The Antiquity of the Commandments in the Thought of Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī: An Analysis of Kitāb al-Anwār w-al-Marāqib 4:52–58

Abstract

The question of whether the divine commandments were observed prior to the revelation at Sinai has vast theological and hermeneutical implications. The first known systematic account that has reached us on the question of the antiquity of the commandments is found in the tenth-century Karaite scholar Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī’s Kitāb al-Anwār w-al-Marāqib. Qirqisānī discusses two theories: according to the first, the divine commandments were given already to Adam; and according to the second, God’s law was given in an accumulative process, the Torah being developed in accordance with the historical circumstances. This article analyzes the two theories and demonstrates that they are rooted in a Muslim-Jewish debate, conducted in the first half of the ninth century, about the Muslim principle of abrogation (naskh), and that the historical context of the argument on the subject probably was that of the interreligious debates that took place in Qirqisānī’s time.

Introduction

The question of whether the Torah was given in a one-time revelation on Sinai or in an ongoing chronological process has occupied generations of Jewish thinkers. ¹ This is above all an exegetical question. On the one hand, Scripture ties the divine command to the stories about the biblical heroes and the lives of the patriarchs; but on the other hand, it also ascribes constitutive importance to the revelation on Sinai, through which God’s will and binding law became known to the people of Israel. However, already in antiquity, and all the more so in the Middle Ages, various opinions emerged that indisputably deviated from the purely exegetical discussion, inasmuch as they also carried legal, theological, and ideological implications.

According to a commonly held position in talmudic and midrashic literature, the commandments preceded the giving of the Torah on Sinai: “We find that Abraham our forefather fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, as it is stated: ‘Because that Abraham listened to My voice, and kept My charge (משמרתי), My commandments (מצותי), My statutes (חקותי), and My laws (ותורֺתי)’ ” (Mishnah, Kiddushin 4:14). ² Alongside those who believed in the antiquity of the commandments, we also find sages who held that the commandments were given in a gradual, historical process. For example, in Pesikta de-Rav Kahana (Baḥodesh) 12:1, we read: “Rabbi Judah son of Rabbi Simon said: ‘Many daughters have done noble things, but you surpass them all’—Adam received six commandments . . . Noah was commanded concerning eating flesh torn from a living animal . . . Abraham was commanded concerning circumcision . . . Jacob concerning the thigh tendon . . . Judah concerning levirate marriage . . . but you were commanded 613 commandments at Sinai.” ³

One of the most sophisticated and systematic medieval discussions dedicated to the antiquity of the commandments is found in the work of the well-known tenth-century Karaite scholar Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī—Kitāb al-Anwār w-al-Marāqib (Book of Lights and Observatories). In chapters 52–58 of the fourth treatise of his work, ⁴ Qirqisānī discusses two principal positions: the first is that of the Ananites and some of the Karaites, according to which all the commandments reach back to Adam (henceforth: the antiquity position); and the second, according to which only some commandments are ancient and over time their number increased in a gradual process until the Torah was finally completed by Moses (henceforth: the accumulation position).

In the present study I will analyze Qirqisānī’s discussion of the two positions. I will review the theoretical-logical part of his discussion and explain the Jewish-Muslim polemical context that is its basis. I will also present the exegetical foundations of the different positions as they were presented by Qirqisānī. Finally, I will discuss the historical conclusions that can be drawn from Qirqisānī’s presentation and formulation of the subject.

The Antiquity Position of the Ananites and Karaites, according to Qirqisānī

According to Qirqisānī, the antiquity position was formulated in response to the Muslim abolition claim (naskh), according to which the Torah of Moses was true until it was abolished by God’s revelation to the prophet of Islam: ⁵

Some of the Ananites and a group of the Karaites claimed that all the commandments given by God through Moses were given already when God created Adam, none has been added and none has been deducted since then. They were spurred to adopt this position out of fear(?) ⁶ lest they would have to acknowledge (ان يلزمهم) the abolition of the Torah (نسخ الشرع), as espoused by the Muslims. ⁷

Qirqisānī’s words are grounded in the reality of the time—by this I mean the interfaith encounters (majālis) that took place in Qirqisānī’s time, in which Jews and Muslims, among others, debated theological issues. ⁸ The position was formulated out of fear, meaning within the framework of preparations for an interfaith debate in which the Muslims would present their naskh argument, and the Jews—in this case Ananites and Karaites ⁹ —would argue in favor of the eternal validity of the Torah of Moses. In response, the Muslims would argue that the Torah of Moses itself abolished previous revelations, and the Jews would then defend their faith by claiming that the Torah of Moses was in force already in the time of Adam and therefore could not possibly be abolished.

According to Qirqisānī, this ahistorical attitude toward the commandments is based on several theological considerations:

1. 1. God’s commandments reflect truth and wisdom and must therefore be ancient and unchanging like them: “Those who reject the abolition of the laws rely on the following proof: Since God’s imperatives reflect truth and wisdom (حق وحكمة), the essence of which cannot change and turn into falsehood and folly, it is inconceivable that God would abolish or invalidate his law.” ¹⁰ The perception of the Torah as being eternal, on the basis of its identification with wisdom, is already found in ancient Jewish sources. According to Michael Segal, in the Jewish literature of Second Temple period, it is possible to discern a process of identification of wisdom with the Torah, ¹¹ and if one combines the biblical motif of the eternity of wisdom ¹² with the transition from wisdom to Torah, one easily arrives at the conclusion that the Torah and its commandments also are eternal. Segal suggests this to be the foundation of the ahistorical perception of the commandments in the Book of Jubilees, and this is what makes room for the talmudic view of the patriarchs as having observed the Torah before it was given on Sinai. ¹³ It is possible that a similar exegetical process lies at the root of the Ananite-Karaite position. However, it is also possible that a combination of biblical sources with the Muʿtazilite theology, according to which all of God’s actions and commandments are wisdom, is the foundation for the Ananite-Karaite position. ¹⁴

