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The Value of Practical Knowledge: Against Engstrom’s Constructivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2016

Joe Saunders
Joe Saunders*
Affiliation:
Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied CentreUniversity of [email protected]
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Abstract

Stephen Engstrom has recently offered an excellent account of morality as practical cognition. He emphasizes the formal conditions of practical knowledge, which he finds in Kant. Engstrom also aligns his account with constructivism, claiming that value is constructed through these formal conditions, chiefly universalisability. In this paper, I employ a variant of Hegel’s empty-formalism objection to challenge the moral significance of the mere form of practical knowledge. I hope to show that Engstrom’s constructivism is neither philosophically compelling, nor required by the rest of his position. In its place, I propose a realist understanding of the value of practical knowledge.

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Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , May 2016 , pp. 117 - 136
Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2016 

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