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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 September 2009
It may be argued that some inconsistencies in Thucydides are due to impartiality, to the prevalence of straight reportage based on available evidence, whereas narrative guided and coloured by opinions and judgements would more probably be consistent. The present writer, however, is more impressed by the view that many inconsistencies are due to imperfect integration into continuous narrative of different or even opposing attitudes.
2. Compare 3.37.2 with 2.63.2; 3.38.1 with 1.140.1, 2.61.2; 3.40.4 with 2.63.2–3. Despite the impression given by de Romilly, pp. 163ff., it seems likely that in Thucydides' view imitation is the proper explanation of at least the linguistic resemblances between Cleon and Pericles; cf. p. 27 below, and see now Cairns, F., JHS 102 (1982), 203ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3. 39.1, 39.6.
4. 1.87–8, 118–19, 125–6.1, 139.
5. Westlake, p. 122.
6. Westlake, ch. 3. At 2.63.3 Pericles, while accusing his opponents of cowardice, offers a greater fear as a reason for continuing the war. At 61.3, in an apparent reference to the Plague, he explains popular rebellion by demoralization due to the unexpected - but the unexpectedness of the Plague affected the Athenian people only indirectly; it was the virulence, not the unexpectedness, of the Plague, from which the Athenians suffered; if anyone should have been demoralized by the unexpected, it was Pericles.
7. Cf. de Romilly, pp. 112ff.
8. Especially as there is little sign in Thucydides of Cleon's ‘buffoonery’.
9. Cf. perhaps the treatment of Pericles in 2.59.3.
10. Westlake, p. 71.
11. Pp. 3, 5, passim; not, as Gomme, p. 113 implies on Nicias in 4.28.1, that we are to perceive judgements of behaviour from which our attention is, if anything, distracted. Nicias fails here as miserably as in 6.23ff. to manipulate the meeting in his favour, but Thucydides (4.28.2) regards his tactics as daring;surely Nicias was at least as astonished as Cleon at the result of his ploy – Thucydides is selective if not worse in ascribing astonishment to Cleon alone.
12. Finlay, J. H., Thucydides (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), pp. 190–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13. To which 4.9.1 ἔτυχον παραγɛνΌμɛνοι is a low-key contribution, even though not synonymous (Gomme, , Commentary, 3 p. 445Google Scholar, Stahl, ad loc.) with τύχτ φαρɛγένουτο.
14. Cf. de Romilly, pp. 173ff.; but my solution differs from de Romilly, p. 177.
15. His failure to do so may contribute to any impression of fairmindedness towards Cleon (cf. Adcock, F. E., Thucydides and his History (Cambridge, 1963), p. 48)Google Scholar.
16. The scrub-fire however is another element of chance.
17. τῸν δὲ ΔημοσӨένη merely repeats 29.1 φροσɛλῸμɛοσ δημοσӨένη. Then οΊ γὰρ στρατιωται seems incoherent, and καì αὐτω lacking in emphasis. I accept from Westlake, p. 106 the idea that much of the Pylos narrative is derived from Demosthenes' own reports; here it seems that such a report has been carelessly edited into the narrative; see however p. 33 below.
18. This may be the original sense of Cleon's accusation of lying at 4.27.3: the implication that victory is impossible merely conceals incompetence; if success by blockade is impossible, it is time for more energetic action.
19. E.g. Woodhead, A. G., Mnemosyne 13 (1960), 289ff., esp. p. 299CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20. Pp. 60ff., esp. p. 71.
21. Pp. 114ff.
22. The difficulties in interpreting the Mytilene Debate (e.g. de Romilly, pp. 156ff., Andrewes, A., Phoenix 16 (1962), 64ff., Westlake, pp. 62ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar) suggest careful ambiguity, if not impartiality.
23. Priority of slant over fact seems carelessly allowed to produce obscurity.
24. Dover, K. J., Thucydides (Greece &• Rome New Surveys in the Classics No. 7), p. 37Google Scholar.
25. Pp. 122, 130–31, 136ff.
26. The change of attitude could be due to the emergence of the bold and enterprising Brasidas as leader; but in this assembly scene his sympathies have veered towards a Sparta still characterized by the opposite. A degree of Spartan incompetence in putting men on Sphacteria is briefly implied and excused by the Spartan in 18.2, but otherwise ignored by Thucydides amid the obscurity of 8.6–8.
27. Why are we not told that an assembly was held (as in 1.139.3, 2.59.3) and the purpose of it? What was Nicias about to do had he not lost his post to Cleon?
