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The Administration of the Empire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2009

E. Badian
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When Alexander invaded Asia, he almost certainly had no idea V V how far he would go or what the end would be. For the moment, Antipater was left in complete charge of Macedon and (with ill-defined powers) of the ‘free’ Greek allies and other European dependants; it was only towards the end of his life that the King began to worry about the excessive power that Antipater had fashioned for himself; and by then, as it turned out, it was too late to deal with him and Alexander died without doing so. As far as Asia was concerned, there were no blueprints on how to organize it. This is not mere conjecture, but can be proved. One point of policy was inherited from Philip and inescapable: the ‘Hellenic crusade’, to liberate the Greeks of Asia and to punish the barbarian for the events of 480. It might be thought that on this point Alexander had little freedom of action. Yet it is precisely here that we see him proceeding—within the elastic framework of ‘liberation’—slowly and pragmatically. Bypassing Greek cities that he knew were unfriendly, he did not take one (Zelea) until after the battle of the Granicus: the Zeleans were ‘forgiven’ for having helped the enemy under compulsion, but got no special concessions (A. i. 12. 6; 17. 2). After his stay at Sardis—which will occupy us soon—he entered Ephesus. This city had been occupied by Parmenio in his invasion of Asia before Philip's death. He had established democracy (since the Persians had ruled through a narrow oligarchy), and the grateful citizens had set up Philip's statue in the great temple of Artemis (‘Diana of the Ephesians’). But a counter-revolution had brought the city under Persian control and undone Parmenio's work. Alexander could do no less than restore the democracy that welcomed the son of Philip. As for the tribute paid to Persia (and presumably, for a time, to Philip), he ordered it to be paid henceforth to Artemis (A. i. 17. 9 ff.)—a gesture befitting both his religious feeling and his love of display. He offered to do more: to finish the restoration of the temple (which had been burnt down the night he was born) and dedicate it in his name, and he was prepared to pay for this honour; but the Ephesians politely declined (Strabo xiv. i. 22).

Type
Research Article
Information
Greece & Rome , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , October 1965 , pp. 166 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1965

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References

page 166 note 1 Too much has been made of his reported gesture in throwing a spear into Asia: Diodorus' explanation that it implied a claim to the whole of Asia is clearly absurd and ex post facto. Such a ceremonial claim has no parallel. The true parallel is perhaps Roman fetial procedure (see Walbank, , JHS lxx [1950], 80).Google Scholar

page 166 note 2 See JHS lxxxi (1961), 36 ff.Google Scholar

page 166 note 3 What follows anticipates the conclusions reached in my contribution to Studies in Ancient Society and Institutions in Honour of V. Ehrenberg (forthcoming, 1966)Google Scholar, where the evidence is presented and analysed in greater detail.

page 167 note 1 This, as the author of [Dem.] xvii points out, was contrary to the state of affairs in European Greece, where Macedonian control was in many cities maintained through pro-Macedonian oligarchies. Loyalty to Macedon was the only consideration.

page 167 note 2 Clear from the punishment of Aspendus (see next note, with text).

page 167 note 3 A. i. 26. 2–27. 4. For comparison, the total original tribute assessment of the Delian League is given by Thucydides as 460 talents and the tribute revenue in 432 as 600 talents–and both figures are reduced by up to one-third by some modern scholars (see Chambers, , CP liii [1958], 26 f.).Google Scholar

page 168 note 1 On Priene, see Tod 184–5; and cf. my discussion, op. cit. (p. 166, n. 3).

page 168 note 2 Chios: Tod 192; Eresus: Tod 191.

page 168 note 3 See Larsen, , CP xxi (1926), 58Google Scholar, clearly making this important point.

page 168 note 4 The word σύνταξις was used in the Second Athenian Confederacy for allied ‘contributions’, to avoid the suspect φόρος (Harp., s.v. σύνταξις).

page 168 note 5 It will be recalled that a good 120 years earlier these same cities had commuted service for tribute to Athens. As for Europe and the islands, we simply do not know whether some of the smaller states preferred contributions to service; but it is quite likely. Alexander—desperately short of money at this time—would prefer whatever they could afford to pay, to a dozen men each from an assortment of petty states. Money was homogeneous.

