholar

41 Jong, L. de, op. cit. pp. 255–6.Google Scholar

42 Ibid. p. 266.

43 Ibid. pp. 105–20. Dr de long admits that he, too, was a victim of the ‘fifth column panic’ in 1940–1 (p. viii).

44 Ibid. p. 221: ‘As far as is known, no evidence has appeared…that a German minority prepared themselves for a coup …in any of the South or Central American states. It is probable that Hitler, if he had been able to subdue the Soviet Union and Britain, would have stimulated such attempts’(our italics).

45 Introductory essay to Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944 London, 1953, pp. vii–xxxv.Google Scholar

46 Martin Bormann.

47 Hitler on 5 Nov. 1937 at the Reich Chancellery (Hossbach, F., Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, 2nd ed., Göttingen, 1965, p. 186).Google Scholar

48 Documents on American Foreign Relations IV, p. 29.Google Scholar

49 See, e.g., Dickmann, F., ‘Machtwille und Ideologic in Hitlers aussenpolitischen Zielsetzungen vor 1933’, Spiegel der Geschichte. Festgabe für M. Braubach zum 10, 04 1964, Münster, 1964, pp. 915–41.Google Scholar

50 Trevor-Roper, H. R., ‘Hitlers Kriegsziele’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 8, 04 1960, pp. 121–33;Google Scholar id. introduction to The Testament of Adolf Hitler, London, 1961, pp. 1–26.Google Scholar

51 Gruchmann, L., ‘Völkerrecht und Moral. Ein Beitrag zur Problematik der amerikanischen Neutralitätspolitik 1939–1941’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 8, 10 1960, pp. 384–418.Google Scholar

52 See Nuremberg document R–140 (Göring's speech of 8 July 1938); Picker, H., Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942, Stuttgart, 1963 and 1965, p. 433Google Scholar (Göring on 4 July 1942).

53 Churchill, W. S., The Second World War, London, 1949, p. 358.Google Scholar

54 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 1937, London, 1941, p. 409.Google Scholar

55 See on this Gruchmann, L., Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung. Die Konstruktion einer deutschen Monroe-Doktrin’, Stuttgart, 1962.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56 Haines, C. Grove and Hoffman, Rosa J. S., Origins and Background of the Second World War, London-New York-Toronto, 1943, p. 477.Google Scholar

57 Gruchmann, L., loc. cit. pp. 397, 416, 418.Google Scholar

58 Ibid. p. 408. On Hitler's determination to avoid a premature conflict with the United States, see also Friedlander, S., Prelude to Downfall. Hitler and the United States 1939–1941, London, 1967.Google Scholar

59 Weinberg, G. L. (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1928, Stuttgart, 1961.Google Scholar

60 Op. cit. pp. 128, 130.

61 Ibid. p. 218.

62 Ibid. pp. 100, 176–215, 217–19.

63 Ibid. p. 163.

64 Ibid. pp. 218–19.

65 Mein Kampf, p. 722.

66 Hitlers Zweites Buch, p. 218.

67 Picker, H., Hitlers Tischgespräche, p. 145; according to the English edition (Hitler's Table Talk, p. 26), the conversation took place a month earlier (10–11 Aug. 1941).Google Scholar

68 Hitler's Table Talk, p. 188 (7 Jan. 1942).

69 That Hitler realized the ultimate inevitability of a clash with Britain is clear from the following passage in Mein Kampf: ‘England desires no Germany as a World Power … Today, however, we are not fighting for a position as a World Power; today we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland…’ (p. 699; Hitler's italics).

70 In 1928 Hitler regarded America as a menace because of its ‘racial superiority’. Subsequently he came to regard it as a racially inferior country, ‘half Judaized’ and ‘half negrified’ (Hitler's Table Talk, p. 188). His conclusion, however, remained unchanged – America must be destroyed. National Socialism being perpetual motion, Greater Germany could not co-exist with any other World Power in the long run; but whether Hitler expected or desired war with the United States in his own life-time is quite another question.

71 Moltmann, G., ‘Weltherrschaftsideen Hitlers’, Europa und Uebersee. Festschrift für Egmonl Zechlin, Hamburg, 1961, pp. 197–240.Google Scholar

72 See above, n. 50.

73 See e.g. Mein Kampf, pp. 337, 703, on the ‘Jewish plan of world dominion’ and the ‘Jewish tendency of world conquest’.

