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Spain: 10 June 19871

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Paul Heywood
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Extract

ON 22 JUNE 1986, THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL (PSOE) achieved a remarkable triumph in the Spanish general elections. Hard on the heels of his success in the highly controversial and close-run referendum on Spain's NATO membership, the Prime Minister, Felipe González, managed to consolidate the PSOE's hold on political power by winning an absolute majority in both the Cortes and the Senate. At the age of 44, with his ability to confound the sceptics seemingly still intact, González appeared to be the most firmly ensconced head of government in Western Europe. Moreover, to underline the magnitude of his achievement, the Socialist leader had reached this position against the prevailing trend of a resurgent Right evident in much of the rest of Europe. Whereas the PSOE's counterparts in Britain, Germany, France and Portugal had suffered a series of demoralizing electoral defeats throughout the 1980s, the Spanish Socialists, with overwhelming successes in 1982 and 1986, seemed set fair to remain in power until the next century.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , 01 October 1987 , pp. 390 - 401
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1987

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Footnotes

1

The results of the elections were as follows:

In the regional elections, the PSOE won most seats in the following areas: Madrid 40 (out of 86), Asturias 20 (45), Navarra 15 (52), Rioja 14 (33), Aragón 27 (67), Valencia 41 (89), Castilla-La Mancha 25 (47), Murcia 25 (45), Andalucía 60 (109), Extremadura 34 (65), Galicia 34 (71), Baleares 25 (59), Canarias 21 (60); AP took a majority in Cantabria 18 (39) and Castilla-Leon 32 (84); CiU was the major party in Catalonia with 73 seats out of 135. In the Basque Country, elections took place in 1986, with the PSOE taking over from the PNV as the major party with 19 seats out of 75.

References

2 The view that the PSOE has taken the traditional practice of ettckufismo, or jobs for the hoys’, beyond acceptable limits has become very widespread amongst Spanish citizens. Such accusations, understandably, rarely find their way into print. One which did, though, was the highly amusing accusation that the PSOE is part of an international conspiracy of high finance by which Felipe González allegedly acts as a servant of the SPD and the Socialist International in their bid to uphold ‘The System’ by distorting the nature of Socialism. See Manuel Bonilla Sauras, Los Amos del PSOE. (Informe confidential), Madrid, 1986.

3 Both Julio Feo and Eduardo Serra gave ‘tiredness’ and ‘the need for a change’ as their reason for resignation. It would seem that their departure had been agreed some time earlier, but its timing was most unfortunate for the PSOE. See Sarasqueta, Antxon, ‘Por que se van’, Cambio 16, 811, 15 06 1987, pp. 40–43Google Scholar.

4 There have been two spectacular collapses by ruling parties in Spain in the twentieth century. In 1936, the Radical Party collected just 9 seats compared to the 104 it had won in the previous elections of 1933. In 1982, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), a coalition in some ways very similar to the Radical Party, plummeted to just 12 seats after winning 165 in 1977 and 168 in 1979.

5 The PSOE in 1982 won absolute majorities in both the Cortes and the Senate, and extended its control over political life in Spain by dominating the local elections of 1983 with 43.3% of the votes cast.

6 The accusation comes from Modesto Seara Vázquez, El socialismo en España, Mexico, 1980, pp. 25—7. For a discussion of the control exercised by González and Guerra and how they used it to lay the basis for victory in 1982, see Paul Heywood, ‘Mirror-images: The PCE and the PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in Spain’, West European Politics Volume 10 No. 2, April, 1987, pp. 193–210.

7 The most penetrating analysis of the rise and fall of the UCD is in Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, London, 1986, which is also the best general study of the transition available in English. See pages 108–14, 160–225 passim. In Spanish, see Javier Figuero, UCD: La ‘empresa’ que creó Aioljo Sudrez, Barcelona, 1981; Emilio Atard, Vida y muerte de UCD, Barcelona, 1983 and Rodolfo Martín Villa, Al servitio del Estado, Barcelona, 1984.

8 See PSOE, , Una politico de paz y seguridad para España, Madrid, 1985 Google Scholar; Gregory Treverton, Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy, Adelphi Papers 204, 1986; Paul Heywood and Bruce George, MP, ‘The Threat to Spain’, in Bruce Watson and Susan “Watson (eds), The Soviet Naval Threat to Western Europe, Washington, in press.

9 ‘Latest statistics show a massively widening trade deficit as a result of entry to the EEC. The Guardian, 13 July 1987.

10 Like the charges of corruption, the accusations of arrogance within the PSOE have become increasingly widespread on Spanish streets. The image is compounded by the withering sarcasm which has become the stock-in-trade of deputy prime minister Alfonso Guerra, renowned for his brusque dismissal of criticism.

11 ‘Autonomíes’ refers to the seventeen Spanish regions, which enjoy varying degrees of autonomous political decision-making power. There is no precise equivalent in English. The issue of regional autonomy remains one of the most complex and controversial in Spanish politics. See Escudero, Manuel, ‘El estado de las Autonomías: una evaluación politíca’, Leviatán 18, 1984, pp. 19–29Google Scholar.

12 At the time of writing, there was talk in Spain of a ‘concertacion social’, or social concertation, between government, employers and unions. Government plans to introduce legislation against lightning strikes in key public services, announced by the Minister of Labour, had earlier been met by CC.OO. leader Marcelino Camacho with a threat to call a general strike. UGT leader Redondo, meanwhile, has threatened to ‘go on the attack’ if changes in government policy are not forThe oming. Cambio 16, 813, 29 June 1987; El País, 9 July 1987.

13 Serra, Narcís, ‘Spanish Security Policy: the Plan and the Process’, in Lasky, Joyce Shub, and Carr, Raymond (ed.), Spain. Studies in Political Security, Washington, 1985, pp. 59–67Google Scholar.

14 ‘Exclusive’ interview with , Suárez (‘Yo acuso a Felipe González’) in Tiempo, 257, 13–19 April 1987, pp. 16–20Google Scholar.

15 On the ETA bombing in Barcelona, see Cambio 16, 813, 29June 1987. On ETA more generally, see Preston, The Triumph, pp. 43–4, 83–4, 124–9; Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952–1980, Wisconsin, 1984; Luciano Rincón, ETA (1914–1984), Barcelona, 1985.