2. 2. The Ananite-Karaite position is also rooted in Muʿtazilite theology, according to which the will of God reflects an objective good, available to humans through their reason—“God is just” in his actions and in his commandments: “One of them also claimed that since God, may he be exalted, is just (عدلًا), and his commands make human beings worthy of receiving reward, it is inconceivable that he should make only some of his creatures worthy of receiving reward and not the rest [of human beings].” ¹⁵ According to this view, it is not the divine command that makes something good; rather, it is the objective good that is reflected in the divine command. ¹⁶ Thus, the deeds of God are righteous, and God rewards his servants according to their righteousness. This leads to the following argument: Discrimination between human beings is unjust; hence, it cannot be attributed to God. If the commandments were not eternal and universal, they would constitute a kind of discrimination, which would mean that God acts unjustly, as only those commanded have been provided with a means to receive reward. In sum: God’s commandments are universal; ¹⁷ the entirety of the commandments is ancient and fixed, for all human beings and for all times.

3. 3. Moreover, the Ananite-Karaite position also claims that the commandments are perfectly consistent and that there can be no contradiction between them. It is inconceivable that God would command mutually contradicting commandments in a way that both lead to the same reward—not in relation to the same person at the same time, not in relation to several people at the same time, and not in relation to several people at different times.

4. 4. According to the Ananites and Karaites moral commandments are the standard for all the commandments (with regard to the impossibility of their abolition):

5. They also claimed: If it was possible for God to abolish his laws, it would be possible for him to abolish the prohibition against lying and permit it, and so also with regard to killing children, and so it would be possible for him to permit his being cursed and to forbid thanking him and praying to him. They said: Since according to our opponents these things cannot be abolished, it is impossible to abolish anything commanded by God. ¹⁸

6. The examples provided by the Ananites and Karaites—“prohibition against lying,” “killing children,” and the like—teach that, in their view, moral commandments are the standard for all the commandments: If moral commandments are eternal, so are all the commandments. ¹⁹ Whereas the Muʿtazilites distinguished between rational and revelatory (or auditory) commandments, ²⁰ the Ananites and Karaites who held the antiquity position implicitly rejected this distinction. In fact, the Ananites and Karaites turned the Muʿtazilite recognition of moral-rational obligations into an argument in support of the eternal validity of the Torah of Moses, and indirectly into an argument against the validity of Islam. According to them, just as “according to our opponents” (referring to Muslims who agree that there are moral, non-abolishable commandments—perhaps members of the Muʿtazilah), commandments like lying and murdering cannot possibly be relative and subject to change, so “our opponents” must concede that none of the commandments can change, and the abolition claim has therefore been refuted.

The Debate between Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām and Menasheh Ibn Șāliḥ

The antiquity position held by the Karaites and Ananites and the opposing accumulation position held by Qirqisānī (to be discussed below) parallel two positions found in a text describing a debate between the Muʿtazilite scholar Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. between 835 and 845) and a Jewish scholar named Menasheh (Yassā in another version of the debate) Ibn Șāliḥ. The text may have undergone Christian redaction, ²¹ and doubt may be cast on the historical reliability of some of its details and even on the authenticity of the personal debate between these two figures. However, as Haggai Ben-Shammai argued, the line of reasoning ascribed to al-Naẓẓām in this text may quite possibly reflect an early Muʿtazilite position. ²² Similarly, Menasheh’s position may reflect a Jewish response of those days to the Islamic abrogation claim.

In the debate, Menasheh argues that God decrees a law (بشريعة) only as it is wisdom (حكمة), and hence, al-Naẓẓām’s Muslim position (according to which God decreed a law and then after a while abrogated it) means that God in fact “prohibited an act of wisdom.” Namely, wisdom cannot change over time according to God’s arbitrary will. ²³

To this al-Naẓẓām replies: “Wisdom is of two kinds: (first), wisdom as such, non-contingent (حكمة بعينها, لا لعلّة), such as justice, faith honesty and charity [. . .] (second), wisdom which becomes such contingent upon its very decree (لعلّة الامر بها), such as ritual, prayer, and fasting.” ²⁴ According to al-Naẓẓām, the principle of abrogation applies only to the second kind of wisdom. Indeed, Menasheh holds that the law of Moses is of the first kind—it is “good as such (حسنة لاعيانها)” ²⁵ —and hence, according to al-Naẓẓām’s own stance, it cannot be abrogated. That is to say, at least with regard to the Torah of Moses and in the polemical context against the Muslim claim of abolition, Menasheh rejects al-Naẓẓām’s distinction between different types of commandments. To this, al-Naẓẓām replies that, if Moses’s law is good as such, human beings would know its goodness whether or not it had been revealed through a prophet (رسول), but the case is that not all of Moses’s laws would have been known without God’s revelation. ²⁶

The debate between the Jew and the Muslim continues, proceeding to theological issues related to the authority of the prophets and the temporal validity of God’s law. For our purposes it will suffice to notice that Menasheh’s position is similar in its principal characteristics to the Ananite-Karaite stance reviewed by Qirqisānī: As with the Ananite-Karaite stance, Menasheh’s position was also from the outset formulated as a counterargument to the Muslim abolition claim. It consistently claims that the commandments reflect wisdom and are eternal like it, rejects the Muʿtazilite distinction between rational and auditory commandments, ²⁷ and views the entire Torah of Moses as being eternal and based on “wisdom.” Thus, the Ananite-Karaite position reviewed by Qirqisānī complements Menasheh’s position: Menasheh claimed a parte post—the Torah, once having been given by Moses, became eternally valid for all future—thus rejecting the possibility of its being changed. The Ananites and Karaites claimed a parte ante—the Torah has existed eternally in the past—thus insisting on the antiquity of the commandments.

