This paper applies categories developed in the classic literature on political opposition to the developing European Union. It is clear that the EU has never developed the third great milestone identified by Dahl in his analysis of the path to democratic institutions. That is, we still lack the capacity to organize opposition within the European polity. This failure to allow for opposition within the polity is likely to lead either (a) to the elimination of opposition altogether, or (b) to the mobilization of an opposition of principle against the EU polity. This problem is also beginning to reach down into the domestic sphere, in that the growing weight of the EU, through its indirect impact on national politics, helps to encourage domestic democratic deficits, hence limiting the scope for classical opposition at the national level. Here too, then, we might expect to see either the elimination of opposition or the mobilization of a new – perhaps populist – opposition of principle.

This paper presents an argument as to why democratic states are unable to delegate authority to international organizations. Influential attempts to justify democratically such international bodies as the European Union by means of delegation are found to be untenable. At a more general level of theorization, it argues that the theory of delegation as involving the recoverability of delegated authority leaves us unable to identify democratic reforms for international organizations. As a remedy to the latter problem, the article proposes an alternative theory of democratic ‘delegation’– one that applies equally well to national and to international politics.

In recent years much debate has been generated over the reshaping of the European airline industry and the restructuring of many of the heavily indebted national flag-carriers across the European Union. The European Commission has sought to orchestrate this reform process by the gradual break up of monopolies in air travel and its associated services and a much tighter policing of state aid practices. The EU's liberalizing agenda in air transport, however, has met with strong domestic opposition in the member states. Nowhere else has the resistance to reform been stronger than in Greece, where for a decade successive attempts to restructure or privatize Olympic Airways have yielded very limited success. By focusing, in particular, on the initiative of the Greek government in 2003 to create a new ‘Olympic Airlines’, the article examines how domestic pressures prompted the Greek government to shift away from cooperation with the Commission and invite conflict. The Greek government lost an ECJ case and both Athens and the Commission were left with a sub-optimal outcome. By linking the narrative to the conceptual literature on Europeanization and compliance, the article addresses a number of themes including: the contestation of European competition rules and the ability of national governments to manipulate them, policy entrepreneurship and complex problem-solving, as well as the Commission's role as a stimulus, but potentially also an obstacle to domestic reform.

Global market integration is widely perceived as presenting a major challenge to the sustainability of many national economic regulatory systems. There is far less agreement, however, about precisely how these pressures feed into the politics of reform and reshape national public policy. This article will seek to cast light on this relationship by identifying four influential ‘models of linkage’ between global pressures and regulatory change. It will then comparatively assess their capacity to elucidate the progress of shareholder protection reform in Germany and Italy. While no single model proves fully satisfactory, it will be argued that the weaknesses of two of them can be largely overcome through a process of refinement and integration.

While there is significant anecdotal evidence that excluded political opposition parties in repressive states adopt the form of human rights organizations, there is little systematic research into this phenomenon. What does exist tends to be descriptive rather than theoretical in nature. This paper draws from collective action and resource mobilization literatures, arguing that excluded political elites respond to repression by searching for political opportunities both domestically and internationally, and then transform their organizations into units better able to take advantage of those opportunities. The politics of external funding push these organizations towards a human rights and democratization orientation. The article evaluates this argument through an analysis of human rights movements in politically repressive, post-Communist Uzbekistan and considers the impact of this phenomenon on democratization and civil society development.