28. 2.60.1 with 59.3: 60.4 with 65.4; 60.5 with 65.8; cf. de Romilly, p. 112, and positive statements of criticism of Cleon, which Westlake (pp. 60ff.) accepts as evidence of bias.
29. Constancy at 2.13.2, 13.9, 55.2, 61.2 (contrast the assembly 59.1); restraint at 1.144.1, 2.13.2, 22.1, 55.2, 65.7.
30. A divergence here from Westlake, pp. 25ff. It is difficult to believe that the conjunction of statements, silences, and compositional devices is accidental.
31. 1.145, 2.14.
32. 59.1 ἠλλοίωντο; 61.2 μɛταβάλλɛτɛ.
33. Cf. de Romilly, p. 112.
34. 3.39.6, 40.4.
35. Pericles is regarded as an intellectual master, but he is excused rational argument when dealing with a recalcitrant demos; indeed so much is implied at 2.65.8–9.
36. See in particular Adkins, A. W. H., Merit and Responsibility: a Study in Greek Values (Oxford, 1960)Google Scholar.
37. See Solmsen, F., Hermes 99 (1971), 285ffGoogle Scholar. Speakers in Thucydides often argue by means of distinction in the meaning of words, in a manner reminiscent of Prodicus.
38. If φρονɛîν τι in 5.7.3 means ‘have some sense’, and if, as its accompanying vocabulary might suggest, it is to be read closely with φρόνημα here, then this latter might mean ‘judgement’, as Shapiro, H. A. (Phoenix 29 (1975), 184)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, takes it. But the inference is not certain, and this sense makes the argument from definition less intelligible. On balance it seems to me, while indeed καταφρόνημα is a mere variation on καταφρόνησις manufactured to make a Gorgianic paronomasia with φρόνημα, that the ad hoccreation of a virtual hapax was necessitated because φρόνησις would have had the wrong sense, so that the intended sense of φρόνημα is that which it does not, in prose, share with φρόνησις, viz. (LSJ II. 1) ‘confidence’. This is divided into good and bad types, ‘empty conceit’ and ‘justified contempt’; μή μόνον κτλ. need not mean ‘both’. ‘Not merely with confidence but actually with contempt; for conceit is based on ignorance encouraged by good fortune, while contempt is the mark of one who is assured of superiority in judgement’ (rather than mere luck).
39. Cf. Plato, Laches, 192bff., 193a, 194d–e, 197a, 199bGoogle Scholar; Protagoras, 350a–c, 360a.
40. While reluctant to commit myself to particular interpretations in the minefield of the Mytilene Debate, I believe Thucydides agrees with the use of these terms by Diodotus, but perhaps not with his motives therefor. It has been pointed out (Andrewes, , loc. cit. n. 22 above, 78Google Scholar) that (contrast de Romilly, p. 157) Diodotus does not totally receive Thucydides' approval; also that arguments from a purely humanitarian viewpoint are not put. If in fact Thucydides does not entirely approve of Diodotus, it is because the latter accepts from his opponent (the behaviour of which the Platonic Thrasymachus disapproves, Republic 336c) the justice of punishing Mytilene. Pericles' argument at 2.63.2 involving the strange verb ἀνδρσγαӨίχɛσӨαι, ‘play the man of valour’, suggests that some of Pericles' rivals had been arguing a near-Socratic view, that ‘true valour’ demanded giving up the war and facing the consequences. Diodotus takes a near-Socratic view in 3.47.5, ‘Better to suffer injustice than justly to exterminate οῦσ μή σɛî. Diodotus does not entirely succeed in living up to his profession of pure expediency; possibly he is one who would commonly use kalon/aischron in their ‘new’ use (Adkins, , op. cit., p. 193 n. 17Google Scholar; also CQ 25 (1975), 209ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar), i.e. in connection with ‘quiet’ values; hence he is able, having eschewed ‘unjust’, simply to substitute aischron for it, thus, from a Platonic viewpoint, falling into inconsistency. Thucydides implies criticism of both sides for being too much influenced by the other, each adopting what he thinks will be popular terms; Cleon, not discouraged by imitation of Pericles, adopts from the ‘sub-Socratics’ emphasis on justice, while Diodotus accepts from Cleon the idea that this favours Cleon's view; so that the most directly opposed (μάλιστα ἀντιφάλων, 3.49.1) of the speeches delivered are closer in tone than their opposite policies require; and a fortiori the other contributions to the debate have been pretty unmemorable. Cleon has laid down the principle (3.37.5) μή…φαρὰ σόɛαν τωὑμɛτέρω φλὴӨɛι φαραινɛιν, while Pericles (2.65.8) was able to impose his opinion uncompromisingly, and 2.65.1Otellsus that his successors were ισοι μᾶλλον φρῸσ ἀλλὴλουσ. In this context it seems that the last may include mutual imitation by all parties; Socrates and Plato believed in arguing in terms shared by the interlocutor. Thucydides thinks that extirpating Mytilene would produde the opposite of καλή δόχα, which he believes in putting to the fore.
