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Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism: With Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

Heiko A. Oberman
Heiko A. Oberman
Affiliation:
Harvard Divinity School
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Extract

To understand the essence of an historical movement, be it primarily philosophical, theological or cultural, the inquirer should abstain from generalizations and obediently analyze the relevant sources.

To understand its significance, however, he has, consciously or unconsciously, to take the dangerous step of comparing movement with movement in order to find a frame of reference which can bring out, by antithesis or analogy, the typical characteristics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , January 1960 , pp. 47 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1960

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References

1 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, London, 19548, pp. 667–680. Esp. p. 677, note 2. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, New York, 1941–1943, I, pp. 59–61. For the opposite view see Roy W. Battenhouse, “The Doctrine of Man in Calvin and in Renaissance Platonism,” Journal of the History of Ideas, IX, No. 4 (October, 1948), pp. 447–471. “Has Calvin, in part, simply projected the outlook of humanism to a higher level? … In the points I have considered I see more signs of polarity than of radical disagreement” (pp. 470–471). Charles Trinkaus, “The Problem of Free Will in the Renaissance and Reformation,” Journal of the History of Ideas, X, No. 7 (January, 1949), pp. 51–62. “It is the limited nature of the moral freedom taught in the Renaissance that seems to have been overlooked…. And it is at this point that the relationship with Reformation thought can be established.”

2 P. Vignaux, Nominalisme au XIVe Siècle, Montreal, Paris, 1948, p. 11.

3 G. Martin, op. cit. in Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950), pp. 31–49; p. 49.

4 In his “Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as illustrated by Pierre d'Ailly on Predestination and Justification,” Harvard Theological Review 52, 1 (January, 1959), pp. 43–60, George Lindbeck qualifies the theological differences within Nominalism first as “secondary” (p. 51) and later even as the “by-product of an intellectual approach…” (p. 60). As far as Occam's stress of the philosophically important notitia intuitiva is concerned, it is quite significant that this concept has the stamp of Augustinian epistemological mysticism.

5 Cardinal Ehrle, “Der Sentenzencommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexander V,” Franziskanische Studien, Münsterr Beiheft IX (1925), p. 106: “Zur Kennzeichnung derselben (i.e. the Nominalistic school) dürfen wir uns nicht mit einem Hinweis auf die logische Eigenart dieser Schule begnügen. Ohne Zweifel ist diese Bezeichnung ‘Nominalismus’ einseitig von dieser logischen Eigenart genommen.”

6 R. Guelluy, Philosophie et Théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham, Louvain, Paris, 1947, p. 372. Cf. E. Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham, ihre Bedeutung für die Ursachen der Reformation, Wiesbaden, 1956, p. 3.

7 Fr. Trapp, D., O.E.S.A., “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century,” Augustana VI (1956), p. 150.Google Scholar

8 Gregorianum, 29 (1948), pp. 212–233.

9 H. A. Obennan, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, A Fourteenth-Century Augustinian. A Study of His Theology in its Historical Context, Kemink, Utrecht, 1958, pp. 20s ff.

10 “II y a done Nominalisme et Nominalisme; mais il n'y a pas à hésiter sur la position de Gerson; c'est un Nominalisme.” A. Combes, Jean Gerson, Commentateur Dionysien, Paris, 1940, p. 611.

11 Paris BN, lat. 16.53S fol. 179r puts Ripa together with Hugolinus, Bradwardine and Mirecourt. Cf. A. Combes, AHDL, 1956, p. 167.

12 Unfortunately, since Feckes' much-quoted book on Biel's doctrine of justification and his position in the Nominalistic movement, Occam and Biel have been too closely identified. I hope to show elsewhere in a more detailed study that it really appears time and again that he only tried hard to be an obedient disciple of Occam.

13 C. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel, Münster i W, 1925, p. 138; Iserloh, op. cit., p. 8.

14 Cf. E. Borchert, Der Einflusz des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik, Münster i W., 1940 BB xxx, I, 1 ff.

15 De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei la. cap. 22; PL 176. 214.

16 ST I. q 25. a 5.

17 “Sic in Deo nulla est potentia ordinata per respectum ad actionem ad extra, cum nullo ordine obligetur aut debeat agere secundum aliquam exigentiam moralem vel naturalem. Unde sic intelligendo, non est in Deo nisi potentia absoluta ab omni ordine et omni debito, nulli subiecta regula nullo modo ad agere aut ad modum agendi aliquem obligata,” I Sent, d 44, a 5, Romae 159b, fol. 1060 a/b.

