Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T02:07:25.306Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Social Justice in Europe: An Evaluation of European Regional Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Vittorio Bufacchi  and
Shari Garmise
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

WHEN RAWLS FORMULATED HIS VIEWS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE IN the 1950s and 1960s, leading to the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, he based his theory on a simple but unconditional assumption, namely, that justice is the first virtue of social institutions. This assumption Rawls considers to be beyond doubt, so much so that in the very first page of his treatise he claims that ‘laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust’.

Largely as a result of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, over the last 25 years questions of social justice have dominated most debates on political theory. And while vast quantities of ink were expended over philosophical discussions on significant but detailed aspects of Rawls's theory, principally on the plausibility of his meta h sical assumptions on individuals and human psychology, it is unfortunate that not enough attention has been paid to Rawls's initial recommendation of adopting normative criteria as a tool for evaluating political institutions.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , 01 April 1995 , pp. 179 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 3.Google Scholar

2 The impact of Rawls on contemporary political theory can be measured by Brian Barry's admission that A Theory of Justice is the watershed that divides the past from the present, hence in political philosophy there is a pre-Rawlsian world, and a post-Rawlsian world. Barry, See B., Political Argument: A Reissue with a New Introduction, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990.Google Scholar

3 See Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982 Google Scholar, and the subsequent debate between liberals and communitarians captured in Mulhall, S. and Swift, A., Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992.Google Scholar

4 In Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the signatory countries agreed to ‘promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion’. In the preamble of that treaty the commitment to regional development is much more pronounced, stressing the goal of ‘reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions’.

5 For a brief and accurate account of Rawls’s theory of justice, See Ryan, A., ‘John Rawls’, in Skinner, Q. (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985 Google Scholar; Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P., Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, Cambridge, Polity, 1990 Google Scholar; Kymlicka, W., Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.Google Scholar

6 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he advocated radically egalitarian principles of justice. Indeed in his Oxford Amnesty Lecture, Rawls seems to have retracted from his earlier views. See Rawls, J. ‘The Law of Peoples’, in Hurley, S. L. and Shute, S. (eds), On Human Rights, New York, Basic Books, 1993.Google Scholar

7 Needless to say, there is more to Rawls’s theory of justice than the difference principle, yet we feel that this is its most distinctive characteristic. Indeed we endorse Barry’s view that the difference principle is not a second-best principle of justice; instead the difference principle is what justice really demands. It is also important to emphasize that the difference principle constitutes the core aspect of what Rawls calls the general conception of justice. See B. Barry, Theories of Justice, Berkeley, California University Press, 1989.

8 Baynes also argues that Rawls’s original position acquires whatever justificatory force it has because it mirrors adequately or models the ideal of a well-ordered society. See Baynes, K., ‘Constructivism and Practical Reason in Rawls’, Analyse & Kritik, 14, 1992.Google Scholar

9 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 13.

10 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 104.

11 B. Barry, Political Argument, p. lvii.

12 See in Rawls, particular J., ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1985; and Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.Google Scholar

13 See Barry, B. Justice as Impartiality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar

14 For an account of contractualism along these lines, Scanlon, see T., ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in Sen, A. and Williams, B. (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar It ought to be said that within this fast growing school of thought there are areas of contention, especially on the question whether the idea of impartiality can be captured by a contractualist approach or not. For example Kymlicka argues that it is best not to phrase the principle of impartiality in terms of agreement, whereas Barry follows Scanlon in accepting a contractualist framework. See Kymlicka, W.., ‘Two Theories of Justice’, Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1990.Google Scholar

15 See Scanlon, T., ‘Levels of Moral Thinking’, in Seanor, D. and Fotion, N. (ed.), Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988.Google Scholar

16 For a classical account of these two principles, see Ch. 5 of Stuart Mill’s, John essay on ‘Utilitarianism’, in Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, Acton, H. B. (ed.), London, Dent, 1972.Google Scholar See also Barry, B., ‘Chance, Choice, and Justice’, in his Liberty andjustice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.Google Scholar

17 See Scanlon, T., ‘The Significance of Choice’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Value, Vol. 8, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1988 Google Scholar; Nagel, T., Mortal (Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979.Google Scholar Recently the question of responsibility has attracted renewed interest, Scheffler, see S., ‘Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4,1992,Google Scholar and Ripstein, A., ‘Equality, Luck, and Responsibility’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1,1994.Google Scholar