74 Mein Kampf, pp. 729–30.

75 Ibid. pp. 755–7, 766–7.

76 Ibid. pp. 689–90.

77 Hitler's italics.

78 Alan Bullock, the leading British biographer of Hitler, shared Trevor-Roper's view that ‘Rauschning's account of his conversations with Hitler…has been vindicated by the evidence of Hider's views which has been discovered since its publication’ (Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, p. 378). But while regarding Rauschning's book ‘as an important source for any biography of Hitler’, Bullock completely ignored Rauschning's account of Hitler's expansionist ambitions.

79 Documents of German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, Series D, XI, London, 1961;Google Scholar the German original was published three years later (Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, Serie D, XI, 1, Bonn, 1964).Google Scholar

80 Deutscher Kolonial-Dienst V, 1940, No. 7, p. 96.Google Scholar

81 Akten XI, 1, p. 76.Google Scholar

82 Ibid. pp. 409–15.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid. pp. 457, 468–9. As early as 13 July 1940 the ‘Führer’ had announced his intention of creating a German colonial empire in Central Africa at a military conference, adding, however, that he still considered the liquidation of the British Empire undesirable from the German point of view (Haider, F., Kriegstagebuch. Aujzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres II, ed. by Jacobsen, H.-A., Stuttgart, 1963, p. 21).Google Scholar

85 Cf. Langer, W. L. and Gleason, S. E., The Undeclared War 1940–41, New York, 1953, p. 595.Google Scholar

86 Hitler on 8 May 1943 to a group of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter (Goebbels, J., Tagebücher aus den Jahren 1942–43, Zürich, 1948, p. 327).Google Scholar

87 At a press conference at the White House (30 May 1940), quoted in Moltmann, loc. cit. p. 222.

88 See n. 86, above.

89 Mein Kampf, p. 742.

90 Moltmann, , loc. cit. pp. 232–3.Google Scholar

91 Ibid. pp. 224–8.

92 In his above quoted speech at the Reich Chancellery Hitler declared that expansion in Europe would solve Germany's problem of Lebensraum ‘for one or two generations. Whatever else might prove necessary later must be left to succeeding generations to deal with ‘(Hossbach, F., op. cit. p. 183).Google Scholar

93 Moltmann, , loc. cit. p. 233.Google ScholarJacobsen, H.-A. (Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 7, n. 23)Google Scholar considers Moltmann's conclusions regarding the global dimensions of Hitler's ambitions ‘somewhat exaggerated’, but makes no attempt to substantiate the charge and offers no alternative interpretation.

94 Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategic. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, Frankfurt/Main, 1965; id., ‘Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategic 1938–1941 ‘, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung das Parlament, B 19/66, ii 05 1966, pp. 3–21.Google Scholar

95 Hitler to Ciano, 25 Oct. 1941: ‘A later generation would have to cope with the problem of Europe - America’ (Hillgruber, A., Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Vnterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1939–1941, Frankfurt/Main, 1967, p. 632).Google Scholar A little earlier, however (14 July 1941), Hitler had told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany and Japan should get together to destroy the U.S.A. (Hillgruber, A., ‘Japan und der Fall “Barbarossa”’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 18, 06 1968, pp. 319–20).Google Scholar

96 Hitler to Burckhardt, High Commissioner for Danzig, on 11 Aug. 1939 (Burckhardt, C. J., Meine Danziger Mission 1937–1939, München, 1960, p. 348.Google Scholar

97 Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategie, pp. 14, 22.Google Scholar

98 Cf. Ludendorff, E., Der totale Krieg, München, 1935 and 1936.Google Scholar

99 Toynbee, A., Acquaintances, London-New York-Toronto, 1967, p . 282.Google Scholar

100 Hossbach, F., Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, p. 184.Google Scholar

101 ‘I order that the reconstruction of the Navy … take precedence of all other tasks inclusive of the reconstruction of the Army and the Air Force and inclusive of exports’ (Nuremberg document C–23, IMT XXXIV, p. 190). Cf. ‘Aufbau der Kriegsmarine 1926–1939’, Bundesarchiv/Militararchiv-PG/33965, pp. 1–39.

102 Hillgruber, A., op. cit. pp. 35–7.Google Scholar

103 Ibid. pp. 144–92.

104 Ibid. pp. 316–88; cf. ‘Der Faktor Amerika’, loc. cit. pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

105 Hider to the Reichstag on 4 May 1941 (Domarus, M., Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, 11, Würzburg, 1963, p. 1708).Google Scholar Hider's claim (incomprehensible at the time) was evidently based on the assumption that the Weltblitzkrieg would succeed.