page 169 note 1 On the end of the Hellenic crusade and its connexion with that of Agis' war, see my forthcoming article in Hermes xciv (1966).Google Scholar

page 170 note 1 The evidence (Paus. ii. 33. 4; Polyaen. vi. 49; Plut. Phoc. 18Google Scholar; Mor. 333A, 531A) is fully discussed in my article (cit., p. 166, n. 3). It is conclusive. Philoxenus' title is variously given, but was perhaps the old Persian one rendered by Greeks as ὕπαρχος (or στρατηγὸς) ‘ιωνίας.

page 170 note 2 See Isocr. Paneg. There is probably no truth in the report that Aristotle had advised Alexander to treat barbarians as slaves (cf. Historia vii [1958], 440 ff.)Google Scholar: his Letters to Alexander, read in antiquity, are unlikely to have been genuine.

page 170 note 3 A. i. 17. 3 f. (On the subordinate appointments, see the general remarks, p. 173, with n. 5, below.) This did not mean any change—for better or worse—in the condition of the Lydians. The Persians had permitted subject peoples the use of their own laws and institutions, unless this was politically dangerous; Alexander merely refrained from exercising the full rights of the conqueror. On the meaning of ‘freedom’ in this context, see Tibiletti, , Athenaeum, xxxii (1954), 3 ffGoogle Scholar. Calas (a relative of Harpalus, later probably a victim of the great purge (see below)) had been appointed satrap of Dascylium (A. i. 17. i). But we know nothing about arrangements for that province, except that its tribute was unchanged and that Zelea was ‘forgiven’ for aiding Persia.

page 171 note 1 A. i. 23; more detail in P. 22; D. xvii. 24.

page 171 note 2 See p. 169, above; cf. Berve, i. 284 f.Google Scholar

page 171 note 3 On all this (not requiring detailed discussion here) see, conveniently, CAH vi. ch. 6.Google Scholar

page 172 note 1 Amply attested: Paus. i. 6. 3; Arr. Succ. 5 (decisive parallel with Ptolemy)Google Scholar; [Arist.] Oecon. ii. 33 ff.Google Scholar (written within a generation).

page 172 note 2 Certainly by the time of the notorious letter forgiving all his sins (A. vii. 23. 6 f.: see Hamilton, , CQ N.S. iii [1953], 157)Google Scholar, but probably much earlier. One might suggest the time (330, it seems) when Philoxenus' authority in Asia Minor was strengthened. Cleomenes and Antigonus were the only satraps with long tenure left in undisturbed possession of their provinces to the end of the reign.

page 172 note 3 See Historia ix (1960), 245 f.Google Scholar

page 172 note 4 A. ii. 14. 4 f. It is widely accepted as genuine in outline: its argument, progressing from the ‘Hellenic crusade’ to the charge that Darius was a usurper whom the gods and his own people had now abandoned for Alexander, precisely mirrors the development of Alexander's policies and propaganda, as we see it in his actions; and this was not— as far as we know—appreciated by anyone in antiquity who might have forged the letter (and certainly not by Arrian).

page 173 note 1 On the title see Tod, ii, p. 264Google Scholar; Dittenberger, , SIG 3 i, p. 381, n. IGoogle Scholar. Tarn puts the change c. 330 (i. 34), which seems as near as we can get. On the royal costume, see D. xvii. 77. 5; C. vi. 6. 4; P. 45.

page 173 note 2 A. iii. 16. 4 f.; C. v. I. 36 f. (disapproving of the excessive feasting).

page 173 note 3 This account follows Arrian, omitting the less significant appointments and routine changes. The other sources are confused and certainly in error over appointments at Babylon and in adjacent areas.

page 173 note 4 Thus the numismatists, e.g. Bellinger, A. R., Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great (1963), 61 f.Google Scholar, with authoritative discussion of the numismatic background (but some historical inaccuracies). They do not, however, make it clear what the evidence is that proves the coins of Mazaeus to have been issued under Alexander. Since it is very likely (see p. 175, below) that Mazaeus had governed Babylonia (or rather, Mesopotamia) at an earlier time, might not the coins date back to that time? Numismatists have not (to my knowledge) discussed this question, which I am not competent to decide. For the coins, see the example, Plate II. That Mazaces also coined in Babylonia seems to be a numismatists' myth.