Correspondingly, and as will be demonstrated shortly, Qirqisānī’s position is a systematic development of the Muʿtazilite position of al-Naẓẓām. ²⁸ In his counterargument to the Jew, the Muslim scholar distinguishes between eternally valid commandments and commandments that may change. Qirqisānī adopts this distinction. But while the Muslim scholar uses this distinction in order to allow for the eternal morality held by his Jewish opponent, and at the same time to maintain the particular validity of Islam, Qirqisānī uses a similar distinction with regard to the past. According to him, the rational commandments are indeed ancient and were known to Adam—in this the Ananites and Karaites were right. But the revealed-auditory-particularistic commandments are relative and may change over time, according to changing circumstances—and in this regard one must adhere to the plain and clear meaning of the Scriptures.

The Accumulation Position

Qirqisānī describes two different versions of Karaite positions on the issue of the antiquity of the commandments and the possibility of their abolition, he himself identifying with the second one. According to the first version, the commandments accumulated gradually in an ongoing historical process that began with Adam, but, with the giving of the Torah through Moses, this process came to an end and the Torah became eternally fixed, without any possibility of adding to it. This view completely rejects the possibility of the abolition of the commandments (naskh) before the Torah of Moses and all the more so after it. The second version—which Qirqisānī supports—is much more complex, as it principally allows for the abolition of commandments, but only in a limited sense that ensures the eternity of the Torah of Moses.

Qirqisānī’s position can be explained on the basis of three principles: first, according to Qirqisānī, the Karaites, to whose position he subscribes, hold a position that is “similar to that [of the first group] with regard to their view that not all of the commandments are ancient,” ²⁹ and the disagreement between them concerns only the possibility of the abolition of the commandments. To my understanding, this means that these Karaites, like the Karaite group previously described by Qirqisānī, subscribe to the accumulation position. ³⁰ Indeed, in Qirqisānī’s view there is a theoretical possibility that God will add to the commandments even after the giving of the Torah of Moses. Hence, the prohibition against adding or deducting from the Torah applies to human beings only, and not to God. ³¹ As for God, deduction is inconceivable because the prophets have already promised that the Torah that has been given is eternal. However, addition entails no aspect of abolition. Just as commandments accumulated continuously before the giving of Torah at Sinai, so this process may in principle continue even after it.

Second, commandments that are not eternal but limited to a certain time can be abolished after the passing of this time. The senior status that was first granted to the firstborn and then passed on to the Levites is an example of such a commandment. ³² Such commandments are restricted a parte post; they are not part of the accumulative corpus that constitutes the Torah of Moses, and they may be abolished when their time passes. ³³ The principle that allows Qirqisānī to admit the possibility of the abolition of commandments should be understood in light of his refutation of Islam. ³⁴ According to him, the Muslim claim about the Bible is self-contradictory: how could Muhammad express his trust in the Bible, which claims to eternal validity, and at the same time argue that the Bible has been abolished? ³⁵ Namely, a commandment may be abolished only if it has not been “eternalized,” but rather has been defined as a temporal commandment from the outset. On the other hand, the commandments of Moses were explicitly defined as being eternal, hence God will never deduct from them, and the Muslim abolition claim must therefore be rejected.

Third, eternal commandments—the validity of which commences at a certain point in time, meaning that they are restricted a parte ante—cannot be abolished before the time of their application. According to Qirqisānī, the abolition of a commandment in such a case would not constitute “abolition” (naskh) but a “change of mind” (badāʾ)—which is inconceivable in connection with God. Badāʾ means a change in the circumstances that leads to a change in the divine imperative. Against the proponents of the possibility of a “change of mind,” Qirqisānī argues that the actions of God stem from wisdom and a complete understanding of all present and future circumstances. This being so, it is inconceivable that one of his actions should turn out to be a vain action not serving any purpose. ³⁶

Qirqisānī’s Critique of the Ananite-Karaite Position

Qirqisānī presents several hypothetical objections of his opponents who hold the antiquity position. One objection clarifies the meaning of the different circumstances in which God may change his commandment: How can God command the observance of one Sabbath and forbid the observance of another Sabbath similar in all its characteristics to the first? Qirqisānī answers that the very fact that these are two different Sabbaths allows for the difference between the commandments that apply to them.

The second objection attempts to examine a situation in which God’s command changes in connection to the very same circumstances: is it possible for God to command fasting on a particular day and then command eating on the very day on which he commanded fasting? Qirqisānī’s answer is negative, as this would constitute a case of badāʾ. However, a situation of two cases that are similar only in certain respects is possible: God commands fasting on a certain day of the month, e.g. the tenth of Tishrei, and allows eating on a similar date, e.g., the tenth of ḥeshvan. According to Qirqisānī’s argument, it is also possible for God to command a law that should be observed in 2024 and command a different law that should be applied in 2034 (this is the case of naskh). Such a case does not exemplify a “change of mind” but reflects the general flux of religious life. Thus, says Qirqisānī, the Torah commanded Aaron to enter the Holy of Holies but forbade this action to others. There is no “change of mind” here but a recognition of the fact that space is not uniform in relation to all human beings. In Qirqisānī’s view, religious life recognizes the distinction between times, places, and the rest of life’s numerous circumstances.

