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Teaching Morality in a Plural Society1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Susan Mendus
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Extract

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MORAL VALUES CAN OR SHOULD BE taught has caused controversy and divided opinion almost since the beginning of time, and certainly since the very earliest days of philosophy. As is well-known, Socrates was condemned to death on charges of impiety and of corrupting the minds of the Athenian youth. Although the latter accusation was never fully spelled out, it was certainly connected with the perceived moral subversiveness of his philosophy and, in particular, with his denial that those who purported to teach moral values were qualified to do any such thing. This denial was construed by many as dangerous and as an attack on the moral foundations of Athenian society for which, famously, Socrates paid a high price.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , July 1998 , pp. 355 - 371
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1998

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Footnotes

1

Work on this paper was undertaken during a period of research leave which I spent in the Research School for Social Science at the Australian National University, Canberra. I am extremely grateful to members of the Philosophy Sector at ANU, all of whom were very generous to me both personally and intellectually. I am deeply indebted to them.

References

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