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A Historical Institutionalist Approach to Political Party Organization: The Case of South Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Olli Hellmann
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Abstract

The existing literature on party organization is deeply divided over the question of how much freedom of choice decision-makers in a party enjoy in relation to their environment. Although the resulting theoretical deadlock seriously weakens our understanding of party formation and change, no attempt has been made to reconcile the different approaches. This article aims to do just that by offering a historical institutionalist perspective on party organization. Studying the development of political parties in South Korea, it argues that party organizations are best understood as strategic responses to electoral markets. Party organizations reproduce and change, as advantaged factions defend the status quo, while disadvantaged factions work towards organizational reform.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , 2011 , pp. 464 - 484
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2011.

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References

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