18 H. J. Mandel, Die geistesgeschichtliche Stellung der Reformation, Leipzig, 1919, pp. 153 ff.

19 Op. cit., p. 57; “Es war nicht schwer das was sie nach der potentia absoluta sagten, nun auch für die Wirklichkeit zu behaupten,” p. 142.

20 “Hier liegt der Ausgangspunkt für die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit. Der menschlichen Vernunft kann etwas unvernünftig sein, was der göttlichen Vernunft konform ist.” Feckes, op. cit. p. 12, n. 57. The demarcation line, however, lies not between faith and reason but between faith — and love and hope: “Quia fides est virtus intellectualis cuius obiectum est verum. Ideo virtus intellectualis penitus excludit falsum. Spei autem et charitatis … non simpliciter excludit errorem.” Biel, III Sent, d 23, q 2 E. The limits of God's potentia absoluta lie in the law of non-contradiction, which does not imply contradiction with His potentia ordinata. Cf. e.g., IV Sent, d 14, q 1, not. 4.

21 “Viator Mundi”; in Aufsätze zu Occams Philosophie und Theologie, Franziskanische Studien, 1950 (32), p. 2; “1st doch die potentia ordinata dei für Ockham, wie schon für Duns Scotus, die gegebene Ordnung der Welt und des Heils, in der Gott als die causa prima mit den causae secundae, den natürlichen Ursachen, also auch den Menschen zusammenwirkt. Das es über dieser gegebenen Ordnung noch ein höhere Ordnung gibt, in der Gott, de potentia absoluta, ohne die causae secundae unmittelbar in den Weltgang eingreifen kann und auch schon eingegriffen hat (italics mine) bezeugt die Heiligen Schrift und war für Duns und Ockham Kirchliche Lehre, da Bischof Stephan Tempier von Paris 1277 ihre Leugnung ausdrücklich verurteilt hatte.” Cf. pp. 18 ff.

22 J. Lortz, Einleitung to Iserloh's op. cit., p. xxiii and p. xxvi; Iserloh, ib., pp. 49. 99. 107, et passim.

23 Lortz says about Occam: “Die einseitige Betonung von Gottes unbeschränkter Allmacht führt Ockham zum Gott der Willkür, der schlechterdings an nichts und durch nichts, auch nicht durch sein Wesen gebunden ist.” Op. cit., p. xxvi. Philotheus Böhner takes another position: “For the Venerabilis Inceptor knows one invariable norm of Ethics, viz. the obligation to obey the will of God or to love God.” “A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy,” Franciscan Studies, 9 (1949), pp. 453 f.Google Scholar

24 M. de Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophic Médiévale, III (Louvain, Paris, 1947), p. 42; Iserloh, op. cit., p. 48.

25 Biel, I Sent., d 41, q 1, a 1, not. 2 B: “Voluntas [dei] nihil aliud est quam deus ipse.”

26 Nominalisme du XIVe Siècle, Paris, 1948, p. 22. Id. Art. “Occam,” DTC XI, Paris, 1931, col. 864 ff. Cf. Luther Commentateur des Sentences, Paris, 1935, p. 78.

27 “Nach Thomas für den Vorherbestimmung ein Entwurf des praktischen Intellektes ist, setzt Gott die Kreaturen in Bewegung auf das Ziel hin. Nach Skotus, für den Vorherbestimmung Wahl des Willens ist, akzeptiert Gott die Kreatur für das Ziel.” W. Pannenberg, Die Praedestinationslehre des Duns Skotus, Göttingen, 1954, p. 42.Google Scholar

28 I Sent. d 41, q 1 E.

29 “Causa igitur obduratibnis est voluntas avertens et haec initiat; voluntas resistens et haec contineat; culpa promerens — et haec confirmat; Deus gratiam non dans — et haec non liberat; deus iuste punens — et haec ordinat.” De Praedestinatione, Köln, 1483 (Hain 7621) II, 308 b.

30 “… inquirendum est quomodo et unde contingat contingentia in rebus; pro quo sit ista conclusio: contingentia effectus praesupponit libertatem alicuius causae agentis.” I Sent, d 38, q 1, a 7 (F).

31 “Praeterea nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est in nostra potestate, sed ilia caritas non est in nostra potestate, ergo actus non est meritorius principaliter propter illam gratiam sed propter voluntatem libere causantem, ergo posset deus talem actum elicitum a voluntate acceptare sine tali gratia.” Quod libet VI, q 7.