page 173 note 5 If Mazaeus did issue coins, it is incredible that he should not have had supreme control of finance. In any case, Asclepiodotus (like Nicias in Sardis: see p. 5) is an insignificant person, not heard of again. Royal appointees in hierarchically subordinate posts are a traditional Achaemenid feature: like garrison commanders, tax-collectors and other high officials may always have been thus appointed by the King. (For a different view, see Griffith, G. T., Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. 190 (1964), 23 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar—which I have considered, but cannot accept.)

page 174 note 1 On Apollodorus, see Berve, ii. 55Google Scholar, no. 101. On the whole subject, see the careful discussion by Leuze, O., Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zweistromlande (1935), 431Google Scholar[= 275 of offprint] ff.

page 174 note 2 Arsaces: A. iii. 25. 7; 29. 5. (On the name see Berve ii. 80, no. 146.) Artabazus: A. iii. 29. I (satrap of Bactria–Sogdiana, with no strategus—cf. A. iii. 23. 9; 28. 2 for his employment as superior to Europeans). Phrataphernes: see next note. (His appoint ment is not recorded.)

page 174 note 3 Phrataphernes: A. iii. 28. 2; iv. 18. I f. (see Berve, ii. 401 for Arrian's error)Google Scholar; v. 20. 7 (commanding Thracians). Tyriaspes: A. v. 20. 7. Mercenaries: Alexander's order to dismiss them (D. xvii. 106. 3; III. I) gives no indication that their enrolment had been illegal. We cannot prove that satraps like Phrataphernes were in this respect equal to Europeans; but it seems likely in the light of their other powers, especially since Alexander could not spare enough troops of the main army to leave with all of them

page 174 note 4 Berve, i. 265f.Google Scholar; 278.

page 175 note 1 It was in Babylon that Alexander tried—along the lines of his new policy—to send a loyal Persian to take over Armenia. When he failed to displace the hereditary satrap Orontes, the latter seems to have been recognized, acknowledging Alexander's formal suzerainty. See Serve, ii. 260, no. 516Google Scholar; 262, no. 524; 395, no. 593. (Orontes continued to call himself satrap.)

page 175 note 2 Berve, ii. 40, no. 82Google Scholar; 84, no. 154. ‘Antibelos’ is clearly corrupted by the influence of the Greek prefix. Curtius (v. 13. II) has ‘Brochubelos’ (various spellings in the manuscripts)—a good Semitic name (‘Blest by the Lord’), which may well be correct.

page 175 note 3 Berve, ii. 244Google Scholar, as corrected by Leuze, , op. cit. (n. 28) 410 [= 254] ff.Google Scholar

page 175 note 4 C. iii. 3. 23 f.; vi. 6. 8; D. xvii. 77. 6 (see Welles's note ad loc. in the Loeb edition: they were necessary for proper royal display).

page 176 note 1 References are innumerable. For a council of ‘Companions’, see A. i. 25. 4; ii. 25. 2; et al.

page 176 note 2 See Berve, i. 27 f.Google Scholar

page 177 note 1 On this incident, see my discussion, art. cit. (p. 169, n. i).

page 177 note 2 See Berve, i. 266–7Google Scholar, with references to his prosopography in vol. ii. On the size and importance of Bactria, cf. C. v. 10. 3.

page 177 note 3 Berve, ii. 30, no. 60Google Scholar. We are told—perhaps not reliably—that the post had been intended for Clitus (C. viii. i. 19 f.; 2. 14—meant to heighten the tragedy of Clitus' death): there is no mention of it in Arrian, even though he deals with Clitus' death at some length. We cannot tell whether it is true. Amyntas did not distinguish himself in the province.