18 See B. Barry, ‘Chance, Choice, and Justice’.

19 See Wallace, H., ‘Distributional Politics: Dividing Up the Community Cake’, in Wallace, H., Wallace, W. and Webb, C. (eds), Policy-Making in the European Community, 2nd edition, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1983.Google Scholar

20 Cheshire, P., Camagni, R. P., de Gaudemerandj, J. P.. Cuadrado Roura, R., ‘1957 to 1992: Moving Towards a Europe of Regions and Regional Policy’, in Rodwin, L. and Sazanami, H. (eds), Industrial Change and Regional Economic Transformation: The Experience of Western Europe, London, HarperCollins Academic for the United Nations, 1991.Google Scholar

21 The ERDF was set up by Council Regulation in 1975 but was only later given a solid legal foundation in article 130C of the EEC treaty by the Single European Act. Lowe, See P., ‘The Reform of the Community’s Structural Funds’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 25, 1988.Google Scholar

22 Croxford, G.J., Wise, M., and Chalkley, B. S., ‘The Reform of the European Regional Development Fund: A Preliminary Assessment’, The Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1987, p. 25, emphasis added.Google Scholar

23 Although this was the established quota between 1975–1977, a secondary clause in ERDF relation 7424/75 awarded 6 million European units of account to Ireland which would be deducted from the shares of all other member states except Italy. Hence, once the deductions were made, Ireland then gained 6.46% of ERDF monies while Germany took less, 6.34%.

24 See P. Cheshire, et al, op. cit.

25 The non-quota section covered areas dependent on declining industries including shipbuilding, fishing, iron and steel, and textiles and clothing.

26 P. Cheshire, et al, op. cit.

27 In addition, the financing of individual projects was replaced by the ‘programme approach’ which takes two forms, National Programmes of Community Interest (NCPIs) and Community Interest Programmes (CIPs). CIPs replaced the non-quota section of the ERDF.

28 Cited in R. Nanetti, ‘The Community’s Structural Funds and the Search for a European Regional Policy’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 30 August-2 September 1990, San Francisco, p. 28.

29 Article 130C of the EEC Treaty declared that the aim of the European Community is to ‘redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions’.

30 See H. Wallace, op. cit.

31 R. Nanetti, op. cit.

32 The Maastricht Treaty has replaced this Council with the Committee of the Regions.

33 These regions include: Objective 1 regions, defined as those regions whose regional GDP is below 75% of the Community average, are the less favoured regions requiring development assistance and structural adjustment. Objective 2 regions are those experiencing industrial decline. Objective 3 regions are experiencing severe long-term unemployment. Objective 4 regions have problems with youth employment. Objective 5 regions are the rural and agricultural areas.

34 See R. Nanetti, op. cit.

35 L. Martinelli, ‘Piu Fondi a chi sa spenderli bene’ and A. Del Freo, ‘Ma l’Abruzzo non si e ancora arreso’, Il Sole 24 Ore, 1 March 1993.

36 As in the case of Molise and Abruzzo where the former spent its resources responsibly whereas the latter did not.

37 See T. Scanlon, ‘Utilitarianism and Contractualism’.

38 For a discussion of how problems with defining and measuring GDP, the chief technical criteria for designating objective 1 regions, resulted in the misrepresentation of the economic position of certain poor peripheral areas in Scotland, see F. Gaskell, ‘All’s Well That Ends Well: A Brief Case Study of the Statistical Aspects of the Highlands and Islands Campaign for Objective 1 Status’, presented at the Statistic Users’ Council Annual Conference on Regional and Local Statistics, London, 16 November 1993.

39 P. Cheshire, et al., op. cit.

40 CEC, VADECUM (The Community Budget), Brussels, DC XIX, 1993.

41 B. Millan, ‘Reducing Disparities: The Reform of the Structural Funds’, Brussels, Directorate General for Audiovisual Information, Communication and Culture, monthly newsletter, November 1993.

42 See Bufacchi, V., ‘Is European Integration Politically Legitimate?’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 19, No. 1–3, 1994.Google Scholar

43 See the papers by Weale, Hirst and Bellamy in Bellamy, R., Bufacchi, V. and Castiglione, D. (eds), Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, London, Lothian Foundation, 1995.Google Scholar

44 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar at the University of Manchester, Department of Government. We are grateful for the useful comments offered by the participants.