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Hegel on Purpose

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2019

Arto Laitinen  and
Constantine Sandis
Arto Laitinen
Affiliation:
Tampere University, Finland
Constantine Sandis
Affiliation:
University of Hertfordshire, [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper we propose a new interpretation of Hegel's views on action and responsibility, defending it against its most plausible exegetical competitors.1 Any exposition of Hegel will face both terminological and substantive challenges, and so we place, from the outset, some interpretative constraints. The paper divides into two parts. In part one, we point out that Hegel makes a number of distinctions which any sensible account of responsibility should indeed make. Our aim here is to show that Hegel at least has the materials for a sensible and nuanced account, whatever the precise details of how they hang together. Part two then turns to a hard question concerning the relation of two different aspects of our deeds to responsibility. We consider five alternate ways of relieving the tension in Hegel's text, before putting forth our own preferred solution.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 40 , Special Issue 3: Hegel and the Philosophy of Action , December 2019 , pp. 444 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2019 

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Footnotes

1

There has been a flood of books and articles on Hegel's philosophy of action during recent decades; see, for example, Stepelevich & Lamb 1983, Quante 2004, and Laitinen & Sandis 2010.

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