The thrust of Qirqisānī’s position is that religion creates distinctions in the world of the believer. It refers to the multiplicity, diversity, and changes in life, and it imposes different obligations on human beings according to the different circumstances in which they find themselves. ³⁷ According to the Muʿtazilite conception of justice reflected in the words of Qirqisānī, God knows what is proper for a person in every set of circumstances (all of which were considered from the beginning) and commands that person accordingly. While the Ananite-Karaite position espouses the universalization of the commandments, Qirqisānī emphasizes their particularization.

Qirqisānī delves further into theological issues, including the doctrine of the divine attributes. ³⁸ Qirqisānī employs one of the Muʿtazilite theories of divine attributes, a theory that can be traced back, in its general lines, to Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf and influenced Jewish and Muʿtazilite thinkers, contemporaries of Qirqisānī. ³⁹ According to this theory, God’s attributes do not express eternal divine realities. For example, God is “wise,” not because he possesses “wisdom,” and God is “able,” not because he possesses “ability.” Rather, God is wise and able because of his essence. From the Muʿtazilite perspective, a reality existing eternally alongside the divine essence impairs the unity of God, ⁴⁰ and hence the proponents of the antiquity position cannot possibly subscribe to the stance according to which an eternal wisdom exists alongside God. Moreover, Qirqisānī views the Torah as God’s speech, but the theory of eternal divine speech is identified by Qirqisānī as Christian, and Jews never admitted a Christian theology, he says. ⁴¹ We also have to bear in mind the fact that God’s speech was an issue that stood at the center of a deep theological and political controversy between the Muʿtazilah (who claimed the Qurʾān to be created), and the traditional Islamic scholars (who claimed the Qurʾān to be eternal). ⁴² It seems that, for Qirqisānī, the Ananites and Karaites would not want to be identified with the traditionalists but rather with the Muʿtazilah. And since, according to Qirqisānī’s position, the only alternative to the conception of essential divine attributes is the conception of divine attributes of action, he argues that the speech of God must necessarily be a divine action, which, like all other divine actions, varies according to changing circumstances.

In a nutshell: it is the tendency to glorify the Torah and grant it eternal existence as the word, or wisdom, of God that ultimately undermines his unity. ⁴³

Qirqisānī goes on to respond to the Ananite-Karaite position, which implies that all the commandments are rational in the sense that they are all eternal and universal and are not subject to change over time. Qirqisānī, in step with his principal position, does not view the entirety of the commandments as being rational. Some of them are revelatory-auditory, meaning that they are dependent on the circumstances, whether being particularistic (applying to a certain group of people) or even individualistic (applying to a certain person). Qirqisānī makes it clear that only revelatory-auditory commandments can be abolished. ⁴⁴

Biblical Prooftexts of the Antiquity Position

According to Qirqisānī’s presentation of the method of those who support the antiquity position, the fact that the Torah describes pre-Mosaic commandments constitutes sufficient proof for the fact that all the commandments of Moses’s law are ancient. Qirqisānī, of course, rejects this reasoning, as it involves a logical fallacy of inferring a general conclusion about all of the commandments from several instances. ⁴⁵ In Qirqisānī’s logic, the part does not testify about the whole, and necessity cannot be inferred from possibility, principles of inference with which he deals—examining as an example the argument of those who hold the antiquity position—elsewhere in his work. ⁴⁶

According to Qirqisānī, the proponents of the antiquity position cited three proofs: the first is the theory of (the proto-Karaite) Benjamin al-Nahāwandī, who claimed that the pre-Mosaic generations received 102 commandments. Benjamin deduced the commandments on the basis of homiletic readings of the Scriptures, dividing the generations in the following way: from Adam to Noah; from Noah to Abraham; from Abraham to Isaac; from Isaac to Jacob; and from Jacob to Moses. ⁴⁷ Benjamin seemingly adopts an accumulative understanding of the giving of the commandments—as also understood by Yoram Erder and David Sklare ⁴⁸ —an understanding that is principally close to Qirqisānī’s position. However, it should be noted that Qirqisānī himself opposed Benjamin’s theory and viewed it as an invalid kind of interpretation (as Qirqisānī states: “he [Benjamin] incorporated arguments that are based on invalid interpretation [التأويل] ⁴⁹ and distorted exegesis”). ⁵⁰ Moreover—and this is the heart of the matter—Qirqisānī does not claim that Benjamin himself sets forth an argument concerning the question of the antiquity of the commandments. The essence of Benjamin’s exegetical method is a broadening of the possibility of deducing laws from the biblical text—on the basis of pre-Sinaitic events described therein, stories and tales, logic, and even far-fetched interpretations. Neither does Qirqisānī claim that Benjamin’s method was used to support the Karaite accumulation position. On the contrary, he claims that it actually served the opposing position—the antiquity position, although only some of the commandments are mentioned explicitly in the verses dealing with the people who lived before the Sinai revelation. From here it may be inferred that Benjamin’s position, in itself, does not relate to the question of the antiquity or the accumulation of the commandments at all.

