Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T01:17:46.107Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Peru before the Election for the Constituent Assembly: Ten Years of Military Rule and The Quest for Social Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Stephen M. Gorman
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE place in Peru in 1978. In view of this event and of the changes which it might bring about, it would be useful to examine the tenyear record of the military revolutionary government in that country.

If the road to hell truly is paved with good intentions, it is of little solace to those who must walk it. So it is that after nearly a decade of revolution in Peru we can no longer concern ourselves with ferreting out the motives of the military officers who have led it, but must turn instead to an assessment of the damage that has been done. Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has attracted considerable attention and even admiration within and without Latin America since its inception through a bloodless coup on 3 October 1968. In subsequent years the military junta, in which the Army dominates over the Air Force and Navy, has passed through three perceptible stages. The first corresponded to the presidency of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, architect of the coup and leader of the revolution until he was ousted in August 1975. His tenure, now referred to officially as the ‘First Phase’ of the revolution, was responsible for dramatic and far-reaching reforms which eventually over-taxed the financial and political resources of his government and forced him from office. The so-called ‘Second Phase’ of the revolution began with Velasco's replacement by his more conservative Prime Minister, General Francisco Morales Bermddez. Attention turned to consolidating the gains of the revolution during this period but the inability of the government to shore up the economy and rationalize the programmes of the Velasco era resulted in the imposition ofa severe austerity programme in July 1976. Violent political upheavals within the popular classes in July, and the backlash of the conservative factions within the military, caused a purge of most of the remaining liberal officers in the government. It is fair to speak of a ‘Third Phase’ of the revolution since the latter part of 1976 in which President Morales has been pressured into systematically dismantling many of the popular reforms of the Velasco era. Official announcements in 1977 clarified the military's intention to withdraw from direct management of the state over the next two to three years. Thus, it is appropriate now to begin assessment of the Institutional Revolution of the Armed Forces and its legacy for Peru.

Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , 01 July 1978 , pp. 288 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 These ideals were expressed in public statements, many of which are contained in Alvarado, Juan Velasco, La revolución peruana, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1973 Google Scholar, and Zavala, Augusto Zimmermann, El Plan Inca, objectivo: revolución peruana, Edioiones Grefalbo, S. A., Barcelona, Spain, 1975.Google Scholar

2 See Villanueva, Victor, El CAEM γ la revolución de la fuerza armada, Institute de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1973.Google Scholar The expectations of the moderate Left are reflected in Frias, Ismael, La revolución peruana γ la vía socialista, Editorial Libreria, Lima, 1969.Google Scholar

3 Villanueva, Victor, Ejército peruano: del caudillaje anárquico al militarismo reformista, Libreria-Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, Lima, 1973.Google Scholar

4 Rouquí, Alain, ‘Military Revolutions and National Independence in Latin America: 1968–1971’, in Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequence and Perspectives, Phillippe C. Schmitter (ed.), Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973.Google Scholar

5 Gorman, Stephen M., Creole Liberalism and Revolutionary Corporatism in Peru: A Socio-historical Analysis of the Revolution of 1968, Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Riverside, 1977, pp. 288–92.Google Scholar

6 World Military Expenditures, 1966–1975, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D. C., 1977, p. 80.

7 For example, in July 1976, food prices increased an average of 30 per cent, while wages were increased an average of 13 per cent. See Official Communiqué in La Crónica, Lima, 2 July 1976.

8 ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1974, United Nations, New York, 1976, p. 310.

9 Latin America Economic Report, London, Vol. V, No. 4, 28 January, 1977, p. 14. There has since been considerable intragovernmental friction over the IMF’s budgetary recommendations and their political costs.

10 See Collier, David, ‘Politics of Squatter Settlements in Peru’, in Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution, David Chaplin (ed.), Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1976.Google Scholar

11 The author was a witness to several attacks on government offices in the ‘model’Pueblo Jóven of Comas in early July. Also see La Crónica, 15 July 1976.

12 DESCO, Peru, 1968–1974: cronologia politica, Vol. III, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, Lima, 1975, pp. 929–30, 932–33, 986–87, 1019.

13 For example, see Cotler, Julio, ‘New Mode of Political Domination in Peru’, in The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule, A. F. Lowenthas (ed.) Princeton, 1975, pp. 75–7.Google Scholar

14 The journal was Kúnan, Lima.

15 Cotler, op. cit., p. 78.