106 Hitler's scheme for a direct assault on the British Isles.

107 Following Ernst Nolte (Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, München, 1963, p. 436)Google Scholar, Hillgruber speaks of ‘the most atrocious war of conquest, enslavement and annihilation known to modern history (op. cit. p. 516).

108 Hillgruber, A., op. cit. pp. 15, 392–3.Google Scholar

109 Hillgruber, A., Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, pp. 654–62;Google Scholar see also ‘Der Faktor Amerika’, loc. cit. pp. 20–1.Google Scholar

110 Picker, H., Hitlers Tischgespräche, p. 171.Google Scholar

111 Quoted in Bullock, A., Hitler, pp. 774–5.Google Scholar

112 Trevor-Roper in Hitler's Table Talk, p. xxxii.

113 ‘Der Faktor Amerika’, loc. cit. pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

114 Hitlers Strategic, pp. 242–55.

115 The dissertation was accepted by the University of Mannheim in 1967 when the author was only 25 years old; it was published in book form two years later (Hildebrand, K., Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945, München, 1969).Google Scholar Cf. our review in International Affairs 46, 10 1970, pp. 748–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

116 Op. cit. pp. 13, 70–88.

117 Ibid. p. 120.

118 Ibid. pp. 609–10; cf. Weinberg, G. L., ‘German colonial plans and policies’, Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein. Festschrijt für Hans Rothjels zum 70. Geburtstag. Göttingen, 1963, pp. 465–8.Google Scholar

119 Hildebrand, K., op. cit. pp. 740–1.Google Scholar

120 Ibid. pp. 77, 83.

121 Ibid. pp. 78–9, 88, 772–4.

122 In a subsequent study of Geiman foreign policy Dr Hildebrand, following Hillgruber, stresses the conflict between ‘rational’ calculation and ‘dogma’ in Hitler's Weltpolitik (Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933–1945 Kalkül oder Dogma?, Stuttgart, 1970).Google Scholar

123 As late as 1 July 1943, 25 days before the second Italian ‘betrayal’, Hitler claimed in a secret speech that his renunciation of the South Tyrol had by no means been a tactical trick (as many of his followers believed): it had been perfectly sincere (Krausnick, H., ‘Zu Hitlers Ostpolitik im Sommer 1943’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 2, 07 1954, p. 311).Google Scholar On National Socialist intrigues in the South Tyrol, see Toscano, M., Storia diplomatica della questione dell' Alto Adige, Bari, 1967, pp. 117–247,Google Scholar who stresses Hitler's (largely ineffectual) disapproval of those intrigues (pp. 112–15, 141) As for co-existence with Britain, it is well known that the dictator continued to pursue the mirage of an Ausgleich with that country until the very eve of final defeat. On 25 Apr. 1945, five days before his inglorious end, he told his entourage that the British would have to come to terms with him in order to prevent Stalin from overrunning the whole of Europe (‘Zeitgeschichte. Hitler-Dokumente’, Der Spiegel of 10 Jan. 1966, p. 34). For all his subjective sincerity, however, Hitler invariably pursued policies which rendered co-existence with other countries impossible.

124 Rauschning's chief weakness is probably his failure to recognize the element of continuity in Hitler's foreign policy which Hans Rothfels has summarized as follows: ‘However long and circuitous the path leading from Bismarck to Hitler may have been, the founder of the Reich appears to be the man responsible for a change of policy, responsible at least for legitimizing a policy, the ultimate and fatal consummation of which has, in our own time, become all too obvious’ (‘Probleme einer Bismarck-Biographie’, Deutsche Beiträge II, München, 1948, p. 170). On this problem cf. also A. Hillgruber, Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege, Göttingen, 1967; id., Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler, Düsseldorf, 1969; H.-U. Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus, Köln, 1969, 2nd ed. 1970; J. C. G. Röhl, From Bismarck to Hitler. The Problem of Continuity in German History, London, 1970; K. Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?, especially ch. 1; I. Geiss, ‘Die Kontinuität der Tradition’, Die Zeit, 12 Nov. 1970, pp. 14–15. There is truth in Hildebrand's contention that Hitler's very break with the German past is in a sense a product of historical continuity.