Beyond all this, a comparison between Benjamin’s position and the later Karaite positions shows that it is very difficult to determine what exactly Benjamin thought. It can be argued that, according to Benjamin, in each period commandments were accumulatively added but not deducted, and this is the difference between Benjamin’s stance and the third position described in the work of Tuvia ben Moshe, Oṣar Neḥmad, ⁵¹ according to which commandments were given in each period, but they obligated only the people living in it—they were not eternal. On the other hand, it seems that in Benjamin’s opinion the Torah of the patriarchs and the Torah of Moses were identical. This is reminiscent of the second approach described in the commentary of Yefet Ben ʿEli on Gen 2:17, ⁵² according to which Adam knew all the commandments but was obligated to observe only some of them. The Ananites and Karaites who, according to Qirqisānī, relied on Benjamin probably understood that in his opinion the patriarchs observed the entire Torah of Moses, even though Scripture mentions only some of the commandments given to them. It is puzzling that several opposing positions can be attributed to Benjamin at one and the same time: 1) the commandments were revealed in an accumulative process; 2) the Torah of Moses is an ancient Torah, partly observed by the patriarchs; 3) the first generations observed all the commandments. Thus, it seems that the genuine position of Benjamin does not touch on the issue of the antiquity or accumulation of the commandments.

From Qirqisānī’s comments on Benjamin’s list of commandments, it becomes clear that he understood the latter to set forth a kind of “historical” argument: the pre-Mosaic biblical characters observed some commandments. At the same time, it also seems that in Qirqisānī’s view the main importance of Benjamin’s list of 102 commandments was legal—it constituted a kind of halakic midrash. With regard to some of the commandments in Benjamin’s list, Qirqisānī remarks that they were deduced from dual sources (i.e., Benjamin learned the same commandment from several different verses). These remarks should be understood to be of a critical tone, meaning that, considering the legal (and not just historical) status of the list, it is meaningless to deduce the same commandment from several sources. ⁵³

Qirqisānī rejects the Ananite-Karaite reliance on Benjamin’s list, arguing that even if some commandments preceded Moses, this does not necessarily mean that the entire Torah of Moses is ancient. The most that can be learned from the words of Benjamin is that the entire Torah of Moses might, perhaps, be ancient. However, even this possibility is rejected by Qirqisānī, insofar as in his opinion there are biblical verses that prove the exact opposite—that not all the commandments are ancient.

Another proof Qirqisānī mentions as put forward by the proponents of the antiquity position touches upon Gen 26:5: “Because Abraham listened to My voice and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws.” ⁵⁴ The proponents claimed that the reference to commandments, statutes, and laws is analogous to what is written regarding Ezra: “And commandments, and statutes, and laws did You command them by the hand of Moses, Your servant” (Neh 9:14), referring to the entire Torah of Moses. Qirqisānī’s response is consistent with his rejection of the reliance on Benjamin’s method: “We do not reject the possibility that God, may he be exalted and glorified, gave Abraham many commandments, but this does not necessarily include the entire Torah of Moses.” ⁵⁵

A third proof brought by the proponents of the antiquity position that Qirqisānī discusses is the verse relating to Abraham: “. . . and they will observe the way of God” (Gen 18:19). They claim that this verse should be understood in light of Jer 5:5, in which “the way of God” refers to the entirety of God’s commandments. Qirqisānī’s response is consistent with his principal stance: “ ‘The way of God’ refers to whatever God commanded him, in accordance with the circumstances of that generation and the one who was commanded,” ⁵⁶ and not necessarily all the commandments of the Torah of Moses.

Biblical Prooftexts of Qirqisānī’s Position

Qirqisānī argues that Scripture itself proves that the commands of God and the religious norms of previous generations differed from the ones found in the Torah of Moses. These are his proofs: ⁵⁷ 1) the sons of Adam must necessarily have married their sisters, seeing that only Adam, Eve, and their offspring lived then. 2) God commanded Abraham to become circumcised at the age of 99 (contrary to the Torah of Moses, which prescribes circumcision at the age of eight days). 3) Jacob married two sisters. 4) Amram, the father of Moses, married his own aunt (Exod 6:20), a marital relationship that would later be prohibited through Moses during Amram’s lifetime. 5) The observance of commandments commemorating the exodus from Egypt, such as the Passover offering and dwelling in a Tabernacle (sukkah), cannot have preceded the exodus. 6) According to “most of our comrades,” ⁵⁸ the commandment of the Sabbath was given in the desert, in the story about the manna, not before that. ⁵⁹ 7) There are four commandments concerning which Moses himself states that he does not know what the law is. Thus, these commandments cannot be ancient: the law of one who curses the name of God (Lev 24:12); the law of the man who gathered wood on the Sabbath day (Num 15:32); the law of the one who has become unclean because of a dead body (Num 9:8); and the law of the daughters of Zelophehad (Num 27:5). 8) According to Qirqisānī, the replacement of the firstborn for the Levites (Num 8:18) is “undoubtedly an abolition (نسخ).” ⁶⁰ This proves that the possibility of abolition existed before the giving of the Torah through Moses (regarding the time-limited commandments).

The Antiquity of the Commandments in Its Broad Context: Summary and Conclusions

Detailed discussions on the antiquity of the commandments, including references to diverse Karaite and proto-Karaite groups, can be found in the commentary of Yefet ben ʿEli on Gen 2:17 ⁶¹ and 26:5; ⁶² in his son’s writings—Levi ben Yefet; in Oṣar Neḥmad of the eleventh-century Karaite scholar Tuvia ben Moshe; and in a few anonymous Karaite fragments. ⁶³ The various approaches to this question are all different shades of the two principal positions discussed by Qirqisānī—the antiquity position and the accumulation position, each one of them entailing different interpretive and polemical implications. ⁶⁴ Also, the Rabbanite scholars expressed their opinions on this issue, and they too did not speak with one voice. ⁶⁵

It seems that the earliest Karaite source from which one can learn about the discussion on the antiquity of the commandments is the composition of Daniel al-Qūmisī (if indeed the attribution to al-Qūmisī is reliable). ⁶⁶ That al-Qūmisī opposed the stance that all the commandments are ancient is evidence that this issue was discussed already in his generation, and perhaps even earlier, in the middle of the ninth century (perhaps by the followers of Anan, as can be inferred from the fact that Qirqisānī attributes the antiquity position to the Ananaites; or by another proto-Karaite group before, or at the time of, Daniel). However, it is difficult to know exactly what Daniel’s position was on the subject, and even more difficult to know the details of the stance he opposed.