page 177 note 4 Alexandropolis, (P. 9)Google Scholar. On Aristotle's tract ὕπὲρ ἀποίκων (?)—probably to be assigned to this occasion—see Historia vii (1958), 442.Google Scholar

page 178 note 1 See Jones, A. H. M., The Greek City (Oxford, 1940), 1–5Google Scholar; Tarn, ii. 232 fGoogle Scholar. Best discussion of principles in Serve i. 291 f. and Tscherikower, V. [= Tcherikover], Die hellen. Städtegründungen von Alexander d. Gr. bis auf die Römerzeit (Philologus, Suppl. 19. i [1927]), 138 fGoogle Scholar. Since the evidence is presented in all these works, I am dispensing with detailed references.

page 179 note 1 See Serve, ii. 344Google Scholar, no. 683, with good discussion. (But his rejection of the title ‘satrap’ is unfounded.) Berve puts Porus' western limit at the Hydaspes; but probably territory on the upper Indus was included: Arrian uses ‘India’ for country beyond the Indus (v. 4. 3 f.). On Philip, see further below. On Alexander in India, see, in general, pp. 155 ff.

page 179 note 2 A. vi. 2. 3 (see Berve, ii. 276)Google Scholar; vi. 15. 2.

page 179 note 3 A. vi. 15. 4; cf. 17. I f. A mention of Oxyartes has crept into Arrian's text, whether through the historian's carelessness or through a scribe's.

page 180 note 1 JHS lxxxi (1961), 16–43.Google Scholar

page 180 note 2 A. vi. 27. 2; C. x. i. 21 (both inaccurate: see Berve ii. 154, no. 311; 371, no. 739, with evidence establishing Taxiles' control of the satrapy).

page 180 note 3 A. iii. 19. 7. On his position as central treasurer, see p. 172, above.

page 180 note 4 D. xvii. 74. 3 f. (in fact even before Darius' death? cf. A. iii. 19. 5); A. vii. 4. 4–5. 6 (the ‘prize-giving’, the marriages (cf. Ath. xii. 538b)Google Scholar and the settlement of the debts). For windfalls on campaigns, cf. C. viii. 4. 18 f. (the herds of Sisimithres). That Alexander paid his soldiers only at the end of a campaign (therefore presumably not during the Indian campaign, but only on his return to Susa) is clear not only from the exorbitant debts they had incurred, but from D. xvii. 74. 3. In between, they had plenty of booty to live on (though it was apparently not enough). He thus needed little cash in the further East.

page 181 note 1 See C. ix. 3. 21: 25,000 suits of armour engraved in gold and silver, conveniently escorted by 7,000 infantry travelling at the same time.

page 181 note 2 See JHS lxxxi (1961), 21 f.Google Scholar

page 181 note 3 Sources in Berve, ii. 78. Cf. art. cit. (last note).Google Scholar

page 181 note 4 On this man see Berve, ii. 44Google Scholar, no. 89. The corrupt †ἡμιόδιος (influenced by the preceding ‘Ρόδιος and hence insoluble) in [Arist, .] Oecon. 1352b28Google Scholar probably hides information that would be useful.

page 181 note 5 See the careful discussion in Bellinger's recent book (cited, p. 173, n. 4), admitting our almost total ignorance. Bellinger denies (he does not make clear why) that Harpalus had anything to do with coinage. There are no known facts on which to argue the matter.

page 182 note 1 Op. cit. 72 ff. His ideas about the transport of vast amounts of coined money to Alexander during his stay in the further East seem to me, however, both unplausible and unnecessary. (Cf. p. 180, n. 4, and text, above.)

page 182 note 2 The sources, on the whole, do not specify; or, where they do, they are contradictory and thus unreliable in detail. (See list in Bellinger, , op. cit. 68, n. 148.)Google Scholar Much of the Persian treasure would, of course, remain buried as a reserve, just as it had been under the Achaemenids. There is no reason to believe (as Rostovtzeff and others do) that all or even much of it was spent, in view of the continuing tribute and the vast booty that fed the actual campaigns. It was probably only in the expensive wars and cold wars of the Successors that these huge reserves were seriously tapped.

page 182 note 3 Volume ii of that work (the ‘Prosopography’) collects the references to all persons with whom Alexander had any direct or indirect contact. Details on men incidentally referred to in this article will easily be found there, and I have saved space by not giving all the relevant references.