32 “Sed per pura naturalia intelligitur animae natura seu substantia cum qualitatibus et actionibus consequentibus naturam, exclusis habitibus ac donis supernaturaliter a solo deo infusis.” I Sent, d 28, a 1, p 1, a 1, n 2.

33 III Sent, q 8 B, cf. q 8 D.

34 Cf. E. Longpré, O.F.M., L'Assomption et l'Ecole Franciscaine, in Vers le Dogme de l'Assomption, Montreal, 1958, pp. 208 f.

35 “Causa autem quare istos [Paul and Mary] praedestinat sine omni ratione et alios propter rationem non est nisi divina voluntas.” I Sent, d 41, col. 5, fol. 7.

36 Cautiously he states: “Bei einigen der besprochenen Autoren hat man zuweilen den Eindruck, die angeführten Kongruenzgründe fanden ihren eigentlichen Stützpunkt in Maria selbst und in ihrer Ehre. Das wäre aber eine bedauernswerte Akzentverschiebung!” “Einführung in die Mariologie der Oxforder Franziskanerschule,” Franz. Stud. 39 (1957), p. 157.Google Scholar

Cf. Id., “Maria's koningschap volgens de Oosterse Vaders,” Verslagboek der 13e Mariale Dagen te Tongerlo 1955, Tongerlo, 1956, pp. 84–88.

37 An unpublished and little noticed Vienna Ms includes a treatise on the cause of predestination and reprobation which, I am convinced, if not a work of Bradwardine, is certainly Bradwardinian. On many points it attacks the Nominalistic autonomous anthropology. In connection with our question of Mary's fittingness it says: “… si non esset personarum acceptio apud Deum tunc si alia filia de domo Iacob consimilis fuisset in merito cum Domina mea ipsa similiter Filium Dei genuisset, et tune plures potuissent genuisse eundem Filium Dei, et sic etiam Domina Mea non per electionem nee divinam providentiam sed fortuitu et creaturaliter facta fuisset mater Dei.” Nat. Bibl. Vienna Cod. 4306. fol. 102r.

38 “… uncle ilia potentia dicitur esse libera quae dominium habet plenum tam respectu objecti quam respectu actus proprii.” St. Bonaventura, II Sent, d 25, p 1, a 1, q 7; Ib. ad 4: “Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se ipsam.” Quoted by William G. Thompson, S.J., “Free Choice in St. Bonaventura,” Franc. Stud. 18 (1958), pp. 3, 4.

39 Note that Duns Scotus introduces the term ultima solitudo in his definition of the person. Opera Ox. III d 1, q 1, nb. 1.

40 Cum loquimur de puris naturalibus, nonexcluditur generalis Dei influentia. … Sed per pura naturalia intelligitur animae natura seu substantia cum qualitatibus et actionibus consequentibus naturam exclusis habitibus ac donis supernaturaliter a solo deo infusis.” Gabriel Biel, II Sent, d 28, q 1, a 1, n 2.

41 Occam agrees with Scotus “quod substantia actus virtuosi et vitiosi potest esse eadem, sed dicitur esse virtuosus propter conformitatem ad circumstantias requisitas….” III Sent, q 13, C.

Cf. the sharp analysis of Iserloh, op cit., p. 61.

42 “The notitia intuitiva of non-existents according to William Ockham,” Traditio 1 (1943), pp. 223 ff.; “The realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham,” Traditio 4 (1946), pp. 307 ff. Both articles are republished in Ph. Boehner, Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., St. Bonaventura, 1950, pp. 268 ff.; pp. 156 ff.

43 “Man muss sehen und sagen, dass bei Ockham eine geradezu ungeheuerlichen Häufung der neugierigen Fragen und Antworten in endlosem Zug auftaucht und ernstestens ohne genügenden religiösen Bezug diskutiert wird.” Einleitung, op. cit., p. xxxi.

44 Op. cit., p. 284.

45 P. O. Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Rome, 1956, p. 284.

46 Id.: The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, New York, 1943, p. 206.

47 Translation by Elizabeth Forbes, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Ernst Cassirer et al., Chicago, 1948, pp. 223–25.

48 Op. cit., p. 224.

49 On Being and Unity, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts, 3, Marquette, 1943, p. 25.

50 Ib., p. 23.

51 Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, Band II: Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation. Ed. Georg Misch, Auflage 5, Vanden Hoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1957, pp. 324 ff., 416 ff., 496 f. Cf. more explicit Joseph Lortz, Die Reformation in Deutschland I2, Freiburg i.B., 1941, pp. 174 f.

52 Cf. P. O. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p. 81.