41. 5.6.3, 7.1.
42. 5.7.3 Cf. Lysias 6.7: ‘Doing no harm to his enemies, but every possible harm to his friends.’
43. 1.140.1, 144.1; 2.22.1, 59.3, 60.1, 60.5; 2.13 as a whole.
44. 4.27.3 twice, 28.1, 28.2; 5.7.1–2, 3, 5.
45. No doubt Pericles at the time was merely jibing at present rivals, including Cleon, but by his arrangement of the work, Thucydides turns this into foresight (see also 2.65.6). On 2.61.41 accept Stahl, despite Gomme (Commentary ad. loc).
46. ἀφῸ τησ όμοíασ τύχησ, which has caused trouble (Gomme, , Commentary 2 p. 173)Google Scholar, perhaps means ‘even on a basis of merely equal luck’, so that the agathos may fail without discredit if chance is actually against him, as in the case of the Plague (cf. n. 48 below). The association of knowledge with virtue and of ἀμαϨῚα with Cleon enables Thucydides to suggest that Pericles’ actions are bravery and restraint, those of Cleon impudent boldness (4.28.4, 5.7.3) and cowardice (5.7.2, 10.9).
47. On the sense of ἀμαϨωσ I accept Gomme, Commentary ad. loc. A good policy may fail through events, which can rival a vacillating mob in stupidity; good supporters should not imitate the latter, but ‘realize’ that the wisdom of a policy may be independent of its actual result. (If Pericles fails, it is events that are wrong.)
48. Hdt. 7.10.8.2 – to paraphrase, the author of a good plan retains the credit for it even if he fails through bad luck, whereas the author of an aischron plan, though good luck may bring him a windfall, will still bear the discredit for his plan. It is perhaps not accidental that this parallel comes from that particular locus – cf. p. 30 below.
49. de Romilly, p. 173.
50. MacDowell, D. M., Greece & Rome 23 (1976), 14ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
51. MacDowell, , loc. cit. 16Google Scholar.
52. Frr. 4, (8–10), 6, 13 (9ff.) West.
53. Fr. 6, Ὸφόσοισ μή νόοσ ἂρτιοσ ἧ.
54. Agamemnon, 750ff.
55. 1.53.3, 56.1, 71.1.
56. 1.189.1: Cyrus accuses the River Gyndes of hybrisfor drowning his horse, which out of hybris has attempted to cross it, and then ‘punishes’ the river. Hybris (e.g. Sophocles, , Antigone 480Google Scholar) often by dramatic irony belongs to those who accuse others of it. Cyrus' behaviour prefigures that of Xerxes at the Bosporus.
57. de Romilly, pp. 159, 324.
58. Disparity with praise of ἀμαӨία suggests irony.
59. It may run counter to this thesis that Cleon himself is permitted reference to sophrosyne in 3.37.3. But his ‘misuse’ of the concept is the exact counterpart of his ‘misuse’ of hybris about Mytilene; his use of terms and his anti-intellectual propaganda (ἀμαӨία τɛ μɛτὰ αωφροσύνησ ὠφɛλιμώτɛρον ῆ δɛχιότησ μɛτὰ μɛτὰ ἀκολασíασ) agree with that of Archidamus in 1.84.2–3 (for the application of ἀμαӨíα see 1.68.1, 142.8, 2.40.3, 62.4); in effect he invites Athens to adopt the character of Sparta, which at this stage consists in sluggishness and cowardice punctuated by atrocity (Archidamus 1.84.3, χὺν χαλɛφότητι σωφρονὲστɛρον) –contrast Pericles' glorious daring (1.144.3–4). Against Archidamus in turn, Sthenelaidas' use of sophrosyne (1.86.2, and compare 87.2 with 127.3) resembles the restraint of Pericles. It seems to me (see what follows) that throughout most of the first half of his work Thucydides calmly pursues the intellectual topic of the use and abuse of moral terms, among others; but that from Pylos to Amphipolis calmness is interrupted by an upsurge in hatred of Cleon. We should not perhaps expect too much consistency between that narrative and what precedes.
60. Through the help of Demaratus, which however Herodotus (7.3.4) does not believe to have made much difference. Yet Herodotus's source, which is curiously sympathetic to this Spartan on the Persian side, while motivated by favour for the enemy of Cleomenes, may have justified its slant by making him the bearer of good luck, and hence downfall, to Xerxes; cf. the case of the younger Miltiades, Hdt. 6.132ff., esp. 135.3.
