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Further Thoughts on Trireme Tactics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2009

A. J. Holladay
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Extract

In Greece & Rome 37 (1987), 169–185, J. F. Lazenby and Ian Whiteheadhave made a most helpful contribution on the problems of advanced manoeuvres by ancient triremes — the diekplous and the periplous. They are surely right to reject the view that these manoeuvres involved a whole fleet moving in line ahead formation at the time of battle, even in the milder version which postulates several squadrons abreast – each in line ahead. Given the nature of the triremes' main instrument of aggression – the ram – such formations could not achieve what Nelson's breakthrough at Trafalgar did – with benefit of cannons: nor was encirclement the aim of the periplous, as Whitehead has well demonstrated.

Type
Research Article
Information
Greece & Rome , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , October 1988 , pp. 149 - 151
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1988

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References

Notes

1. A close approach in line-ahead formation towards an enemy would give the attacking fleet an absolutely minimum chance to use its rams but a maximum exposure of its flanks if the enemy closed in his ships from both sides. In contrast, an approach in line-ahead round an enemy flank would be less dangerous, especially if conducted by line-ahead squadrons abreast of each other, since here the inner squadron would protect the outer squadrons and the time of passing the enemy flank would be much reduced. Such a flanking movement would be needed to replace the normal method of attack if the enemy had closed up his line very tightly or blocked the gaps in it by a second line suitably arranged against the diekplous or periplous. A flanking movement by a whole fleet would also be called a periplous, but it was on a large, or strategic, scale not a small or tactical one. At Syracuse the narrowness of the harbour prevented its use by the Athenians, whilst the arrangement of Syracusan ships prevented penetration of their line. Even when such a large-scale periplous was possible the issue still remained to settle, since the defending ships, or at least those on the farther flank, would have had time to reposition themselves and not succumb easily to attack from the rear, although any need for manoeuvre in face of the enemy was likely to cause confusion among weaker crews, so they could hardly have hoped to form a strong line again.

But in the end each encounter had to be decided by any one of at least four possibilities— diekplous, periplous, a direct head-on ram, or an indecisive collision with a subsequent struggle between grappling ships.

2. The Athenian fleet in its heyday would always have gone into battle prepared to use these manoeuvres: but when the Spartans finally had, at Arginusae, a fleet capable of so doing, it is no surprise to learn that they needed to prepare themselves specifically for it (Xen., Hell. 1.6.31)Google Scholar.

3. I realize, of course, that the cost of building triremes today is so high that it is unlikely that a second one will be built to enable experiments in ramming techniques to be carried out in practice.