The first known systematic and developed account that has reached us on the question of the antiquity of the commandments is Qirqisānī’s, although Saʿadya Gaʾon was also aware of the importance of the issue. ⁶⁷

It is possible that the words of al-Qūmisī were directed toward a version of the antiquity position. As has been shown, the antiquity position of the Ananites and Karaites, as discussed by Qirqisānī, is a development of an earlier Jewish stance that was formulated by Menasheh (or Yassā) Ibn Șāliḥ, or other Jews, in the days of the early Muʿtazilah (al-Naẓẓām died toward the end of the first half of the ninth century). According to this stance, all the commandments are expressions of the divine wisdom. The meaning of the Ananite-Karaite position is that just as the commandments are eternally valid in the future, so they have existed eternally in the past. Hence, it is quite possible that Ananites, or scholars belonging to another proto-Karaite group, developed the antiquity position in the middle, or toward the end, of the ninth century—during the active years of al-Qūmisī. Accordingly, it is quite possible that Ananites and Karaites presented this position in anti-Muslim debates during Qirqisānī’s time.

The position Qirqisānī advocated focuses on the unique, non-universal aspects of the commandments—the relation of the law to the diverse and ever-changing circumstances of life. Qirqisānī’s exegetical integrity does not allow him to base himself on the Ananite-Karaite antiquity position in order to refute the Muslim abolition claim. He bases his position on the distinction between rational and auditory commandments, according to which the rational commandments are eternal, while the auditory commandments may be abolished or changed under certain conditions.

Yoram Erder, who devoted extensive and profound research on the subject of the antiquity of the commandments in Karaite thought, argued that the Karaite positions—both the antiquity position and the accumulation position—rely on ancient sectarian sources, especially the Damascus Covenant and the Book of Jubilees. ⁶⁸ However, both positions can be found in rabbinic literature, and it is not necessary to view the Karaite positions as drawing on sources that are “external” to the midrash and the Talmud. In my opinion, the Ananite-Karaite position can also be viewed as a development of the talmudic-midrashic position: both the talmudic sages and the Ananites and Karaites believed that the commandments preceded the Sinaitic revelation. However, for the most part, the rabbis did not see any reason to extend the antiquity of the commandments beyond the scope of Jewish identity as established by biblical tradition. In their view, the patriarchs kept the Torah, but there was no reason to claim the antiquity of the Torah beyond that. To them, Adam and the descendants of Noah do not belong to the identity circle of the sons of Abraham; hence, the question whether they observed the commandments has no religious significance. The Ananites and the Karaites expanded this midrashic view on the basis of the principal position, already expressed by Jews before them, that the commandments of the Torah are identical with the eternal wisdom of God. They argued that there is no place to “begin” the Torah in historical time, because just as the commandments are eternally valid for all future, so they have been in force eternally in the past. It was their quest for theological consistency and logical soundness that led the Ananites and the Karaites to claim that the commandments were observed already by Adam.

However, it is most conceivable that both the Ananite-Karaite antiquity position and the accumulation position supported by Qirqisānī are based on a variety of ancient—sectarian and midrashic-talmudic—sources that express similar positions. The proponents of the Karaite approaches may have adopted the ancient positions and developed them in a systematic-theological way, in the context of the anti-Muslim debate in which they took part.

Appendix: The List of the Commandments that Preceded the Torah of Moses, according to Benjamin al-Nahāwandī

In this appendix I will briefly summarize the words of Benjamin cited by Qirqisānī, as they are of interest for understanding the early sectarian methods of interpretation, as well as the way in which the proponents of the antiquity position established their argumentation. The appendix is not meant to exhaust the study of Benjamin’s list in terms of its method and sources, as that topic deserves a separate study.

From Qirqisānī’s list it is evident that he was aware of Benjamin’s general calculation of the ancient commandments—102 in all—but not of its full details. For example, the number of commandments given between the period of Abraham and the period of Isaac is supposed to be 35, but Qirqisānī lists only 18. Also, the list of commandments given between the period of Jacob and the period of Moses is lacking—13 commandments instead of 29. Furthermore, the list from Noah to Abraham seems deficient (see paragraph 28 below). It also seems that at least one of the following lists—from Adam to Noah or from Isaac to Jacob—is deficient.

These are the commandments that, according to Benjamin, preceded the giving of the Torah on Sinai:

1. 1. “Marrying and uniting with a woman.” The commandment is learned from the verse: “And be united to his wife, and they will become one flesh” (Gen 2:24). Qirqisānī mentions a group that interpreted this verse by way of taʾwīl and deduced four prohibitions (prohibitions a–d below) from it. From what is stated below (see paragraph 41), it turns out that these deductions also reflect the position of Benjamin.

2. 2. a. The prohibition against sexual relations with one’s mother.

3. 3. b. The prohibition against sexual relations with the wife of one’s father (these two prohibitions are learned from the verse: “For this reason a man will leave his father [meaning the wife of his father] and mother [in the same way that he unites with his wife, he is to separate from his mother]”—Gen 2:24).

4. 4. c. The prohibition against sodomy (اللِوَاط —usually homosexual intercourse, but here it might refer to anal sex with a woman—see below).

