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The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2009

George Klosko
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Extract

In a well-known article appearing in 1967, E. L. Harrison examines Plato's manipulation of Thrasymachos in the first book of the Republic. Harrison looks into certain peculiarities in the argument between Thrasymachos and Socrates and explores motives that may have led Plato to have Thrasymachos develop his doctrine in this particular fashion. Though Harrison's conclusions are widely discussed and frequently accepted, it strikes me as interesting that little scholarly attention has been focussed on equally striking features of the debate between Socrates and Callicles in the Gorgias. For I believe it can be shown that Plato's presentation of Callicles contains numerous peculiarities of its own, that the powerful, vigorously argued doctrine of immoralism enunciated by Callicles in a celebrated portion of the dialogue is actually infected with glaring weaknesses. I do not believe that these weaknesses have been satisfactorily accounted for, nor has the possibility been explored that Plato could have put them there intentionally. The purpose of this paper, then, is threefold: (a) to examine the nature of these flaws in Callicles' position; (b) to demonstrate their apparently odd and gratuitous character; and (c) to explore possible reasons Plato may have had for incorporating them into his presentation of Callicles in the Gorgias.

Type
Research Article
Information
Greece & Rome , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , October 1984 , pp. 126 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1984

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References

Notes

1. ‘Plato's Manipulation of Thrasymachus’, Phoenix 21 (1967)Google Scholar; similarly, Maguire, J. P., ‘Thrasymachus… or Plato?’, Phronesis 16 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. See, e.g., Maguire, 142 n. 3; cf. Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1962–1981), III. p. 96Google Scholar.

3. See below n. 20.

4. See the Appendix in Dodds, E. R., Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1959): ‘Socrates, Callicles, and Nietzsche’Google Scholar.

5. E.g., beltion, ameinōn, ischuroteron, kreittōn; for a brief explication of these, see Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 284–85Google Scholar.

6. Esp. 489c4–7; Santas, G.Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues (London, 1979), pp. 261–66Google Scholar is especially good on the argument in 488b–491a.

7. See Irwin, T., Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), pp. 197–200Google Scholar, for as precise an account of Callicles' hedonism as can be given.

8. They are carefully analysed by Irwin, (Gorgias, pp. 201–4)Google Scholar and Santas, (Socrates, pp. 266–86)Google Scholar and shown to be fallacious by both.

9. In constructing (C.4), I combine two propositions, that pleasure comes from the satisfaction of desires, and that the strong man should satisfy all his desires; both are found in 494c.

10. See Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 21–22Google Scholar; Guthrie, , History, IV. p. 214Google Scholar; both of these contain numerous further references; cf. Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work, 6th ed. (Cleveland, 1956), p. 235Google Scholar; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (1935; rpt. Boston, 1958), p. xii.

11. See Protagoras 353c–355a; on this, see Taylor, C. C. W., Plato: Protagoras (Oxford, 1976), pp. 174–79Google Scholar; cf. Irwin, , Gorgias, pp. 196–99Google Scholar.

12. J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. IV.

13. Irwin, , Gorgias, pp. 192–93Google Scholar; see also pp. 196–97; and see below n. 20.

14. Similarly in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives the desire for more of the goods men covet – ‘those they pray for and pursue’ (1129b4) – as the motive for injustice. These goods are such things as Honour, money, and security (1130a32-b5). Cf. the aspirations seen in Polus' remarks at Grg. 466c; and in those of Thrasymachos at Rep. 344b–c.

15. See, e.g., Jaeger, W., Paideia (Oxford, 1939–1945), I. p. 324Google Scholar; Skemp, J., Plato's Statesman (London, 1952), p. 29Google Scholar.

16. In 46b4 Burnet changes the generally accepted reading, ou motion nun, to ou nun proton; see his note, Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito (Oxford, 1924)Google Scholar, ad loc. Cf., e.g., Adam, J., Platonis Crito, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1891), text and ad locGoogle Scholar.

17. Cf. Callicles' remarks at 483a–b.

18. On the elenchos, see Robinson, R., Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953), Ch. IIGoogle Scholar.

19. A number of examples of princes brought down by their passions are collected by Aristotle in the Politics, Bk. 5, Ch. 8; see 1311b40–1312al4; 1312bl7–25; cf. 1314b28–36.

20. See, e.g., Jaeger, , Paideia, II. pp. 140–41Google Scholar; Friedlander, P., Plato (Princeton, 1958–1969), II. p. 262Google Scholar; Barker, E., Greek Political Theory, p. 161Google Scholar. Dodds, (Gorgias, p. 291)Google Scholar sees the immoralism and view on temperance as linked by opposition to conventional morality. Attempts to demonstrate the connection are made by Santas, (Socrates, pp.256–57,266)Google Scholar and Irwin, (Gorgias, pp. 192–93,196–97)Google Scholar (see above, p. 132). The difficulty of proving this is seen in the weakness of Irwin's arguments. Of commentators I have consulted, only Gomperz, T., (The Greek Thinkers (London, 1901—1912)Google Scholar seems fully aware of the arbitrary connections in Callicles' position; see I. pp. 405–7; II. pp. 335, 351–52. Had Gomperz consolidated these findings, he would have come close to the argument of this paper. The arbitrariness is noted in passing by, e.g., Grube, (Plato's Thought, p. 56 n.l)Google Scholar and Taylor, (Plato, p. 116)Google Scholar. H. Raeder notes the suddenness of the shift between immoralism and temperance, though without noting any difficulties in Callicles’ doctrine (Platons philosophische Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1905), p. 119)Google Scholar.

21. On these see Dodds, , Gorgias, pp. 1–4Google Scholar.

22. As Shorey, P. says, one of Plato's fundamental ethical doctrines is the ‘negativity of sensual pleasure’ (What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p. 145)Google Scholar.

23. There is good evidence that, by the time he wrote the Gorgias, Plato had developed the moral psychology of the middle dialogues. For the moral psychology of the early dialogues, of 'Socrates', see Klosko, G., ‘On the Analysis of Protagoras 351B–360E’, Phoenix 34 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For non-Socratic elements in the Gorgias,see Irwin, , Gorgias, on 491Google Scholar d4, 493a, 499e–500a, 505b–c, 507a–b. It is argued by many scholars that the psychological views presented in the Gorgias are intended as a direct criticism of the views presented in earlier works; see, e.g., Pohlenz, M., Aus Platos Werdezeit (Berlin, 1913), pp. 156–57Google Scholar.