Normativity, Equal Opportunity, and the Adjustment Problem in The Just State

Abstract

The Just State, as Richard Winfield notes at the outset, is the culmination of an ambitious project devoted to limning the contours and content of a systematic philosophy of right. Apart from its value as a substantial contribution to the understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The Just State offers its own self-standing, content-rich account of political justice. Winfield's book is overflowing with argument and analysis, which calls for careful, detailed consideration, and the brief set of comments that follow cannot possibly do it full justice. It is useful, however, to focus on a specific topic concerning normativity discussed in the ‘Introduction’. In particular, I would like to raise some questions about the principle of equal opportunity and the adjustment problem that arises from it.

Before turning to those questions, it might be helpful to offer an overview of the overarching structure of The Just State. The ‘Introduction’ and eight chapters can be clustered thematically into three parts. The ‘Introduction’ has the important task of clearing away the obstacles thrown up by sceptical arguments against the very possibility of a normative theory of political justice. Chapters 1-3 set the stage for the account of political justice proper, which then takes up the remainder of the book, chapters 4-8. So the argument starts, in the ‘Introduction’, with a refutation of the sceptical denial of the project of political philosophy understood as the normative theory of political justice. This is important because the positive upshot of this anti-sceptical argument is the identification of a singular normative criterion: self-determination.