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Fundamentality without Metaphysical Monism: Response to Critics of Reason in the World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 October 2016

James Kreines
James Kreines*
Affiliation:
Claremont-McKenna College, [email protected]
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Abstract

This article is a reply to comments by Franz Knappik and Robert Stern on my book, Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Issues addressed include the systematicity of Hegel’s philosophy, the prioritizing of metaphysical over epistemological questions in his arguments, Hegel’s response to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason, and my conclusion that there are senses in which Hegel’s own position is both ambitiously metaphysical and also monist, but that the monism present there is epistemological, and the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist.

Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 39 , Issue 1 , May 2018 , pp. 138 - 156
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Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2016 

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