5. 5. d. The prohibition against celibacy (“and they will become one flesh”—Gen 2:24. Qirqisānī explains that “the man has not truly united with the woman and become one body, until they perform intercourse in the source (מקור).” ⁶⁹ This explanation might refer not only to prohibition number 4 but also to number 3, wherefore اللِوَاط in prohibition 3 means anal sex with a woman, while prohibition 4 refers to ejaculating sperm outside the source, through organs or otherwise. However, according to Benjamin, the prohibition against having anal sex with a woman is learned from another verse; see paragraph 62 and also paragraph 14 below. ⁷⁰

6. 6. Qirqisānī notes that according to some—perhaps the abovementioned group, or the proponents of the antiquity position, and perhaps also Benjamin—“be fruitful and multiply” (Gen 1:28) is a commandment. Qirqisānī rejects this stance by arguing that if this was the case, the fish also would be commanded to get offspring (see Gen 1:22)—which is absurd. According to Qirqisānī, this is a blessing and not a commandment.

7. 7. Women must obey men. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Your desire will be for your husband” (Gen 3:16).

8. 8. The prohibition against heeding the woman regarding forbidden acts. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Because you have listened to the voice of your wife” (Gen 3:17). Qirqisānī does not reject these last two interpretations but argues that they are only possible.

9. 9. Qirqisānī mentions the prohibition against eating from the tree of knowledge (Gen 2:17) as an evident prohibition, and it seems that he is presenting Benjamin’s opinion. Qirqisānī notes that this prohibition was limited in time and space.

10. 10. To bring sacrifices from the firstborn and the best portions of sheep and goats. The commandment is learned from the verse: “While Abel brought the best portions of the firstborn of his flock” (Gen 4:4).

11. 11. To wear garments. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Garments of skin and clothed them” (Gen 3:21). Qirqisānī rejects this inference with the words: “This is nonsense.” ⁷¹

12. 12. The obligation to pray. The commandment is learned from the verse: “At that time men began to call upon the name of God” (Gen 4:26). According to Qirqisānī, if this interpretation of Benjamin was right (he thinks it is not, as it is based on a broadening of the taʾwīl method), the obligation to pray began with Enosh the son of Seth and not before that. ⁷²

13. 13. To walk in the path of obedience to God. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Enoch walked with God” (Gen 5:22). Qirqisānī here argues that this obligation is necessitated by reason (يُعلَم ضرورةً) ⁷³ and in no need of a specific command.

14. 14. The prohibition against “spilling sperm (إلقاء البذر) on the ground.” ⁷⁴ The prohibition is learned from the verse: “For all living creatures on the earth had corrupted their ways” (Gen 6:12). Also, here, Qirqisānī argues that Benjamin’s interpretation constitutes taʾwīl, and that this is not a specific command, since “every act of rebellion is a corruption of one’s way.” ⁷⁵

15. 15. The prohibition against murder. The prohibition is learned from the story about Cain and Abel. Qirqisānī of course agrees that one is forbidden to murder, but he claims that this prohibition is learned “from reason” (من الفِطَن), or “from an auditory commandment” (من الأمر سماعًا). ⁷⁶

16. 16. Admitting guilt. The commandment is learned from the verse: “My guilt is greater than I can bear” (Gen 4:13).

17. These were the commandments that, according to Benjamin, were given between Adam and Noah. Following is a list of 14 commandments that were given between Noah and Abraham.

18. 17. Bringing sacrifices from the ritually clean animals. The commandment is learned from the verse: “And he took from every kind of clean animal” (Gen 8:20).

19. 18. Separating the clean from the unclean before entering the ark. On this, Qirqisānī comments that even though this separation is mentioned only in the story about Noah, it may possibly be an ancient command that was in force already at the time of Adam.

20. 19. The permission to eat clean creeping animals. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Every creeping animal that is חי (lit., lives) will be food for you” (Gen 9:3), חי explained as meaning “ritually clean.” ⁷⁷

21. 20. The prohibition against eating the limb of a living animal. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “You must not eat meat with its lifeblood still in it” (Gen 9:4).

22. 21. The prohibition against eating blood. It is learned from the same verse.

23. 22. The prohibition against eating an animal that has been torn by a beast. The prohibition is also learned from that same verse. Qirqisānī agrees with Benjamin’s opinion on the commandments that are learned from Gen. 9:4 (20, 21, 22).

24. 23. The obligation to build an altar to God. Qirqisānī agrees, without mentioning the source for this obligation, which must be the verse: “Then Noah built an altar to God” (Gen 8:20).

25. 24. The prohibition against becoming drunk. Qirqisānī does not mention the source, which must be the verse: “When he drank some of its wine, he became drunk” (Gen 9:21).

26. 25. The prohibition against becoming haughty in times of tranquility and welfare. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “Sodom [your sister] ⁷⁸ arrogant and overfed” (Ezek 16:49).

27. 26. The obligation to help the weak.

28. 27. Strengthening the hands of the weak.

29. 28. Condemning oppression. These previous three obligations are learned from the verse: “She did not strengthen the hand of the poor and needy” (Ezek 16:49). ⁷⁹

30. 29. The prohibition against seeing the nakedness of one’s father. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “Cursed be Canaan” (Gen 9:25).

31. 30. The prohibition against oppression. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “The earth is full of violence” (Gen 6:13).

32. These were the commandments that were given from Noah to Abraham. Following is a list of 35 commandments given in the period between Abraham and Isaac.

33. 31. The prohibition against living in the land of “the rebellious people” (أرض العُصاة). ⁸⁰ Qirqisānī mentions this and the following commandment together, noting as a source only the verse in Gen 24:3 (see 32 below). However, these seem to be two separate commandments, and the source of the present commandment seems to be Gen 24:6: “Beware not to take my son back there.”

