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Federalism and Opposition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

C. J. Friedrich
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Extract

In general discussions about opposition in democratic political systems, such as the thoughtful reflections of Robert A. Dahl, the role which federalism may play in providing an opposition with opportunities to oppose is often forgotten. This is curious, but perhaps in part at least the result of the fact that the institutionalization of opposition has gone farthest in Great Britain – a non-federal state. Yet in a sense to be further developed below, federalism may be looked upon as an alternative method for institutionalizing opposition – alternative that is to the British parliamentary system.

Type
Original Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , 01 April 1966 , pp. 286 - 296
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1966

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References

1 Cf. Dahl’s, R. A. paper in this journal, Vol. I, No. I, pp. 7–24 Google Scholar. Of the eight standards he outlines on page 7 as measuring rods for determining whether a particular system of opposition ‘maximizes’ the effective chances of realizing demo‐ cratic goals or values, six at least seem to suggest an afiirmative answer where federalism is concerned.

2 For a more detailed development of this theory, cf. Selected Trends and Issues in Contemporary Federal and Regional Relations, a study contributed by myself to the work of the US/Puerto Rico Status Commission, 1965, esp. part I. It is a further development of ‘New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice’, Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts, 1965.

3 It will be noted that this set of propositions follows with some rather significant variations, the statement in Dahl, loc. cit. It does not seem empirically sound to speak of ‘maximizing’ the phenomena cited, since it is unknown what the ‘maximum’ would be. On the subject of minimal and maximal solutions cf. my Man and His Government, 1963, pp. 663f. and passim.

4 Cf. for this vexed issue the several papers in Nomos, VII, ‘Rational decisions’, including my own paper on the historical dimension.

5 Cf. the studies published by the Commission cited above, fn. 2.

6 A special feature was the chance it offered the Nazis to naturalize Hitler; without that he could not have become chancellor.

7 This problem is, of course, not peculiar to federal regimes, but is ubiquitous in contemporary society. For the underlying theoretical and philosophical issues, cf. my Constirutiml Reason of State, 1957.

8 Riker, William H., Federalism, 1964, p. 151 Google Scholar. (Italics mine.) Cf. also p. 14: ‘But when national uniformity is worth more than confusion, then federalism is an impediment to freedom because it deprives the national majority of the chance to eliminate the excess costs of confusion.’ The author seems to be unaware that this argument is practically identical with one advanced by partisans of the one‐party state against the confusion and cost caused by opposition in general.

9 See for these countries the rich bibliographical material contained in Livingston, William S., Federalism in rhe Commonwealth, 1963, and Wheare, K.C., Federal Government, 1946, 1953 Google Scholar. For the Federal Republic, cf. especially Neunreither, Karl‐Heinz, Der Bundestag zwischen Politik und Verwaltung, 1959 Google Scholar.

10 Such a situation confronted the German federal government in 1965/16 with regard to the election in mineland‐Westphalia. A good deal of criticism is at times expressed in Germany over this ‘alienation’ of the Land elections, as Land issues are relegated to the background in favour of national concerns.

11 Cf. for this my study cited in fn. z above, and Studies in Federalism ed. Bowie and Friedrich, 1954, Study 2.

12 Neunreither, op. cit. pp. ssff. and 9zff. at least as far as the more technical and detailed aspects of controversial national legislation are concerned. In short, the involvement of a federal government in the politics of its component units is an inevitable result of the interweaving of the policies of the two levels, especially when the balance of the federal representative body is affected. At times such federal interference may, however, boomerang, especially where the sense of local pride and autonomy is strongly developed. Even so powerful a political leader as Franklin D. Roosevelt discovered, when he tried to interfere with the reelection of some conservative Southern senators who had opposed his policies, that his support crumbled and the men he had attacked were re‐elected with resounding majorities. (No similarly striking case has so far occurred in Germany; it might therefore be argued that local sentiment is less pronounced; it may be surmised, however, that an attempt on the part of Chancellor Ludwig Erhardt to influence the Bavarian electorate against Joseph Strauss, leader of the local party, would have produced similar results.)

13 For the ‘federalizer’ see the two studies cited above fn. 2.

14 The most authoritative treatment is found in Key, V. o. Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 4 ed. 1958.Google Scholar