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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
THE POLITICAL TRIAL IS FREQUENTLY RESORTED TO BY REGIMES seeking to establish or reaffirm their legitimacy. Almost by definition the opposition is the target of such trials for it has questioned or challenged the incumbent regime's right to rule. The trial, when successfully engineered, reveals the opposition as not simply misguided, but as subversive, treasonous, and, in the case of the monarchies, sacrilegious. The condemnation of all or part of the opposition for sins towards God and country emphasizes the objective validity and immutability of the regime's tenets, the components of its charter myth.
Such trials have several functions, but three stand out among them. First, one may consider the propagandistic, mass communication function. The trial itself becomes the scene for the definition, re-affirmation, and manipulation of the regime's symbols and credos. Official doctrine is hammered home to the society as a whole, under highly dramatic circumstances inherent in the trial process. The unfolding of the drama often evokes far greater public interest and concern than the routine propaganda efforts of the controlled mass media.
1 For a general discussion, see Kirchheimer, Otto, Political Jutice, Princeton University Press, 1961 Google Scholar.
2 The Moroccan constitution of December 1962 states, in article 3, that the citizens are rcpresented by political parties, and that thc single-party regime is unconstitutional. It is also unconstitutional to question the monarchical form of government.
3 Because the forces of order are crucial to rule enforcement in such regimes, it is essential that they be linked firmly to the person of the king. They are servants of the nation only to thc extent that the king incarnates the nation, and their primary duty is to the throne. When civilians try to break such links they are striking at the heart of the system: among other examples one can cite Shah Reza Mohammed vs. Mossadegh (1952); King Mohammed V vs. P. M. Ibrahim (1960); King Constantine vs. Papandreou (1965).
4 For a more detailed analysis, see my ‘Marginal Politics and Elite Manipulation in Morocco’, European Journaf of Sociology, V. 8, No. 1, 1967, pp. 94–111.
5 I have delineated the dynamics of the interaction of the palace and the political elite in my dissertation, The King and His Courtiers: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study, in Segmented Politics, Dept. of Public Law & Government, Columbia University, May 1968 (to be published).
6 The ummah is the community of faithful Muslims.
7 For an account of the trial see Al-Alum, 27 April 1966, and for the editor’s case, see The Battle of Destiny: Towards the Reform and Arabization of Education (in Arabic), Kitab al-Alam Series, No. 3. 1967, pp. 177–231.
8 For an account of this incident see Zartman, I. W., Morocco: Problems of New Power, Atherton Press, 1964, pp. 79–82 Google Scholar
9 To what extent the king had encouraged Ou Bihi is a moot point. Al-Youssi was clearly involved in the revolt from his position in the Crown Council.
10 The party was aided by the fact that Ou Bihi’s leading defence lawyer was a high-ranking member of the Democratic Independence Party (PDI), the Istiqlal’s only organized rival.
11 Extensive coverage of the trial was provided almost daily by the Istiqlal’s Al-Alam, throughout January 1939.
12 For the decree and the list of those amnestied, see Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Information, Maroc-Documents, December 1963, pp. 105–8.
13 The ‘Union of the Throne and People’ is a slogan that was widely used by the Istiqlal Party prior to independence, particularly from 1953 to 1955 at the time of the exile of Muhammed V to the island of Madagascar. By means of this slogan, Muhammed V was portraycd as the symbol of Morocco’s lost sovereignty and the martyr of the nationalist movement. Once returned to independent Morocco and the throne, the king was able to use his new-found prestige to forego his hitherto intimate ties with the Istiqlal.
14 For accounts of the trial, see Poulsson, Erik T., ‘The Treason Trial in Morocco’, Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 18, 03 1964, pp. 26–37 Google Scholar; and ‘Le Complot contre le Roi’, Confluent, No. 41, May 1964, PP. 470–510.
15 From the point of view of King Hassan, the humiliation of the police in this manner may serve to remind its directors that they may not always act with impunity.
16 On 14 March, 12 of the accused were sentenced to death, 9 in absentia; 67 were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the rest were released.
17 Speech delivered on the ‘Id al-Kabir, 13 April 1965. For the text see, Kingdom of Morocco, Ministry of Information, Le Maroc en Marche, Rabat, 1965, PP. 497–8.
18 The judgement was handed down in a trial of salesmen of cooking oil and was published in Le Monde, 23 April 1960, cited by Zartman, I. W., Destiny of a Dynasty, University of South Carolina Press, 1964, n., pp. 34–5.Google Scholar
19 For the text of the speech and other relevant documents, see Un Procès d’Inquisition, Paris-Provence-Impression, 1960, 189 pp., citation from p. 168.
20 The official text of the judgement was supplied to me by the Supreme Court: ‘The Moroccan Communist Party vs. The State Prosecutor’, Rabat, 28 May 1964, handtyped, 4 pp.
21 For the king’s remarks, see Le Maroc en Marcbe, op. cit., p. 209; and for a resumé of the case, see ‘L’Affaire des Bahaistes’, COnfluent, December 1963, pp. 968–86.
22 Kingdom of Morocco, Supreme Court, ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Waryashi vs. the State Prosecutor’, judgement no. 300-S.-7 Rabat, 11 December 1963, handtyped, 2 pp.