34. 32. The prohibition against marrying “the rebellious people.” The prohibition is learned from the verse: “Do not take a wife for my son from the daughters of Canaan” (Gen 24:3).

35. 33. Circumcision. Qirqisānī does not note the source of this commandment, which clearly seems to be the Scriptures recounting the circumcision of Abraham (Gen 17:10–14, 23–27).

36. 34. The prohibition against marrying the uncircumcised. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “To give our sister to an uncircumcised man” (Gen 34:14) ⁸¹ .

37. 35. Building a place of prayer: “And he called thereon the name of God” (Gen 12:8).

38. 36. The slaves’ obligation to obey their masters: “Return to your mistress and submit to her authority” (Gen 16:9).

39. 37. Slaves are forbidden to despise their masters. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “And she despised her mistress” (Gen 16:4).

40. 38. To stand before the Creator in the morning. The commandment is learned from the verse: “Abraham got up early in the morning” (Gen 19:27). Qirqisānī comments that this is a taʾwīl interpretation, and he seems to disagree with it.

41. 39. Giving tithe to the priest: “And he gave him a tenth of everything” (Gen 14:20), “and he was a priest to God Most High” (Gen 18).

42. 40. The prohibition against sexual relations with another man’s wife. It is learned from the verse: “For she is a married woman” (Gen 20:3).

43. 41. The prohibition against sexual relations with one’s daughter, “from the story about Lot,” ⁸² related in Gen 19:32–35.

44. 42. The prohibition against having sexual relations with one’s mother—as can be inferred from the story about Lot and his daughters. That is to say, the prohibition regarding a daughter is understood broadly as relating to parent-child relations, wherefore it includes mother-son relations too. Qirqisānī notes that this prohibition is learned already from Gen 2:24 (paragraph 1 above), but there it is deduced by way of (erroneous) taʾwīl and here through a true interpretation (شرح), ⁸³ and it is clear from his words that the prohibitions learned from Gen 2:24 reflect Benjamin’s opinion. ⁸⁴

45. 43. To enforce righteousness and justice: “For I have chosen him, that he may command his children . . . to do righteousness and justice” (Gen 18:19), and also: “Walk before me and be blameless” (Gen 17:1). Qirqisānī rejects this interpretation, arguing that no obligation whatsoever can be learned from this verse, which, in his opinion, relates to circumcision. ⁸⁵

46. 44. An oath must be taken in the name of God. The commandment is learned from the verse: “I will swear” (Gen 21:24).

47. 45. Making slaves take an oath. Qirqisānī does not explain what is meant, but it seems that the intention is that the oath of the slave must also be in the name of God. The source of this law seems to be Gen 24:3: “And I will have you swear by the Lord, the God of heaven and the God of earth.”

48. 46. The obligation to bury the dead: “So that I can bury my dead” (Gen 23:4).

49. 47. Eulogizing and weeping for the dead, from the verse: “To eulogize Sarah and to weep for her” (Gen 23:2). Qirqisānī comments that it is possible that this is not really a commandment but something that is inherent in human nature: the grief over the loss of the loved ones.

50. 48. Giving gifts to one’s children, from the verse: “Abraham gave gifts to the sons of his concubines” (Gen 25:6).

51. Henceforth, the commandments between Isaac and Jacob (Qirqisānī does not state their number:

52. 49. Benjamin counts the verse “and Isaac went out לשוח in the field” (Gen 24:63) as a commandment, but according to Qirqisānī, he does not explain its nature. Qirqisānī presents four different opinions as to the meaning of the expression לשוח. Some say, prayer; “If so,” he remarks, “prayer has already been mentioned” ⁸⁶ —see above, paragraph 12. Some say, cleaning himself following seminal emission; while others say, strolling; and still others say, gathering wormwood.

53. The 29 commandments between Jacob and Moses are as follows:

54. 50. To fulfill vows: “Then Jacob made a vow” (Gen 28:20).

55. 51. The prohibition against cheating: “But your father cheated me” (Gen 31:6).

56. 52. The prohibition against swindling friends and breaching promises: ⁸⁷ “Why have you deceived me” (Gen 29:25).

57. 53. Determining the time of menstrual impurity: “For I am having my period” (Gen 31:35).

58. 54. The prohibition against touching a vessel used for idol worship and to purify oneself in them: “Get rid of the foreign gods” (Gen 35:2).

59. 55. Granting a dowry in connection with marriage: “Demand a high dowry and an expensive gift” (Gen 34:12).

60. 56. The levirate marriage. Qirqisānī does not note the source of this commandment, which seems to be the story about Judah and Tamar (Gen 38:26).

61. 57. The prohibition against murder, from the verse: “And they plotted to kill him” (Gen 37:18). Qirqisānī comments that this has already been learned from the story about Cain and Abel—see paragraph 15 above.

62. 58. The prohibition against sexual relations with the wife of one’s father, from the verse: “And he slept with Bilhah” (Gen 35:22). Qirqisānī comments that this is a true interpretation (شرح), unlike the commandment deduced earlier on by way of (erroneous) taʾwīl, ⁸⁸ on the basis of Gen 2:24—see paragraph 3 above.

63. 59. Burning the adulteress: “Bring her out and let her be burned” (Gen 38:24).

64. 60. The double inheritance of the firstborn: “Sell me now your birthright” (Gen 25:31).

65. 61. The prohibition against eating the thigh tendon. Qirqisānī does not note the source of this commandment, which obviously is learned from Gen 32:33.

66. 62. The prohibition against anal sex with a woman. The prohibition is learned from the verse: “Whenever he would sleep with his brother’s wife, he would spill his seed on the ground” (Gen 38:9).