61. On whom see recent article by Lateiner, D. (CQ 30 (1980), 30ff.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62. ὴ νɛότησ ἐφέχɛσɛ; cf. Th. 2.21.2. Hybris is often associated with youth (MacDowell, , loc. cit. 15Google Scholar).
63. Plato, , Protagoras 360b lumps in a single category ‘the cowardly, the bold, and the mad’Google Scholar.
64. 6.19, 22, 27, 32.
65. Clouds, 1459–61.
66. Hence at 5.7.2 his troops are said to have followed him reluctantly.
67. How can Cleon at 3.40.4 suggest that mercy will be no favour to Mytilene? On the assumption that she was guilty of hybris, it would merely preserve her for a worse punishment later and perhaps involve Athens in her guilt (Lysias 6.14, Cleon ὐμασ αὐτοὺσ μαλλον δικαιώσɛσӨɛ).
68. While the real reason lies in political partisanship, sophrosyne provides a theoretical reconciliation among these mutually contrasting or inconsistent elements: admiration for Pericles' boldness or intransigence in courting war; blindness towards the ineffectiveness of his more positive war-policy (Kagan, D., The Archidamian War (Ithaca, 1974), pp. 27ff.)Google Scholar, which is concealed behind admiration for his restraint in tolerating invasions of Attica and forbidding imperial expansion; and hostility towards the success of Cleon in more active warfare, which is partly concealed (Westlake, pp. 76–7, Gomme, p. 114, id.Commentary p. 636), partly translated into hybris, caused by good luck and leading to downfall. Boldness is kalon if accompanied by knowledge and restraint, but that of the ‘ignorant’ Cleon is mere Өρασύτησ (2.61.4; cf. 40.3), and its result is aischron.
69. Pericles may have accepted from Anaxagoras (Plato, , Phaedrus 270aGoogle Scholar; Kirk, G. S. and Raven, J. E., The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 362–63) that Mind controlled the universeGoogle Scholar. Downfall through over-optimism resulting from good fortune could be merely a commonsense psycho-political theory (cf. de Romilly, p. 175). But the emphasis on the fulfilment of Cleon's promise, the failure to credit Demosthenes, the equivocation about foresight, and Pericles' seeming belief in a guided universe, all suggest something more.
70. On the assumption that Thucydides accepted Mind as universal governor, his attitudes to Pericles and to Cleon are as usual different. Pericles fails because Mind can lose control of events (ἀμαӨωσ 1.140.1, Plato Phαɛdo 98b; Kirk, and Raven, , op. cit., p. 384Google Scholar; cf. p. 375); but to the inferior Өɛοîσ ἐχӨρόσ Mind is positively hostile, trapping him through good fortune into over-confidence and downfall. I do not accept the view of Parry, A. (BICS 16 (1969), 106ff.Google Scholar) that Thucydides paints the Plague as an irresistible daemonic visitation; otherwise one might think that in Thucydides' view Cleon attracted the Plague; but there is no sign of that in Book 2 (cf. n. 59 above).
71. Evenin4.9–12, whereDemosthenes seems at his best, there is reference to τύχη: 12.3, Athens and Sparta had exchanged elements (cf. 14.3) in a manner which gave the advantage to the former.
72. The degree of actual downfall in 421 may seem too modest by comparison with 413 to justify the preoccupation with it which seems to exist in Thucydides Part I. This may support the view that downfall is a late compositional theme. However, the idea that retribution is a unifying and therefore late theme is associated in some cases (de Romilly, p. 190, hence Hunter, V. R., Historia 26 (1977), 285Google Scholar) with apparent overlooking of Amphipolis; retribution in the latter half of Part I is directed against Cleon and is fulfilled by his downfall in that battle; after later disasters it would have seemed ridiculous to blame Cleon and Thucydides would have lost the personal motive. Further, contrast between Pericles and Cleon tends against the belief, which commends itself to some who regard Part I as late, that Thucydides is ironic about Pericles. I believe the Pylos-Sphacteria-Delium-Amphipolis narrative to be fairly early: our impression of gloom over retribution in Part I may be excessively influenced by the late passages (2.65.7, 11–12). Cleon's troops, who in 5.7.2 have followed him ‘reluctantly’, actually fight better when in 5.10.9 they finally get rid of him, and his death brings Nicias again to the fore. Possibly Thucydides not only defends himself from guilt by blaming Cleon but congratulates himself that by his failure he has proved the vehicle of downfall to him (p. 28 and n. 60 above).