The word religion, as commonly used, refers to complex institutions which are made up of many different elements. I am not so much interested in the complex institutions which we call religions as I am in isolating from them the element which causes us to call them religions. I am interested in the religious attitude of mind rather than in religion as an institution. Similarly, in regard to science, I am interested in the scientific attitude of mind rather than in applied science. To most people the word science means applied science rather than the scientific attitude of mind.

In a recent article, F. Pfister has put forth a theory which appears to me so interesting a mixture of fruitful suggestion and of error as to repay a detailed and critical examination. It is briefly that ‘der Verfasser des Urevangeliums, das in verschiedenen Fassungen den drei Synoptikern bekannt war, eine kynisch-stoische Heraklesbiographie vor Augen hatte, und in enger Abhängigkeit von dieser das Leben Jesu geetaltete.’ This proposition he endeavors to support by a series of comparisons between details of the life of Jesus as given in the Synoptic Gospels and descriptions of the corresponding events in the life of Herakles, especially as told by our later authorities, such as Diodorus Siculus and the so-called Apollodoros.

The writer's interest has been much aroused by two important monographs appearing in this Review: (I) ‘A Vision of Mandulis Aion,’ by A. D. Nock (vol. xxviii, 53–104); and (II) ‘The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos,’ by C. Roberts, T. C. Skeat, A. D. Nock (xxix, 39–88). The evidence is of necessity predominantly drawn from Graeco-Roman sources, while the Oriental background or parallels figure less because of the lack of material.

In Arabic philosophic texts, and following them also in Hebrew philosophic texts, restatements of Aristotle's distinction between ‘equivocal’ (ὁμώνυμα, mushtarakah) and ‘univocal’ (συνώνυμα, mutawāṭi'ah), terms usually contain another type of term which stands midway between these two. It is called ‘ambiguous’ or ‘amphibolous’ (mushakkikah) terms. So far no adequate explanation as to the origin of this type of term has been advanced. In the latest and most important study of the subject, the problem of its origin has been left unsolved. To solve this problem as well as to account for the various treatments of ambiguous terms in Arabic philosophy, including Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali, Averroes and Maimonides, is the purpose of this paper.

Even at the cost of a slight delay to the publication of the Homily on the Passion, it has seemed prudent to submit to the readers of this Review two problems arising out of Melito's language, which are not without their difficulties. If the view here taken about the first of these is open to other objections than those which the writer has anticipated, he will be grateful to any reader who will call them to his attention. As to the second, it is likely that Hebrew and patristic scholars may be able to add further illustrations. Such contributions will be most welcome.